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Abstract	
The	overall	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	corroborate	whether	the	Situation	Awareness	(SA)	of	
older	drivers	is	deficient	to	that	of	younger	driving	groups,	due	to	the	onset	of	age‐
related	cognitive	decrements.	This	is	important	to	ascertain	due	to	a	presumed	linkage	
between	the	concept	and	accident	causation.	In	addition,	the	research	undertaken	to	
date	to	investigate	this	linkage	has	exclusively	utilised	rather	artificial	driving	
simulators	and	simulations.	Thus	there	is	a	need	for	data	from	more	ecologically	valid	
methods.			
	
The	research	studies	reported	here	have	sought	to	preference	on‐road	assessments	(of	
different	complexity),	and	to	capture	what	information	was	selectively	perceived,	
comprehended	and	reacted	to;	rather	than,	as	in	previous	work,	what	was	recalled.					
	
To	achieve	this,	a	‘Think	aloud’	methodology	was	chosen	to	produce	narratives	of	a	
driver’s	thoughts.	This	method	was	advantageously	unobtrusiveness,	but	also	flexible	‐	
it	could	additionally	be	used	to	compare	an	individual’s	SA	to	a	driving	performance	
measure,	Hazard	Perception.		
		
The	driving‐based	studies	undertaken	found	that	for	a	relatively	non‐taxing	route,	an	
older	driver	group	could	produce	cohesive	awareness	in	parity	with	a	younger	driver	
group.	However,	the	concepts	from	which	that	awareness	was	based	upon	drew	more	
on	general,	direction	based,	concepts,	in	contrast	to	the	younger	group’s	focus	on	more	
specific,	action	based,	concepts,	and	rearward	and	safety‐related	cues.	For	a	more	
cognitively	taxing	route,	the	younger	group	produced	significantly	higher	(p<0.024)	
individual	SA‐related	scores	than	their	older	counterparts.	But	the	concepts/cues	both	
groups	relied	upon	remained	similar	‐	particularly	in	regards	to	the	ratio	of	those	
indicative	of	a	rearward	and/or	a	safety‐related	focus.	
	
In	a	video‐based	study,	however,	and	in	contrast,	the	older	driver	group’s	SA	scores	
improved	sufficient	to	outperform	a	younger	group,	but,	despite	this,	not	for	video‐
based	scores	indicative	of	Hazard	Perception	(HP).	In	this	latter	regard,	age‐related	
decrements	appeared	to	be	more	influential,	as	the	older	group	felt	they	were	under	
time	pressure	during	a	HP	test.	However,	the	difficulty	this	presented	appeared	to	
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advantageously	bring	more	attention	and	effort	to	the	task,	which	were	argued	as	
important	factors	for	the	uplift	in	their	SA	scoring.		
	
The	thesis	also	showed	that	older	groups’	judgement	of	the	actual	complexity	of	a	
driving	task	could	potentially	be	deficient	to	that	of	younger	driver	groups.	This	could	
cause	problems	as	incorrect	perceptions	could	deflate	the	relevance	and	cohesiveness	
of	information	being	processing.	In	contrast,	the	perceived	complexity	of	a	task	could	
bring	a	rise	or	fall	in	SA	score	for	both	groups.	
	
Such	results	raised	questions	as	to	the	impact	of	cognitive	decrements,	relative	to	task	
difficulty	and	related	effort	whilst	driving.	It	also	provided	evidence	that	Situation	
Awareness,	rather	than	being	uniformly	good	or	bad,	could,	like	any	other	psychological	
construct,	be	prone	to	change.	These	aspects	were	drawn	together	in	a	proposed	model	
of	driving	SA.	
	
Keywords	
Situation	Awareness;	Hazard	Perception;	Older	drivers;	‘Think	aloud’	method.	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
	
1.1.	Preamble	
This	thesis	centres	on	the	exploration	of	a	driver’s	Situation	Awareness	(SA).	A	term	
first	used	by	United	States	Air	Force	fighter	aircrew	after	conflicts	in	Korea	and	Vietnam	
(see	Watts,	2004).	They	identified	having	good	SA	as	the	decisive	factor	in	air	combat	
engagements	(Spick,	1988).	
	
Given	these	roots,	it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	the	study	of	Situation	Awareness	has	
traditionally	been	carried	out	within	aviation	contexts	(see	Stanton	et	al.,	2001).	
However,	it	can	be	a	vital	component	of	human	performance	across	a	range	of	socio‐
technical	domains,	and	became	of	interest	to	human	factors	expertise	in	the	1990’s.	
Today,	it	is	prevalent	in,	for	example:	power	plant	operations;	military	command	and	
control	(across	all	services);	emergency	services	‐	such	as	surgery	teams;	and	transport	
‐	including	more	individually	focussed	tasks	such	as	cycling,	or	driving	a	motor	vehicle.	
	
1.2.	What	factors	assist	good	SA	
We	tend	to	intrinsically	know	what	factors	might	assist	or	prevent	us	having	good	
Situation	Awareness	in	a	particular	environment,	though	perhaps	not	all.	To	begin	with,	
some	brief,	often	interrelated,	examples	are	given	below	that	give	a	flavour	for	the	range	
involved.	
	
a)	To	be	able	to	identify	crucial	or	critical	information	cues.	
Bellet	et	al.	(2009)	have	proposed	that	our	identification	of	crucial	cues,	that	inform	
good	Situation	Awareness,	are	dependent	upon	our	goals,	past	experiences,	and	the	
level	of	attention	that	we	have	available	for	processing	information.	The	identification	of	
such	cues	would	be	of	particular	importance	in,	for	example,	safety	systems,	such	as	Air	
Traffic	Control.		
	
b)	To	accurately	extract	relevant	information	during	times	of	information	overload.		
Related	to	(1.2.a)	above,	an	individual	can	often	be	confronted	with	excessive	amounts	
of	information,	and	may	not	be	able	to	accurately	process,	or	might	simply	miss,	its	
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important	aspects.	Thus,	if	an	individual	cannot	rapidly	and	accurately	extract	the	
information	s/he	needs,	then	errors	may	occur	which	may	cause	“lower	alertness	and	
situation	awareness”	(Yung‐Tsan	et	al.,	2011,	p.236).	
	
c)	Being	aware	of	fixation	errors.	
Brooker	(2008)	highlights	the	role	of	fixation	errors,	which	he	defines	as	“fixation	on	
some	precise	detail	or	aspect	that	prevents	an	objective	consideration	of	the	‘total	
situation’”	(p.1484)	‐	akin	to	the	expression	of	‘not	being	able	to	see	the	wood	for	the	
trees’	(Heywood,	1546/1874).	Thus	if	we	fixate,	we	have	poorer	Situation	Awareness.	
	
d)	Being	able	to	effectively	allocate	limited	attention	to	different	tasks	
Woods	et	al.	(2010)	argue	that	limited	attention	is	“especially	critical	when	examining	
human	performance	in	dynamic,	evolving	situations	where	practitioners	are	required	to	
shift	attention	in	order	to	manage	work	over	time”	(pp.114/5).	Our	limited	attention	
denies	us	an	opportunity	to	process	all	of	the	information	presented	to	us,	therefore	
how	we	allocate	it	will	determine	how	effectively	we	retain	Situation	Awareness.	An	
example	might	be	landing	an	aircraft,	and	needing	to	observe	the	approaching	runway	
whilst	checking	relevant	instrumentation.	
	
e)	Having	good	mental	representations.	
Stanton	et	al.	(2009)	(amongst	others)	have	argued	that	Situation	Awareness	is	about	
the	mapping	of	relevant	information	in	a	situation	onto	a	mental	representation	of	that	
information.	These	representations	have	been	argued	as	equating	to	networks	that	are	
said	to	have	a	structure	(e.g.	Anderson,	1983),	with	their	proficiency	dependent	on	the	
interconnection	between	the	elements	that	comprise	them.	These	networks	are	said	to	
also	inform	both	the	cues	that	we	take	from	an	environment	and	how	quickly	we	can	
process	and	comprehend	them,	both	of	which	impacting	on	our	Situation	Awareness.	
	
f)	Relevant	communication	
Fulton	et	al.	(2011)	suggest	that	communication	with	others	impacts	on	what	people	
observe	in	the	environment	around	them,	which	again	will	impact	on	the	quality	of	their	
Situation	Awareness.	
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These	examples	highlight	that	an	important	aspect	of	Situation	Awareness	is	our	
proficiency	in	processing	information,	as	we	cannot	process	all	that	is	available	to	us	(as	
suggested	by	e.g.	Bellet	et	al.,	2009).	As	a	result,	it	seems	that	sometimes	we	can	process	
too	little	information	(e.g.	Brooker,	2008)	or	conversely	attempt	to	process	excessively	
large	amounts	of	information	(e.g.	Yung‐Tsan	et	al.,	2011)	with	both	impacting	on	our	
quality	of	Situation	Awareness.		
	
1.3.	Definitions	
Although	we	seem	to	know	the	kinds	of	factors,	highlighted	above,	that	might	assist	or	
reduce	our	Situation	Awareness,	the	concept	itself	nevertheless	continues	to	defy	a	
single	definition.	The	most	cited	is	that	given	by	its	most	influential	researcher,	Mica	
Endsley:	“the	perception	of	elements	in	the	environment	within	a	volume	of	time	and	
space,	the	comprehension	of	their	meaning,	and	the	projection	of	their	status	in	the	near	
future”	(Endsley,	1988,	p.97).		
	
However,	many	other	definitions	have	been	suggested,	some	examples	of	which	are	
given	below	that	are	indicative	of	the	concept’s	relevance	for	a	wide	range	of	domains:	
 "accessibility	of	a	comprehensive	and	coherent	situation	representation	which	is	
continuously	being	updated	in	accordance	with	the	results	of	recurrent	situation	
assessments"	(Sarter	&	Woods,	1991,	p.52).	
 “The	knowledge	that	results	when	attention	is	allocated	to	a	zone	of	interest	at	a	
level	of	abstraction”	(Fracker,	1988b,	p.102).	
 "adaptive,	externally‐directed	consciousness	that	has	as	its	products	knowledge	
about	a	dynamic	task	environment	and	directed	action	within	that	environment"	
(Smith	&	Hancock,	1995,	p.145).	
 The	"aim	of	efficient	situation	awareness	is	to	keep	the	operator	tightly	coupled	
to	the	dynamics	of	the	environment"	(Moray,	2004,	p.4).	
 "the	ability	to	maintain	a	constant,	clear	mental	picture	of	relevant	information	
and	the	tactical	situation	including	friendly	and	threat	situations	as	well	as	
terrain"	(Dostal,	2007,	p.1).	
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 “an	intermediate	state	in	the	decision‐making	process	of	dynamic	systems	where	
one	should	be	able	to	comprehend	the	situation	in	order	to	make	an	appropriate	
decision	for	future	development”	(Artman	&	Garbis,	1998,	p.1).	
	
These	definitions	can	perhaps	be	encapsulated	by	simply	suggesting	that	Situation	
Awareness	is	an	individual’s	ability	to	know	what	is	going	on	around	him/her,	sufficient	
to	allow	effective	operation	within	an	environment.	However,	not	having	a	single	
definition,	or	even	a	poorly	defined	one,	is	not	uncommon	or	necessarily	a	detriment	for	
psychological	concepts.		Pew	(2000)	gives,	intelligence,	vigilance,	attention,	fatigue,	
stress,	and	workload,	as	related	examples,	and	argues	that	despite	them	being	poorly	
defined,	they	each	have	brought	beneficial	attention	to	critical	processes	or	mental	
states	that	were	previously	unknown. 
	
1.4.	Situation	Awareness	and	driving	
Situation	Awareness	has	relevance	for	driving	as	it	enables	us	to	explain	how	drivers	
can	combine	long‐term	goals	(such	as	reaching	a	destination)	with	short‐term	goals	
(such	as	slowing	down	for	a	junction)	as	they	drive	(e.g.	Sukthankar,	1997).	It	also	
explains	how	we	employ	a	range	of	cognitive	processes	in	driving	contexts,	to	recognise	
and	comprehend	meaningful	events	(e.g.,	a	roundabout	is	approaching,	so	traffic	may	
appear	from	the	right),	and	that	as	the	number	of	these	events	increase,	that	this	could	
bring	about	an	overload	of	information.	As	was	mentioned	above	(in	1.2.b.),	how	we	
deal	with	such	excesses	of	information	will	impact	on	the	quality	of	our	Situation	
Awareness,	and	as	Woods	et	al.	(2010)	(1.2.d.)	have	argued,	this	is	particularly	crucial	in	
regards	to	how	our	attention	is	distributed.	In	driving	this	relates	to	both	individual	
tasks	(e.g.,	what	to	concentrate	on	whilst	driving);	and	across	tasks	(e.g.,	when	driving	
and	interacting	with	in‐car	technologies).		
	
SA	in	driving	also	involves	both	temporal	and	spatial	components.	The	tempo	of	an	
individual’s	driving	will	be	dependent	on	his/her	actions,	the	task	characteristics,	and	
the	environment.	As	new	inputs	enter	the	system,	s/he	will	incorporate	them	into	their	
relevant	mental	representations	that	might	then	require	changes	in	plans	and	actions	to	
achieve	a	desired	goal.	For	example,	slowing	down	to	avoid	a	collision.	The	spatial	
component	relates	to	knowledge	of	locations	and	events,	such	as	the	vehicle’s	current	
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position	in	relation	to	its	destination,	the	relative	positions	and	behaviour	of	other	
vehicles	and	hazards,	and	also	how	these	critical	variables	are	likely	to	change	in	the	
near	future	(Sukthankar,	1997).	
	
Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	a	lack	of,	or	inadequate	levels,	of	Situation	Awareness	are	said	
to	constitute	a	primary	factor	in	accidents	attributed	to	human	error (Hartel,	Smith,	&	
Prince,	1991;	Merket,	Bergondy,	&	Cuevas‐Mesa,	1997;	Nullmeyer	et	al.,	2005).	Indeed,	
Gugerty	(1998)	points	out	that	“errors	in	maintaining	situation	awareness	are	the	most	
frequent	cause	of	errors	in	real‐time	tasks	such	as	driving”	(p.498)	and	that	poor	SA	can	
be	attributed	to	more	accidents	than	improper	speed	or	technique.	
	
As	will	be	seen	in	the	following	chapters,	there	can	be	much	debate	on	the	internal	
processes	underlying	the	acquisition	of	SA,	and	the	ways	drivers	utilise	it.	However,	
there	is	agreement	that	the	major	source	of	SA	errors	alluded	to	above	appear	to	reside	
at	the	information	‘content’	level	of	analysis	(e.g.	Jones	&	Endsley,	1996).	This	is	also	the	
level	at	which	SA	is	most	amenable	to	measurement,	and	it	provides	a	precursor	in	this	
thesis	for	finding	a	method	to	measure	the	concept	in	a	range	of	driving	environments.			
	
1.5.	Situation	Awareness	and	driver	age	
The	measurement	of	an	individual’s	or	a	group’s	Situation	Awareness	is	of	value,	as	if	it	
is	in	some	way	deficient	and	the	basis	of	that	deficiency	can	be	found,	then	we	may	be	
able	to	suggest	improvements.	At	this	time,	the	performance	of	older	drivers,	for	
example,	has	become	increasingly	scrutinised	due	to	the	rapid	expansion	of	this	driver	
group,	and	our	awareness	of	age‐related	cognitive,	perceptual	and	physical	declines.	
Research	suggests	that	these	could	impinge	on	an	older	driver’s	performance	and	
therefore	road	safety,	examples	include	slower	motor	responses	(Rinalducci,	Smither,	&	
Bowers,	1993)	and	poorer	judgement	of	gaps	(Darzentas,	McDowell,	&	Cooper,	1980).			
	
In	fact,	relevant	research	in	the	literature	is	generally	rather	negative	in	regards	to	older	
drivers.	For	example:	Albert	&	Kaplan	(1980),	have	demonstrated	inabilities	in	
focussing	on	more	than	one	source	of	information	at	one	time;	Ponds,	Brouwer,	&	Van	
Wolffelaar	(1988),	a	neglect,	or	insufficient	attention	to,	relevant	information	from	road	
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signs	and	from	other	cars	and	pedestrians;	and	Rabbitt	(1965),	a	greater	susceptibility	
to	distraction	by	irrelevant	information.		
	
Situation	Awareness	is	of	relevance	to	these	perceived	declinations,	as	most	relate	to	an	
individual’s	proficiency	in	processing	information.	Therefore,	an	evaluation	based	
around	the	concepts	that	are	informative	to	older	drivers	could	provide	some	important	
evidence	as	to	whether	this	driver	group	does	indeed	present	a	potential	danger	to	
other	road	users,	as	the	studies	reported	above	suggest.				
	
1.6.	Aims	and	scope	
The	overall	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	provide	a	view	as	to	the	performance	of	older	drivers’	
Situation	Awareness,	and	to	compare	it	to	drivers	within	far	younger	age	groupings.	
What	threshold	is	taken	for	a	driver	to	be	classed	as	‘older’	appears	to	depend	on	what	
point	the	researcher	feels	a	driver	might	experience	the	onset	of	age‐related	cognitive	
declines	(and	perhaps	the	number	of	age‐group	s/he	is	assessing).	So	the	age	chosen	
can	be	as	low	as	56	(Ho	et	al.,	2001);	more	usually	65	(Kaber	et	al.,	2012/Zhang	et	al.,	
2009;	Bolstad,	2001),	or	even	sub‐divided	to	include	groups	over	75	(Horswill	et	al.,	
2009).	Each	of	the	thresholds	have	been	found	to	demonstrate	age‐related	deficiencies.	
For	example,	hazard	perception	response	latencies	have	been	found	amongst	drivers	
over	55	(Quimby	&	Watts,	1981);	a	worsening	of	an	awareness	of	hazards	has	been	
found	for	over	65’s	(e.g.	Renge	et	al.,	2005),	and	that	this	declines	further	after	75	
(Horswill	et	al.,	2009).		
	
It	was	decided,	when	looking	to	recruit	participants	for	this	series	of	studies,	to	take	a	
pragmatic	approach	and	to	set	the	age	threshold	for	the	older	groups	at	60	years,	but	to	
always	give	a	preference	to	the	oldest	of	those	who	volunteered.	This	would	
advantageously	maximise	the	scope	to	recruit	sufficient	numbers,	be	at	an	age	that	also	
had	justification	in	the	literature	(e.g.	Underwood	et	al.,	2005;	Bolstad,	1996),	and	align	
with	that	which	many	organisations	first	considered	a	person	to	be	‘old’:	such	as	the	
Royal	Society	for	the	Protection	of	Accidents	(ROSPA),	Age	UK,	and	the	United	Nations.		
	
The	Situation	Awareness	of	such	participants	would	be	assessed,	both	quantitatively	
and	qualitatively,	through	a	methodology	capable	of	providing	in‐depth	age‐group	
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comparisons.	As	most	Situation	Awareness	research	in	the	driving	domain,	and	all	in	
regards	to	older	drivers,	has	been	undertaken	with	the	assistance	of	simulators	‐	from	
rudimentary	p.c.’s	with	no	kinetic	element,	to	more	sophisticated	car	mock‐ups	–	an	aim	
was	to	collect	data	through	more	ecologically	valid	methods.	To	achieve	a	
comprehensive	assessment	of	both	an	individual’s	and	a	group’s	Situation	Awareness,	a	
‘Think	aloud’	methodology	would	be	used	for	all	three	studies.	This	was	an	
advantageously	safe,	simple,	and	unobtrusive	approach	for	capturing	the	thoughts	of	
the	participants	as	they	encountered	differing	driving	environments.		
	
The	scope	of	the	work	was	anchored	around	the	principal	aim	of	assessing	the	Situation	
Awareness	of	older	participants.	It	began	by	considering	cognitively	non‐taxing	driving	
environments:	firstly,	when	driven	(Study	1);	and	then,	secondly,	when	viewed	on	video	
(Study	2).	The	emphasis	then	shifted	towards	more	cognitively	taxing	environments:	
with	a	measure	now	firstly	being	taken	from	video	footage	(Study	2);	and	then	from	a	
final	return	to	actual	roadways	(Study	3).	The	thesis	did	not	and	could	not	(on	
epistemological	grounds)	extend	to	any	quantification	of	age‐related	cognitive	
decrements	amongst	the	older	groups	that	it	evaluated.	Neither	did	it	seek	or	make	
judgements	as	to	an	individual’s	driving	capability	when	on	actual	roadways.	This	was,	
for	reassurance,	always	made	clear	to	a	participant	prior	to	driving	a	route.	The	only	
measure,	related	to	driving	proficiency,	that	was	sought,	was	an	exploration	of	Hazard	
Perception	in	Study	2.	This	was	an	opportunistic	assessment	to	see	whether	better	
Situation	Awareness	could	assist	Hazard	Perception.	Such	an	assessment	was	
considered	of	value,	as,	if	any	correlation	was	found,	this	could	indicate	a	potential	for	
improving	proficiency	in	the	latter	through	SA	training.		
	
The	following	Aspects	(labelled	AP1	&	AP2)	and	Research	Questions	(labelled	RQ1,	RQ2,	
&	RQ3)	were	addressed	within	the	thesis:	
	
AP1:	What	theoretical	perspective	and	method	would	be	the	most	useful	for	
evaluating	Situation	Awareness	in	driving	contexts?	
 Research	methods	(Chapter	3)	
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RQ1:	Is	Situation	Awareness	worse	amongst	older	(than	younger)	drivers	in	
cognitively	non‐taxing	driving	conditions?	
 Study	1	(Chapter	4)	
 Study	2	(Chapter	6)	
	
RQ2:	Does	Situation	Awareness	proficiency	assist	in	the	detection	of	roadway	
hazards?	
 Study	2	(Chapter	6)	
	
RQ3:	Is	Situation	Awareness	worse	amongst	older	(than	younger)	drivers	in	more	
cognitively	taxing	driving	conditions?	
 Study	2	(Chapter	6)	
 Study	3	(Chapter	7)	
	
AP2:	What	conclusions	can	be	made	in	regards	to	older	driver	SA?	Could	it	be	
improved	and	how?	
 Overview	and	synthesis	(Chapter	8)	
	
	
1.7.	Chapter	summaries	and	the	structure	of	the	thesis	
This	chapter,	Chapter	1,	introduced	Situation	Awareness	as	a	topic.	It	highlighted	that	
although	we	may	instinctively	know	the	kinds	of	information	that	might	inform	it,	a	
single,	encapsulating,	definition	has	proved	hard	to	achieve.	The	concept	was	then	
considered	in	relation	to	driving	and	driver	age,	and	proposed	as	a	lens	through	which	
older	driver	information	processing	proficiency	could	be	revealed.	The	chapter	
concluded	by	outlining	the	scope	of	the	thesis,	its	aims	and	objectives,	the	Aspects	and	
Research	Questions	that	were	tackled,	and	its	structure.	
	
Chapter	2	is	a	literature	review	that	has	two	parts.	The	first	of	which	looks	at	the	
general	concerns	that	an	increasing	older	driver	population	raise,	but	also	how	any	
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related	risks	might	be	mitigated.	The	second	part	looks	at	the	relevance	of	Situation	
Awareness	for	driving,	and	how	age‐related	cognitive	declines	might	impact	upon	its	
proficiency:	again	mediating	facts	are	discussed.	Finally,	consideration	is	given	to	older	
driver	Situation	Awareness	and	driving	performance,	where,	as	yet,	no	negative	
correlation	has	been	found.			
	
Chapter	3	(Aspect	1)	focuses	on	research	methods.	It	outlines	the	two	main	and	
competing	approaches	for	explaining	SA:	one	based	on	the	individual,	the	other	taking	a	
wider	environmental,	or	systematic,	view.	Various	methods	are	then	discussed	that,	in	
general,	are	related	to	either	of	these	two	approaches	(though	mainly	to	the	former).	
The	merits	of	both	approaches	are	then	compared	and	discussed,	with	a	justification	
then	made	for	a	systematic‐based	evaluation	for	the	studies	that	are	to	be	undertaken.	
The	‘Think	aloud’	method,	that	is	utilised	for	all	three	studies	in	the	series,	is	then	
introduced	and	explained.	The	chapter	concludes	by	outlining	how	captured	narratives	
would	be	assessed	through	computer	software	that	is	capable	of	displaying	their	main	
concepts	visually	as	networks,	and	able	to	quantify	both	their	overall	cohesiveness	and	
the	strength	of	the	concept	interrelations	within	them.	
	
Chapter	4	(Research	Question	1)	reports	the	first	empirical	study	that	considers	the	
Situation	Awareness	proficiency	of	two	driver	groups	based	on	age.	This	is	assessed	fom	
having	participants	drive	their	own	cars	around	a	cognitively	non‐taxing	route,	whilst	
contemporaneously,	they	provide	a	commentary	on	what	they	feel	is	of	driving	
relevance.	It	was	later	found	that	when	assessed	at	the	group	level	that	the	younger	
driver’s	commentaries,	or	narratives,	were	more	cohesive,	and	thereby	demonstrated	
better	Situation	Awareness.	However,	when	they	were	scored	individually,	and	then	
averaged	for	each	group,	that	these	SA	‘scores’	were	then	remarkably	similar.	There	
were,	though,	indications	of	more	depth	in	information	processing	by	the	younger	
participants:	these	included	the	enunciation	of	more	safety‐related	cues,	and	words	
indicative	of	a	rearward	awareness.		
	
Chapter	5	is	a	brief	literature	review	chapter	that	introduces	the	concept	of	Hazard	
Perception	(HP),	how	it	relates	to	SA	and	older	drivers,	and	the	usefulness	of	the	
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method	presently	used	to	measure	it	in	the	UK	Driving	Test.	The	detection	of	hazards	
was	to	be	measured	in	the	following	chapter	(Study	2).		
	
Chapter	6	(Research	Questions	1,	2,	&	3).	This	chapter	reports	the	second	empirical	
study	in	the	series	that	assesses	an	older	and	a	younger	participant	group’s	Situation	
Awareness	and	Hazard	Perception	through	the	commentaries	they	gave	for	segments	of,	
or	longer,	journeys,	that	were	shown	on	video	footage.	The	Situation	Awareness	scores	
subsequently	calculated	were	found	to	be	better	for	the	older	participants;	whereas	
those	indicative	of	Hazard	Perception	ability,	better	for	the	younger	participants.	
Although	no	general	SA	to	HP	relationship	was	found	when	all	the	participant	scores	
were	considered	together,	a	strong	statistically	significant	relationship	was	revealed	for	
the	younger	driver	group.	It	was	also	evident	that	there	were	differences	between	the	
two	groups	in	regards	to	the	perceived	difficulty	of	undertaking	the	study’s	video	tasks,	
in	comparison	to	the	actual	driving	task	undertaken	for	Study	1.	
	
Chapter	7	(Research	Question	3)	reports	the	third	empirical	study	that	once	again	
considered	the	Situation	Awareness	proficiency	of	an	older	and	a	younger	participant	
group.	This	was	again	assessed	by	having	participants	drive	their	own	cars,	though	on	
this	occasion	they	would	traverse	a	quantifiably	more	cognitively	taxing	route.	It	later	
was	found	that	when	assessed	at	both	the	group	and	individual	levels	that	the	younger	
drivers	demonstrated	the	better	Situation	Awareness.	There	were,	though,	again	
indications	of	more	depth	in	information	processing	by	the	younger	participants:	these	
included	similar	ratios	to	Study	1	in	regards	to	the	detection	of	safety‐related	cues,	and	
of	what	was	occurring	behind	their	vehicles.		
	
Chapter	8	(Aspect	2)	summarises	and	brings	together	the	main	findings	from	the	thesis	
structured	around	its	Aspects	and	Research	Questions,	and	considers	how	the	Situation	
Awareness	of	older	drivers	might	be	improved.	
	
The	thesis	concludes	in	Chapter	9.	This	states	what	were	felt	to	be	its	most	important	
contributions	to	the	literature,	its	notable	limitations,	and	the	potential	future	work	that	
has	emerged.	
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The	structure	of	the	thesis	is	shown	in	a	graphic	below	(Figure	1.1).	This	indicates	the	
relationship	between	the	Aspects	and	Research	Questions	posed,	the	existing	
knowledge,	and	that	contributed	by	the	thesis. 
	
Figure	1.1.	The	structure	of	the	thesis
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Chapter	2:	Situation	Awareness	literature	review		
	
2.1.	Issues	relating	to	older	driver	performance,	and	the	contribution	of	
Situation	Awareness		
2.1.1.	Why	is	the	Situation	Awareness	of	older	drivers	worthy	of	measurement?	
In	today’s	UK	society,	increasingly	larger	towns	have	often	made	amenities	more	distant	
and	less	accessible	through	public	transport	–	impacting	on	older	people.	Additionally,	
families	have	become	more	dispersed,	and	less	able	to	provide	immediate	help	for	older	
relatives	than	in	previous	generations.	Older	citizens	are	therefore	reluctant	to	give	up	
driving	(Eby	et	al.,	2003;	Burkhardt	&	McGavock,	1999),	and	when	they	do,	it	has	been	
found	that	this	can	lead	to	a	variety	of	negative	psychological	outcomes:	such	as	regret;	
a	lower	sense	of	self‐worth;	and	feelings	of	social	isolation	(Rudman	et	al.,	2006;	
Johnson,	1995).	In	fact,	it	is	said	that	even	the	prospect	of	giving	up	driving	can	lead	to	
considerable	depression	and	depressive	feelings	(Marottoli	et	al.,	1997).	It	therefore	
must	be	beneficial	to	try	to	keep	older	people	driving	for	as	long	as	possible,	and	
increasing	their	Situation	Awareness	could	assist	in	that	aim.			
	
A	related	issue,	that	would	help	to	facilitate	this	aspiration,	is	the	need	to	assess	
whether,	for	example,	mandatory	re‐testing	schemes	that	are	used	in	many	countries	
for	drivers	above	a	specified	‘risk‐related’	age,	are,	in	fact,	necessary.	We	know	there	is	
research	that,	using	actual	crash	involvement	rates,	suggests	these	“have	no	
demonstrable	road	safety	benefits	overall”	(Langford	et	al.,	2004,	p.326).	Also,	that	there	
is	a	bias	in	the	accident	data	that	informs	this	testing.	For	example,	the	exaggeration	of	
the	risk	for	low	mileage	(mainly	older)	drivers	(Staplin,	Gish,	&	Joyce,	2008),	when	in	
fact	an	increasing	number	of	licensed	older	drivers	(>60	years)	relates	more	to	
significant	negative	effects	on	crash	fatality	rates	(e.g.	Tay,	2006).		
	
Much	of	the	debate	as	to	the	proficiency,	or	otherwise,	of	older	drivers	is	due	to	the	fact	
that	there	is	not,	as	yet,	an	assessment	method	capable	of	accurately	identifying	
accident	risk.	The	relatively	new	measures	of	Situation	Awareness	that	are	employed	in	
this	thesis	also	cannot	provide	a	full	picture	in	this	regard,	but	they	certainly	can	make	a	
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contribution	as	to	whether	an	individual	shows	information	processing	deficiencies	
likely	to	increase	accident	risk.	
	
Additionally,	the	Situation	Awareness	assessments	of	the	kind	undertaken	in	this	work	
potentially	may	improve	the	cognition	of	older	adults,	as	they	provide	a	framework	to	
highlight	where	their	awareness	may	have,	for	example,	been	negatively	affected	by	
new	technology	or	particular	driving	environments.	They	could	also,	in	turn,	inform	
training	programs	that	could,	for	example,	focus	on	expanding	an	older	adult’s	view	of	
his/her	surroundings,	and/or	alert	him/her	to	a	narrowing	of	attention.	Aspects	that	
could	be	very	beneficial	both	to	the	older	driver	him/herself,	and	for	the	safety	of	
others.		
	
Indeed,	training	interventions	that	have	focussed	on	informational	cues	have	
significantly	improved	an	older	drivers’	cognitive	abilities	‐	such	as	processing	speed,	
reasoning,	and	memory	(e.g.	Ball	et	al.,	2002;	Salthouse,	1985).	Additionally,	training	
programmes	that	have	facilitated	the	development	of	anticipatory	schema	in	regard	to	
other	road	users,	have	been	found	to	enhance	road	user	Situation	Awareness	and	to	
increase	driving	performance	(Walker	et	al.,	2009).	Finally,	training	strategies	that	aim	
to	enhance	Situation	Awareness	by	improving	an	older	driver’s	perception,	may	also	
improve,	as	a	result,	his/her	comprehension	of	an	environment.	This	is	because	it	could	
facilitate	a	change	in	situational	processing	from	a	conscious	to	an	unconscious,	
automatic	state,	enabling	the	driver	to	better	project	appropriate	actions.	In	this	regard	
we	have	seen,	for	example,	that	Hazard	Perception	ability	can	be	improved	by	learner‐
generated	and/or	expert	commentaries	while	viewing	driving	scenarios,	or	from	the	
identification	of	high	risk	locations	(Pollatsek	et	al.,	2006).		
	
2.1.2.	The	relevance	of	Situation	Awareness	for	driving	
As	was	seen	in	the	previous	Chapter,	the	most	widely	used	definition	of	Situation	
Awareness	(SA)	is	“the	perception	of	elements	in	the	environment	within	a	volume	of	
time	and	space,	the	comprehension	of	their	meaning,	and	the	projection	of	their	status	
in	the	near	future”	(Endsley,	1988,	p.97).	This	was	encapsulated	as	an	ability	to	know	
what	is	going	on	around	you,	and	to	be	able	to	provide	an	understanding	of	the	
environment	that	you	operate	within.	
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Although	the	assessment	of	Situation	Awareness	has	had	a	traditional	focus	within	the	
aviation	domain,	it	is	a	relevant	component	of	human	performance	in	any	socio‐
technical	environment,	including	driving.	It	has	been	argued	that	it	enables	us	to	explain	
how	drivers	can	combine	long‐term	goals	(such	as	reaching	a	destination)	with	short‐
term	goals	(such	as	avoiding	collisions	with	other	vehicles)	as	they	drive	(e.g.	
Sukthankar,	1997).	These	goals	are	undertaken	within	continuously	and	often	rapidly	
changing	environments	where	a	driver	must	keep	track	of	a	number	of	critical	
variables:	such	as	the	route;	his/her	own	and	another’s	position	and	speed;	and	the	
road	and	weather	conditions.	This	information	then	being	used	to	anticipate	and	react	
to	changes	and	events	in	an	environment,	to	avoid	conflicts	with	objects	and	other	road	
users	(Gugerty,	2011).	
	
To	achieve	this,	the	driver	will	employ	a	range	of	cognitive	processes	demonstrative	of	
Situation	Awareness,	including:	perception	and	pattern	recognition	(Kass	et	al.,	1991);	
attention	allocation	(within	and	across	tasks)	and	comprehension	(Kass	et	al.,	2007;	
Wickens	&	Hollands,	2000);	and	decision‐making	(Endsley,	1995b;	Ma	&	Kaber,	2005).	
As	such,	Gugerty	(1998)	argues	that	“errors	in	maintaining	situation	awareness	are	the	
most	frequent	cause	of	errors	in	real‐time	tasks	such	as	driving”	(p.498),	and	that	poor	
SA	can	be	attributed	to	more	accidents	than	improper	speed	or	technique.	
	
The	review	that	follows	will	consider	the	Situation	Awareness	of	a	particular	group	of	
drivers,	those	over	60	years	of	age,	who	are	classed	by	the	UK	Royal	Society	for	the	
Prevention	of	Accidents	(ROSPA)	as	‘older	drivers’.	This	group	has	been	chosen	as	the	
principle	one	to	assess,	as	due	to	the	relevance	of	cognitive	deficits	for	driving,	alluded	
to	above,	much	research	has	been	undertaken	into	this	group’s	driving	proficiency.		
	
This	review	will	begin	by	outlining	the	evidence	in	relation	to	older	driver	performance	
and	risk,	and	then	consider	the	mediating	factors	to	the	concerns	that	were	raised.	In	its	
second	part,	the	discussion	will	then	turn	to	Situation	Awareness	based	investigations	
of	driving	and	age,	how	age‐related	cognitive	declines	might	affect	it,	and	how	these	too	
might	again	be	mediated.	Consideration	will	then	be	given	to	the	evidence	for	older	
drivers	actually	having	poorer	SA,	and	how	that	might	relate	to	driving	performance.	
Finally,	a	reasoning	and	an	approach	will	be	given	for	the	work	that	follows.		
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2.2.	The	evidence	in	relation	to	older	driver	performance	and	risk	
2.2.1	The	basis	of	a	potential	problem	
2.2.1.1.	A	rising	older	driver	population	
With	continuing	advances	in	health	and	medicine,	people	are	generally	living	longer.	
The	Organisation	for	Economic	and	Co‐operation	Development	(OECD)	forecast	that	by	
2030	one	quarter	of	the	population	of	their	member	nations	will	be	over	65	years	old	
(Organisation	for	Economic	Co‐operation	and	Development,	2001).	The	World	Health	
Organisation	(WHO)	further	expect	the	number	of	people	aged	65	or	older	to	grow,	
from	an	estimated	524	million	in	2010	to	nearly	1.5	billion	by	2050,	with	most	of	the	
increase	in	developing	countries	(National	Institute	on	Aging	Report	for	the	World	
Health	Organization,	2011).	In	the	UK	it	is	estimated	that	by	the	year	2031	almost	23%	
of	our	population	will	be	over	60	(Office	for	National	Statistics,	2010).	
	
As	the	population	in	the	developed	world	is	aging,	so	the	number	of	older	drivers	is	
rapidly	expanding.	In	the	UK	it	has	been	estimated	that	today	some	4.5	million	people	
aged	over	70	hold	a	current	driving	licence	(Noble,	2000).	The	Driver	and	Vehicle	
Licensing	Agency	(DVLA)	has	estimated	that	whereas	amongst	80‐89	year	olds	in	1993,	
44%	of	men	and	11%	of	women	held	a	current	driving	licence,	by	2020	the	figures	for	
this	age	group	will	rise	to	around	65%	and	35%	respectively	(Department	for	
Transport,	2004).	In	fact,	older	drivers	represent	the	fastest	growing	group	in	the	UK	
driving	population	(e.g.	Burkhardt	&	McGavock,	1999;	Lyman	et	al.,	2002).	This	is	
principally	because	older	drivers	are	continuing	to	drive	into	later	years,	and	with	an	
increasing	number	of	females	entering	the	older	driver	population,	this	trend	is	
expected	to	rise	(Department	for	Transport,	2004).	
	
2.2.1.2.	Lifestyle	
Much	of	the	reason	behind	this	increase	lies	in	the	fact	that	many	elderly	people	view	
driving	as	an	important	social	and	‘self‐care’	facility	(Chipman	et	al.,	1998;	Department	
for	Transport,	2004;	Oxley	&	Whelan,	2008).	As	alluded	to	above	(2.1.1.),	as	
communities	have	become	more	dispersed	and	regional	infrastructures	have	
increasingly	made	transport	use	a	necessity,	older	drivers	are	becoming	increasingly	
reliant	on	driving	to	compensate	for	physical	frailties	and	disabilities	that	impede	their	
mobility	(Bendixen,	Mann,	&	Tomita,	2005;	Cannon,	Hendrickson,	&	Mann,	2005).	
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2.2.2.	What	are	the	concerns	related	to	this	increase	in	older	drivers?	
It	has	been	predicted	that	road	traffic	accidents	will	be	the	sixth	most	prevalent	cause	of	
global	deaths	by	the	year	2020	(Jacobs,	Aeron‐Thomas,	&	Astrop,	2000).	As	the	
proportion	of	older	people	in	society	and	their	propensity	to	continue	driving	increases,	
this	demographic	change	has	been	a	cause	of	concern	due	to	established	age‐related	
declines	in	perceptual	and	cognitive	abilities	(e.g.	Birren	&	Schaie,	2006;	Salthouse,	
2010).		
	
There	are	three	main	arguments	here,	that:	
a)	There	are	a	range	of	age‐related	physiological	changes	that	may	negatively	affect	
driving	ability,	namely:	declines	in	vision;	hearing;	reaction	time;	and	the	
musculoskeletal	system.	
	
b)	Police	reports	and	insurance	data	show	older	drivers	are	more	likely	to	be	
considered	responsible	for	the	accidents	in	which	they	are	involved	(Langford	et	al.,	
2006),	and	that	they	tend	to	involve	multiple	vehicles	and	more	serious	injuries	
(Department	for	Transport,	2004).		
	
c)	Older	individuals	are	more	likely	to	suffer	serious	injury	and	are	at	more	frequent	
risk	of	being	a	fatality	as	a	result	of	an	accident	‐	in	the	region	of	2‐5	times	more	than	
that	of	a	younger	person	‐	due	to	their	physical	frailty	(Department	for	Transport,	
2004).	They	are	also	likely	to	take	far	longer	to	recover	from	their	injuries,	in	
comparison	to	younger	accident	victims	(see	Platts‐Mills	et	al.,	2015).	
	
These	arguments	are	now	considered	in	further	detail,	but	at	this	point	it	might	be	
useful	to	reiterate	that	the	age	used	in	this	research	as	a	threshold	for	being	considered	
as	an	older	driver	will	be	60	years.	The	UK	Royal	Society	for	the	Prevention	of	Accidents	
(ROSPA)	states	that	“older	drivers	are	defined	as	drivers	over	the	age	of	60	years.	
Although	they	“do	not	form	a	homogenous	group	as	wide	variations	in	their	
characteristics	and	driving	abilities	exist	within	this	general	category”.		(ROSPA	policy	
paper,	2010,	p.7)	
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2.2.2.1.	Age‐related	physiological	changes	
As	people	age,	they	tend	to	have	to	cope	with	decrements	to	a	number	of	physiological	
functions.	The	examples	of	visual,	auditory,	and	cognitive	declines	are	discussed	below.	
Such	decrements	have	been	found	to	affect	basic	driving	skills	and	manoeuvres:	such	as	
speed	control,	tracking,	positioning,	and	reversing	(Brendemuhl,	Schmidt,	&	Schenk,	
1988;	Brainin,	1980);	turning	to	look	out	of	the	rear	window	(Herriots,	2005);	and	
coping	with	visual	displays	and	technological	functions	(Shaheen	&	Niemeier,	2001),	
which	are	likely	to	contribute	to	an	increased	risk	of	accident	involvement.	
	
Visual	
It	appears	that	visual	attention	and	search	efficiency	declines	with	age	in	regard	to	what	
is	termed	‘bottom‐up’	processing	(Madden,	2007).	This	relates	to	our	more	micro	
scanning	activities,	such	as	finding	our	vehicle’s	actual	speed	on	a	display	(as	opposed	
to	more	macro,	‘top‐down’	processing,	such	as	looking	briefly	at	the	position	of	an	
indicator).		
	
In	addition,	it	has	been	suggested	that	for	every	decade	after	the	age	of	25,	a	driver	may	
need	twice	the	brightness	at	night	to	receive	visual	information.	On	this	basis,	drivers	
reaching	75	years	may	require	32	times	the	brightness	that	they	did	when	they	were	25	
years	old	(Department	for	Transport,	2004).	This	may	equate,	at	night,	to	older	drivers	
needing	to	be	as	much	as	23	to	35%	closer	to	road	signs	in	order	to	accurately	interpret	
them	(Sivak,	Olson,	&	Pastalan,	1981;	Sivak	&	Olson,	1982).	
	
The	loss	of	visual	field	–	defined	as	“the	extent	of	visual	space	over	which	vision	is	
possible	with	the	eyes	held	in	a	fixed	position”	(Sekuler	&	Blake,	1985,	p.499)	is	also	
most	severe	amongst	older	drivers	(over	65),	and	relates	to	a	far	higher	risk	of	collision	
when	compared	to	normally	sighted	people	(e.g.	Johnson	&	Keltner,	1983;	Szlyk	et	al.,	
1992).		
	
Research	on	the	‘useful	field	of	view’	(UFOV)	–	defined	as	“the	total	visual	field	area	
from	which	target	characteristics	can	be	acquired	when	eye	and	head	movements	are	
precluded”	(Kline	&	Scialfa,	1997,	p.37)	has	also	found	age‐related	decrements	(e.g.	Ball	
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et	al.,	1988)	and	has	been	able	to	show	an	association	with	poor	driving	performance	
(Clay	et	al.,	2005)	and	actual	crash	frequency	(Ball	&	Owsley,	1991).		
	
Age	also	often	leads	to	decrements	in	contrast	sensitivity	‐	the	visual	ability	to	see	
objects	that	may	not	be	outlined	clearly	or	that	do	not	stand	out	from	their	background.	
This	makes	the	older	driver	more	sensitive	to	glare,	and	more	vulnerable	to	its	disabling	
effects	(Mortimer,	1989;	Schieber,	1994).	This	is	particularly	evident	on	roads	where	
there	is	no	distinct	separation	from	oncoming	vehicles	(e.g.	Staplin	et	al.,	1988).	
	
Auditory		
Although	research	has	not,	as	yet,	directly	associated	injury‐related	crashes	with	
impaired	hearing,	driving	while	using	hearing	aids	does	appear	to	increase	this	risk	by	
about	two	times	due	to	them	giving	feedback	and	distracting	reaction	noise	(McCloskey	
et	al.,	1994).		
	
Cognitive		
In	relation	to	crash	involvement,	studies	of	older	drivers	have	found	a	pattern	of	
cognitive	deficits	relating	to	visual,	perceptual,	and	motor	functioning	(e.g.	Lundberg	et	
al.,	1998).	These	are	often	related	to	age‐related	declines	in,	for	example,	fluid	abilities	
(Horn	&	Cattell,	1967)	that	bring	reductions	in:	processing	resource	capacity	and	
processing	speed	(Salthouse,	1991);	deficiencies	in	inhibitory	processing	(Hasher	&	
Zacks,	1988);	and	increases	in	neural	noise	(Welford,	1981).	These,	in	turn,	negatively	
impacting	on	problem‐solving,	reasoning,	spatial	abilities,	and	reaction	times.	
	
A	fuller	appraisal	of	such	theories	will	be	made	in	relation	to	Situation	Awareness,	
below,	but	to	illustrate	their	relevance,	it	is	inhibitory	processing,	for	example,	that	
leads	to	a	tendency	amongst	older	drivers	to	prioritise	accuracy	over	speed	when	
driving,	due	to	processing	all	available,	than	just	relevant,	information	(Welford,	1962;	
Rabbitt,	1965).	It	has	also	been	found,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	that	stressful,	cognitively	
demanding	situations,	seem	to	exacerbate	this	need	(Szafran,	1969;	Kemp,	1973).	
	
Effective	on‐road	decision	making	relies	on	a	balance	between	information	processing	
and	speed	of	reaction	(French	et	al.,	1993)	and	it	is	this	that	the	older	driver	finds	
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difficult	to	do,	particularly	when	under	pressure.	In	a	sample	of	UK	drivers	over	70	
years,	for	example,	a	relationship	was	found	between	reaction	time	and	serious	driving	
errors	(Simms,	1993),	and	in	other	research	that	older	drivers	were	slower	at	
recovering	from	errors	and	‘incorrect	anticipations’	(Department	for	Transport,	2004).		
	
2.2.2.2.	Collision	analysis	in	older	age‐groups	
The	above	research	envisages	a	steady	decline	in	driving	performance	as	the	age	of	the	
driver	increases.	To	explore	this	assertion	further,	consideration	is	now	given	to	a	risk	
assessment	report	undertaken	by	Gandolfi	&	Dorn	(2009).	This	study	considers	data	
relating	to	injury	collisions	caused	by	drivers	age	60	and	over	in	Suffolk	between	2005	
and	2007;	sub‐dividing	its	findings	into	a	number	of	age	groupings.	The	author	has	
sought	to	use	three	groups	for	comparative	purposes	(60‐69,	70‐79,	and	80+)	to	
investigate	whether	risk	in	relation	to	collisions	increased	linearly	with	age	in	this	
study.	The	stand‐out	findings	follow.	
	
Fatalities	
Although	older	drivers	are	at	greater	risk	of	causing	a	fatal	collision	compared	with	the	
general	driving	population,	collisions	caused	by	drivers	over	80	were	significantly	more	
likely	to	involve	a	fatality	than	collisions	involving	the	over	70’s	age	group.	The	mean	
fatality	level	of	drivers	in	their	60s	was	approximately	half	that	of	those	over	80,	with	
drivers	in	their	70’s	displaying	the	lowest	mean	fatality	rate.		
	
Number	of	vehicles	
The	study	indicated	that	25.4%	of	the	injury	collisions	caused	by	older	drivers	were	
single‐vehicle	incidents,	63.5%	involved	two	vehicles,	and	11.1%	involved	three	or	
more	vehicles.	Collisions	caused	by	drivers	in	their	60s	involved	significantly	fewer	
vehicles	compared	with	those	caused	by	drivers	in	their	70s	and	80s.	
	
Road	type	
Drivers	over	80	were	least	likely	to	cause	a	collision	(those	over	70	the	highest)	on	dual	
carriageways,	three‐lane	roads,	and	one‐way	streets,	but	were	the	most	likely	to	cause	a	
collision	on	roundabouts	and	single	carriageways.		
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Lighting	
In	daylight,	drivers	in	their	60’s	were	slightly	less	likely	to	cause	a	collision	compared	
with	drivers	over	70,	but	at	night	they	were	more	likely	to	do	so.	On	roads	with	good	
street	lighting,	drivers	in	their	60’s	were	a	third	more	likely	to	cause	a	collision	
compared	with	the	over	80’s,	and	over	twice	as	likely	when	compared	with	drivers	in	
their	70’s.	On	unlit	roads,	drivers	in	their	60’s	displayed	almost	twice	the	risk	of	drivers	
over	70.	These	results	may,	though,	be	due	to	a	higher	prevalence	amongst	the	60‐69	
age	group	undertaking	nighttime	driving.	
	
Type	of	collision	
In	regard	to	the	type	of	collision,	the	data	suggests	particular	difficulties	for	all	three	age	
groupings	with	situations	involving	high	cognitive	demand,	such	as	junctions	(30%,	in	
fact,	of	all	over	60’s	at‐fault	injury	collisions	in	the	Gandolfi	&	Dorn	study).	However,	
leaving	aside	the	fact	that	the	numbers	assessed	for	each	age	group	here	will	be	
different,	as	there	are	fewer	over‐80	drivers,	the	data	provided	and	summarised	by	the	
author	for	age‐related	risk	(in	Table	2.A	below)	is	to	simply	demonstrate	a	more	
complex	picture	than	one	indicative	of	a	general	worsening	of	driving	performance	with	
age.		
Table	2.A:	Collision	risk	comparisons	by	age‐group	drawn	from	Gandolfi	&	Dorn	(2009)	
Type	of	collision	 Age	Group	
60‐69	 70‐79	 80+	
Loss	of	control	 Lowest	risk	 Medium	risk	 Highest	risk	
Crossing	junction	on	red‐light	 Lowest	risk	 Medium	risk	 Highest	risk	
Illegal	manoeuvre	 Lowest	risk	 Medium	risk	 Highest	risk	
Head‐on	 Lowest	risk	 Medium	risk	 Highest	risk	
Right‐turns	at	junctions*	 Lowest	risk	 Highest	risk	 Medium	risk	
Reversing	into	vehicles	 Lowest	risk	 Highest	risk	 Medium	risk	
Oncoming	traffic	at	Junctions	 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	 Highest	risk	
Over	centre‐line	of	carriageway	 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	 Highest	risk	
Oncoming	traffic	on	roadway	 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	 Highest	risk	
Overtaking	 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	 Highest	risk	
(with)	Pedestrians	(off	of	road.)		 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	 Highest	risk	
Rear	of	another	vehicle**	 Medium	risk	 Highest	risk	 Lowest	risk	
Skid‐related	 Highest	risk	 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	
Changing	lanes	 Highest	risk	 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	
Merging	with	traffic	 Highest	risk	 Medium	risk	 Lowest	risk	
Total	of	all	collisions	for	>60’s	 51.7%	 31.5%	 16.8%	
(inc.1.1%	>	90)	
*	Most	prevalent	‐	20.3%	of	total	collisions	
**	Second	most	prevalent	–	19.1%	of	total	collisions	
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Although	‘Highest	risk’	evaluations	were	more	prevalent	for	the	80+	age‐group,	the	
extent	to	which	driver	risk	increased	with	age	appeared	more	dependent	on	collision	
type.	This	itself	could	reflect	an	awareness	of	ability,	and	so,	for	the	over‐80	group	in	
particular,	it	could	indicate	that	the	group	may	seek	out	conditions	where,	for	example,	
there	would	be	less	of	a	need	to	‘change	lanes’	or	‘merge	with	traffic’.	As	a	whole,	
however,	the	most	common	collisions	found	in	the	study	(right	turns	at	junctions,	and	
‘rear‐ending’	other	vehicles),	have	also	been	found	in	other	research	(Clarke	et	al.,	2010;	
Hakamies‐Blomqvist,	1993;	Langham	et	al.,	2002;	Preusser	et	al.,	1998),	indicating	a	
higher	risk	for	the	70‐79	age	group.	
	
2.2.2.3.	Injury	severity	
Older	drivers	have	a	much	higher	likelihood	of	being	a	fatality	in	an	accident,	according	
to	the	findings	in	the	Gandolfi	&	Dorn	study,	with	that	vulnerability	rising	with	age	
increments.	This	would	account	for	the	85	and	over	age	group	being	over‐represented	
in	serious	injury	and	fatality	outcomes	(e.g.	Staplin	et	al.,	2001).	It	seems	that	the	higher	
rates	of	older	drivers’	injury	and	severity	are	likely	to	be	due,	to	some	extent,	to	the	type	
of	accidents	they	seem	more	vulnerable	to.	
	
Due	to	the	rising	numbers	of	older	drivers	it	is	predicted	that:	“although	the	numbers	of	
accidents	per	unit	distance	travelled	may	stay	the	same	over	the	next	30	years,	the	
absolute	numbers	of	fatal	accidents	involving	elderly	drivers	are	set	to	increase”	
(Department	for	Transport,	2004,	p.5).		
	
This	prediction	is	supported	by	studies	that	have	shown	accident	involvement	and	the	
number	of	injuries	per	miles	driven	to	be	the	highest	among	the	very	youngest	and	
oldest	driver	groups	(Dellinger	et	al.,	2004;	McGwin	&	Brown,	1999),	and	that	older	
drivers	are	more	likely	to	sustain	more	critical	and	fatal	injuries	(Reinfurt	et	al.,	2000;	
Cerelli,	1989).	Older	drivers,	incrementally	with	age,	tend	to	be	involved	in	
comparatively	more	accidents,	resulting	in	higher	fatalities	and	hospital	admissions	
than	younger	driver	age	groups;	although	the	actual	number	of	such	accidents	is	
relatively	small	when	differences	in	exposure	levels	are	taken	into	account	(Ryan,	
Legge,	&	Rosman,	1998;	Williams	&	Carsten,	1989).	
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2.2.3.	A	more	complex	issue:	ameliorating	the	impact	of	age?	
2.2.3.1.	Contradictory	evidence	
Whilst	research	is	indicative	of	a	general	decline	in	driving	performance	once	a	driver	
reaches	the	60	years	threshold,	this	matter	is	not	so	straightforward.	As	Howell	puts	it	
“age	is	not	the	reliable	index	of	functional	impairment	that	society	has	customarily	
taken	it	to	be”	(Howell,	1997,	p.4).	Indeed,	although	the	literature	supports	age‐related	
changes	in	driving	performance,	it	is	conceded	that	this	does	not	mean	there	will	be	all‐
encompassing	age‐related	deficits	(Hakamies‐Blomqvist,	1994;	Langford	et	al.,	2006).	
	
The	evidence	given	above	shows	that	older	drivers	represent	a	particularly	vulnerable	
group	with	high	relative	accident	and	fatality	rates	and	a	propensity	to	sustain	more	
serious	injury	to	themselves	in	collisions.	On	the	other	hand,	it	has	to	be	said	that	
evidence	can	also	be	produced	that	shows	this	driver	group	is	actually	relatively	safe	
compared	to	its	younger	counterparts,	and	that	enabling	unimpaired	older	drivers	to	
drive	for	longer	may,	in	fact,	have	a	positive	impact	on	traffic	safety.	Some	brief	
examples	of	where	research	has	made	the	issue	of	older	driver	safety	more	opaque,	now	
follows.		
	
Low‐mileage	bias	
If	the	proportion	of	crashes	experienced	by	the	entire	licensed	driver	population	is	
considered,	then	the	older	groups	appear	to	be	the	safest,	with	the	least	number	of	
crashes.	But	in	terms	of	exposure,	younger	drivers	tend	to	cover	far	more	miles	per	
annum,	so	when	crash	rates	per	miles	travelled	are	calculated,	older	drivers	appear	to	
have	increased	risk	compared	to	all	but	the	young	and	relatively	inexperienced	
(Williams	&	Carsten,	1989).	However,	older	drivers	undertake	far	more	of	their	driving	
on	local	roads,	and	so	encounter,	disproportionately,	more	intersections,	congestion,	
confusing	visual	environments,	signs,	and	signals	(Eberhard,	1996).	Whereas	those	who	
drive	longer	distances	are	likely	to	amass	much	of	this	mileage	on	motorways,	where	
there	is	less	chance	of	an	accident.	For	example,	Janke	(1991)	has	shown	that	there	are	
2.75	times	more	crashes	per	mile	driven	on	roads	other	than	motorways.	
	
Visual	abilities		
As	approximately	90%	of	information	processed	in	the	driving	task	is	visual,	the		
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potential	effects	of	age‐related	visual	impairments	are	clearly	a	concern	with	older	
drivers	(Simms,	1985).	However,	measurements	of	visual	decrements	“are	not,	by	
themselves,	a	good	representation	of	the	complex	visual	skills	needed	in	the	driving	
task”	(Department	for	Transport,	2004,	p.10).	For	example,	although	age‐related	visual	
impairments	have	been	found	to	have	significant	deleterious	effects	on	sign	detection,	
recognition	of	hazards,	reaction	times,	and	driving	task	ability	and	completion	times	
(Wood,	1999;	Andersen	et	al.,	2000;	Wood,	2002),	research	conducted	amongst	drivers	
with	no	recognised	visual	impairment	failed	to	find	significant	differences	in	
performance	between	different	driver	age	groups	(Underwood	et	al.,	2005).	Perhaps	
this	is	because	older	drivers	often	adapt	their	driving	to	compensate	for	any	visual	
impairments	by	slowing	their	speed	or	avoiding	lane‐changes	(e.g.	Szlyk	et	al.,	2002).	
Furthermore,	although	accident	analysis	has	made	associations	between	people	with	
disease‐related	visual	impairments	and	road	accident	rates,	any	such	link	may	be	
confused	by	the	potential	interfering	effects	of	medication	(Owsley	&	McGwin,	1999).	
	
Road	signage	
Another	example	of	conflicting	findings	is	found	in	relation	to	the	extent	to	which	older	
drivers	can	see	and	respond	to	road	signs.	Some	findings	indicate	sign	recognition	and	
understanding	difficulties	(Richards	&	Heatherington,	1988),	even	a	proneness	to	
ignoring	road	signage	(Otani	et	al.,	1992).	However,	other	findings	demonstrate	that	
older	drivers	are	more	likely	to	respond	in	order	to	comply	with	traffic	regulations	
(Hofner,	1982,	cited	in	Al‐Madani	&	Al‐Janahi,	2002).	Perhaps	more	relevant,	though,	is	
evidence	that	suggests	a	drivers’	ability	to	recognize	and	comprehend	road	signage	is	
not	associated	with	‘at‐fault’	accident	involvement.	It	appears	that	drivers	more	often	
involved	in	accidents	are	as	good	at	understanding	traffic	signs	as	those	rarely	involved	
in	accidents	(Al	Madhani,	2000;	Al‐Madani,	2001).		
	
2.2.3.2.	Lessening	the	impact	of	cognitive	decline	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	there	are	a	number	of	ways	in	which	older	drivers	may	be	
able	to	ameliorate	or	eliminate	the	important	effects	of	age‐related	declines	in	cognitive	
ability	that	were	considered	above:	
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a)	They	can	engage	in	what	has	been	termed	‘strategic	compensation’	(De	Raedt	&	
Ponjaert‐Kristoffersen,	2000),	i.e.	select	driving	conditions	and	driving	demands	to	suit	
their	abilities	(Molnar	&	Eby,	2008:	see	also	Baltes	&	Baltes,	1990).	For	example,	older	
drivers	with	poor	driving	ability	have	reported	that	they	avoid	specific	situations,	such	
as	turns	across	traffic,	driving	on	high	speed	roads,	driving	in	‘rush	hour’	traffic,	driving	
at	night,	and	driving	in	the	rain	(Baldock	et	al.,	2006).		
	
b)	They	can	compensate	for	a	declining	speed	of	cognitive	processing	by	‘tactical	
compensation’	(De	Raedt	&	Ponjaert‐Kristoffersen,	2000).	For	example,	they	drive	
slower	(Becic	et	al.,	2007;	Shinar	et	al.,	2005),	they	adopt	longer	headways	in	the	
presence	of	distracting	tasks	(e.g.	Strayer	&	Drews,	2004),	and	they	look	for	bigger	gaps	
when	turning	at	junctions	(Middleton	et	al.,	2005).	Through	these	adjustments	they	are	
better	able	to	give	themselves	more	time	to	react	to	events	on	the	road	and	to	make	
driving‐related	decisions	(Walker	et	al.,	1997).		
	
c)	Older	drivers	maintain	levels	of	performance	by	means	of	‘optimisation’	(see	Baltes	&	
Baltes,	1990),	such	that	practice	enables	performance	levels	to	be	maintained	(Krampe	
&	Charness,	2006;	Krampe	&	Ericsson,	1996).	This	can	lead	to	automatic	processing	that	
places	minimal	demands	on	cognitive	processing	resources,	and,	as	such,	it	has	been	
argued	that	they	are	not	subject	to	age‐related	declines	(Hasher	&	Zacks,	1979).	
	
d)	Older	drivers	compensate	for	declining	cognitive	fluid	abilities	(see	below	for	an	
explanation)	by	restructuring	the	driving	task	to	favourably	meet	their	abilities	and	
skills.	For	example,	Hakamies‐Blomqvist	et	al.	(1999)	concluded	that	older	drivers	are	
more	serial	in	the	performance	of	component	elements	of	the	driving	task,	thereby	
compensating	for	declining	ability	for	multi‐tasking	(Salthouse	&	Miles,	2002).	
	
e)	Older	adults	compensate	for	age‐related	declines	by	engaging	additional	regions	of	
the	brain	to	support	cognitive	networks	that	are	struggling	to	cope	with	task	demands	
(Cabeza,	2002;	Cabeza	et	al.,	2002;	Dennis	&	Cabeza,	2007;	Reuter‐Lorenz	&	Cappell,	
2008).	
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2.2.3.3.	Cessation		
Older	drivers	also	seem	to	naturally	reduce	their	driving	exposure	as	time	goes	on	
(Benekohal	et	al.,	1994),	with	most	typically	wanting	to	withdraw	from	driving	slowly	
and	gradually	rather	than	in	a	fast	and	imposed	manner	(Hakamies‐Blomqvist	&	
Whalstrom,	1998).	It	seems	the	differences	between	older	people’s	decisions	to	give	up	
driving	are	a	function	of	their	self‐perceptions	regarding	ability	(Eby	et	al.,	2003;	
Rudman	et	al.,	2006;	Hakamies‐Blomqvist	&	Whalstrom,	1998;	Owsley	et	al.,	1999)	and	
in	particular	their	levels	of	confidence	(Parker	et	al.,	2001;	Marottoli	&	Richardson,	
1998;	Stalvey	&	Owsley,	2000).		
	
2.2.4.	Exclusion	and	measuring	risk	
The	above	sections	have	shown	that	gauging	the	risk	of	older	drivers	to	themselves	and	
others	is	difficult	to	measure.	It	has	been	alluded	to	above,	for	example,	that	unlike	
younger	age	groups,	older	drivers	(from	around	65	years)	tend	to	lack	confidence	when	
approaching	junctions:	although	from	‘tactical	optimisation’	(De	Raedt	&	Ponjaert‐
Kristoffersen,	2000)	they	do	tend	to	slow	down	earlier	and	approach	more	slowly	and	
smoothly.	However,	this	lack	of	confidence	can	become	a	major	problem	when	merging	
onto	motorways	as	this	is	said	to	translate	into	hesitant,	erratic,	and	sometimes	very	
late	and	precarious	actions	(Schlag,	1993).	
	
On	country	roads,	older	drivers	tend	to	drive	more	consistently	and	smoothly,	with	
fewer	accelerations	and	braking	actions,	than	those	in	younger	age	groups.	However,	on	
inner	city	roads,	they	apparently	can	make	many	more	serious	errors,	especially:	failing	
to	notice	traffic	lights;	disregarding	traffic	system	priorities;	and	failing	to	reduce	speed	
adequately	at	road‐level	railway	crossings	(Schlag,	1993).	
	
Such	examples,	and	more	could	be	given,	have	prompted	consideration	of	driving	
assessments	and	restrictions	for	the	older	driver	(Department	for	Transport,	2001).	
However,	as	was	shown	above,	the	effects	of	aging	on	driving	safety	are	complex,	and	
indeed,	a	large	proportion	of	older	drivers	maintain	a	high	standard	of	performance	
(Dobbs	et	al.,	1998;	Hakamies‐Blomqvist,	1998).	Also,	the	literature	does	not	offer	a	
great	deal	in	terms	of	comparing	the	best	approaches	to	assess	older	drivers’	
competence,	or	how	to	deal	with	age‐related	declines.		
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In	the	following	part	of	this	review,	consideration	will	be	given	to	the	relevance	of	
Situation	Awareness	to	such	issues,	and	the	contribution	that	it	can	make	to	
understanding	age‐related	driving	performance.		
	
2.3.	Situation	Awareness	based	investigations	into	driving	and	age	
One	of	the	principle	problems	that	previous	sections	have	highlighted	for	older	drivers	
is	that	roadway	environment	complexity	can	decrease	their	performance	far	more	than	
younger	drivers	(for	example,	in	terms	of	lane	keeping,	and	speed	maintenance,	
Chaparro	&	Alton,	2000;	Ho	et	al.,	2001).	Yet,	in	general,	to	attain	a	good	standard	of	
driving	ability,	a	driver	needs	to	be	able	to	cope	with	such	complexity,	by	being	more	
aware	of	his/her	surroundings,	and	from	attending	to	important	and	necessary	
information:	abilities	that	form	an	intrinsic	part	of	Situation	Awareness.	
	
Situation	Awareness	is	of	particular	importance	when	unfamiliar	and	dynamic	
situations	are	faced,	such	as	those	encountered	whilst	driving,	where	there	is	a	need	to	
manage	both	cognitive	and	physical	workloads	across	tasks	with	frequently	conflicting	
goals	and	opposing	demands	(Perry	et	al.,	2008).	It	could	be	said	to	begin	through	the	
formation	of	concepts	from	representations	that	we	find	in	the	environment.	These	
concepts	consisting	of	components	that	are	representative	of	experiences,	rather	than	
full	length	recreations	(Barsalou,	2003),	which	are	then	stored	in	our	memory	(Schyns,	
Goldstone,	&	Thibaut,	1998).	This	conceptual	system	then	guiding	what	is	perceived,	
what	is	inferred,	and	our	actions	within	an	environment	(Hampton	&	Ross,	2003).	
	
The	process,	by	this	approach,	is	said	to	be	a	cyclical	one,	as	what	is	perceived	will	
expand	knowledge,	which	in	turn	will	influence	what	new	information	is	sought	out.	So	
crucially,	the	quality	of	the	information	cues	selectively	attended	to	will	also	influence	
the	level	of	Situation	Awareness	(Regal,	Rogers,	&	Boucek,	1988).		
	
This	is	of	relevance	to	driving,	particularly	during	pressing	and	unexpected	tasks,	as	a	
good	choice	in	selecting	which	movements	and	cues	to	attend	to	could	allow	a	driver	to	
anticipate	intentions	and	react	more	quickly.	If	a	‘rush	hour’	driving	situation	is	taken	as	
an	example,	here,	clearly	the	driver	would	not	attempt	to	attend	to	all	the	cues	in	an	
environment	‐	such	as	every	traffic	sign,	car	and	pedestrian	–	as	this	would	be	
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ineffective	and	potentially	dangerous;	just	if	his/her	attention	was	overly	narrowed	to	a	
single	object,	such	as	the	car	directly	in	front.	The	driver	would	more	likely	selectively	
attend	to	what	cues	were	deemed	relevant,	and	seek	to	frequently	update	them.		
	
Whilst	there	is	much	debate	on	how	the	internal	processes	underlying	the	acquisition	of	
Situation	Awareness	are	undertaken,	and	indeed	what	drivers	do	with	the	resulting	
information	(issues	that	will	be	considered	in	further	detail	in	the	following	Chapter	
(3)),	what	is	apparent	is	that	a	major	source	for	SA	errors	stems	from	our	deficiencies	in	
analysing	information	‘content’	(e.g.	Jones	&	Endsley,	1996).		
	
Such	deficiencies	are	of	particular	relevance	to	the	age‐related	cognitive	demands	
considered	above.	For	example,	our	need	to	frequently	update	information	can	present	
difficulties	for	older	adults	due	to	deficiencies	in	cognitive	functioning	and	information	
processing	speeds	(Damos	&	Wickens,	1980;	Korteling,	1993;	Lorsbach	&	Simpson,	
1988;	McDowd	&	Craik,	1988;	Schneider	&	Fisk,	1982;	Tun	&	Wingfield,	1997).	
	
2.3.1.	Age	and	cognitive	related	declines	for	Situation	Awareness	
To	explain	these	declinations	further,	it	is	necessary	to	revisit	prominent	theories	that	
have	been	proposed	to	explain	the	causes	of	age‐related	differences	in	cognitive	
functioning,	that	were	alluded	to	in	2.2.2.1,	above.	Four	will	be	considered	here:	fluid	
versus	crystallized	intelligence	(Horn	&	Cattell,	1966;	Rabbitt,	1993);	inhibition	deficits	
(Hasher	&	Zacks,	1988;	Layton,	1975);	reduced	processing	resources	(Navon,	1984;	
Salthouse,	1985,	1988);	and	cognitive	slowing	(Birren,	1970;	Cerella,	1994;	Salthouse,	
1985).	
	
The	evidence	given	in	support	of	these	theories	shows	increasing	age‐related	problems	
(e.g.,	the	capacity	to	hold	information	in	working	memory,	performing	dual	tasks	
simultaneously,	and	a	general	slowing	of	responses	as	well	as	processing	speed),	so	how	
might	these	cognitive	declines	influence	performance	and	Situation	Awareness	in	
driving?		
	
To	aid	an	explanation,	utilisation	will	be	made	of	Endsley’s	three	level	model	of	
Situation	Awareness	(Endsley,	1995a)	as	a	reference	framework.	Endsley	proposed	that	
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Situation	Awareness	is	formed	through	three	stages,	or	levels	(see	Chapter	3).	These	
are:	Perception	(Level	1):	perceiving	the	status,	attributes,	and	dynamics	of	relevant	
environmental	elements;	Comprehension	(Level	2):	integrating	that	disjointed	
information	to	understand	its	impact	on	an	individual’s	goals;	and	Projection	(Level	3):	
extrapolating	this	information	to	project	future	actions	and	environmental	states.	
	
2.3.1.1.	Fluid	versus	Crystallized	Intelligence		
During	our	lives	we	acquire	and	store	knowledge,	which	through	repetition,	develops	
into	meaningful	information.	The	processes	of	accessing	this	information	are	known	as	
crystallized	intelligence	(Horn	&	Cattell,	1966;	Rabbitt,	1993):	for	example,	the	retrieval	
and	use	of	vocabulary.	
	
In	contrast,	some	situations	require	us	to	process	comparatively	new	information.	In	
these	situations,	a	lack	of	previous	information	requires	us	to	tap	into	what	is	termed	
fluid	intelligence.	It	has	been	found	that	ageing	brings	declines	in	fluid	intelligence;	
whereas	our	crystallized	intelligence	can	actually	improve	(Horn	&	Cattell,	1966;	
Rabbitt,	1993).		
	
Relevance	to	Situation	Awareness	in	driving	
In	predictable,	stable	situations,	crystallized	intelligence	remains	constant	and	causes	
no	detrimental	effects	on	Situation	Awareness.	However,	in	unpredictable	and	changing	
road	environments,	fluid	intelligence	is	needed	to	provide	accurate	comprehension	of	
the	unfamiliar	cues	that	the	driver	would	be	receiving.	
	
As	an	example,	consider	a	driver’s	knowledge	of	traffic	laws,	which	would	have	become	
part	of	his/her	crystallized	intelligence.	These	are	unchanging	and	easy	to	draw	upon	
when	driving	along	familiar	routes.	However,	when	driving	in	an	unfamiliar	city	during	
‘rush	hour’,	a	driver	may	need	to	draw	on	fluid	intelligence	to	deal	with	new	
information	and	environments.	It	is	here	where	deficits	are	likely	to	occur	for	older	
drivers.		
	
To	relate	this	to	Endsley’s	three	level	model,	declines	in	fluid	intelligence	from	aging	
would	simply	impact	initially	at	the	perceptual	SA	Level	(1),	which	would	thus	cause	
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problems	for	comprehension	(Level	2),	which,	in	turn,	could	affect	the	projection	(Level	
3)	of	proficient	driving‐related	actions.		
	
2.3.1.2.	Inhibition	Deficits		
It	has	been	proposed	that	our	working	memory	can	only	operate	efficiently	when	we	
can	selectively	attend	to	relevant	information,	whilst	inhibiting	irrelevant	information,	
in	order	to	achieve	a	goal	(Hasher	&	Zacks,	1988).	As	older	adults	have	a	more	detailed	
knowledge	base,	specific	situations	may	activate	too	much	information	causing	
interference	in	working	memory	(McDowd,	Oseas‐Kreger,	&	Filion,	1995).	In	other	
words,	older	adults	find	difficulty	in	inhibiting	information,	which	then	interferes	with	
memory	retrieval	processes,	particularly	with	those	relating	to	perception	(Hashtroudi,	
Johnson,	&	Chrosniak,	1990).	
	
Relevance	to	Situation	Awareness	in	driving	
Because	perceptual‐based	memories	are	key	to	producing	good	Situation	Awareness,	an	
inability	to	suppress	information	here	will	cause	deficits	across	all	three	of	Endsley’s	SA	
levels.	During	the	perceptual	Level	(1),	a	failure	to	inhibit	information	will	allow	
multiple	environmental	cues	to	be	accessed,	causing	difficulties	in	selecting	what	is	
most	relevant.	This	places	a	burden	on	our	working	memory,	causing	further	problems	
for	comprehension	(Level	2)	‐	such	as	from	having	to	decide	upon	what	is	relevant	from	
an	excessive	number	of	cues,	and	therefrom,	appropriate	information.	While	such	
inhibition	deficits	do	not	directly	influence	Situation	Awareness	at	the	projection	level	
(3)	both	it,	and,	consequently,	driving	performance,	will	be	impaired,	because	of	the	
deficiencies	that	are	occurring	at	Levels	1	and	2.		
	
2.3.1.3.	Processing	Resources		
The	amount	and	complexity	of	the	information	we	have	to	process,	the	difficulty	of	the	
task,	and	the	relative	diversity	in	any	dual	tasks	that	we	undertake,	all	extend	and	
degrade	our	processing	resources	(e.g.,	processing	speed,	working	memory,	and	
attention).	This	is	especially	the	case	with	older	adults	(Damos	&	Wickens,	1980;	
Korteling,	1993;	Lorsbach	&	Simpson,	1988;	McDowd	&	Craik,	1988;	Schneider	&	Fisk,	
1982;	Tun	&	Wingfield,	1997),	and	particularly	for	those	suffering	from	attention	
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deficits,	as	they	may	ultimately	have	greater	difficulty	in	registering	and	encoding	
information	efficiently.		
	
Relevance	to	Situation	Awareness	in	driving	
As	dynamic	tasks,	like	driving,	involve	continuous	perception	and	comprehension	of	
information,	any	deficits	in	the	processing	of	that	information	may	cause	difficulties	in	
maintaining	Situation	Awareness.	
	
A	lack	of	processing	resources	is,	in	fact,	the	single	most	limiting	factor	for	perceiving	
relevant	cues	(i.e.	for	Level	1	SA),	particularly	in	circumstances	where	multiple	stimuli	
are	present	or	when	dual	tasks	are	being	performed.	So	this	is	of	particular	relevance	
for	older	drivers,	given	their	difficulties,	highlighted	above,	in	selectively	attending	to	
informative	environmental	cues.	However,	comprehension	(Level	2	SA)	and	projection	
(at	Level	3)	will	also	suffer	from	age‐related	declines	(Bolstad	&	Hess,	2000;	Endsley,	
1995)	as	when	processing	resources	are	taxed	by	the	need	to	retrieve	and	classify	large	
amounts	of	information,	inaccurate	mental	models	could	be	created	from	a	poor	
selection	of	cues	at	the	perception	level	(1)	of	SA.	
	
So	if	an	older	US	citizen,	for	example,	did	not	have	a	mental	model	of	a	roundabout	
whilst	driving	in	the	UK,	s/he	may	approach	it	unaware	of	the	traffic	with	the	right	of	
way,	or	of	correct	road	positioning.	The	need	for	quick	action,	coupled	with	this	
unfamiliarity,	may	well	weaken	his/her	processing	resources	to	more	likely	result	in	an	
accident.		
	
2.3.1.4.	Cognitive	Slowing		
As	mental	and	physical	operations	gradually	slow	during	older	adulthood	(Birren,	1970;	
Salthouse,	1985),	this	can	become	a	particular	concern	in	highly	demanding	situations,	
where	there	is	often	a	need	for	both	quick	and	simultaneous	operations	that	can	
significantly	affect	processing	speeds	(Salthouse,	1996).		
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Relevance	to	Situation	Awareness	in	driving	
In	any	time‐limited	dynamic	environment	such	as	driving,	the	initial	task	(i.e.	processing	
perceptual	cues,	at	Level	1),	will	be	equally	as	important	to	the	secondary	operation	
(i.e.,	comprehension,	at	Level	2)	for	effective	Situation	Awareness	to	be	achieved.		
	
However,	when	simultaneous	and	extended	processing	is	needed	to	comprehend	a	
situation,	this	could	be	inadequately	based	on	either	little	processing	effort	(at	Level	2	
SA)	or	from	cue	perception	alone	(from	Level	1	SA)	due	to	age‐related	cognitive	
decrements.	Furthermore,	in	such	circumstances,	information	from	that	earlier	
processing	could	be	lost	or	become	obsolete	after	later	processing	has	been	completed	
(Salthouse,1996)	‐	all	of	which	impacting	on	the	creation	of	appropriate	mental	models	
for	good	projection	(at	Level	3	SA).			
	
So,	to	give	a	driving	example,	when	vital	cues	are	quickly	presented	regarding	the	speed	
of	traffic	and	available	lanes	for	entering	unanticipated	roadworks,	a	slowing	in	the	
processing	of	perceptual	information	(at	Level	1	SA),	or	a	constraint	on	the	time	needed	
for	comprehension	(at	Level	2),	could	cause	an	accident	through	a	lack	of	appropriate	
projection	(at	Level	3).		
	
What	the	above	theories	of	age‐related	decline	have	shown	is	that	ageing	would	appear	
to	particularly	disrupt	the	perception	level	(1)	of	SA	acquisition,	by	decreasing	the	
efficiency	with	which	individuals	can	extract	information	from	the	environment	and	
accurately	store	it	in	memory.	According	to	Bolstad	&	Hess	(2000),	this	may	result	in	
older	adults	creating	less	complete	and/or	qualitatively	different	representations	of	
their	environment	than	younger	adults,	and	that	this	would	be	particularly	evident	
when	there	was	a	lot	of	information	present,	or	when	it	was	presented	in	multiple	
modalities,	and/or	where	more	than	one	task	had	to	be	performed	at	the	same	time.		
	
At	the	comprehension	stage	of	SA	(Level	2)	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	problems	
mentioned	above	in	regards	to	diminished	processing	resources	and	inhibition	deficits,	
will	particularly	affect	the	ability	of	an	older	person	to	create	an	accurate	mental	model	
of	a	situation	in	working	memory.	Bolstad	&	Hess	(2000)	highlight	that	this	would	stem	
from	problems	associated	with	the	processing	of	large	amounts	of	complex	information,	
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along	with	difficulties	in	retrieving	and	utilising	information	registered	during	the	
perceptual	level	stage.	
	
2.3.2.	Mediating	factors	
The	age‐related	changes	that	have	been	considered	above,	are	not,	however,	a	given	in	
universal	form,	and	consideration	as	to	how	they	may	be	tempered	is	worthy	of	note.	
Five	are	briefly	highlighted	below,	but	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis	concentration	will	
centre	on	the	automaticity	of	processes	through	experience,	as	these	appear	to	have	
particular	relevance	for	SA	performance.		
	
The	main	considerations	against	uniformity	in	age‐related	declines	are	that:	
	
a)	The	extensive	training	of	older	adults	may	overcome	some	of	the	negative	effects	
associated	with	ageing	(e.g.	Ball	et	al.,	2002).	
	
b)	The	cognitive	changes	considered	above	are	now	accepted	as	potentially	varying	
widely	in	their	form	and	progression	across	individuals.	As	Hakamies‐Blomqvist	(1998)	
notes,	“while	earlier	research	was	mostly	guided	by	the	question	‘why	do	older	drivers	
have	higher	accident	risk’,	this	has	been	superseded	by	‘which	older	drivers	have	higher	
accident	risk?”	(p.296).	
	
c)	There	may	be	problems	related	to	the	measurement	of	SA	in	older	adults,	due	to	
these	changes	in	physiological,	perceptual,	and	cognitive	functions.	In	assessing	SA	
acquisition	in	older	adults,	and	when	comparing	age‐related	variations	in	SA	factors,	
these	changes	need	to	be	taken	into	account	in	order	to	reduce	age	biases	in	
measurement	(Endsley	&	Garland,	2000).	
	
d)	Ageing	effects	can	be	moderated	by	specific	circumstances,	such	as:	more	simple	
driving	environments,	situations	with	a	great	deal	of	environmental	support,	and/or	
unpaced	situations.	As	noted,	for	example	by	Molnar	&	Eby	(2008)	above,	older	drivers	
tend	to	take	on	journeys	related	to	their	perceived	driving	skill.	
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e)	Older	drivers	may	show	minimal	decline	in	areas	where	they	can	draw	on	their	
expertise	(e.g.	Bolstad,	1996).	Attention	problems	attributed	to	older	adults	in	the	
literature	typically	occur	within	novel	contexts	(e.g.,	laboratory	driving	tasks),	however,	
such	effects	may	be	greatly	reduced	or	eliminated	where	the	driver	has	domain	specific	
expertise	(such	as	driving	his/her	own	car	locally).	
	
The	most	commonly	cited	alleviant	of	the	negative	impact	of	ageing,	however,	is	driver	
experience.	This	is	based	on	the	premise	that	older	adults	may	be	able	to	employ	well‐
developed	scripts	and	schemas	that	enable	them	to	maintain	both	good	Situation	
Awareness	and	circumvent	the	processing	limitations	highlighted	above.	Bosman	&	
Charnes	(1996),	for	example,	argue	that	the	latter	is	achieved	from	being	able	to	
develop	automaticity	in	certain	skills,	that	can	compensate	for	some	declines	(e.g.,	in	
relation	to	working	memory,	Bolstad	&	Hess,	2000).	
	
2.3.2.1.	Advantages	of	experience	
We	know	that	as	a	driver’s	interactions	with	other	road	users	increases	over	time,	and	
as	a	greater	range	of	events	are	negotiated,	that	his/her	Situation	Awareness	can	also	
develop	(Lee,	Olsen,	&	Simons‐Morton,	2006).		
	
This	experience	is	additionally	said	to	lead	to	safer	driving.	Soliman	&	Mathna	(2009),	
for	example,	found	driving	expertise	correlated	with	both	SA	and	driving	errors.	They	
found	that	novice	drivers	were	less	situationally	aware	than	those	with	expertise,	and	
were	more	often	involved	in	driving	infringements:	such	as,	having	collisions	with	other	
vehicles;	driving	through	stop	signs;	crossing	centre	lines;	hitting	pedestrians;	
exceeding	speed	limits;	and/or	making	excursions	outside	the	roadway.		
	
Expertise	through	experience	has	also	been	found	to	enable	better	collection,	
representation,	and	employment	of	suitable	information	to	project	future	actions	(Sohn	
&	Doane,	2004)	and	to	build	up	accurate	descriptions	of	situational	elements	that	are	
tactically	important	(Randel	et	al.,	1996).		
	
It	has	been	argued	that	this	is	related	to	levels	of	visual	scanning	(e.g.	Crundall	&	
Underwood,	1998;	Underwood	et	al.,	2002;	Underwood	et	al.,	2003).	It	appears	that	
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whilst	experienced	drivers	develop	an	awareness	of	when	they	need	to	be	especially	
attentive	and	increase	their	scanning	activity;	inexperienced	drivers	are	more	uniform	
in	this	regard.	For	example,	on	safer,	uneventful	roads,	the	scanning	of	both	experienced	
and	inexperienced	drivers	was	found	to	be	similar,	but	on	an	urban	motorway,	with	
other	road	users	merging	from	both	directions,	experienced	drivers	were	found	to	
search	the	roadway	around	them	more	extensively	(Underwood,	Ngai,	&	Underwood,	
2013).		
	
Appropriate	scanning	of	the	roadway	is	important	from	a	Situation	Awareness	
perspective,	because	without	seeing	and	perceiving	necessary	information	(at	Level	1	
SA)	it	will	be	difficult,	perhaps	even	impossible,	for	the	driver	to	then	achieve	sufficient	
SA	at	its	higher	levels	(2	&	3)	‐	thereby	increasing	his/her	potential	for	accidents.		
	
This,	in	fact,	is	evident	in	the	better	performance	of	experienced	drivers	in	hazard	
anticipation/perception	tasks	(Jackson,	Chapman,	&	Crundell,	2009;	Garay‐Vega	&	
Fisher,	2005),	which	again	has	been	explained	by	narrower	visual	searches	exhibited	by	
novice	drivers,	that	as	a	corollary	required	them	to	undertake	extra	processing	time	to	
completely	search	a	driving	scene.	This	has	found	to	be	evident	in	both	on‐road	and	
laboratory	studies	(Mourant	&	Rockwell	1972;	Crundall	&	Underwood,	1998;	
Underwood	et	al.,	2002;	Underwood,	2007).	Therefore,	if	a	driving	situation	becomes	
very	complex,	or	contains	many	cues,	then	consequently	novices	will	be	at	a	greater	
disadvantage.		
	
The	above	findings	appear	logical.	How	well	we	integrate	perceived	elements	of	a	
driving	scene	should	provide	a	better	basis	for	understanding	the	scene	as	a	whole	
(thus	enhancing	Level	2	SA),	and	in	turn	the	anticipation	of	future	movements	or	the	
behaviour	of	other	drivers	or	pedestrians	(at	Level	3	SA).	So	the	more	experience	we	
can	bring	to	bear	for	the	extracting	of	elements	for	Level	1	SA,	the	more	likely	we	would	
be	able	to	maximise	our	comprehension	and	decision‐making	time,	which	should	
translate	into	safer	driving.	And	indeed,	McKenna	&	Crick	(1991)	have	provided	some	
evidence	for	this	by	showing	reaction	time	differences	between	experienced	and	novice	
drivers.	One	should	point	out,	however,	that	having	good	Situation	Awareness	at	its	
higher	levels,	or	informed	by	proficient	processing	from	its	lower,	perception,	level,	
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does	not	mean	an	accident	cannot	happen	(Endsley,	1990).	A	driver	could,	for	example,	
have	excellent	perception	of	a	scene,	but	still	not	perceive	a	potential	hazard,	such	as	
with	‘look	but	fail	to	see’	accidents	(Brown,	2002).		
	
There	are	also	studies	that	question	the	advantage	of	driving	experience.	Vogel	(2003),	
for	example,	found	that	experienced	drivers	were	no	more	skilful	at	predicting	the	
development	of	traffic	situations	than	novice	drivers.	And	although	more	confident	in	
answering	hazard	detection/awareness	and	driving	performance	questions,	Jackson,	
Chapman,	&	Crundell	(2009)	found	that	this	was	not	reflected	in	their	actual	
performance.	(Though,	as	noted	above,	they	did	find	experienced	drivers	to	record	
higher	scores	by	these	measures	than	novice	drivers).		
	
Overall,	it	would	seem	reasonable	to	conclude	that	as	a	driver’s	interactions	with	other	
road	users	increases	over	time,	and	as	a	greater	range	of	roadway	events	and	
environments	are	negotiated,	that	this	should	be	beneficial	both	for	safer	driving,	and	
indeed	Situation	Awareness	‐	as	has	been	found	by	Lee,	Olsen,	&	Simons‐Morton	(2006).	
The	crucial	question,	however,	is	whether	an	older	driver’s	greater	driving	experience	
will	allow	him/her	to	compensate	for	age‐related	cognitive	decrements	(as	argued	by	
McPhee	et	al.,	2004),	or	perhaps	these	are	more	universal	deficits	that	experience	
cannot	compensate	for?	This	is	indicated,	for	example,	by	DeLucia	et	al.,	(2003),	who	
found	accuracy	in	judgments	about	potential	collisions	to	be	significantly	lower	for	
older	drivers.	
	
2.3.3.	The	SA	capability	of	older	drivers	
It	is	important	to	preface	this	section	by	mentioning	that,	firstly,	there	is	a	sparseness	of	
research	considering	the	impact	of	an	older	driver’s	experience	on	their	SA,	or,	for	that	
matter,	looking	at	the	SA	of	older	drivers	more	generally.	Much	of	the	existing	
knowledge	in	these	areas	still	comes	from	the	work	of	Cheryl	Bolstad	some	15	to	20	
years	ago.	
	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	when	considering	the	SA	of	older	drivers	that	the	
concentration	has	been	on	Level	1	SA	(perception).	This	is	due	to	a	belief	that	
differences	in	age‐related	abilities	(highlighted	in	the	theories	given	above)	would	be	at	
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their	most	acute	during	the	initial	formation	of	Situation	Awareness,	where	it	is	
necessary	to	perceive	what	is	important	in	a	driving	environment	(e.g.	Bolstad	&	Hess,	
2000,	supporting	this	viewpoint	given	by	Jones	&	Endsley,	1996).		
	
In	regards	to	the	benefit	of	driving	experience,	then,	Bolstad	(1996)	evaluated	and	
compared,	through	an	extensive	40‐item	questionnaire,	the	Level	1	(perception)	and	
Level	2	(comprehension)	Situation	Awareness	of	drivers	in	different	age	groups.	
Specifically,	she	compared	the	performance	of	young	(18	to	39	year	old)	drivers	with	
less	than	5	years	driving	experience,	with	middle‐aged	(40	to	59	years),	and	older	
drivers	(60	to	84	years)	with	more	than	20	years	experience.	
	
The	expectations	were	that	the	older	drivers	would	experience	more	driving	difficulties	
associated	with	potential	SA	problems	than	the	younger	drivers.	In	fact,	the	younger	
drivers	reported	experiencing	the	most	problems,	such	as	forgetfulness,	failure	to	stop,	
and	navigating	in	unfamiliar	areas;	whereas	the	middle‐aged	drivers	had	the	fewest	
difficulties.	
	
These	results	could	be	attributed	to	experience	and	expertise	with	the	driving	task.	In	
that	whereas	the	younger	drivers	may	not	have	accumulated	enough	experience	to	
allow	them	to	perform	certain	driving	components	automatically,	the	older	drivers	may	
indeed	have	done	so.	And	thus,	this,	together	with	other	compensatory	approaches,	
might	have	enabled	them	to	overcome	many	of	the	negative	changes	associated	with	
ageing.	Such	an	argument	did,	in	fact,	receive	some	support	from	Bolstad’s	findings,	in	
that	her	older	drivers	did	report	certain	changes	in	their	driving	behaviour	indicative	of	
such	compensations,	and	more	often	than	the	other	age	groups.	For	example,	they	
would	avoid	motorways	during	the	‘rush	hour’,	and	not	drive	at	night.	
	
However,	when	the	older	driver	group	was	compared	with	the	middle‐aged	group	(who	
had	more	driving	experience	than	the	young	cohort)	the	older	adults	were	then	found	to	
have	reported	more	driving	difficulties	and	to	have	exhibited	lower	levels	of	Situation	
Awareness.		
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In	a	further	study,	Bolstad	(2001)	aimed	to	understand	how	ageing	affected	a	driver's	
ability	to	attend	to	important	information	in	driving	environments	of	different	
complexity,	and	to	see	how	these	impacted	on	an	individual	driver’s	Situation	
Awareness.	Overall,	her	results	showed	that	older	adults	again	produced	lower	SA	
scores.	However,	although	SA	performances	for	all	of	her	age‐groupings	were	
significantly	worse	overall	in	a	highly	complex	driving	condition	to	that	in	a	moderately	
complex	condition,	the	older	drivers	did	not,	as	expected,	experience	a	greater	decrease	
in	performance.		
	
In	a	later	related	study,	that	additionally	considered	the	impact	of	hazards	on	Situation	
Awareness,	Zhang,	Jin,	Garner,	Mosaly,	&	Kaber	(2009)	found	that,	in	general,	a	younger	
driver	group	again	exhibited	higher	levels	of	SA	compared	to	that	of	an	older	driver	
group.	Surprisingly	though,	after	a	hazard	event	was	triggered,	there	was	no	difference	
in	SA	proficiency	between	them.	Zhang	et	al.	argue	that	this	might	have	been	due	to	the	
older	drivers	improving	their	attention	and	concentration	to	avoid	potential	hazards	
similar	to	the	one	they	had	experienced	(whether	static	or	dynamic).	(Actions	that	may	
in	fact	had	led	to	them	to	show	better	SA	at	Level	1	in	rural	conditions	than	the	younger	
driver	group).	
	
In	a	rework	of	that	study,	Kaber,	Zhang,	Jin,	Mosaly,	&	Garner	(2012)	highlighted	that	
older	drivers	exhibited	worse	performances	at	higher	SA	levels	when	compared	to	
younger	drivers	(as	measured	by	SPAM/SAGAT	scores).	It	was	argued	that	although	the	
SA	of	the	older	drivers	could	be	enhanced	at	Level	1	(perception),	this	then	impacted	on	
their	SA	at	Level	2	(comprehension)	‐	perhaps	due	to	reorientation	needs	‐	and	at	Level	
3	(projection),	which	was	generally	found	to	be	degraded.	It	was	also	concluded	that	the	
complexity	of	a	driving	environment	was	influential	for	Level	2	SA,	and	that	this	was	
related	to	a	driver’s	age.	The	scores,	though,	were	more	mixed	at	other	SA	Levels,	with	
the	older	driver’s	scores	at	Level	3	in	the	rural	(non‐complex/pre‐hazard)	condition	
appearing,	comparatively,	the	most	degraded.		
		
Although	such	studies	provide	support	for	the	contention	that	SA	will	decline	with	age,	
and	is	not	arrested	by	driving	experience,	the	evidence	is	not	conclusive.	The	latter	two	
studies,	for	example,	show	changing	age‐related	SA	performance	in	different	driving	
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conditions,	and	before	and	after	a	‘hazardous’	event.	Though	in	the	latter	case	this	does	
seem	to	have	been	more	due	to	a	rise	in	concentration	levels	than	any	invocation	of	
better	experience.	Also,	in	a	preliminary	analysis	of	SA	scores	for	experienced	pilots	‐	
where	no	correlation	was	found	between	SA	and	age	‐	Bolstad	&	Endsley	(1991)	
tentatively	argue	that	their	small	number	of	selected	participants	may	have	precluded	
the	impact	of	ageing	on	SA	due	to	an	accumulation	of	expertise	through	experience.	
Again,	though,	whether	this	would	also	be	demonstrated	with	experienced	older	drivers	
is	questionable.	
	
2.3.4.	Older	drivers	SA	and	driving	performance	
In	addition	to	evaluating	the	proficiency	of	an	older	driver’s	SA,	and	whether	it	can	be	
arrested	by	driving	experience,	another	important	consideration	here	is	in	relation	to	
driving	performance	indicators.		If	an	older	driver	does	have	worse	SA	would	this	
translate	into	poorer	driving?	
	
In	this	regard	it	is	firstly	important	to	mention	that,	again,	studies	that	link	SA	and	
driving	performance,	even	amongst	all	driving	groups,	are	rare.	The	most	persuasive	is	
perhaps	Rogers,	Zhang,	Kaber,	Liang,	&	Gangakhedkar	(2011),	who	found	that	following	
a	car	under	visual	distraction	led	to	a	significant	negative	correlation	between	Level	1	
SA	(perception)	and	steering	error	and	speed	variability,	as	well	as	between	total	SA	
scores	and	steering	error.	And	that	conversely,	as	SA	increased,	so	steering	error	
decreased	and	vehicle	control	became	more	stable.	The	negative	effects	of	visual	and	
cognitive	distraction	on	SA	amounted	to,	on	average,	a	43%	decrease	in	accuracy	in	time	
estimates	and	a	50%	decrease	in	spatial	position	estimates	for	passing	and	following	
tasks.		
	
The	importance	of	visual	and	cognitive	abilities	has,	of	course,	been	highlighted	in	
previous	sections	of	this	chapter,	in	relation	to	attending	to	important	information.	
These	include	vision	impairments,	perception,	memory,	and	attention.	It	was	further	
suggested	that	these	abilities	change	with	age	(Laux,	1995;	Salthouse,	1985;	Smith	&	
Earles,	1996)	and	that	they	are	more	pronounced	as	a	task’s	difficulty	increases	(Tun	&	
Wingfield,	1997).	Shinar	(1993),	in	fact,	reminds	us	of	the	importance	of	this	by	
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highlighting	that	driver	inattention	and	deficiencies	in	information	processing	are	major	
factors	in	accident	causation.	
	
Previous	research	has	indicated	that	decrements	in	age‐related	perceptual	and	
cognitive	abilities	may	also	lead	to	an	increased	risk	of	collision	(Potts	et	al.,	2004).	
These	may	be	compounded	by	difficulties	with	certain	environmental	factors,	such	as	
increased	roadway	complexity,	which	has	been	found	to	decrease	older	driver	task	
performance	far	more	than	younger	drivers.	For	example,	in	terms	of	lane	keeping,	and	
speed	maintenance	(Chaparro	&	Alton,	2000;	Ho	et	al.,	2001)	and,	additionally,	from	a	
susceptibility	to	dynamic	hazards	(Ryan	et	al.,	1998).	
	
Ho	et	al.	(2001),	for	example,	examined	the	effect	of	visual	clutter	on	a	visual	search	for	
traffic	signs	under	normal	driving	conditions.	They	found	that	older	adults	were	slower,	
less	accurate,	and	required	more	fixations	to	acquire	a	traffic	sign.	This	suggests	that	in	
time‐limited	situations	that	involve	visually	complex	scenes	(e.g.,	a	busy	intersection),	
that	older	adults	are	more	likely	than	younger	adults	to	misidentify	or	miss	a	sign	
altogether.		
	
However,	it	should	be	mentioned	that	the	older	adults	in	the	Ho	et	al.	study	did	not	
suffer	disproportionately	to	their	younger	counterparts	as	a	result	of	increased	
roadway	clutter.	Ho	et	al.	argue,	though,	that	as	their	stimuli	were	static	scenes	with	
high	visibility,	it	is	likely	that	in	a	more	realistic	driving	simulation,	with	dynamic	
stimuli	and	varying	degrees	of	visibility,	that	the	older	adults	would	be	more	
dramatically	affected	by	clutter.		
	
An	inference	is	thus	made,	that	due	to	information	processing	decrements,	an	older	
driver’s	SA	will	decrease	particularly	when	exposed	to	driving	environments	of	high	
complexity,	and	thus	his/her	driving	performance	will	be	worse	in	comparison	to	
younger	drivers	in	such	circumstances.		
	
However,	the	evidence	to	support	this	claim	is	light.	In	Bolstad	(2001),	only	three	
measures	were	found	to	be	significantly	correlated	with	SA	and	complexity.	In	a	
moderately	complex	driving	condition	these	were:	gender;	self‐reported	vision;	and	
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perceptual	speed.	However,	in	a	highly	complex	condition	they	included,	along	with	
driving	experience,	two	measures	of	‘useful	field	of	view’	(UFOV)	‐	the	breadth	of	an	
individual’s	visual	focus.	Thus,	as	reductions	in	UFOV	have	been	correlated	with	
increases	in	on‐road	crash	involvement	by	older	drivers	(Owsley	et	al.,	1991),	an	
indirect	link	could	be	proposed	between	older	driver	SA	and	driving	performance.	
	
Such	a	link,	though,	was	not	supported	in	the	Zhang	et	al.	(2009)	study	that	also	looked	
for	an	SA‐driving	performance	relationship.	They	did	find	that	older	drivers	were	
adversely	affected	by	increased	clutter	in	a	driving	environment	(as	reported	in	Ho	et	
al.,	2001),	and	showed	poorer	SA	under	city	than	rural	conditions	(in	similar	fashion	to	
Bolstad,	2001).	However,	contrary	to	expectation,	their	older	drivers’	performance	did	
not	significantly	differ	from	that	of	younger	drivers	in	regards	to	their	lane	keeping	
abilities	‐	either	when	assessed	over	two	levels	of	driving	complexity,	or	after	
encountering	a	hazard.			
	
Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	reporting	the	same	findings,	again	highlight	lower	older	driver	SA	
scores,	but	no	significantly	observed	difference	from	younger	drivers	in	lane	deviations	
before	or	after	a	hazard’s	exposure,	and	on	either	city	or	rural	roads.		
	
Kaber	et	al.	argue	that	the	lack	of	a	performance	difference	was	due	to	the	older	drivers	
adopting	a	conservative	driving	style	to	compensate	for	any	age‐related	declines	in	
ability.	Specifically,	they	note	that	the	older	drivers	drove	slower	(31‐40%	of	their	
normal	speed)	when	negotiating	dynamic	hazards,	presumably	to	give	themselves	more	
time	to	perceive	and	process	environmental	cues	(at	Level	1	SA).	In	effect,	to	maintain	
risk	levels	below	certain	internal	thresholds	(as	also	found	by	Fuller,	McHugh,	&	Pender,	
2008;	Summala,	1996).	It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	such	compensations	did	not	
allow	the	older	driver	group	to	match	the	SA	performance	of	younger	participants,	as	
was	also	found	for	the	road	simulator	task	administered	by	Bolstad	(2001).		
	
In	addition	to	driving	slower,	previous	research	has	also	shown	that	perceptual‐motor	
co‐ordination	abilities,	such	as	the	lane	keeping	measured	in	the	Zhang/Kaber	study,	
can	become	automated	with	longer	driving	experience	(Shinar,	Meir,	&	Ben‐Shoham,	
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1998),	and	thus	to	be	undertaken	without	conscious	control	or	by	placing	excessive	
demands	on	the	older	driver’s	working	memory	capacity	(Horrey	&	Wickens,	2006).		
So	although	older/elderly	drivers	may	have	poorer	SA	when	compared	to	younger	
drivers,	it	may	again	be	experience	that	enabled	them	to	more	proficiently	access	and	
undertake	such	automatic	processing.	This,	coupled	with	slower	vehicle	speeds	in	
recognition	of	poorer	cognitive	skill,	may	thus	have	accounted	for	their	capability	to	
keep	within	a	lane	to	a	similar	standard	to	younger	drivers,	as	Zhang	et	al.	report.	
	
It	should	be	mentioned,	however,	that	the	number	of	studies	that	have	sought	such	
correlations	is	small,	and	have	focussed	on	a	few,	and	perhaps	more	easily	achieved,	
tasks	(in	addition	to	lane	keeping,	for	example,	spotting	signs	(Ho	et	al.,	2001),	and	all	
driven	at	a	comfortable	pace	for	a	short	duration).	Nevertheless,	these	findings	do	run	
contrary	to	what	might	have	been	expected	for	SA	and	performance	in	the	driving	
domain.	
	
2.3.5.	Conclusion	and	the	way	forward	
The	consideration	given	above	to	the	theories	for	older	driver	cognitive	declines	from	a	
Situation	Awareness	perspective	highlight	the	concept’s	usefulness	as	an	explanatory	
framework	for	explaining	driving	performance.	It	has	been	seen,	for	example,	how	much	
can	depend	on	what	relevant	movements	and	cues	a	driver	selectively	attends	to,	as	
these	can	allow	for	better	anticipation	of	the	intentions	of	others.		
	
It	has	also	been	suggested	that	driving	requires	Situation	Awareness	to,	for	example,	
monitor	a	constantly	changing	environment,	understand	and	manage	incoming	
information,	and	make	decisions	under	high	mental	workload	conditions.	So	if	drivers	
are	not	able	to	adequately	perform	such	tasks,	it	would	seem	reasonable	to	conclude	
that	their	driving	performance	would	ultimately	suffer.	It	has	additionally	been	seen	in	
previous	sections	that	several	cognitive	and	physical	abilities	are	needed	to	undertake	
these	driving	tasks.	These	include	vision,	perception,	memory,	and	attention,	and	that	
these	abilities	also	change	with	age,	and	become	more	pronounced	as	a	task’s	difficulty	
increases.	Thus	it	is	proposed	that	these	declinations	will	impinge	on	the	initial	
formation	of	Situation	Awareness	(Bolstad	&	Hess,	2000,	supporting	a	viewpoint	given	
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by	Jones	&	Endsley,	1996),	as	they	will	bring	difficulties	in	perceiving	what	is	important	
in	a	driving	environment	such	as	lane	position,	speed,	and	the	location	of	other	cars.	
	
Yet	when	older	drivers	undertake	the	somewhat	contrived,	simulator‐based	tasks	of	
Boldstad	(2001)	and	Zhang	et	al.	(2009),	although	their	SA	is	generally	found	to	be	
deficient	to	that	of	younger	groups,	it	is	not	(as	assessed	by	Zhang/Kaber)	related	to	a	
driving	performance	measure.	Intuitively,	however,	as	Rogers	et	al.	(2011)	have	shown	
above,	there	should	be	a	relationship	between	SA	and	such	performance.	So	could	it	be,	
as	Zhang	et	al.	suggests,	that	the	older	drivers	benefitted	from	using	compensatory	
mechanisms	(such	as	slowing	their	speed)	to	help	overcome	any	cognitive	and	physical	
difficulties,	and	thus	produce	task	performances	to	similar	standards	as	younger	
participants?	But,	then,	if	cognitive	and	physical	difficulties	were	overcome	to	perform	a	
task,	why	was	SA	still	detrimentally	effected?		
	
A	more	recent	Distributed	Situation	Awareness	(DSA)	approach	to	driving	studies	(as	
advocated	by	e.g.	Salmon	et	al.,	2008;	Stanton	et	al.,	2010)	perhaps	may	help	to	provide	
some	additional	answers.	This	approach,	that	considers	the	driving	‘system’	as	the	unit	
of	analysis,	rather	than	one	based	solely	on	the	individual,	will	be	considered	further	in	
Chapter	3.	In	brief,	however,	it	importantly	argues	that	only	by	assessing	the	driving	
‘system’	can	a	complete	picture	of	a	driver’s	SA	be	revealed,	and	that	previous	SA	
studies	that	have	focussed	solely	on	the	individual	will,	as	a	result,	carry	methodological	
limitations.	
	
Those	adhering	to	a	Distributed	Situation	Awareness	approach	also	advocate	for	the	
evaluation	of	SA	from	data	gathered	during	actual	journeys,	and	due	to	recent	advances	
in	software	capability,	data	captured	from	such	environments	can	now	be	analysed	
more	rigorously.	Such	an	approach	would	thus	appear	to	provide	a	better	basis	for	
understanding	the	relationship	between	SA	and	driver	age	than	the	‘individualistic’	
measures	considered	thus	far,	which	have	exclusively	focussed	on	artificially	‘freezing’	
simulated	driving	tasks	to	ask	recall‐based	questions.	
	
The	merits	of	the	DSA	approach,	and	the	SA	models	they	are	based	on,	will	also	be	
considered	in	Chapter	3,	and	this,	in	turn,	will	then	inform	the	method	and	analysis	to	
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be	adopted	for	the	studies	that	follow	in	Chapter’s	4,	6,	and	7.	Overall,	however,	when	
considering	research	methods	for	these	studies,	the	aim	was	to	look	to	gather	a	greater	
range	and	depth	of	information	than	had	been	undertaken	previously,	and	whenever	
possible,	for	it	to	be	captured	from	on‐road	environments.	The	routes	chosen	for	
investigation	in	this	context	would	additionally	have	to	be	different	in	their	levels	of	
complexity,	in	order	to	provide	an	insight	as	to	whether	SA	could	be	degraded	by	age‐
related	decrements	in	cognitive	processing,	or	be	compensated	for	by,	for	example,	
presumed	higher	levels	of	automatic	processing	and	longer	driving	experience.	
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Chapter	3:	Research	Methods	
	
3.1.	Two	competing	models	of	Situation	Awareness	(SA)	
As	has	been	seen	in	Chapter	1,	there	is	a	divergence	of	views	as	to	what	Situation	
Awareness	actually	is.	Some	contend	that	it	is	knowledge	held	in	working	memory	(e.g.	
Bell	&	Lyon,	2000),	some	a	cognitive	product	of	information‐processing	(e.g.	Endsley,	
1995a),	others	externally	directed	consciousness	(e.g.	Smith	&	Hancock,	1995).	There	
are	also	different	views	as	to	whether	it	is	simply	a	process	of	gaining	awareness	(e.g.	
Fracker,	1991b),	more	the	product	of	awareness	(e.g.	Endsley,	1995a),	or	a	combination	
of	the	two	(e.g.	Smith	&	Hancock,	1995).			
	
This	chapter	begins	by	considering	two	models	of	how	an	individual	is	thought	to	gain	
Situation	Awareness,	so	as	to	provide	a	contrast	between	the	one	favoured	in	this	thesis	
(based	on	externally	directed	consciousness),	and	the	one	still	predominant	in	the	
literature	at	this	time	(based	on	an	individual’s	information‐processing).	Further	
consideration	is	then	given	to	a	‘Distributed	system’	perspective	of	Situation	Awareness	
(DSA),	and	its	linkage	to	the	first	of	these	two	models,	proposed	by	Smith	&	Hancock	
(1995).	A	number	of	related	measures	of	SA	are	then	reviewed,	leading	to	a	justification	
for	taking	a	more	systems‐based	approach,	and	an	explanation	of	a	(related)	method	
and	technique	that	would	be	utilised	for	the	studies	reported	in	the	chapters	that	follow.	
	
3.1.1.	SA	based	on	an	individual’s	information	processing		
Although	numerous	definitions	of	Situation	Awareness	have	been	proposed,	Endsley's	
definition	(1988,	p.97)	remains	the	established	and	most	widely	accepted.	This,	to	
restate,	contends	that	SA	is:	"the	perception	of	elements	in	the	environment	within	a	
volume	of	time	and	space,	the	comprehension	of	their	meaning,	and	the	projection	of	
their	status	in	the	near	future".	The	reason	for	this	longevity	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that	
whilst	some	definitions	are	specific	to	the	environment	from	which	they	were	adapted,	
Endsley's	definition	is	applicable	across	a	range	of	task	domains.		
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Endsley	has	also	provided	the	most	cited	and	well	known	theoretical	framework	of	SA	
(Endsley,	1995a),	which	Stanton	et	al.	(2001)	and	Salmon	et	al.	(2009)	suggest	is,	
advantageously,	both	simple	to	understand	and	to	measure.	
3.1.1.1.	Endsley’s	three‐level	model	
As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	3.1	below,	the	model	is	linear	in	approach	with	Situation	
Awareness	being	formed	through	three	inter‐connecting	stages	or	levels:	these	are	the	
‘Perception	of	elements	in	the	current	situation’	(Level	1);	‘Comprehension	of	the	
current	situation’	(Level	2);	and,	‘Projection	of	future	states’	(Level	3).	These	three	
levels	will	now	be	considered	in	further	detail.	
	
Figure	3.1:	Endsley's	model	of	Situation	Awareness	(adapted	from	Endsley,	1995a)	
	
		
	
At	the	‘Perception’	Level	(1):	we	are	said	to	perceive	the	status,	attributes,	and	dynamics	
of	relevant	environmental	elements.	This	involves	monitoring,	cue	detection,	and	simple	
recognition	of	multiple	situational	elements	(objects,	events,	people,	environmental	
factors)	and	their	current	states	(locations,	conditions,	modes,	actions).	
	
At	the	‘Comprehension’	Level	(2):	a	synthesis	of	the	disjointed	Level	1	elements	occurs	
through	the	processes	of	pattern	recognition,	interpretations,	and	evaluations.	This	
information	is	then	integrated	on	the	basis	of	an	individual's	goals	and	objectives.	Thus	
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at	this	stage	we	are	said	to	have	the	capability	to	develop	a	comprehensive	picture	‐	a	
world	view,	or	at	least	a	portion	of	relevant	concern.	
	
At	the	‘Projection’	Level	(3):	we	seek	to	project	the	future	actions	of	the	elements	in	an	
environment.	We	achieve	this	through	our	knowledge	of	their	status	and	dynamics,	and	
a	comprehension	of	a	situation	(through	our	Level	1	&	2	SA	processing).	We	then	
extrapolate	this	information	forward	in	time	to	determine	how	it	will	affect	the	future	
states	of	the	environment	that	we	are	seeking	to	understand.	
	
The	model’s	formulation	is	based	on	the	individual,	who	processes	information	in	a	
data‐driven	and	linear	fashion.	The	information	the	person	directs	attention	to	and	
interprets	will	much	depend	on	his/her	goals	and	preconceptions.	Thus,	a	person’s	
perception	of	the	elements	deemed	of	relevance	in	an	environment	will	form	the	basis	
of	their	SA,	which	will	then	serially	inform	his/her	decision	making	and	actions.	
	
In	terms	of	how	information	translates	into	Situation	Awareness,	the	model	assumes	
that	features	in	the	environment	are	mapped	onto	mental	models	in	the	mind	of	the	
individual	and	that	these	models	are	used	to	develop	SA.	Having	to	process	(excessive)	
demands	through	(limited)	working	memory	capacity	will	restrict	this	development,	as	
will	a	situation’s	or	task’s	difficulty	and/or	novelty.	However,	experience	can	afford	an	
individual	an	advantage	by	enabling	environmental	cues	to	be	matched	with	existing	
mental	models	in	memory,	aiding	recall.		
	
Endsley's	model	thus	illustrates	that	several	variables	can	influence	the	development	
and	maintenance	of	SA,	and	therefore,	although	it	can	support	the	necessary	input	
processes	(e.g.,	cue	recognition,	prediction)	upon	which	good	decisions	are	based	(e.g.	
Artman,	2000)	we	should	not	expect	similar	SA‐related	performances.	This	is	even	the	
case	when	the	same	information	or	training	is	provided,	as	each	individual	will	vary	in	
their	ability	to	acquire	SA.	
	
Endsley	concludes	that	her	model	shows	how	SA	"provides	the	primary	basis	for	
subsequent	decision	making	and	performance	in	the	operation	of	complex,	dynamic	
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systems"	(Endsley,	1995a,	p.65).	However,	other	approaches	suggest	the	approach,	in	
essence	at	least,	is	too	reductionist.		
	
3.1.2.	SA	based	on	the	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’	model	
An	alternative	model	of	Situation	Awareness	has	been	proposed	by	Smith	&	Hancock	
(1995),	it	is	often	referred	to	as	having	either	a	systems	or	ecological	approach,	and	is	
based	on	Neisser’s	‘Perceptual	Cycle’	(Neisser,	1976).	That	is	not	to	suggest	that	it	is	the	
only	alternative	to	Endsley’s	model.	There	is,	for	example,	the	lesser	considered	Theory	
of	Activity	model	(Bedny	&	Meister,	1999),	however,	Smith	and	Hancock’s	is	arguably	
the	most	widely	known	and	the	principal	alternative.	Macquet	&	Stanton	(2014),	for	
example,	state	“In	the	literature,	two	main	models	are	distinguished	to	describe	SA:	
Endsley's	(1995)	three‐levels	model,	which	is	the	most	popular,	and	Smith's	and	
Hancock's	(1995)	model	based	on	Neisser's	perception–action	cycle	theory”	(p.725).	
The	elevation	of	this	model	is	probably	due	to	other	prominent	alternatives	focussing,	
like	Endsley,	solely	on	the	individual	when	considering	SA	acquisition	and	maintenance.	
Smith	and	Hancock,	in	contrast,	take	a	more	holistic	view	of	SA	by	considering	how	the	
individual	interacts	with	other	technical	artefacts	to	produce	a	‘generative	process	of	
knowledge	creation	and	informed	action	taking’	(Smith	&	Hancock,	1995,	p.142).		
		
The	model	views	Situation	Awareness	as	being	achieved	through	a	cyclical	interaction	
between	the	perceived	environment,	memory	schema,	and	active	exploration.	And	that,	
therefore,	its	‘unit	of	analysis’	should	be	at	the	level	of	such	interactions,	rather	than	
Endsley’s	concentration	on	an	individual’s	more	serial	processing	of	information.	Like	
Patrick	et	al.	(2006),	Smith	and	Hancock	also	advocate	that	these	cyclical	interaction	
activities	should	be	tracked	in	real	time,	rather	than	mere	‘snapshots’	favoured	by	
methods	aligned	to	Endsley’s	model,	as	these	would	not	be	able	to	tell	the	whole	‘SA	
story’,	no	more	than	a	few	still	photographs	would	reveal	the	nature	of	a	plot	in	a	film.	
		
Produced	below,	in	Figure	3.2,	is	their	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’	model	of	Situation	
Awareness	(Smith	&	Hancock,	1995).	This	shows	how	schema	driven	sampling	and	
perception	of	an	environment	can	confirm	or	modify	an	individual’s	relevant	schemas,	
which	then	directs	his/her	behaviour.	And	so	the	cycle	continues.		
58 
 
Figure	3.2:	Smith	&	Hancock’s	model	of	Situation	Awareness	based	on	Neisser’s	(1976)	
‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’	
		
	
The	model	is	based	on	three	strands	of	thinking:	schema	theory	(including	genotype	
and	phenotype	schemata);	the	mapping	of	these	concepts	onto	a	Perceptual‐action	cycle	
model	of	cognition	(Neisser,	1976);	and,	in	turn,	the	mapping	of	these	concepts	onto	SA.	
Consideration	shall	now	be	given	to	each	of	these	aspects	of	the	model.		
	
3.1.2.1.	Schema	theory	
Bartlett	(1932)	introduced	the	‘schema’	concept	to	describe	how	people	interpret	
information.	He	saw	them	as	active	organisations	(mental	templates)	of	past	reactions	
and	experiences,	which	were	combined	with	current	information,	goals,	available	tools,	
and	the	situation,	to	produce	behaviour.	Our	schemata	enable	us	to	understand	streams	
of	activity.	They	allow	us	to	anticipate,	to	make	sense	of	an	event,	which	then	informs	
what	we	do,	and	what	information	we	then	look	for,	and	attend	to.		They	thus	can	both	
modify,	and	be	modified	by,	an	experience.		
	
Norman	&	Shallice	(1986)	have	suggested	that	schemata	are	templates	for	behaviour	
that	are	triggered	by	cues	in	the	environment.	So	although	several	schemata	might	be	
activated	at	any	moment	in	time	(offering	a	range	and	variety	of	possible	behaviours),	a	
selected	schema	can	often	be	automatically	allocated	on	the	basis	of	the	strength	of	
activation	and	the	motivations	of	the	individual;	whereas	controlled	processes	are	only	
activated	when	the	task	becomes	too	difficult,	such	as	novel	situations	or	when	errors	
are	made.	So	in	this	regards	we	can	contrast	genotype	schemas,	that	allow	us	to	react	
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automatically	or	prototypically	to	specific	situations	or	tasks,	such	as	a	strong	
stereotyped	response	to	turn	a	tap	in	a	particular	direction	to	turn	it	on	or	off	(Sanders	
&	McCormick,	1992),	with	phenotype	schemas,	which	are	more	state	specifically	
activated	and	controlled,	and	brought	to	bear	in	more	novel	situations	through,	say,	
intuitive	interpretations.	
	
Thus,	schema‐based	theories	tacitly	assume	that	cognition	is	not	only	cyclical	(rather	
than	linear)	but	also	parallel	(rather	than	serial)	in	processing	information.		
	
The	individualistic	nature	of	schema	use	could	additionally	indicate	that	those	with	
experience	of	a	particular	situation	could	have	richer	schemata.	As	a	result,	they	may	
not	only	attend	to	different	stimuli	(as	directed	by	their	schemata),	but	also	derive	a	
better	understanding	of	it	through	that	interaction.	Thus	an	argument	is	made	that	
different	road	users	could	possess	different	schema	even	for	the	same	road	situations,	
with,	in	some	cases,	the	wrong	schema	being	activated	or	mistimed	(Walker	et	al.,	
2011).	This	is	likely	to	include	issues	such	as	failing	to	see	other	road	users	(i.e.	looked	
but	failed	to	see	errors	(Brown,	2002)),	or	failing	to	comprehend	how	other	road	users	
are	likely	to	behave.	
	
3.1.2.2.	Neisser’s	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’	model	of	cognition	
Neisser	(1976)	described	what	he	termed	the	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’,	which	proposed	
that	the	anticipatory	schemata	an	individual	holds	served	to	anticipate	perception	and	
direct	action	(see	Figure	3.3	below).	He	saw	perception	as	an	active,	rather	than	a	
passive,	process	that	was	schema	guided	as	to	what	was	attended	to,	acted	upon,	and	
expected.			
	
Once	again,	this	exploration	leads	to	an	adaptation	to	the	environment	by	the	perceiver,	
which	in	turn	guides	future	exploration.		So,	for	example,	in	a	driving	context,	a	driver’s	
schemas	direct	what	information	s/he	samples,	which	in	turn	modifies	the	driver’s	
schema/mental	theory	of	the	situation,	and	thus,	his/her	behaviour.	
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Figure	3.3:	Neisser’s	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’	model	(1976)	
	
	
	
3.1.2.3.	Mapping	onto	SA	
In	a	similar	fashion,	Situation	Awareness	is	seen	by	this	approach	as	neither	resident	in	
the	world	nor	in	the	person,	but	as	a	result	of	the	cyclical	interaction	between	them	
both.		
	
Adams,	Tenney,	&	Pew	(1995)	who,	like	Smith	and	Hancock,	have	produced	their	own	
SA	theory	based	on	the	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’,	illustrate	how	it	is	possible	for	people	
to	maintain	SA.	Using	a	driving	example,	they	explain	that	as	a	car	driver	knows	from	
previous	experiences	how	a	driving	situation	should	evolve	(e.g.,	the	distance	to	a	lead	
vehicle	should	remain	stable);	so	s/he	will	repeatedly	and	actively	attend	to	relevant	
aspects	in	the	environment	(e.g.,	the	lead	vehicle),	and	compare	them	to	an	expected	
‘situational	development’	based	on	prior	knowledge.	The	results	of	that	comparison	will	
then	guide	both	future	exploration,	and	other	aspects	of,	behaviour.	However,	they	add	
the	caveat	that	“the	flow	of	data	[must	be]	manageably	paced	and	reasonably	
compatible	with	the	knowledge	and	experience	constituting	the	perceiver’s	active	
schema”	(Adams	et	al.,	1995,	p.90).	
	
3.2.	A	‘Distributed’	Situation	Awareness?	
	A	further	important	distinction	then	between	Endsley’s	model,	and	‘Perceptual‐action	
Cycle’	models	such	as	Smith	and	Hancock’s,	is	in	relation	to	where	Situation	Awareness	
is	said	to	reside.	For	Endsley,	Situation	Awareness,	like	cognition,	and	knowledge,	is	
held	solely	within	the	individual;	however,	for	Smith	and	Hancock	it	is	gained	from	
61 
 
externally	directed	consciousness,	and	thus	sourced	from	across	the	environment	the	
individual	is	operating	within.	To	explain	this	distinction	further	it	is	necessary	to	
consider	the	work	of	Edwin	Hutchins,	who	introduced	a	theory	of	‘distributed	cognition’	
(Hutchins,	1995ab).		
	
3.2.1.	Distributed	cognition	
Hutchins	saw	our	cognitive	activities	as	computations	that	took	place	within	a	system	
through	a	transformation	of	information	resources.	He	argued	that	the	knowledge	and	
cognition	to	operate	a	naval	vessel,	for	example,	would	not	exist	solely	in	the	head,	as	
contended	by	Endsley,	but	rather	that	it	would	be	distributed	across	objects,	individuals,	
artifacts,	and	tools	on	the	ship.	It	therefore	wasn’t	necessary	for	the	individual(s)	to	
know	all	the	required	information,	just	relevant	information.	As	long	as	the	required	
information	was	held	somewhere	in	the	system	(by	a	human	or	instrumentation)	and	
correctly	activated,	a	task	could	be	successfully	completed.	Indeed,	this	could	still	be	the	
case	even	where	one	individual	had	degraded	SA,	as	it	could	be	compensated	for	by	
another	element	(either	human	or	instrumentation)	within	the	system.	
		
So	to	understand	Situation	Awareness,	Hutchins	argued	that	we	should	analyse	the	
interactions	between	these	different	information	'components'	over	time	and	place.	
These	would	include	the	physical	manipulation	of	objects,	and	the	creation/exchange	of	
external	representations	that	were	evolving	between	people,	or	between,	say,	people	
and	instrumentation.	We	should	take	account	of	the	fact	that	individuals,	whether	
working	alone	on	a	task,	or	in	a	team,	would	bring	different	kinds	of	knowledge	to	it	
depending	on	their	own	goals,	roles,	and	experience.	And	that	they	would	also	engage	in	
interactions	that	would	allow	them	to	pool	various	resources	to	accomplish	a	task.		
	
Hutchins	therefore	believed	that	SA	was	better	viewed	as	an	emergent	property	from	
such	interactions,	rather	than	residing	within	the	individual	alone.	He	did	not	discount	
the	individual,	but	rather	saw	his/her	role	as	confined	to	“providing	the	internal	
structures	that	are	required	to	get	the	external	structures	into	co‐ordination	with	one	
another”	(Hutchins,	1995a,	p.131).	
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3.2.2.	Distributed	Situation	Awareness	(DSA)	
Drawing	much	on	the	work	of	Hutchins	(1995ab)	above,	Stanton	et	al.	(2006)	have	
additionally	proposed	a	model	of	Distributed	Situation	Awareness	(DSA),	that,	like	
Hutchins,	suggests	SA‐related	knowledge	is	distributed	between	both	human	(e.g.,	
human	operators)	and	non‐human	(e.g.,	tools,	documents,	displays)	‘agents’.			
	
As	Situation	Awareness	will	change	moment	by	moment,	in	the	light	of	changes	in	a	
task,	an	environment,	and	interactions	(both	social	and	technological),	it	thus	is	defined	
as	“activated	knowledge	for	a	specific	task	within	a	system	at	a	specific	time	by	specific	
agents”	(Stanton	et	al.,	2010,	p.34).	In	the	context	of	a	driving	system,	like	Hutchins,	
Stanton	argues	that	it	would	not	matter	if	the	driver,	the	car’s	technology,	or	perhaps	
the	road	infrastructure,	owned	relevant	SA‐related	information,	only,	that	it	was	held	
somewhere	in	the	driving	system,	and	was	drawn	upon	at	the	right	time	by	the	right	
person.	
	
Stanton’s	theory,	however,	has	more	relevance	for	teams	than	those	involved	in	
individual	tasks	such	as	driving.	In	this	regard	he	draws	his	ideas	from	Artman	&	Garbis	
(1998)	who	defined	team	SA	as	“the	active	construction	of	a	model	of	a	situation	partly	
shared	and	partly	distributed	between	two	or	more	agents,	from	which	one	can	
anticipate	important	future	states	in	the	near	future”	(Artman	&	Garbis,	1998,	p.2).		
	
According	to	Stanton	et	al.	(2006),	each	agent	within	a	system	plays	a	critical	role	in	the	
development	and	maintenance	of	another	agents’	SA,	and	again	like	Hutchins	(1995ab),	
he	believes	that	limited	or	degraded	SA	can	be	enhanced	or	updated	through	
interactions	with	other	agents.	In	this	respect,	some	relevance	to	driving	can	be	noted,	
as	a	passenger,	policeman,	or	passer‐by	could	be	viewed	as	such	an	additional	‘agent’.	
	
In	Figure	3.4,	Stanton	et	al.’s	DSA	concept	is	represented	by	a	graphic	reproduced	from	
Salmon	et	al.	(2008).	In	this	example,	the	information	comprising	the	DSA	of	the	system	
is	held	by	four	human	agents	and	a	number	of	non‐human	elements	(i.e.	computers,	
documents,	displays,	and	mobile	‘phones).	Although	the	human	agents	are	physically	
‘distributed’	from	one	another,	they	are	able	to	work	collaboratively	by	utilising	the	
non‐human	elements	that	will	provide	them	with	DSA‐relevant	information	additional	
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to	what	they	hold	themselves.	A	key	facet	of	the	model	then	is	the	exchanges,	or	
‘transactions’,	between	these	agents	and	elements,	as	their	quality	will	determine	how	
well	DSA	is	maintained	throughout	the	course	of	a	task,	and	how	efficiently,	and	
potentially	how	safely,	it	is	performed.		
	
Figure	3.4:	A	visual	representation	of	Stanton	et	al.’s	Distributed	Situation	Awareness	
(Stanton	et	al.,	2006)		
	
	
Although	the	DSA	approach	focusses	on	team	working,	the	theory	and	method	work	
equally	well	with	what	Stanton	et	al.	(2006)	term	‘single	person‐machine’	systems	
(p.1308),	as	DSA	is	concerned	with	how	knowledge	is	used	and	parsed	between	agents	
in	systems	interactions.	For	example,	the	proficiency	of	the	‘transactions’	a	driver	might	
make	with	different	roadway	‘elements’	–	say,	other	vehicles,	pedestrians,	road	
infrastructure,	and	signage	–	may	inform	his/her	level	of	DSA.	
	
As	such	system‐based	approaches	to	SA	view	it	as	emerging	from	a	cyclical	processing	
of,	and	an	interaction	with,	a	system’s	numerous	elements	‐	in	effect,	a	product	of	the	
system	itself	‐	they	tend	to	be	linked	to	the	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’	models	of	SA,	such	
as	those	proposed	by	Smith	&	Hancock	(1995)	and	Adams	et	al.	(1995).	Salmon	et	al.	
(2008)	explain	that	this	is	because	they	cater	for	the	dynamic	aspects	of	SA,	and	that	the	
factors	impacting	on	SA	acquisition	and	maintenance	are	better	described.	Neville	&	
Salmon	(2015)	additionally	emphasise	their	schema‐driven	exploration	of	the	world,	
and	that	the	overall	system	(rather	than	the	individual)	is	seen	as	the	unit	of	analysis.	
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Having	knowledge	of	these	two	different	approaches	to	SA	formulation,	one	based	on	
systems,	but	perhaps,	moreover,	the	other	established	alternative	proposed	by	Endsley,	
are	important	precursors	for	the	following	section.	This	is	because	each	approach,	as	a	
result	of	the	assumptions	that	it	makes	as	to	the	provenance	and	conceptualisation	of	
SA,	will	inform	the	techniques	that	it	employs	for	its	measurement.	In	the	following	
section,	consideration	will	be	given	to	the	main	methods	that	have	been	utilised	to	date.	
	
3.3.	The	main	methods	of	SA	measurement	
It	is	firstly	important	to	preface	this	section	by	highlighting	that	the	nature	of	Situation	
Awareness	poses	a	considerable	challenge	to	its	quantification	and	measurement	(see	
Endsley	&	Garland,	2000;	Fracker,	1991ab).	Perhaps	partly	as	a	result,	one	review	has	
identified	over	twenty	different	approaches	designed	specifically	for	its	measurement	
(Stanton	et	al.,	2005).	Generally,	these	techniques	will	fall	into	one	of	seven	main	
categories.	These	shall	be	considered	briefly	below,	moving	from	those	more	aligned	to	
the	traditional,	individualistic,	approach	to	SA	measurement,	to	ones	more	favoured	by	
researchers	who	advocate	a	systems	approach.	
	
3.3.1.	Freeze	probe	techniques		
Freeze	probe	recall	techniques	seek	to	take	a	snapshot	of	the	contents	of	an	individual’s	
mind,	as	it	relates	to	SA,	at	particular	point(s)	in	time.	They	have	their	origin	in	aviation	
and	along	with	this	domain	have	been	utilised	in,	for	example,	road	transport,	the	
military,	and	nuclear	power.	They	involve	the	administration	of	SA‐related	queries	
during	‘freezes’	in	a	simulation	of	the	task	under	analysis.	Typically,	at	random	intervals,	
all	displays	and	screens	are	blanked,	and	a	set	of	SA	queries	are	administered.	A	
participant’s	answers	are	judged	against	what	is	felt	should	be	recalled	at	each	‘freeze’	
stage	with	an	overall	SA	score	being	calculated	at	the	end	of	a	trial.	
	
3.3.1.1.	Examples	
Although	other	tests	exist,	such	as	the	WOMBAT/HUPEX	Situational	Awareness	and	
Stress	Tolerance	Test	(Roscoe	&	Corl,	1987),	the	most	commonly	used	freeze	probe	
measure	is	the	Situation	Awareness	Global	Assessment	Technique	(SAGAT:	Endsley,	
1988,	1995b).	SAGAT	is,	in	fact,	the	partner	to	Endsley’s	three‐level	theoretical	model	of	
SA,	and	was	developed	to	assess	pilot	SA.	SAGAT,	unsurprisingly	therefore,	measures	
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the	extent	to	which	a	participant	is	aware	of	a	pre‐defined	element	in	the	environment,	
their	understanding	of	the	properties	of	this	element	in	relation	to	the	task	they	are	
performing,	and	also	what	the	potential	future	states	of	it	might	be.			
	
Ma	&	Kaber	(2005,	2007),	have	used	a	SAGAT	style	method	to	assess	vehicle	locations	
and	colours	(Level	1	SA),	driving	behaviours	(e.g.,	acceleration,	braking,	turning)	
required	to	improve	vehicle	following	accuracy	(Level	2	SA),	and	the	projection	of	times	
to	certain	events,	such	as	the	time	until	a	next	turn	(Level	3	SA).	Notably,	most	other	
road	transport	SA	investigations	have	also	utilised	SAGAT	style	measures	(e.g.	Bolstad,	
2001;	Kass	et	al.,	2007).		
	
3.3.1.2.	Strengths	
a)	Although	interruptions	are	necessary,	it	can	measure	SA	during	a	task’s	performance.	
b)	It	can	be	applied	in	a	range	of	domains,	and	has	positive	validation	evidence.	
c)	The	approach	is	simple,	which	allows	SA	to	be	easily	compared	across	conditions.	
	
3.3.1.3.	Limitations	
a)	Its	measures	are	deterministic	and	linear,	in	that	one	defines	what	SA	is	and	then	
measures	it.	However,	in	real	world	scenarios,	arguably	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	
beforehand	what	SA	should	comprise	of.		
b)	The	method	only	captures	SA	at	specified	points	through	tasks	being	frozen,	as	such	
it	is	difficult	to	apply	in	real	world	settings	such	as	driving.		
c)	It	only	captures	data	relating	to	an	individual’s	knowledge	of	SA	elements,	not	how	
well	they	may	be	integrated.	
d)	The	approach’s	ecological	validity	could	be	questioned,	as	the	allocation	of	attention	
between	task	and	test	elements	in	a	simulator	may	differ	in	real	world	environments.			
	
3.3.2.	Real‐time	probe	techniques		
Real‐time	probe	techniques	involve	the	administration	of	SA‐related	queries	during	a	
task’s	performance,	but	with	no	freeze	of	the	task	under	analysis,	and	with	answers	and	
response	times	being	taken	as	a	measure	of	a	participant’s	SA.		
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3.3.2.1.	Examples	
The	Situation	Present	Assessment	Method	(SPAM:	Durso	et	al.,	1998)	is	a	real‐time	
probe	technique	developed	for	assessing	air	traffic	controller	SA.	It	uses	task‐related	
queries	to	probe	operators	(e.g.,	which	of	the	two	aircraft,	A	or	B,	has	the	highest	
altitude?)	via	telephone.	The	query	response	time	(for	those	responses	that	are	correct)	
is	taken	as	an	indicator	of	the	operator’s	SA,	and	the	time	taken	to	answer	the	telephone	
acts	as	an	indicator	of	workload.	The	method	has	also	been	used	in	driving	contexts.	For	
example,	a	simulator	can	be	paused	at	unpredictable	times	(with	the	scenario	being	
evaluated	remaining	visible)	and	the	‘driver’	then	asked	to	respond	to	one	or	two	
questions	about	the	scenario	(Durso,	Bleckley,	&	Dattel,	2006).	Alternatively,	the	
scenario	is	not	interrupted,	and	the	‘driver’	is	asked	about	a	predefined	event	(e.g.,	a	car	
swerving)	(Greenburg	et	al.,	2003).	The	most	common	variables	for	SA	measurement	
here	are,	again,	speed	and	accuracy	of	response.	
	
3.3.2.2.	Strengths	
a)	It	has	a	reduced	level	of	intrusiveness	compared	to	freeze	probe	approaches,	since	no	
freeze	of	the	task	is	usually	required.		
b)	The	technique	has	applicability	for	a	range	of	domains,	with	positive	validation	
evidence.	
c)	It	is	a	simple	approach	that	allows	SA	to	be	easily	compared	across	conditions.	
	
3.3.2.3.	Limitations	
a)	Real‐time	probe	measures	suffer	from	many	of	the	issues	(outlined	above)	in	relation	
to	freeze	probe	approaches.	
	
3.3.3.	Self‐rating	techniques		
This	approach	simply	asks	the	participant	to	rate	their	own	SA	after	a	particular	task	
has	been	concluded.	
	
3.3.3.1.	Example	
The	Situation	Awareness	Rating	Technique	(SART:	Taylor,	1990)	is	the	most	popular	
variant.	It	uses	ten	dimensions	to	measure	an	individual’s	SA,	is	administered	post‐trial,	
and	involves	self‐ratings	of	each	dimension	by	a	seven‐point	rating	scale.	
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3.3.3.2.	Strengths	
a)	The	approach	is	less	intrusive	than	the	above	techniques,	as	it	is	administered	post‐
trial.	
b)	It	is	quick,	low	cost,	easy	to	use,	and	requires	little	training.	
c)	It	can	be	applied	in	any	domain,	and	to	both	simulated	and	naturalistic	scenarios.	
	
3.3.3.3.	Limitations	
a)	The	measure	has	difficulty	in	correlating	SA	ratings	with	performance	(Endsley	
1995b).	It	was	found	to	have	poor	sensitivity	in	driving	assessments,	and	it	is	
questionable	as	to	whether	SA	is	actually	being	assessed.	
b)	SART	provides	a	measure	of	how	confident	a	participant	is	in	their	SA	and	their	own	
performance,	but	these	are	subjective	and	often	an	individual	is	unaware	of	the	
information	they	don’t	know.		
c)	The	results	tend	to	be	global	in	nature	and	do	not	provide	the	detailed	diagnostics	
that	objective	measures	can	provide,	or	how	they	may	relate	to	the	different	elements	
within	an	environment.		
d)	It	has	problems	connected	with	the	collection	of	data	post‐trial	(e.g.,	a	lack	of	
correlation	between	SA	and	performance	due	to	poor	recall).	
	
3.3.4.	Observer	rating	techniques		
Observer	rating	techniques	are	most	commonly	used	when	measuring	SA	‘in‐the‐field’	
due	to	their	non‐intrusive	nature.	They	typically	involve	experts/experienced	observers	
(e.g.,	peers,	commanders,	or	trained	external	experts)	who	may	have	more	information	
about	the	true	state	of	an	environment,	observing	participants	during	a	task’s	
performance	and	then	providing	an	assessment	or	rating	of	their	SA.	The	ratings	are	
based	upon	pre‐defined	observable	SA‐related	behaviours	that	"infer"	SA	from	the	
actions	that	individuals	choose	to	take,	based	on	the	assumption	that	good	actions	will	
follow	from	good	SA	and	vice‐versa.		
	
3.3.4.1.	Examples	
The	Situation	Awareness	Behaviourally	Anchored	Rating	Scale	(SABARS:	Matthews	et	
al.,	2000;	Strater	et	al.,	2001)	is	an	observer	rating	technique	that	has	been	used	to	
assess	the	Situation	Awareness	of	infantry	personnel	in	field	training	exercises	(e.g.	
68 
 
Matthews	&	Beal,	2002;	Matthews	et	al.,	2000).		In	Matthews	et	al.,	the	technique	
involved	domain	experts	observing	participants	during	a	task’s	performance	and	then	
assessing	(28)	observable	behaviours,	by	a	five‐point	rating	scale,	specifically	designed	
to	assess	platoon	leader	SA.	
	
3.3.4.2.	Strengths	
a)	It	is	non‐intrusive	to	the	tasks	being	undertaken.		
b)	Those	with	expertise	in	relation	to	the	tasks	can	make	SA‐related	judgements.	
	
3.3.4.3.	Limitations	
a)	The	extent	to	which	these	expert	observers	can	accurately	rate	the	internal	construct	
of	SA	from	actions	and	verbalisation	indicators	must	be	questioned	(see	Endsley,	
1995b).	
b)	Researchers	will	no	doubt	face	difficulties	in	assembling	an	observer	team	of	
sufficient	size	and	experience	to	rate	the	tasks.		
	
3.3.5.	Recall	and	imbedded	task	performance	measures		
Performance	measures	have	their	origins	in	road	transport,	where	they	have	mainly	
been	used	to	date.	Depending	upon	the	task,	certain	aspects	of	a	participant’s	
performance	are	recorded	in	order	to	determine	an	indirect	measure	of	his/her	SA	
which	is	"inferred"	from	the	end	result	(i.e.	task	performance	outcomes).	This	is	based	
on	the	assumption	that	better	performance	indicates	better	SA.	Common	performance	
metrics	include	the	quantity	of	output	or	productivity	level,	time	to	perform	a	task	or	
respond	to	an	event,	and	the	accuracy	of	the	response	or,	conversely,	the	number	of	
errors	committed.		
	
3.3.5.1.	Examples	
When	assessing	driver	SA,	Gugerty	(1997)	has	used	a	combination	of	recall	measures	
(e.g.,	the	percentage	of	cars	recalled	and	recall	error),	imbedded	task	measures	(e.g.,	
hazard	detection,	blocking	car	detection),	and	more	global	measures.		
	
In	a	Post‐Drive	Memory	Test	(Strayer,	Drews,	&	Johnston,	2003),	participants	were	
shown	pairs	of	driving	scenes:	one	scene	from	the	drive	they	undertook;	one	not.	They	
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were	asked	to	choose	the	one	from	the	drive	(i.e.	a	recognition	memory	test),	with	
recognition	accuracy	the	main	evaluation	variable.		
	
3.3.5.2.	Strengths	
a)	These	techniques	can	collect	information	objectively	and	without	disrupting	task	
performance.		
b)	Multiple	aspects	of	SA	can	be	measured.	
c)	Evidence	has	been	found	for	a	correlation	between	the	measures	(Gugerty,	1997).	
d)	It	is	a	simple	approach,	requiring	little	training.	
	
3.3.5.3.	Limitations	
a)	Although	evidence	exists	to	suggest	a	positive	relation	between	SA	and	performance,	
this	connection	is	argued	as	probabilistic	and	not	always	direct	and	unequivocal	
(Endsley,	1995b).	In	other	words,	as	was	suggested	in	Chapter	2,	good	task	performance	
is	not	necessarily	refective	of	good	SA	(Endsley,	1990).	
b)	It	requires	simulation	of	the	task	or	system	under	analysis.		
c)	Since	its	original	application,	it	has	had	limited	uptake	as	a	technique.	
	
3.3.6.	Process	indices	
Process	indices	examine	how	individuals	process	information	in	their	environment	in	
order	to	develop	SA	during	a	task	under	analysis.		They	are	typically	used	in	road	
transport	contexts,	taking	physiological	measurements	during	a	task’s	performance	(e.g.	
Smolensky,	1993)	to	determine	how	a	participant’s	attention	is	being	allocated,	or	how	
the	pressure	of	a	task	may	impact	upon	his/her	SA	proficiency.		
	
3.3.6.1.	Examples	
Eye	tracking	systems,	that	can	employ	various	eye	fixation	measures	(e.g.,	fixation	
duration,	scan	patterns)	to	assess	an	individual’s	attention	to	items	in,	for	example,	a	
driving	environment	or	an	in‐car	technology.		
	
Psycho‐physiological	measures	that	can	assess	the	relationship	between	performance	
and	an	individual's	physiological	state	(e.g.	French	et	al.,	2007).	For	example:	
electroencephalographic	data,	eye	blinks,	and	cardiac	activity,	to	determine	whether	an	
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individual	is	sleep	fatigued,	or	mentally	overloaded;	or	transient	heart	rate	and	
electrodermal	activity	to	evaluate	perceptions	of	critical	task‐relevant	cues	(Wilson,	
2000).	In	addition,	it	is	also	possible	to	monitor	an	individual’s	environmental	
expectancies,	that	is,	their	physiological	responses	to	upcoming	events,	as	a	measure	of	
their	current	level	of	SA	(Wilson,	2000).	
	
3.3.6.2.	Strengths	
a)	It	is	relatively	unobtrusive	to	the	primary	task	performance.		
b)	There	is	a	long	history	of	applicability	to	road	transport	settings.	
c)	Newer	system	models,	e.g.,	eye‐trackers,	have	made	it	possible	for	measurements	to	
be	taken	on	actual	roadways.	
	
3.3.6.3.	Limitations	
a)	Like	‘performance	measures’	above,	process	indices	suffer	from	the	problem	of	
measuring	the	extent	to	which	performance	and	process	can	be	linked	to	good	or	poor	
SA.		
b)	Equipment	and	data	analysis	can	require	expertise	and	training,	and	can	be	resource	
intensive.	
c)	As	it	is	an	indirect	assessment	of	SA,	there	is	usually	a	requirement	for	additional	
measures.	
	
3.3.7.	Network	analysis	
Propositional	or	semantic	networks	are	essentially	forms	of	mind	map	depicting	the	
information	that	comprises	a	person’s,	group’s,	or	system's	SA	(Salmon	et	al.,	2009).	
They	are	an	established	way	of	representing	knowledge	(e.g.	Collins	&	Loftus,	1975;	
Collins	&	Quillian,	1969,	1970)	and	have	been	used,	for	example,	in	road	transport	and	
military	domains.	They	are	based	on	the	belief	that	all	knowledge	is	in	the	form	of	
associations	(Eysenck	&	Keane,	1990).		
	
3.3.7.1.	Examples	
(Concurrent)	Verbal	Protocol	Analyses	(VPAs)	are	used	to	elicit	thought	processes	and	
knowledge	(see	Bainbridge,	1990).	They	involve	creating	a	written	transcript	of	a	
participant’s	thoughts	by	asking	him/her	to	‘think	aloud’	whilst	undertaking	the	task	
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under	investigation.		VPA’s	are	used	as	a	means	of	gaining	insights	into	the	cognitive	
aspects	of	complex	behaviours,	and	often	SA	proficiency	in	military	and	road	traffic	
contexts	(Stanton	et	al.,	2007;	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Salmon,	2011).	
	
Networks	can	also	be	constructed	from	Critical	Decision	Method	(CDM:	Klein	&	
Armstrong,	2005)	and	Hierarchical	Task	Analysis	(HTA:	Shepherd,	1998;	Stanton,	2006)	
outputs.		The	CDM	procedure	involves	interviewing	the	key	agents	involved	in	the	
scenario	under	analysis	using	a	series	of	pre‐defined	‘cognitive’	probes,	from	which	
information	elements	are	extracted.	These	are	said	to	present	a	description	of	the	
agent’s	subjective	view	of	a	system’s	SA	in	terms	of	its	information	elements.		
	
3.3.7.2.	Strengths	
a)	It	removes	the	need	for	scenario	freezes	and	probes	and	does	not	require	observer	
ratings	of	SA.		
b)	It	can	provide	a	description	of	SA	held	by	the	system,	as	well	as	the	individual	
operator.		
c)	The	networks	that	are	produced	can	be	analysed	statistically	and	visually.		
d)	The	technique	has	applicability	to	many	domains.	
	
3.3.7.3.	Limitations	
a)	Time	constraints	and	technological	limitations	(e.g.,	the	cost	and	availability	of	
speech	recording	systems	and	speech‐to‐text	translation	software)	make	this	approach	
less	practical	and	viable	in	time‐pressured,	fast	paced,	operations.	
b)	The	method	can	be	criticised	for	its	inability	to	identify	tacit	SA‐related	knowledge	
(i.e.	knowledge	used	but	not	openly	expressed),	and	sometimes,	as	a	result,	the	quality	
of	the	system's	SA	has	additionally	been	based	on	task	performance	and	SME’s	(Subject	
Matter	Experts)	subjective	judgements.	
c)	As	the	data	used	to	construct	a	network	is	subjective,	it	could	be	construed	as	being	
either	prone	to	error	or	lacking	content.		
d)	CDM	data	is	collected	post‐task,	and	so	could	potentially	suffer	from	problems	
associated	with	post‐trial	data	collection,	such	as	memory	degradation.	
e)	Without	software	support,	the	construction	of	a	network	is	highly	subjective	and	
resource	intensive.	
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Summary	
It	can	be	concluded	from	the	above	section	that	in	the	road	transport	sphere,	which	is	of	
relevance	to	this	thesis,	that	the	traditional,	individualistic,	approach	to	SA	
measurement,	stemming	from	the	work	of	Endsley	(1995a),	will	tend	to	utilise	
environmental	simulations.	This	is	because,	with	a	simulator,	it	is	possible	to	be	exact	
and	explicit	as	to	the	knowledge	objects	that	‘should’	be	reported,	and	it	also	allows	for	
precise	and	repeatable	information	‘probes’,	which	would	not	be	possible	in	a	
naturalistic	setting.	
		
The	problems	with	such	approaches,	however,	are	that	often	no	kinetic	motion	cues	or	
interactive	traffic	conditions	can	be	represented	in	the	simulation.	This	is	augmented	by	
a	lack	of	highly	realistic	and	complex	driving	tasks,	and	as	participants	know	SA‐related	
questions	are	to	occur	at	the	end	of	each	segment	of	a	trial,	they	may	take	advantage	of	
this	knowledge	to	prepare/anticipate	for	the	questions.	
	
The	systems	approach	as	advocated	by	Hutchins	(1995ab),	and	more	recently	by	
Stanton	et	al.	(2006)	and	Salmon	et	al.	(2008),	tends	to	favour	more	naturalistic	
methods	in	road	transport	research.	These	provide	more	ecological	validity	as,	for	
example,	actual,	more	meaningful,	driving	environments	are	utilised.	A	preference	is	
also	given	to	the	participant	using	his/her	own	car,	allowing	him/her	to	undertake	real	
driving	within	a	familiar	environment.	This	perhaps,	as	a	corollary,	provides	the	best	
chance	of	capturing	realistic	task	feedback,	particularly	as	it	is	usually	based	on	what	
the	participant	decides	to	verbalise,	rather	than	it	being	structured	by	questioning.	
	
The	principal	problem	here	though	is	that	experimental	control	is	much	harder	to	
achieve.	Even	simple	factors,	such	as	having	an	unfamiliar	passenger	present	in	the	
vehicle	(who	could	be	perceived	as	evaluating	the	participant’s	ability)	might	influence	
his/her	driving	style	and	behaviour.	This	could	lead	to	‘correct’	driving	being	
undertaken	that,	in	general,	may	not	be	evident	–	such	as	strictly	keeping	to	speed	
limits,	and	enunciating	procedural	doctrines	as	one	would	for	a	driving	test.	It	is	also	
impossible	to	create	the	exact	same	driving	environment	for	each	participant,	as	
weather	and	traffic	density	cannot	be	‘precisely’	repeated	between	trials.	
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3.4.	Justification	for	a	systems‐based	methodology	
3.4.1.	Discrete	or	structured	elements?	
It	could	be	argued	that	the	crucial	point	from	the	above	consideration	of	the	techniques	
employed	to	measure	Situation	Awareness	is	in	regards	to	whether	the	information	
elements	a	person	perceives	are	structured	in	some	way.	Is	SA	more	about	the	presence	
or	absence	of	discrete	elements	that	can	be	measured	by	tools	such	as	SAGAT,	or	is	it	
reflected	more	from	the	interconnection	of	those	elements,	and	thus	better	measured	
by,	say,	information	networks?		
	
Walker	et	al.	(2009)	has	shown	how	simple	recall	of	SA‐related	information	might	not	
be	reflective	of	SA	proficiency	by	considering	the	comparative	advantage	of	four	media	
for	a	simulated	mission‐planning	task.		
a)	Voice	only	(a	telephone	link	between	participants)	
b)	Voice	and	video	(a	live	video	link	between	participants)	
c)	Voice	and	data	(an	electronic	shared	workspace)	
d)	Voice,	video,	and	data.	
	
At	various	stages	in	the	mission	planning,	the	work	was	stopped	and	participants	were	
asked	questions	about	the	tasks.	It	was	found	(from	SAGAT	measurements)	that	the	
best	SA	performances	came	in	the	voice‐only	condition,	and,	in	fact,	as	the	media	
became	richer,	the	SAGAT	scores	became	poorer.		
	
This	counter‐intuitive	finding	is	explained	by	a	changing	reliance	on	memory.	As	the	
awareness	within	the	system	became	more	‘distributed’	across	more	media,	so	the	SA	
held	by	the	individual	declined,	as	there	was	less	of	a	need	to	remember	information.	
However,	in	circumstances	where	the	information	was	less	‘distributed’,	the	individual	
was	forced	to	remember	more	information	and	thus	was	more	able	to	score	highly	on	
the	recall‐based	SAGAT	measure.	
	
No	one,	however,	would	advocate	having	just	a	voice	only	configuration	to	undertake	a	
task	in	preference	to	one	based	on	voice,	video,	and	data.	It	would	not	be	more	SA	
proficient	for	a	pilot	to	have	no	instrumentation,	or	in	collaboration	with	an	observer	on	
the	ground,	to	guess	what	speed	s/he	was	at	for	each	stage	of	a	descent.	The	pilot’s	
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passengers	would	probably	feel	more	relaxed	if	they	knew	s/he	had	speed	indicators	
and	pre‐set	speed	settings	that	allowed	for	more	consideration	of	necessary	changes	to	
say,	wing	flaps.	
		
As	such,	it	can	be	argued	that	instruments	and	flying	aids	not	only	inform	SA	in	aviation	
contexts,	but	that	it	is	only	by	looking	at	the	interaction	with,	and	awareness	of	them,	
that	we	can	explain	how	SA	is	maintained.	This	contrasts	with	traditional	SA	measures,	
where	our	experienced	pilot,	although	more	likely	to	extract	the	critical	cues	needed	for	
each	flying	task	and	to	organise	them	more	consistently,	would	more	likely	be	seen	as	
demonstrating	worse	SA	than	a	novice	pilot,	due	to	the	latter’s	higher	utilisation	of	
feedback	control.	
	
Although	Endsley	and	her	colleagues	believe	SA	can	be	distributed	between	human	
agents,	they	are	critical	of	a	technology‐led	view	of	SA,	stating	that	“SA	does	not	exist	by	
creating	information	in	some	technical	system.	SA	exists	only	when	it	is	developed	
within	the	cognition	of	a	person	who	assesses	the	information”	(Endsley	&	Jones,	1997,	
p.22).	Endsley	(2004)	further	argues	that	a	systems	approach	is	an	alternative	one	to	
her	individual	cognitive	view,	but	through	the	systems	approach	the	level	of	analysis	
can	still	be	chosen.	This	could,	like	Endsley,	be	the	individual,	or	alternatively	a	team,	or	
a	socio‐technical	system.	But	for	systems‐based	advocates	it	would	still	have	to	
encompass	all	such	elements	and	their	interactions,	as	they	would	argue	that	you	
cannot	claim	to	understand	an	entire	system	by	studying	the	individual	(or	any	other	
discrete	aspect	of	it)	alone.	
	
3.4.2.	How	do	people	process	information?	
In	addition	to	the	potential	importance	of	the	structure	of	the	various	elements	that	
constitute	SA,	further	questions	can	be	raised	in	regards	to	the	way	Endsley	assumes	
people	process	information.	
	
She	contends	that	people	passively	accept	inputs	from	the	environment	in	a	linear	
fashion,	process	them,	and	then	initiate	some	form	of	output.		But	is	it	not	possible	that	
a	chain	of	events,	our	experiences,	or	dispositions,	might	bias	us	to	respond	to	
information	in	a	particular	way?	It	has	been	found,	for	example,	that	we	do	place	a	great	
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deal	of	importance	on	expectancy,	for	example,	in	military	decision	making	(Famewo	et	
al.,	2007;	Gadsen	et	al.,	2008;	Gadsen	&	Outteridge,	2006;	Greitzer	&	Andrews,	2008;	
Wilson	et	al.,	2007;	Dean	&	Handley,	2006).	Endsley’s	model	does	allow	for	
‘expectations’,	but	it	appears	to	influence	all	three	SA	levels	after	information	from	the	
environment	has	been	received.	But,	here	again,	are	such	factors	influential	in	primarily	
a	conscious	fashion,	particularly	in	regards	to	driving?		
	
Gugerty	(2011)	suggests,	for	example,	that	three	levels	of	cognitive	processing	are	
probably	involved	in	maintaining	SA	whilst	driving.	In	addition	to	conscious,	controlled	
processing,	he	suggests	there	is	also:	
	
a)	automatic,	pre‐attentive	processing	that	occurs	unconsciously	and	places	almost	no	
demands	on	cognitive	resources;	e.g.,	perceiving	the	changing	shape	of	the	road	and	
using	this	information	to	control	speed	and	heading,	and;	
	
b)	recognition‐primed	decision	processing,	that	may	be	conscious	for	brief	periods	(less	
than	one	second)	and	which	places	few	demands	on	our	cognitive	resources;	e.g.,	
making	routine	decisions	about	whether	to	change	lanes,	back	up,	or	stop	in	response	to	
a	yellow	light.	
	
Some	researchers	have	argued	that	a	large	proportion	of	driving	tasks	may	actually	be	
performed	in	a	predictive,	feed‐forward	manner,	such	as	the	Driving	Without	Attention	
Mode	(DWAM)	(Kerr,	1991;	May	&	Gale,	1998).	As	a	result,	perception	could	become	
automatic	for	long	periods	(Kerr,	1991),	leading	to	higher	levels	of	SA	being	developed	
on	extremely	parsimonious,	or	even	no,	instances	of	Endsley’s	lower	‘perception’	level.				
	
Thirdly,	as	Endsley	portrays	the	individual	as	merely	a	passive	recipient	of	information,	
or	an	information‐processing	unit	that	encodes	and	retrieves	information	from	
memory,	no	account	is	given	for	information	retrieval	failures	and	meaning	
misunderstandings.	Thus,	interactive	processing	(say,	with	other	system	elements)	and	
technological	support	are	discounted	(Artman	&	Garbis,	1998).		
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Finally,	Endsley’s	approach	to	SA	suggests	that	whereas	information	in	an	environment	
can	be	independently	perceived	(Level	1	SA),	it	then	apparently	has	to	be	combined	to	
be	comprehended	(Level	2),	but	then	again	unpacked	into	both	individual	and	
combinations	of	information	for	projection	(Level	3)	to	occur.	This	would	appear	
counter	intuitive,	as	where	comprehension	is	achieved	by	integrating	elements	from	
perceptions,	projection	then	requires	them	to	be	disintegrated.	Niesser	(1976)	believes	
that	it	is	unlikely	this	packing	and	unpacking	process	of	cognition	would	occur	in	reality.		
	
3.4.3.	Explanatory	value	
As	a	device	for	explaining	how	SA	is	derived,	Endsley	(1995)	describes	the	different	
cognitive	resources	and	mechanisms	that	might	be	involved	in	constructing	and	
maintaining	Situation	Awareness.	However,	her	model	is	rather	vague	about	the	nature	
of	these	processes	and	how	the	different	functions	of	SA	are	realised.	A	network	
approach	appears	to	offer	more	explanatory	value,	by	being	able	to	give	an	indication	of	
what	the	key	elements	of	SA	are	and	how	they	may	be	related.		
	
It	also	can	be	said	that	viewing	SA	solely	as	an	individual	psychological	phenomenon	
does	not	sit	easily	with	the	modern	approach	of	evaluating	socio‐technical	systems	(see	
Walker	et	al.,	2008).	Hollnagel	(1999,	2001)	goes	further,	suggesting	that	due	to	the	
complexity	of	modern	day	systems,	the	study	of	information	processing	in	the	mind	of	
individuals	has	lost	its	relevance.	And	for	Ottino	(2003),	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	
understand	a	system	by	studying	its	parts	in	isolation:	real	meaning	can	only	be	found	
by	considering	interactions	within	a	system,	and	the	resulting	behaviour	that	emerges	
from	them.	
	
The	approach	taken	in	this	thesis	for	the	evaluation	of	Situation	Awareness	in	road	
environment	contexts	is	to	incorporate	the	individual	within	the	system	s/he	is	
operating,	but	to	allow	the	component	parts	of	that	system,	most	notably	that	of	the	
individual	driver	or	driver	group,	to	be	extracted	and	evaluated.	To	achieve	this,	the	
driving	system	from	the	driver’s	perspective	has	to	be	represented,	and	it	is	proposed	
that	this	can	best	be	realised	by	creating	a	semantic	or	knowledge‐based	network.		
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3.5.	Knowledge	networks	
Networks	are	an	established	way	of	representing	knowledge	(e.g.	Collins	&	Loftus,	
1975;	Collins	&	Quillian,	1969,	1970).	In	order	to	create	one	that	is	representative	of	an	
individual’s	SA,	it	is	necessary	to	extract	information	elements	and	establish	links	
between	them.	This	can	be	achieved	when	these	elements	become	temporally,	spatially,	
causally	or	semantically	interlinked.	Typically	a	network	would	be	formed	by	concepts,	
and	as,	it	is	claimed,	that	dictionary‐like	definitions	of	concepts	can	be	produced	
(Ogden,	1987),	perhaps	this	has	provided	encouragement	for	the	development	of	
computer	software	(such	as,	Leximancer,	considered	below)	that	can	now	produce	
various	network	representations.	
		
The	network	approach	to	SA	also	fits	well	with	systems	thinking,	in	that	the	network	is	
characterised	not	only	by	its	parts,	but	by	the	relations	[or	mapping]	between	those	
parts	(Anderson,	1983;	Ausubel,	1963),	and	that	the	activity	through	them	need	not	be	
linear.	Baumann	&	Krems	(2009)	describe	how	this	approach	might	work	in	practice,	
from	their	view	of	SA	being	constructed	by	a	comprehension	process.	They	suggest	that	
perceived	information	activates	knowledge	linkages	that	are	stored	in	long‐term	
memory.	From	this	activated	knowledge	network,	a	coherent	representation	is	
constructed	by	a	‘constraint	satisfaction	process’.	This	process	constrains	the	spreading	
of	network	activation	to	only	that	of	compatible	(than	incompatible)	knowledge	
elements.	For	example,	an	event	such	as	a	traffic	light	turning	red	would	activate	
deceleration‐related	driver	interpretations	and	actions,	whilst	inhibiting	acceleration‐
related	driver	interpretations	and	actions.		
	
In	order	to	create	such	networks,	and	to	assess	how	the	information	theirin	may	be	
interrelated,	it	is	necessary	to	gain	an	insight	into	the	individual	driver’s	thoughts	and	
thought	processes.	Arguably,	the	only	way	to	achieve	this	during	actual	driving	is	
through	a	technique	known	as	the	‘Think	aloud’	method.		
	
3.6.	‘Think	aloud’	method	
The	overall	aim	of	this	method,	developed	by	Ericsson	&	Simon	(1984),	and	sometimes	
referred	to	as	Verbal	Protocol	Analysis,	is	to	extract	an	extensive	narrative	that	pertains	
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to	an	individual’s	actions	as	s/he	undertakes	a	problem	solving	task.	A	participant	is	
encouraged	to	give	a	concurrent	account	of	his/her	thoughts,	whilst	avoiding	
interpretations	or	explanations	of	what	s/he	is	doing	(although	these	can	also	usefully	
be	included).	Unlike	other	techniques	for	gathering	verbal	data,	there	are	
advantageously	no	interruptions	or	suggestive	prompts	or	questions	from	the	
researcher	that	may	hinder	the	driving	task.	
	
The	method	enables	a	capture	of	what	information	a	participant	concentrates	on,	how	it	
is	structured,	and	(if	required)	the	reasoning	and	decisions	behind	a	particular	task’s	
resolution.	In	short,	it	allows	a	researcher	to	understand,	at	least	in	part,	the	thought	
processes	that	an	individual	is	bringing	to	a	task,	and	for	the	participant,	it	is	an	
opportunity	to	relay	(and	sometimes	explain)	their	approach	in	regards	to	undertaking	
it.	
	
For	most	people,	and	indeed	this	was	also	found	in	the	series	of	studies	that	follow,	
thinking	‘aloud’	becomes	routine	after	a	few	minutes,	and	because	of	the	continual	
nature	of	the	driving‐related	tasks	undertaken,	there	was	advantageously	little	time	for	
a	participant	to	reflect	on	what	s/he	was	saying.	In	addition,	providing	a	narrative	
appears	to	neither	interfere	with	the	speed	of	performing	a	particular	task,	nor	the	
performance	itself	(see	Thomas	et	al.,	2015).		
	
Like	other	qualitative	captures,	the	‘Think	aloud’	method	seeks	rich,	in‐depth	data	from	
a	small	sample.	Kuipers	&	Kassirer	(1984)	have	justified	the	approach,	thus:	“a	
methodology	of	discovery	appropriate	to	the	undoubted	complexity	of	human	
knowledge	requires	rich	data	about	individuals	rather	than	easily	analysed	data	about	a	
population”	(p.365).	That	said,	the	method	does	allow	for	comparisons	to	be	made	both	
between	individual	participants,	and	participant	groups,	through	inferences	drawn	
from	the	structure	of	the	captured	texts.		
	
3.6.1.	Network	analysis	of	transcripts	
The	transcripts	of	commentaries	produced	by	each	participant	from	the	‘Think	aloud’	
method	provide	the	input	for	a	network‐based	analysis	of	Situation	Awareness.	Each	
participant’s	SA	can	subsequently	be	represented	by	information	‘elements’	and	the	
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relationships	between	them.	In	recent	times,	capturing	narratives	for	network	analysis	
has	become	a	popular	approach	to	investigate	driver	SA	on	the	road	(e.g.	Walker	et	al.,	
2011;	Walker	et	al.,	2008;	Salmon,	Young,	&	Cornelissen,	2013).	This	is	probably	
because,	in	tandem,	they	enable	the	keywords	and	concepts	that	may	underlie	a	
person’s	awareness,	and	the	relationships	between	them,	to	be	revealed;	and	also	how	
the	same	information	may	be	uniquely	processed.	This	relies,	of	course,	on	the	notion	
that	knowledge	comprises	of	concepts	and	how	they	are	related	(e.g.,	as	argued	by	
Shadbolt	&	Burton,	1995).	
	
A	mathematical	analysis	of	the	content	and	structure	of	a	network	can	further	reveal	
quantifiable	SA	comparisons	across	different	individuals	and	groups	(e.g.	Walker	et	al.,	
2011).	These	evaluation	tasks	can	be	undertaken	by	Leximancer	and	Agna	computer	
software,	and	the	comparative	data	that	these	programmes	can	produce,	as	they	relate	
to	the	studies	undertaken	in	this	series,	will	now	be	outlined	in	more	detail.	
	
3.7.	Assessing	the	network	
3.7.1.	Leximancer	
Leximancer	software,	developed	by	Andrew	Smith	(Smith,	2003)	at	the	University	of	
Queensland,	Brisbane,	Australia,	uses	text	representations	of	natural	language	to	
interrogate	verbal	transcripts	and	identify	themes,	concepts	and	the	relationships	
between	them.	It	does	this	by	using	algorithms	linked	to	an	in‐built	thesaurus	and	by	
focussing	on	features	within	verbal	transcripts	such	as	word	proximity,	quantity,	and	
salience	(Walker	et	al.,	2011).	The	software	employs	a	five	stage	process:		
	
a)	Conversion	of	the	raw	text	data	(definitions	of	sentences	and	paragraph	boundaries,	
etc.).	
	
b)	Automatic	concept	identification	(keyword	extraction	based	on	proximity,	frequency,	
and	other	grammatical	parameters).	
	
c)	Thesaurus	learning	(the	extent	to	which	collections	of	concepts	‘travel	together’	
through	the	text	is	quantified	and	clusters	formed).	
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d)	Concept	location	(blocks	of	text	are	tagged	with	the	names	of	concepts	which	they	
may	contain).	
	
e)	Mapping	(a	visual	representation	of	the	semantic	network	is	produced	showing	how	
concepts	link	to	each	other).	
	
As	‘e’	above	indicates,	the	software	is	able	to	produce	a	network	that	contains	any	
number	of	prescribed	concepts	derived	from	a	transcript,	and	also	the	relationships	
between	them	(reflected	within	the	text).	In	addition,	it	provides	the	basis	for	how	each	
network	is	formed	by	taking,	for	example,	a	word	count	of	all	the	concepts	it	‘finds’,	and	
from	producing	algorithmic	scores	for	how	well	they	are	related	to	one	another.	
Relevant	sentences	containing	a	concept	are	also	provided	as	supporting	evidence/text.		
	
The	Leximancer	software	can	also	make	centrality/sociometric	status	calculations,	
which	allows	for	the	most	important	nodes	within	a	network	to	be	revealed.	The	
sociometric	status	metric	is	used	to	identify	the	key	concepts	underpinning	SA	within	a	
network	(Salmon	et	al.,	2009).	It	provides	a	measure	of	how	‘busy’	a	concept	is	relative	
to	the	total	number	of	concepts	within	the	network	under	analysis	(Houghton	et	al.,	
2006).	The	key	concepts	that	are	extracted	are	defined	as	having	‘salience’,	as	they	are	
the	ones	most	highly	connected	to	others	in	the	network.	They	also	are	said	to	have	
‘centrality’,	as	they	tend	to	act	as	hubs	in	the	network.	Concepts	with	high	centrality	
have,	on	average,	shorter	distances	to	other	concepts,	they	are	likely	to	be	well	
clustered,	and	to	be	near	the	centre	of	the	network.	Concepts	with	low	centrality,	in	
contrast,	are	likely	to	be	on	the	periphery	of	the	network,	and	to	be	semantically	distant	
from	other	concepts.		
	
Leximancer	can	also	identify	those	concepts	that	are	the	same	across	individuals	or	
groups	(i.e.	present	in	many	networks),	and	those	that	are	unique	to	each	(i.e.	present	in	
only	one	network).	These	can	be	revealed	through	an	assessment	of	relevant	network	
depictions	(or	‘maps’),	and	from	the	‘Prominence’	scores	that	it	produces,	reflecting	the	
comparative	‘uniqueness’	a	main	concept	has	for	a	particular	individual	or	group.		
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3.7.1.1.	Justification	for	use	
The	Leximancer	software	was	chosen	to	assess	Situation	Awareness	for	these	road‐base	
trials,	as	it	can	uniquely	identify	and	quantify	concepts	within	an	individual	narrative	‐	
either	as	a	whole	or	in	part,	or	collectively	as	part	of	an	inter	or	intra	group	analysis.	It	
can	produce	visual	outputs	in	the	form	of	tables,	charts,	and	network	‘maps’	(see	Figure	
3.5),	allowing	a	researcher	to	visually	explore	the	conceptual	nature	of	a	narrative.	The	
‘maps’	are	created	from	concepts	that	are	derived	from	a	weighted	list	of	words	from	
the	text,	removing	the	need	for	coding	by	the	researcher.	The	software	further	allows	
direct	text	searches	to	be	undertaken,	and	provides	numerical	assessments	of	the	
importance	particular	concepts	may	have	through	word	frequencies	and	algorithmic	
values	to	other	concepts.			
	
Figure	3.5:	A	typical	Leximancer	concept	‘map’	
	
	
	
3.7.1.2.	Leximancer’s	advantages	over	a	leading	alternative,	NVivo	
Although	Leximancer	and	NVivo	software	packages	can	be	used	on	similar	sets	of	
empirical	materials	(e.g.,	interview	transcripts,	documents	and	open	survey	responses),	
they	actually	work	in	very	different	ways.	Although	NVivo	helps	a	researcher	manage	
and	organize	data,	and	facilitate	its	analysis,	it	critically	requires	him/her	to	code	the	
data	and	to	develop	themes	or	categories.	The	data	analysis	is	thus	principally	
subjective,	and	although	it	does	allow	for	meaningful	engagement	in	the	analysis	
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process,	this	could	include	a	researcher’s	preconceptions	and	biases	towards	a	
particular	individual’s	or	group’s	narrative.		
	
Leximancer,	in	contrast,	produces	results	without	the	requirement	for	such	manual	
intervention.	The	software	has	been	developed	to	identify	any	number	of	concepts	and	
their	interrelationships	automatically.	According	to	Hansson,	Carey,	&	Kjartansson	
(2010)	this	is	its	main	limitation,	as	the	researcher’s	skill	in	interpretation	is	effectively	
suppressed	by	the	manner	in	which	it	analyses	the	data.	However,	as	Leximancer	can	
link	complex	algorithmic	analysis	with	aspects	of	psychology	and	language	when	
interpreting	transcript	data,	it	is	able	to	analyse,	consistently	and	reliably,	vast	amounts	
of	text	that	would	be	equal	to	a	human	analysing	it	1000	times	over	(Gapp	et	al.,	2013).	
	
NVivo	also	appears	of	more	use	when	an	‘a	priori’	model,	or	set	of	factors,	exist(s)	that	
allows	the	researcher	to	categorise	and	summarise	the	coded	results	easily.	Leximancer,	
on	the	other	hand,	is	a	useful	tool	when	a	researcher	is	exploring	textual	data	to	uncover	
important	factors	(Davies	et	al.,	1994).	In	other	words,	it	is	particularly	relevant	when	
the	researcher	does	not	have	that	‘a	priori’	set	of	factors	or	a	model	by	which	to	analyse	
the	data,	which	was	the	case	with	the	SA	driving	studies	undertaken	for	this	thesis.	
	
Leximancer	is	also	capable	of	immediately	giving	a	‘birds‐eye’	view	of	data,	from	which	
a	researcher	can	advantageously	explore	concepts	and	their	connectivity	by	linking	the	
software’s	findings	back	to	the	original	text.	S/he	can	then	remove	concepts	that	the	
software	has	highlighted,	but	in	validation	are	not	relevant,	and	then	rebuild	a	network.	
As	such,	new	and	undiscovered	meanings	could	be	found	from	this	process	that	may	be	
missed	in	a	manual	Nvivo	analysis.		
	
Finally,	Leximancer,	unlike	Nvivo,	can	also	provide	quantitative	outputs	in	‘Excel’	format	
for	each	of	the	networks	it	produces.		These	Excel	sheets	can	then	be	entered	into	Agna	
network	analysis	software	(see	below)	for	further	quantifiable	content	and	structural	
scores.		
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3.7.2.	Agna	
This	software,	from	geocities.com,	employs	techniques	from	graph	theory	to	interrogate	
a	semantic	network	in	terms	of	its	nodes	and	linkages	(or	edges).	In	basic	terms,	it	can	
reveal	the	underlying	structural	properties	of	a	network	from	the	times	a	main	concept	
is	recorded	and	the	times	it	is	related	to	other	main	concepts.	Thus,	advantageously,	it	
can	reveal	configurations	that	would	not	readily	be	apparent	from	a	visual	inspection	
alone.	The	software	is	capable	of	providing	an	analysis	of	a	network	by	a	number	of	
metrics.	In	regards	to	Situation	Awareness,	however,	two	are	of	particular	relevance:	its	
Density	and	Diameter.		
	
3.7.2.1.	Density	
Density	refers,	in	effect,	to	the	cohesiveness	of	a	network	as	a	whole,	and	represents	a	
measure	of	its	interconnectivity	in	terms	of	the	linkages	between	its	concepts.	A	score	is	
expressed	as	a	value	between	0	and	1,	with	0	representing	a	network	with	no	
connections	between	its	concepts,	and	1	representing	a	network	in	which	every	concept	
is	connected	to	every	other	concept	(Kakimoto	et	al.,	2006;	cited	in	Walker	et	al.,	2011).	
For	SA	assessments,	higher	levels	of	interconnectivity	indicate	an	enhanced,	richer	level	
of	SA,	since	there	are	more	linkages	between	concepts	and	shorter	average	path	lengths	
between	them.	Poorer	SA	is	embodied	by	contrasting	lower	levels	of	interconnectivity,	
with	underpinning	concepts	that	are	not	so	well	integrated	and	often	reflected	by	longer	
average	path	lengths.		
	
3.7.2.2.	Diameter	
Diameter	also	refers	to	an	analysis	of	the	connections	between	concepts,	but	here	this	is	
in	relation	to	distances	across	a	network.	Higher	diameter	values	being	indicative	of	
more	concepts	per	pathway	through	the	network,	whereas	lower	diameter	scores	
indicate	the	routes	through	the	network	are	shorter	and	more	direct.	As	such,	lower	
diameter	scores	are	indicative	of	better	SA,	since	the	holder	is	able	to	generate	
awareness	through	a	shorter	linkage	between	the	concepts	within	his	or	her	network.	
Higher	diameter	scores,	in	contrast,	are	indicative	of	a	network	with	potentially	more	
concepts	but	with	longer	linking	distances	between	them.		
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Thus,	essentially,	both	measures	relate	to	the	speed	of	accessing	information.	And	so,	if	
a	network	is	overfilled	with	poorly	connected	concepts,	then	this	will	impact	on	the	
speed	and	proficiency	of	an	individual’s	awareness.			
	
Summary	
In	general,	when	consideration	is	given	to	studies	of	Situation	Awareness	in	road	
transport	contexts	there	are	few	in	number.	Consequently,	relatively	little	is	known	
about	the	factors	that	may	inhibit	or	augment	it.	When	studies	have	been	undertaken	
they	have	also	tended	to	utilise	the	model	that	was	prevalent	in	aviation	at	the	time,	
Endsley’s	three	level	model,	to	evaluate	SA;	and	indeed,	still	continue	to	do	so	(see	
Ward,	2000;	Matthews	et	al.,	2001;	&	Reason,	2008).	Consequently,	the	limitations	
associated	with	this	model	(as	highlighted	e.g.,	by	Salmon	et	al.,	2008;	Stanton	et	al.,	
2009;	and	above	in	this	chapter),	also	apply	to	the	majority	of	the	road	transport‐
related	SA	research	undertaken	to	date,	that	have	taken	it	as	a	basis	for	their	
methodology.	
	
As	has	been	argued	above,	the	main	problems	with	Endsley’s	model	in	contexts	like	
driving	are	in	both	the	way	it	conceives	SA	to	operate,	and	to	be	measured.	By	viewing	
SA	as	a	cognitive	phenomenon,	where	the	processing	of	information	is	undertaken	by	a	
driver	in	a	linear,	conscious,	fashion,	necessarily	devalues	the	awareness	that	s/he	has	
for,	say,	important	interactions	with	other	components	of	the	driving	task.	Thus	
measuring	these	interactions	could	conceivably	determine	the	character	of	SA	more	
effectively	than	traditional	SA	methods	that,	for	example,	may	simply	ask	a	driver	to	
recall	information	elements	for	matching	against	those	on	a	predetermined	list.	
	
It	has	been	shown	that	those	who	advocate	a	systems	approach	to	driver	SA,	in	contrast,	
take	a	wider	perspective	than	the	individual,	defining	driver	SA	as	activated	knowledge	
(Salmon	et	al.,	2012).	This	encompasses	the	relationships	between	the	driver’s	goals	
and	behaviours,	other	vehicles,	the	road	environment,	and	the	road	infrastructure.	It	is	
related	to	Smith	and	Hancock’s	‘Perceptual‐action	Cycle’	sampling	of	the	driving	
environment,	in	that	it	understands	that	our	behaviour	can	be	directed,	with	that	output	
then	modifying	our	schemata	in	a	cyclical	manner	(Smith	&	Hancock,	1995).	SA	is	seen	
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by	this	approach,	then,	as	much	a	feed‐forward	phenomenon,	as	one	based	on	feedback	
(alone),	as	with	Endsley’s	model.	
	
Also	central	to	this	more	contemporary	view	of	SA	is	the	notion	that	in	order	to	fully	
understand	it,	the	entire	relevant	system,	with	its	many	interacting	component	parts,	
should	be	taken	as	the	unit	of	analysis	(Salmon	et	al.,	2009,	2010a;	Stanton	et	al.,	2010;	
Walker	et	al.,	2010),	and	additionally	that	performance	variability	is	seen	as	a	natural	
occurrence	of	those	interactions	(e.g.	Shahar	et	al.,	2010;	Walker	et	al.,	2011).	This	is	
because	different	road	users	will	perceive	and	interpret	the	same	road	environment	
situation	differently	due,	for	example,	to	their	differing	goals	and	experience.	This	will	
be	the	case	whether	they	fall	within	a	particular	road	user	group	(e.g.,	car	drivers)	or	
across	different	road	user	groups	(e.g.,	car	drivers,	motorcyclists,	pedestrians,	van	
drivers).	Thus	the	level	of	SA	compatibility	between	these	different	‘agents’	is	said	to	be	
the	key	to	a	transport	system’s	overall	performance	(Stanton	et	al.,	2010)	as	they	bind	
this	socio‐technical	system	together.	
	
In	terms	of	methodology,	the	most	commonly	adopted	measure	that	has	been	utilised	to	
assess	SA	to	date	is	the	individual‐centric,	Situation	Awareness	Global	Assessment	
Technique	(SAGAT:	Endsley,	1995b).	As	has	been	seen,	this	is	a	simulator‐based	recall	
approach	that	involves	probing	participants	for	their	knowledge	of	SA	elements	during	
simulation	‘freezes’.		
	
In	contrast,	the	‘systems’	approach	has	had	a	preference	for	considering	process	indices,	
and	network	analyses.	This	later	approach	has	typically	involved	the	use	of	‘Think	
aloud’	narratives	along	with	post‐trial	cognitive	task	analysis	interviews	(e.g.	Walker	et	
al.,	2009).		
	
Both	the	SAGAT	and	network	methods	have	their	limitations,	as	was	highlighted	above,	
and	both	are	reliant	to	some	degree	on	inferring	inner	processes,	thus	raising	questions	
in	regards	to	their	construct	validity.	However,	the	network’s	relationship	to	
naturalistic	driving	contexts	arguably	retains	compelling	advantages	for	SA	
assessments.	Specifically,	the	attributes/information	that	underpin	a	driver’s	SA	(as	
part	of	the	driving	system)	are	extractable,	observable,	and	can	be	reported	on	within	
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actual	roadways.	Additionally,	the	use	of	the	participant’s	own	vehicle	probably	affords	
the	best	chance	of	capturing	the	feedback	the	driver	might	normally	exhibit.	It	can	also	
be	added,	of	course,	that	these	advantages	can	conversely	act	as	criticisms	for	
simulator‐based	research.	As	here,	any	gains	in	experimental	control	could	be	lost	by	
using	far	less	ecologically	valid	methods	(Jackson	&	Blackman,	1994).		
	
3.8.	Conclusion	
The	Distributed	model	of	SA	(DSA),	although	more	relevant	to	teams,	would	appear	the	
most	persuasive	perspective	for	the	assessment	of	driver	SA	in	the	studies	that	follow,	
as	it	allows	for	a	more	holistic	examination	of	a	driver	within	different	driving	systems.	
The	system’s	perspective	of	SA,	that	embraces	Smith	&	Hancock’s	(1995)	ecological	
model,	and	which	proposes	that	SA	exists	within	the	system	itself,	also	appears	a	more	
useful	conceptualisation	for	driving	than	Endsley’s	three‐level	model	of	information	
processing.	A	driving	system	or	environment,	after	all,	will	have	‘agents’,	both	human	
(e.g.,	vehicles)	and	non‐human	(e.g.,	traffic	lights).	These	will	have	‘different,	but	
potentially	compatible,	requirements	and	purposes’	at	any	instant	(Stanton	et	al.,	2006),	
and	indeed	it	is	the	extent	of	their	compatibility	that	will	inform	the	proficiency	of	the	
driving	system,	which,	like	SA,	would	appear	capable	of	change	over	time.			
		
Recent	movements	in	the	wider	ergonomics	community	additionally	vouch	for	a	
systems	approach,	not	just	to	assessments	of	SA	(e.g.	Salmon	et	al.,	2010a),	but	to	other	
ergonomics	concepts	‐	such	as	error	and	accidents	(Reason,	2008),	cognition	(e.g.	
Hutchins,	1995ab),	resilience	(e.g.	Hollnagel	et	al.,	2006),	and	command	and	control	(e.g.	
Walker	et	al.,	2008).	
However,	approaches	focusing	more	exclusively	on	the	individual,	with	their	related	SA	
measurements,	do	remain	appropriate.	For	example,	with	individual	training	
programmes	and	assessments	of,	perhaps,	particular	information	elements.	For	driving	
research	more	generally	then,	a	combination	of	naturalistic	and	simulator	research	
would	therefore	seem	of	value.	As	the	ecological	validity	of	real	world	driving	could	
provide	the	evidence	for	the	sorts	of	questions	that	could	be	better	answered	in	a	more	
controlled	and	safer	simulator	environment.		
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Chapter	4:	A	Study	investigating	the	comparative	proficiency	of	
older	and	younger	driver’s	Situation	Awareness	whilst	driving	a	
route	with	limited	periods	of	cognitive	taxation		
	
4.1.	Introduction	
4.1.1.	Background	to	the	issues	investigated	
In	Chapter	2,	data	was	provided	that	showed	that	with	continuing	advances	in	health	
and	medicine,	that,	in	western	societies	in	particular,	this	had	led	to	a	rapid	increase	in	
older	age	groups.	In	the	UK	alone,	an	estimate	was	given	that	by	the	year	2031	almost	
23%	of	the	population	will	be	over	60	(Office	for	National	Statistics,	2010).		
	
This	rise	has,	in	turn,	led	to	an	increase	in	the	number	of	older	drivers	in	the	UK,	up	
10.3%	to	14.5m	from	the	year	2000	(Department	for	Transport,	2014),	with	the	
expectation	that	this	number	will	not	only	increase,	but	will	do	so	faster	than	any	other	
age	group	(e.g.	Burkhardt	&	McGavock,	1999;	Lyman	et	al.,	2002;	Box,	Gandolfi,	&	
Mitchell,	2010).	It	was	argued	that	a	major	reason	for	this	continual	rise	in	older	driver	
numbers	was	borne	of	a	necessity	to	compensate	for	physical	frailties	and	disabilities	
that	impede	mobility	(Bendixen,	Mann,	&	Tomita,	2005;	Cannon,	Hendrickson,	&	Mann,	
2005),	particularly	as	communities	have	become	larger	and	amenities	more	diffuse.	
	
The	increase	in	the	number	of	older	drivers,	and	drivers	more	generally,	has	fomented	
predictions	that	road	traffic	accidents	will	continue	to	rise.	In	the	UK,	although	
casualties	from	road	accidents	have	actually	fallen	since	2009,	in	2014	this	trend	was	
reversed.	Those	killed	on	UK	roads	that	year	rose,	for	example,	by	5%,	with	this	figure	
including	a	statistically	significant	rise	of	16.6%	for	those	aged	60	and	over.	
Furthermore,	older	drivers	being	seriously	injured	also	rose	(by	11.1%)	that	year,	to	
reach	levels	not	seen	since	2003	(Department	for	Transport,	2014).	
	
It	is	because	of	such	statistics,	and,	as	was	highlighted	extensively	in	Chapter	2,	the	
range	of	age‐related	physiological,	perceptual,	and	cognitive	declines	that	may	
negatively	affect	driving	ability,	that	attracts	road	safety	research	to	older	driving	
groups.	There	is	perhaps	a	rightful	concern	that	older	drivers	are	more	susceptible	to	
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having	accidents,	as	they	have	been	found	to	be	more	likely	to	be	considered	
responsible	for	the	accidents	in	which	they	are	involved	(Langford,	et	al.,	2006)	‐	
especially	when	over	70	(Box,	Gandolfi,	&	Mitchell,	2010).	They	also	are	more	likely	to	
be	involved	in	multiple	vehicle	accidents	(Department	for	Transport,	2004),	and	to	
sustain	serious	injuries	in	comparison	to	younger	driving	age	groups.	
	
4.1.2.	SA	and	driving	
Researchers	of	Situation	Awareness	(SA)	are	also	interested	in	age‐related	
physiological,	perceptual,	and	cognitive	declines,	as	their	impact	on	an	individual’s	
information	processing	capability	should	lead	to	related	declines	in	SA.	This	has	led	to	
research	that	typically	has	sought	to	assess	how	ageing	impacts	on	a	driver's	ability	to	
attend	to	important	information	in	driving	environments	of	different	complexity.	For	
the	most	part,	as	was	shown	in	Chapter	2,	it	has	been	found	that	older	drivers	
demonstrate	poorer	Situation	Awareness	(e.g.	Bolstad,	2001;	Zhang	et	al.,	2009;	Kaber	
et	al.,	2012).	However,	there	are	studies	that	have	found	similar	(poor)	levels	amongst	
young	drivers	(Bolstad,	1996),	changing	SA	performance	according	to	environment	
conditions	(e.g.,	rural,	urban,	hazards:	Zhang	et	al.,	2009),	and	in	Bolstad	&	Endesley	
(1991),	no	age	effects	at	all.	
	
Overall,	however,	there	has	been	a	surprising	paucity	of	research	in	this	area,	
considering	the	rapid	rise	in	older	driver	populations,	and	the	potential	for	Situation	
Awareness	to	provide	insights	into	information	processing	capabilities	and	driving	
performance	in	general.	In	the	latter	respect,	for	example,	Rogers	et	al.,	(2011)	have	
found	significant	negative	correlations	between	SA	and	car	steering	error	and	speed	
variability.	
	
An	investigation	of	issues	such	as	whether	older	drivers	can	maintain	good	Situation	
Awareness	would	therefore	seem	of	value,	and	particularly	if	this	could	be	measured	on	
actual	roadways.	This	is	due	to	the	unique	usage	of	simulators	in	previous	older	driver	
SA	studies,	where	computer‐simulated	journeys	were	broken‐up	by	pre‐formulated	
questions,	and	where	SA	was	measured	by	how	well	a	participant’s	answers	matched	a	
researcher’s	expectations.	As	a	result,	the	ecological	validity	of	these	studies	has	been	
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questioned	(notably	by	Salmon	et	al.,	2008)	and	as	was	seen	in	Chapter	3,	different,	
‘distributed’,	approaches	to	SA	measurement	have	now	been	proposed.	
	
Furthermore,	if	any	linkages	could	be	found	between	SA	and	safer	driver	proficiency,	
this	could	also	be	important	as	there	then	could	be,	for	example,	potential	benefits	from	
producing	training	programmes	directed,	say,	at	appropriate	levels	of	SA.		
	
In	view	of	age‐related	information	processing	decrements	affecting	SA,	there	is	also	an	
expectation	that	older	drivers	will	demonstrate	related	declines	in	driving	performance,	
when	compared	to	other	driver	age‐groups.	However,	in	studies	that	have	assessed	
older	drivers	as	a	separate	grouping,	no	such	clear	correlation	has	been	found	(e.g.	
Bolstad,	2001;	Zhang	et	al.,	2009;	Ho	et	al.,	2001;	Kaber	et	al.,	2012).	It	could	be,	as	Lee,	
Olsen,	&	Simons‐Morton	(2006)	and	Randel	et	al.	(1996)	have	argued,	that	as	driver	
Situation	Awareness	can	develop	with	driving	experience	(and,	in	turn,	produce	safer	
driving	(Soliman	&	Mathna,	2009)),	perhaps	that	experience	can	also	feed	back	
information	that	helps	to	prolong	both	adequate	levels	of	SA	and	driving	performance?			
	
Finally,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	paucity	of	research	that	has	been	undertaken	to	date	
to	consider	the	influence	of	SA	in	driving	contexts,	applies	as	much	to	younger	as	it	does	
to	older	drivers.	Therefore,	the	approach	taken	in	this	study,	and	those	that	follow,	will	
be	to	compare,	in	depth,	the	SA	of	both	of	these	driver	age	groups.	This	should	more	
illuminate	any	of	the	expected	SA	deficits	that	the	literature	presumes	the	older	driver	
groups	will	have,	but	could	also	reveal	useful	SA‐related	information	for	the	benefit	of	
the	younger	drivers.	
	
4.1.3.	Objective	and	hypotheses	
This	study’s	objective	is	to	assess	the	Situation	Awareness	of	two	driving	groups:	one	
with	participants	above	60	years	old	(in	line	with	ROSPA	guidance,	see	Chapter	2,	
ROSPA,	2010);	and	one	with	participants	below	40	years	old.	The	assessment	will	be	
made	whilst	driving	a	non‐taxing	route	(and	thus	address	RQ1).	It	will	allow	the	driver	
to	provide	a	commentary	that	subsequently	will	reveal	a	SA	driving	network	from	the	
information	elements	that	are	considered	of	relevance	and	how	well	they	are	related.	
These	networks	can	be	compared	quantitatively	by	a	mathematical	evaluation	
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(undertaken	by	software)	that	can	indicate	the	proficiency	and	cohesion	of	the	concept	
linkages	that	comprise	them,	and	qualitatively	by	the	relevance	those	concepts	have	to	
the	task	under	investigation.			
	
It	is	hypothesised	that	the	quantitative	scores	will	be	lower	on	average	for	the	older	
(than	younger)	age	grouping,	in	line	with	previous	findings	in	the	literature.	And	
additionally,	when	the	networks	of	the	two	age	groups	are	compared,	that,	overall,	
different	concepts	will	be	focussed	on,	and	gain	prominence.		
	
4.2.	Method	
4.2.1.	Design	
Generally,	research	that	has	considered	older	drivers	and	SA	has	tended	to	utilise	
driving	simulators	and	‘freeze	probe’	methods	of	measurement	(e.g.	SAGAT),	as	was	
discussed	in	Chapter	3.		
This	study,	in	contrast,	required	participants	to	drive	their	own	cars	around	a	pre‐
defined	course,	and	whilst	doing	so	to	provide	a	verbal	commentary	of	what	
information	they	were	taking	in	from	an	environment,	what	they	intended	to	do	with	it,	
and	to	explain	their	driving	actions	(for	instructions,	see	Appendix	1).		
	
These	commentaries	were	recorded	via	an	audio	capture	device,	whilst	simultaneously	
being	listened	to	via	earphones	to	ensure	that	what	was	being	said	could	be	clearly	
heard.	For	all	of	the	driving	trials	undertaken	for	this	thesis,	only	two	people	were	
present	in	the	vehicle	–	the	researcher,	who	undertook	all	of	the	trials	to	improve	
reliability	within	the	research;	and	the	participant.	
	
The	narratives	captured	were	then	later	transcribed	verbatim,	after	which	they	were	
run	through	software	capable	of	extracting	a	detailed	network	of	the	main	cognitive	and	
physical	concepts	that	were	considered	of	importance	whilst	driving	the	route.	
Additionally,	and	again	through	computer	software,	an	individual’s	or	a	group’s	
Situation	Awareness	was	scored	from	how	proficiently	those	concepts	that	comprised	a	
driver’s	or	group’s	network	were	interrelated.	The	method	has	been	used	in	previous	
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driving	research	(e.g.	Cornelissen	et	al.,	2013;	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Chowdhury,	2013),	
but	was	pre‐tested	on	a	different	route	and	found	to	work	well.		
	
It	has	been	argued	that	this	approach	provides	a	better	and	more	realistic	basis	for	
extracting	the	level	of	detail	needed	to	provide	a	comprehensive	understanding	and	
comparison	of	the	SA	of	different	driver	age‐groups.			
	
4.2.2.	Participants	
20	participants	undertook	the	trial	(15	male;	5	female),	ranging	in	age	from	23	to	82	
years.	They	were	divided	into	two	groups:	either	to	one	comprising	of	an	age	range	of	
up	to	40	years;	or	to	another	comprising	of	an	age	range	of	above	60	years.		
The	older	participants	(8	male/2	female;	average	age:	75.6	years)	were	UK	drivers	
recruited	through	local	Probus	retirement	clubs;	the	younger	participants	(7	male/3	
female;	average	age:	31.1	years)	were	research	students	and	associates	at	the	
Loughborough	Design	School.	They	were	compensated	£20	for	their	time	and	travel	
expenses.	In	deciding	who	was	to	take	part,	preference	was	given	to	the	oldest	and	
youngest	volunteers.	
	
4.2.2.1.	Inclusion	criteria	
The	inclusion	criteria	stipulated	was	for	potential	participants	to	have	a	full	UK	driving	
licence	with	no	recent	major	endorsements,	to	be	regular	drivers,	and	to	be	aged	either	
up	to	40	years	old,	or	above	60	years	old.	
	
4.2.2.2.	Exclusion	criteria	
Due	to	the	need	for	accurate	transcriptions,	potential	participants	who	had	a	poor	
clarity	of	spoken	English	would	be	excluded.	
	
4.2.3.	Materials	
The	vehicle	used	to	drive	the	route	was	provided	by	the	participant.	The	researcher	
required	a	digital	device	to	record	the	driver’s	commentary,	and	latterly	a	PC	capable	of	
running	the	required	software	packages.	
	
92 
 
4.2.3.1	Route	
The	test	route	was	14.9	miles	in	length	(following	a	short	warm‐up	phase	of	1.26	miles)	
running	mainly	through	Leicestershire,	but	briefly,	also	in	Derbyshire,	UK.	This	route	
was	pre‐tested	for	its	suitability	for	giving	a	commentary,	for	potential	roadwork	delays,	
and	surface	condition	–	in	this	latter	regard	the	route	was	adjusted	slightly	due	to	the	
poor	condition	of	one	residential	street.	What	a	participant	faced	was	a	fairly	
straightforward	drive,	though	did	expose	him/her	to	all	classifications	of	UK	roadways.	
Specifically,	it	comprised	of	3.89	miles	of	motorway	(M1);	3.51	miles	along	major	roads	
(e.g.,	the	A6);	2.87	miles	along	urban	roads;	3.46	miles	of	rural	roads;	and	1.19	miles	
within	residential	roads.	The	route	was	estimated	to	take	about	30	minutes	to	drive	(40	
minutes	were	allocated	for	each	journey)	and	started	and	ended	at	Loughborough	
University	(see	Figure	4.1).	Prior	confirmation	was	sought	the	preceding	day	that	it	was	
generally	unknown	to	the	participants	(as	some	local	roads	would	be	familiar).	In	
addition,	the	older	drivers	were	previously	consulted	on	two	alternative	routes	(one	
without	motorway	driving;	one	with),	in	case	a	potential	participant	had	any	difficulties	
with	motorway	driving.	
	
Figure	4.1:	Route	map	and	major	route	sectors	
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All	trials	took	place	in	good	visibility	and	at	pre‐defined	times	(9.30am,	11.30	am,	or	
2pm)	in	order	to	avoid	peak	traffic	conditions	and	to	retain	some	control	over	traffic	
density.	As	the	weather	could	not	be	controlled,	it	was	important	to	ensure	a	
participant’s	safety	by	not	allowing	any	driving	in	dangerous	conditions.	Also	in	this	
regard,	care	was	taken	by	the	researcher	not	to	overly	distract	a	driver	with	
instructions,	particularly	as	this	was,	for	them,	an	unfamiliar	route.	
	
4.2.4.	Procedure	
4.2.4.1.	Pre‐run	phase	
Firstly,	informed	(ethical)	consent	was	obtained	from	all	participants	before	the	route	
was	driven	(see	Appendix	3).	At	this	time,	it	was	also	emphasised	that	control	of	the	
vehicle,	and	the	safety	of	other	road	users,	remained	the	participants’	responsibility	at	
all	times,	and	therefore	that	they	should	drive	as	they	normally	would	do	on	each	
roadway.	An	instruction	sheet	(Appendix	1)	on	how	to	provide	a	commentary	was	then	
re‐read	by	the	participant	(who	had	received	this	the	preceding	day)	and	the	researcher	
again	provided	examples	relating	to	its	desired	style	and	content.	Emphasis	was	placed	
here	on	what	information	was	being	sought	from	a	driving	environment,	and	what	
actions	were	being	taken	and	why,	but	essentially	the	message	conveyed	was	that	all	
thoughts	were	useful	and	none	could	be	‘wrong’.				
	
4.2.4.2.	Warm‐up	phase	
The	participant	then	walked	the	researcher	to	his/her	car,	and	once	comfortable,	the	
short	1.26	mile	journey	to	the	start	of	the	test	route	through	the	University’s	sprawling	
campus	began.	This	enabled	the	participant	to	practice	his/her	commentaries,	and	for	
the	researcher	it	provided	an	opportunity	to	suggest	additional	input	and	to	encourage	
as	constant	a	flow	of	relevant	information	as	possible.	It	was	also	important	during	this	
phase	for	the	researcher	to	ensure	that	the	recording	equipment	was	switched	on	once	
the	car	moved	off,	and	was	adequately	capturing	the	driver’s	comments.	At	the	end	of	
this	phase	the	participant	was	required	to	stop	their	vehicle,	and	asked	if	they	were	
happy	with	the	task.	Final	further	instructions,	if	necessary,	were	then	given	at	this	
point.	
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4.2.4.3.	Data	collection	phase	
During	this	(14.9	mile)	phase	the	researcher	remained	silent	and	simply	monitored	the	
audio	capture	process.	He	did,	however,	give	route	directions	(and	whenever	possible	
these	were	conveyed	at	times	when	a	participant	had	taken	a	pause	in	his/her	
commentary).	It	was	felt	of	importance	not	to	interrupt	or	break	a	train	of	thought	that	
was	being	enunciated.	
	
4.2.4.4.	Debriefing	stage	
A	debriefing	session,	in	the	participant’s	car,	took	place	on	return	to	the	university,	at	
which	point	the	full	purpose	of	the	study	was	revealed	and	views	were	taken	as	to	the	
perceived	difficulties	of	the	drive	and	task	(if	any).	
		
4.2.5.	Data	analysis	
The	verbal	commentaries	that	were	recorded	were	transcribed	verbatim	post‐trial,	and	
then	subjected	to	analysis	by	Leximancer	software	(Smith,	2003)	capable	of	creating	
semantic	networks	(i.e.	themes,	keywords,	key	concepts,	and	the	relationships	between	
them)	unique	to	each	participant	and/or	group.	These	networks	represented	the	
cognitive	elements	of	the	driving	task	through	changing	journey	environments,	and	thus	
provided	an	insight	into	an	individual’s	or	a	group’s	SA	within	a	driving	‘system’.	In	each	
network	were	nodes	of	variable	size	that	related	to	its	relevance,	that	is,	how	frequently	
it	occurred	and	how	it	related	to	other	elements	within	the	network	–	what	is	termed,	
its	‘semantic	connectivity’	(Leximancer,	2009).	
The	application	of	this	technique	to	verbal	commentaries	in	real‐life	transport	contexts	
is	a	relatively	new	one,	but	proven	as	a	useful	tool	for	evaluating	Situation	Awareness	in	
driving	research	(e.g.	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Chowdhury,	2013;	Walker	et	al.,	2007;	Stanton	
et	al.,	2007;	Salmon,	Stanton,	&	Young,	2012;	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Salmon,	2011).	
However,	commentaries	from	a	short	(pilot)	trial	journey	were	analysed	through	the	
Leximancer	and	Agna	software	and	were	found	to	produce	acceptable	results.			
	
4.2.5.1.	Network	analysis	
The	raw	quantitative	data	sets	that	the	Leximancer	software	provides	can	be	entered	
into	a	mathematical	program	(Agna,	published	by	geocities.com)	for	structural	analysis	
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comparisons	of	particular	networks.	Two	of	the	measures	that	the	software	can	
produce,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	are	of	particular	relevance	for	calculating	Situation	
Awareness.	For	clarity	and	reference	these	are	explained	again	below:		
	
a)	Density	
A	Density	score	represents	the	level	of	interconnectivity	within	a	network,	in	the	sense	
of	how	proficient	the	linkages	are	between	its	concepts.	For	SA	assessments,	higher	
levels	of	interconnectivity	are	indicative	of	enhanced,	richer,	SA,	since	there	are	more	
linkages	between	the	network’s	concepts,	thus	aiding	information	retrieval.	Poorer	SA,	
in	contrast,	is	embodied	by	networks	with	lower	levels	of	interconnectivity.	
	
b)	Diameter	
A	Diameter	score	is	also	representative	of	the	connections	between	the	concepts	in	a	
network,	but	moreover	it	reflects	the	efficiency	of	the	paths	across	it.	Greater	diameter	
values	are	indicative	of	more	concepts	per	pathway	through	the	network	(Walker	et	al.,	
2011)	suggesting	poorer	SA,	whilst	lower	diameter	scores	are	indicative	of	better	SA,	
since	the	holder	is	able	to	generate	awareness	through	shorter,	more	proficient,	and	
thereby,	faster	linkages.	
	
To	identify	the	unique	and	common	concepts	for	each	group,	and	the	key	concepts	
underpinning	SA	in	general,	the	Leximancer	software	also	makes	a	sociometric	status	
analysis	of	each	of	the	networks	it	produces.	
	
Sociometric	status	
The	software	will	also	identify	a	network’s	key	or	main	SA	concepts	by	providing	a	
measure	of	how	‘busy’	a	concept	is	relative	to	the	total	number	of	concepts	within	the	
network	(Houghton	et	al.,	2006).	These	concepts	are	defined	as	having	salience	as	they	
act	as	hubs	and	are	highly	connected	to	other	concepts	in	the	network.	Typically,	
concepts	with	a	sociometric	status	value	above	the	mean	value	for	the	network	as	a	
whole	are	taken	to	be	key	or	main	concepts.	
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4.2.6.	Summary	of	the	approach	to	data	capture	
Figure	4.2	below	summarises	the	stages	involved	in	capturing	and	comparing	the	data	
for	this	study.			
Figure	4.2:	Study	1	data	analysis	stages	
	
	
4.3.	Results	
4.3.1.	Quantitative	data	
4.3.1.1.	Group	SA	scores	and	other	comparative	data	
As	was	expected,	and	as	is	generally	found	in	the	literature,	the	younger	drivers	
exhibited	the	better	SA	scores	(Table	4.A).	The	network	Density	scores	showing	that	
when	the	narratives	were	allocated	to,	and	evaluated	collectively	as,	a	group,	that	it	was	
the	younger	participants	who	had	demonstrated	the	better	cohesion	and	linkage	of	their	
concepts.	This	would	aid	the	speed	of	their	recall,	and	thus	assist	their	Situation	
Awareness.		
	
Table	4.A:	Group	network	as	a	whole	
	 SA	assessment	scores	 Participant	data	
Group	 Network	
Diameter	
Network	
Density	
Av.	age		
(yrs.)	
Gender	 Av.	exp.	
(yrs.)	
Av.	time	
on	course	
Av.	word	
count	
Older	 2	 0.7417	 75.6	 8M/2F	 53.9	 32.3	mins.	 2643	
Younger	 2	 0.8238	 31.1	 7M/3F	 11.2	 29.7	mins.	 2655	
	
Participant drives route whilst
providing a verbal 'think aloud'
protocol
Participant's verbal transcript
created
Transcripts analysed by
Leximancer to create individual
and group SA networks
Identification of unique and 
common SA concepts via
Sociometric/Prominence values
Network data entered into
Agna and analysed in
terms of structure and content
SA metrics produced
i) Density   ii) Diameter
Comparison of SA group and 
individual quantitative and  
qualitative data
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It	should	be	noted	that	Table	4.A	also	shows	other	comparative	‘Participant	data’	
between	the	two	groups.	This	is	included	to	show	acceptable	differences	(in	age	and	
driving	experience)	and	similarities	(in	gender,	and	length	of	narrative)	between	them.	
The	average	course	completion	times	for	the	groups	also	appear	similar,	however	the	
younger	group	were	found	to	have	competed	the	course	significantly	faster	(p<0.013).	
This,	though,	had	no	relevance	for	the	task’s	results.		
	
4.3.1.2.	Individual	SA	scores	and	other	comparative	data	
Although	the	older	drivers,	as	a	group,	had	a	wider	range	of	journey	perceptions	and	
interpretations	(arguably	also	of	more	varying	relevance),	when	they	were	assessed	at	
the	individual	level	with	their	SA	scores	totalled	and	averaged,	they	then	were	found	to	
have	a	similar	SA	cohesion	to	that	of	the	younger	group	(Table	4.B).	
	
Table	4.B:	Average	of	individual	network	scores	
	 SA	assessment	scores	
Group	 Av.	Network	Diameter	 Av.	Network	Density	
Older	 3.1	 0.3819	
Younger	 3.2	 0.3847	
	
When	individual	performances	were	assessed	more	closely	(see	Table	4.C,	below),	it	
was	found	that	although	the	younger	drivers	occupied	four	of	the	top	six	positions	in	
terms	of	SA	performance	scores,	they	also	occupied	four	of	the	bottom	five	positions.	So	
if	an	individual	performance	approach	is	taken,	it	can	be	seen	that	not	only	could	some	
older	drivers	score	well,	but	moreover	that	there	was	no	relationship	between	the	SA	
Density	and	Diameter	scores	and	age.	
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Table	4.C:	SA	rankings	and	scores,	and	other	individual	data	
Rank.	 Group	
	
Network	
Diameter	
Network	
Density	
Age	 Driving	
Exp.	(yrs.)	
Course	
	time	(mins.)	
Word	
Count	
M/F	
1	 Younger	 2	 0.6984	 22	 2	 30	 3905	 F	
2	 Younger	 2	 0.6866	 26	 7	 28.5	 2044	 M	
3	 Older	 2	 0.6428	 81	 56	 33	 4457	 M	
4	 Older	 2	 0.6084	 76	 59	 32	 3107	 M	
5	 Younger	 2	 0.5846	 39	 22	 30.5	 2858	 M	
6	 Younger	 2	 0.5541	 39	 21	 31	 3972	 F	
7	 Older	 3	 0.4729	 82	 61	 33.5	 2419	 M	
8	 Older	 2	 0.4433	 77	 60	 33	 2268	 M	
9	 Older	 3	 0.4242	 74	 50	 30	 1102	 M	
10	 Younger	 3	 0.3105	 26	 9	 30.5	 2178	 M	
11	 Younger	 3	 0.3103	 26	 9	 33.5	 4273	 M	
12	 Older	 4	 0.3078	 74	 42	 31.5	 3963	 F	
13	 Older	 3	 0.2934	 72	 45	 32.5	 1475	 M	
14	 Older	 4	 0.2301	 78	 60	 33.5	 3014	 M	
15	 Older	 4	 0.2116	 68	 50	 31	 2874	 F	
16	 Younger	 4	 0.2095	 40	 2(UK)	 32	 1377	 M	
17	 Younger	 4	 0.1937	 28	 10	 28.5	 3305	 M	
18	 Older	 4	 0.1851	 74	 56	 33	 1756	 M	
19	 Younger	 4	 0.1699	 29	 12	 26	 957	 F	
20	 Younger	 6	 0.1300	 36	 18	 26.5	 1682	 M	
	
4.3.2.	Qualitative	data	
4.3.2.1.	Individual	Group	data	
In	Figure	4.3	(below)	the	key	or	main	concepts	for	each	group,	from	combining	their	
narratives,	are	given.	(An	example	narrative	is	provided	as	an	appendix).	Those	
concepts	that	are	in	bold	text	being	found	to	be	unique	to	a	particular	group,	with	the	
background	shading	indicative	of	three	word	count	ranges	(400+,	300+,	or	200+).	The	
Figure	also	shows	the	percentage	of	occurrence	with	other	important	concepts	in	the	
text	(with	darker	background	shading	denoting	a	stronger	connection),	and	where	such	
linkages	were	unique	or	similar	for	each	group.	The	two	Tables	that	follow	(4.D	&	4.E)	
then	show	the	words	that	were	linked	to	these	main	concepts	for	each	group.	
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Figure	4.3:	Major	concepts	for	the	Older	and	Younger	Groups	
	*major	concepts	are	those	above	a	50%	relevance	for	the	network	and	with	over	a	200	word	count	
	
a)	Older	Group	
So,	for	the	older	drivers,	Figure	4.3	indicates	that	there	was	more	of	a	focus	on	‘Traffic’,	
particularly	in	relation	to	‘Lights’,	and	more	of	a	preoccupation	as	to	what	was	‘Coming’	
or	‘Going’	‘Towards’	the	‘Car’,	and	on	the	‘Left’	‘Hand’	‘Side’.	The	act	of	‘Turning’	the	
vehicle	also	had	more	relevance	for	this	group,	with	both	‘Left’	and	‘Right’	turns	being	
mentioned.	Like	the	younger	group	there	was	a	similarity	in	the	relevance	assigned	to	
being	‘In’	‘Lane’	and	‘Car(s)’	‘Parked’.		
	
As	for	the	words	related	to	these	main	concepts	(see	Table	4.D,	below),	again	there	was	
much	that	suggested	a	focus	on	what	could	be	seen	to	the	front	of	the	vehicle,	with	
words	such	as	‘Towards’,	(in)	‘Front’,	‘Ahead’.		Like	the	younger	Group,	again	there	was	
a	similarity	in	the	awareness	of	‘Parked’	cars.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Main concept by % of network linkage
OLDER
Traffic 37 Lights 20 Warning
Coming 100 Towards 24 Junct'n 24 Roundabout
Going  49 Straight 22 Over 20 Towards
Road 35 Side
Car 91 Parked 36 Side 23 Towards
In 25 Lane
Right 41 Hand 34 Turning 21 Lane 20 Parked
Left 51 Hand 23 Turning 27 Side
YOUNGER
Right 53 Hand 20 Indicate
Cars 95 Parked 29 Behind 27 Side 20 Coming
See 14 Behind
Road 36 Side
In 27 Lane
Down 19 Gear
Going 25 Around
Coming 21 Stop
Speed 9 Down
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Table	4.D:	Main	concepts	and	related	words	important	to	Older	Drivers	
Main	Concepts	(and	word	count)	 Related	to	these	words	(w/algorithmic	score)	
1.	Coming	(442)	 Towards	(6.16)	
2.	Right	(387)	 Turning	(3.96)	
3.	In	(374)	 Front	(5.85),	Case	(4.11),	Fact	(4.02)	
4.	Car	(372)	 Parked	(6.31)	
5.	Road	(355)	 Main	(4.86),	Slip	(4.5),	Windy	(3.57)	
6.	Going	(353)	 North	(4.35),	Slipway	(3.47)	
7.	Left	(349)	 					 Bearing	(3.23),	Entry	(3.23)	
8.	Traffic	(248)	 Ahead	(8.14)	
*Main	concepts	are	those	with	over	50%	network	influence	and	appear	in	the	texts	on	over	200	occasions	
	
b)	Younger	Group	
The	younger	Group,	in	Figure	4.3,	paid	more	attention	to	gear	changes,	as	in	‘Down’	
‘Gear’,	and	also	to	their	‘Speed’	as	in	slowing	‘Down’.	This	may	be	indicative	of	the	group	
travelling	faster	and	exhibiting	more	variable	speeds.	There	were	also	indications	of	a	
better	awareness	of	what	was	‘Behind’	the	vehicle	with	linkages	to	‘Cars’	and	‘See’	‐	
there	was	no	similar	rearward	concept(s)	of	importance	for	the	older	group.		
	
As	for	the	words	related	to	these	concepts	(in	Table	4.E,	below)	it	was	found	that	the	
‘Speed’	concept	was	probably	regulated	by	a	(better?)	awareness	of	particular	road	
artefacts,	such	as	‘Bumps’,	‘Limits’,	and	‘Cameras’.	However,	generally	it	could	be	said	
that	there	was	more	awareness	of	speed	regulation	by	this	group	from	concepts/word	
associations,	such	as:	‘Slow’/’Slowing’	‘Down’;	‘Coming’	to	a	‘Full	(stop)’;	and	‘Go’	with	
‘Going’.	
	
Overall,	the	concepts	and	the	related	words	that	the	software	provided	for	the	younger	
participants	were	arguably	more	diverse	(as	they	uniquely	included	such	speed	
regulation	and	rearward	observations)	and	included	more	specific	artifacts	(e.g.	orange	
(lights),	national	speed	limit	signs,	speed	cameras,	and	bumps),	which	perhaps	was	
indicative	of	deeper	information	processing.		
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Table	4.E:	Main	concepts	and	related	words	important	to	Younger	Drivers	
Main	Concepts	(and	word	count)	 Related	to	these	words	(w/algorithmic	score)	
1.	Down	(412)	 Slow	(6.01),	Slowing	(5.92)	
2.	Cars	(393)	 Parked	(5.88),	Front	is	(3.47)	
3.		Going	(376)	 Go	(6.74),	Orange	(3.81)	
4.	In	(358)	 Front	(4.97),	Case	(4.62)	
5.	Coming	(272)	 Towards	(4.78),	Full	(stop)	(3.23)	
6.	Road	(269)	 Slip	(4.32)	
7.	See	(260)	 Gaps	(3.35)	
8.	Speed	(252)	 Limit(s)	(4.44,	3.32),	Bump	(4.1),	National	
(3.57),	Cameras	(3.12)	
9.	Right	(239)	 None	of	note	
*Main	concepts	are	those	with	over	50%	network	influence	and	appear	in	the	texts	on	over	200	occasions	
	
These	main	concepts,	along	with	others	of	less	significance,	can	also	be	represented	as	a	
network	by	the	Leximancer	software	(see	Figures	4.4	&	4.5	below),	with	the	degree	of	a	
concept’s	importance	reflected	by	its	nodal	size	and	its	linkages	to	other	concepts.	
Groups	of	concepts,	that	the	software	calculates	as	sharing	a	similar	‘theme’,	are	
denoted	by	different	colours.	So,	for	example,	in	Figure	4.4,	‘sign’,	‘hour’,	‘limit’,	and	
‘speed’,	are	often	found	together	in	the	group’s	texts.	
	
Figure	4.4:	Concept	network	for	the	Older	Group	
	
What	is	also	particularly	apparent	from	this	Figure	is	the	centrality	and	importance	of	
the	‘Coming’	concept,	particularly	what	the	vehicle	is	coming	‘Towards’.	There	is	also	a	
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closeness	and	interrelation	between	a	number	of	other	main	concepts,	such	as	‘Car’	and	
‘Road’.	The	important	‘Going’	concept	for	the	group	is	highlighted	as	a	separate	theme,	
as	is	the	‘Traffic’	concept	‐	that	was	one	of	two	unique	for	the	group.	This	seems	to	be	
particularly	related	to	traffic	lights	and	roundabouts.	
	
The	younger	groups’	network	is	given	below	in	Figure	4.5.	Like	the	older	group	there	is	
again	good	linkages	between	the	main	concepts,	though	no	single	concept	appears	to	
dominate	the	network,	as	was	the	case	with	the	central		‘Coming’	concept	for	the	older	
group,	above.	This	is	also	reflected	in	Tables	4.D/E,	also	above.	
	
Figure	4.5:	Concept	network	for	younger	group	
 
The	result	is	that	although	the	importance	of	the	‘Cars’	concept	is	evident,	the	network’s	
other	main	concepts,	‘Down’	and	‘Going’	appear	advantageous	more	spread	out	and	
discrete,	and	thus	perhaps	improving	network	density.		
	
4.3.3.	Combined	Group	data	
The	Leximancer	software	also	has	the	capability	of	assessing	two	(or	more)	individual	
or	group	texts	to	reveal	the	most	distinguishing	concepts	for	each.	In	Table	4.F	(below)	
it	combines	the	frequency	and	strength	of	a	concept	to	produce	Prominence	scores	for	
the	two	driver	groups.	
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The	Table	shows	that	the	younger	group’s	awareness	of	‘Speed’	and	(in	particular)	their	
need	to	‘See’	what	was	behind	their	vehicles,	as	particularly	differentiating	concepts	for	
the	software	(although	‘Down’	which	has	a	68‐31%	split	also	seems	worthy	of	mention	
here).	For	the	older	group,	it	was	what	was	on	the	‘Left’	hand	side	of	the	vehicle,	and	
‘Traffic’‐	ahead	or	lights.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	uniqueness	of	these	concepts	for	the	
groups	was	also	reflected	in	Figure	4.3,	above.		
	
Table	4.F:	Concept	Prominences	for	the	older	and	younger	groupings	based	on	text	
strength	and	frequency	(expressed	as	a	percentage)		
	 	 Relative	Prominence	of	main	concepts	for	both	groups	
	 Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Concept	 Rk.	 Freq.		 Strength		 Prom.		 Rk.	 Freq.		 Strength		 Prom.		
Left	 7	 6	 67	 1.4	 12	 	 	 	
Traffic	 8	 4	 62	 1.3	 16	 	 	 	
Coming	 1	 7	 61	 1.3	 5	 4	 38	 0.7	
Right	 2	 6	 61	 1.3	 9	 4	 38	 0.7	
Road	 5	 6	 56	 1.2	 6	 4	 43	 0.8	
Lights	 9	 4	 53	 1.1	 10	 3	 46	 0.9	
In	 3	 6	 51	 1.1	 4	 6	 48	 0.9	
Car	 4	 6	 48	 1.0	 2	 6	 51	 1.0	
Going	 6	 6	 48	 1.0	 3	 6	 51	 1.0	
Down	 10	 3	 31	 0.6	 1	 7	 68	 1.3	
Speed	 19	 	 	 	 8	 4	 69	 1.3	
See	 27	 	 	 	 7	 4	 77	 1.5	
			
Finally,	any	further	differences	between	the	two	group’s	perspectives	can	be	revealed	
through	a	combined	network	that	includes	many	(in	this	case	40)	of	the	concepts	that	
the	two	groups	generated	collectively:	not	just	the	main	ones	compared	in	Figure	4.3	
above.	For	this	output,	all	twenty	narratives	are	run	through	the	software,	the	desired	
number	of	concepts	is	set,	and	a	network	is	then	produced	showing	the	relevance	a	
concept	has	for	a	particular	group	‐	indicated	by	its	proximity	to	a	group’s	‘Folder’	node	
(see	Figure	4.6	below).	
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Figure	4.6:	Concept	relevance	to	each	group	in	network	format	
	
	
	
	
This	network	again	highlights	the	importance	of	the	‘See’	(behind)	and	‘Speed’	concepts	
for	the	younger	group	and	the	‘Left’	and	‘Traffic’	concepts	for	the	older	group	by	their	
direct	link,	and	often	their	proximity	to	the	relevant	group	‘Folder’	node.	The	evidence	
that	the	younger	group	had	a	better	awareness	of	what	was	behind	their	vehicles	again	
had	support	here	from	the	inclusion	of	the	‘Mirror’	and	‘Checking’	concepts,	and	indeed	
their	interrelation	in	the	network.	For	the	older	group	‘Turning’	–	relating	to	‘Left’	turns;	
and	‘Hour’	–	as	in	miles	per	hour,	were	also	strong	differentiating	factors.	More	neutral	
concepts	for	the	two	groups	were,	for	example,	‘In’,	‘Car’	and	‘Roundabout’.	
	
It	should	be	noted	that	this	network	is	in	a	‘social’	format	to	allow	the	nodes	to	be	of	
similar	size	and	more	evenly	spaced.	This	was	felt	necessary	to	retain	clarity	for	this	
particular	(network)	data.	The	Figure,	then,	is	slightly	different	to	the	networks	in	
Figures	4.4	&	4.5,	which	are	in	a	‘topical’	format,	and	where	the	size	of	each	node	and	its	
spatial	relationship	to	other	nodes	within	the	network	represent	its	importance.		
	
It	therefore	is	worth	mentioning	that	in	Figure	4.6,	an	impression	is	given	that	the	
‘Mirror’	and	‘Checking’	concepts	appear	to	have	similar	relevance	to	the	’See’	concept	
for	the	younger	group,	which	is	not	the	case.	All	three	of	these	concepts	are	particularly	
related	to	the	younger	(than	older)	group	narratives,	but	the	extent	of	their	importance	
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to	the	group	will	be	different.	For	example,	a	contrast	can	be	made	with	the	word	count	
and	network	relevance	of	the	‘See’	concept	(260/63%),	with	that	of	the	‘Mirror’	
(123/30%),	and	indeed,	the	‘Checking’	(178/43%)	concept.		
 
4.4.	Discussion	
4.4.1.	SA	scoring	and	concept	comparisons	
It	is	worth	prefacing	this	section	by	reiterating	a	number	of	group	parities	in	Table	4.A	
above.	Specifically,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	two	groups	were	of	similar	gender	
composition,	took	a	time	to	complete	the	route	that,	although	statistically	significantly,	
equated	to	an	average	difference	of	only	three	minutes	(over	15	driven	miles),	and	
provided,	again	on	average,	similar	lengths	of	narrative	(a	0.45%	group	difference).	All	
participants	also	undertook	the	task	with	seemingly	little	inhibition	or	difficulty,	and	in	
the	main	encountered	very	similar	traffic	conditions.	So,	in	short,	it	can	be	said	that	
there	is	a	good	basis	to	make	group	network	comparisons.		
	
4.4.1.1.	Quantitative	data	
If	consideration	is	firstly	given	to	the	overall	SA	scores	in	Tables	4.A	&	4.B,	it	can	firstly	
be	seen	that	a	group’s	SA	proficiency	is	dependent	on	how	it	is	calculated.	If	the	
narratives	for	a	group	are	analysed	together,	then	the	younger	group	out‐performs	the	
older	group	(Table	4.A).	However,	if	the	individual	narratives	for	each	group	are	
considered	separately	and	their	SA	scores	averaged,	then	both	groups	actually	exhibit	
similar	levels	of	network	cohesion	(Table	4.B).	
		
This	raises	the	important	question	as	to	which	score	better	reflects	a	group’s	
performance.	With	the	group	scores	in	Table	4.A,	it	is	as	if	all	ten	drivers	comprising	
each	one	are	in	a	single	vehicle	seeking	to	aid	SA,	and	in	such	an	instance	the	younger	
group	is	relying	on	more	similar	information	which	is	also	better	in	its	cohesion.	
Additionally,	the	group’s	score	is	unlikely	to	change	too	much	here	if	one	participant’s	
narrative	is	removed	at	random.		
	
SA	group	scores	based	on	the	average	of	individual	scores,	however,	whilst	appearing	a	
more	accurate	indicator,	could,	with	a	small	sample,	be	unrepresentatively	skewed	by	
just	one	extreme	result.	So	in	this	study,	if	just	the	worse	performing	driver’s	data	was	
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removed,	on	the	basis,	say,	that	this	person	had	demonstrated	particularly	poor	
cohesion	in	relaying	information,	the	younger	group’s	average	score	would	then	rise	to:	
Diameter:	2.8;	Density:	0.4130,	and	appear	clearly	superior	to	that	of	the	older	group	
(Diameter:	3.1;	Density:	0.3819).	
	
However,	for	this	data	set,	the	worse	performing	driver’s	scores	did	not	merit	exclusion,	
and	overall	it	has	to	be	conceded	that	the	individual	scores	in	Table	4.C	do,	in	fact,	show	
surprising	consistency.	Specifically,	two	younger	participants	head	the	scoring,	but	then	
generally	blocks	of	older,	then	younger	drivers	alternate,	until	finally	there	is	a	block	of	
two	younger	participants	in	the	lowest	scoring	positions.	The	Density	scores	also	fall	by	
similar	margins,	with	the	largest	gap	between	the	9th	and	10th	rankings	(0.1137).	But	
again,	if	just	the	top	nine	scores	are	extracted	and	considered,	both	age	groups	are	
similarly	represented	(five	younger	drivers	and	four	older	drivers).		
	
So,	in	summary,	if	the	older	driver	population	could	have	its	SA	quantified,	it	would	
probably	record	a	lower	score	than	any	younger	age	grouping.	However,	this	would	
mask	individual	performances	that	in	this	study	suggest	a	limited	relationship	between	
SA	and	age,	and	some	notable	individual	performances	by	the	older	drivers.	For	
example,	the	81	year	old	who	produced	the	third	best	SA	score	(only	0.0556	points	
behind	first	position).	This	suggests	caution	in	assuming	that	SA	proficiency	falls	
linearly	with	age	due	to	information	processing	deficits.		
	
4.4.1.2.	Qualitative	data	
Before	considering	the	qualitative	data	from	this	study,	of	which	much	was	produced,	
and	much	more	could	still	be	extracted	if	time	permitted	(for	example,	SA	comparisons	
for	particular	roadway	categories),	one	caveat	should	first	be	borne	in	mind.	Although	
better	cohesion	in	information	processing	will	undoubtedly	assist	with	a	driver’s	
Situation	Awareness,	whether	this	translates	into	safer	driving	is,	however,	another	
issue.	For	example,	a	person	may	try	to	evaluate,	very	cohesively,	but	too	broadly,	too	
much	information	and	miss	what	is	safety‐critical.	Another	might	simply,	but	again,	
cohesively,	seek	to	assess	only	sub‐optimal	safety‐related	information,	or	very	
cohesively	process	information	coming	from	only	one	direction,	say	from	the	front	of	
the	vehicle.		Yet	in	all	these	cases	participants	who	adopted	such	strategies	could	score	
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highly	on	the	SA	measures	taken	here.	That	is	why	it	is	important	to	compare	the	
driving	concepts	that	underlie	an	individual’s	or	group’s	score,	to	gain	a	sense	of	what	
she,	he,	or	the	group,	is	seeking	to	process.	
	
In	this	regard	a	contrast	is	found	between	the	older	drivers’	predilection	for	more	
general	concepts	derived	mainly	from	the	front	of	their	vehicles,	to	the	younger	drivers’	
focus	on	more	specific	concepts	that	included	those	more	indicative	of	the	act	of	driving	
in	itself.	This	indicates	that	the	younger	group	is	deriving	its	SA	scores	from	potentially	
more	relevant	information.	
	
If	consideration	is	given	to	Figure	4.3,	and	Tables	4.D	and	4.E,	it	can	be	seen,	for	
example,	that	the	younger	drivers	appear	to	take	information	(more)	from	a	360‐degree	
perspective	around	their	vehicles,	as	they	spoke	far	more	about	what	they	could	‘See’	
‘Behind’	and	the	‘Cars’	‘Behind’.	The	older	drivers,	in	contrast,	concentrated,	perhaps	in	
an	anticipatory	mode,	more	on	what	was	coming	‘Towards’	them,	such	as	a	‘Junction’	or	
a	‘Roundabout’,	and	‘Traffic’	(‘Lights’/’Warning’)	‘Ahead’.	This	was	also	indicated	by	the	
‘In’	and	‘Front’	concept/word	relationship	(Table	4.D).	There	was	also	more	interest	to	
the	‘Left’	‘Side’	of	the	vehicle,	and	‘Bearing’	‘Left’,	and	also	to	the	‘Right’	‘Hand’	‘Lane’	and	
what	was	‘Parked’	on	the	‘Right’.	
		
The	younger	drivers	spoke	more	about	the	operation	of	their	vehicles,	e.g.,	the	need	to	
go	‘Down’	‘Gear’,	or	to	‘Indicate’,	and	much	in	respect	of	speed	regulation	‐	slowing	
‘Down’	‘Speed’	due	to	‘Limits’	or	‘Bumps’,	or	‘Coming’	to	a	‘(Full)	stop’,	and	to	‘See’	‘Gaps’	
in	the	traffic	(Table	4.E).		The	older	drivers	had	more	interest	in	the	direction	their	cars	
were	heading,	such	as	‘Going’‐	‘Straight’	‘Over’	or	‘North’,	and	both	‘Right’	and	‘Left’	
‘Hand’	‘Turning’.	This	lack	of	interest	in	driving	operations	may	be	demonstrative	of	
more	automatic	processing,	but	equally	it	could	reflect	less	awareness	of	speed	
regulation	and	of	other	(specific)	road	vehicles.	
	
Finally,	here,	both	groups	showed	a	strong	interest	in	‘Parked’	‘Car(s)’,	although	the	
older	drivers	more	so	to	those	on	the	‘Right’	(Figure	4.3).		‘Cars’	at	the	‘Side’	and	what	
was	at	the	‘Side’	of	the	‘Road’	also	figured	for	both	groups	to	similar	degrees,	although	
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as	was	mentioned	above	the	‘Left’	‘Side’	was	particularly	discriminating	for	the	older	
group.		
	
Network	map	data	
When	consideration	is	given	to	the	network	maps	(Figures	4.4	and	4.5),	which	include	
the	most	relevant	concepts	drawn	from	each	group’s	transcripts,	further	interesting	
data	is	revealed.	
	
For	the	older	group,	two	concepts:	‘Down’	(as	in	‘Coming’	down);	and	‘Hour’	(as	in	miles	
per	hour	speed	limits),	are	worthy	of	note	‐	due	to	having	a	word	count	around	the	150	
mark.	The	‘Down’	concept	is	once	again	reflective	of	the	group’s	directional	preference,	
the	‘Hour’	concept	indicative	of	an	interest	in	speed	limits	(a	related	‘Sign’	concept	also	
has	some	relevance	here,	and	was	also	linked	to	traffic	speeds	‐	‘Hour’/’Limit’/’Speed’).	
Perhaps,	then,	the	older	drivers	relied	more	on	such	signs	to	regulate	their	speed?	
	
The	younger	group’s	network,	in	contrast,	showed	some	interesting	additional	safety‐
related	actions,	and	an	interrelation	between	them.		Of	note	are	the	‘Mirror’,	‘Checking’,	
and	‘Looking’	concepts	in	this	regard,	which	surprisingly	did	not	figure	in	the	older	
driver’s	network	at	all.	Both	group	networks	did	include	a	‘Behind’	concept,	however.	
This	reached	a	123	word	count	for	the	older	group,	but	this	concept	was	somewhat	
peripheral	in	their	network	and	seemed	only	to	become	particularly	relevant	when	
traversing	‘Village’(s)	(see	Figure	4.4).	For	the	younger	group	whilst	the	‘Behind’	word	
count	was	actually	lower	at	the	92	word	count	mark,	it	was	better	linked	(to	the	central	
‘cars’	concept)	in	the	network	(see	Figure	4.5),	and	as	will	be	seen	below,	when	other	
rearward	relevant	concepts	are	taken	into	account,	this	group	demonstrated	a	far	better	
awareness	of	what	was	‘behind’	their	vehicles.	
		
By	way	of	a	postscript	for	the	network	graphics,	an	argument	can	be	made	that	they	are	
not	as	useful	as	the	data	from	which	they	are	drawn	(and	represented	e.g.,	in	Figure	4.3,	
Tables	4.D,	4.E,	&	4.F).	The	networks	can	be	inconsistent	on	occasion	and	potentially	
misleading.	For	example,	whilst	the	centrality	and	importance	of	the	‘Coming’	concept	
for	the	older	group	(in	Figure	4.4),	and,	albeit	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	‘Cars’	concept	for	
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the	younger	group	(in	Figure	4.5)	can	be	seen,	the	same	prominence	cannot	so	easily	be	
discerned	for	the	‘Right’	and	‘Down’	concepts	for	these	respective	groups.	
	
Also,	whereas	the	main	concepts	in	the	network	are	generally	quite	stable,	the	more	
peripheral	ones	tend	to	move	around	on	each	iteration	of	the	same	data.		This	random	
element	for	the	network	maps	is	acknowledged	by	the	Leximancer	team	in	their	
website’s	FAQ’s,	but	that	does	not	absolve	the	problem.	
	
4.4.1.3.	Combined	Group	data	
When	all	of	the	participants’	narratives	are	considered	and	compared	as	one	entity,	it	
then	becomes	possible	to	reveal	which	concepts	stand‐out	as	being	of	particular	
relevance	to	each	(age)	group,	and	in	tabular	form	(Table	4.F).	This	comparison,	
however,	does	not	provide	an	exhaustive	list	of	all	the	concepts	found.	The	software	
draws	on	the	main	concepts	from	all	twenty	of	the	narratives,	and	then	allocates	a	
‘Prominence’	score	for	their	relevance,	or	not,	to	each	group.	So	taking	a	Prominence	
score	of	1.3	as	a	cut‐off	point,	where	the	comparative	strength	of	a	concept	to	one	
particular	group	was	then	over	60%,	it	was	firstly	found,	in	Table	4.F,	that	‘See’	was	
particularly	discriminating	for	the	younger	group	(with	a	77‐22%	split).	This	concept	
had	a	strong	relationship	with	that	for	‘Behind’	(Figure	4.3),	and	to	words	like	‘Gaps’	
(Table	4.E).	The	other	six	concepts	with	over	a	60‐40%	split	have	less	of	a	pronounced	
difference,	but	of	these	the	two	highest	in	terms	of	group	discrimination	were	again	
with	the	younger	group.	These	are	‘Speed’,	as	in	slowing	‘Down’	speed	(see	Figure	4.3)	
for	such	things	as	speed	‘Limits’,	‘Bump(s)’,	and	‘Cameras’	(Table	4.E),	and	the	related	
concept,	‘Down’,	which	also	had	the	highest	occurrence	in	the	younger	group’s	
narratives	at	7%	(Table	4.F).	This	concept,	in	turn,	had	linkages	to	going	down	‘Gear’	
(Figure	4.3),	and	a	direct	relationship	with	words	such	as	‘Slow’	and	‘Slowing’	(Table	
4.E).	So	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	from	such	data	that	an	awareness	of	speed	
adjustments	and	a	consideration	of	what	was	behind	the	vehicle	were	aspects	in	the	
narratives	that	were	of	particular	discriminating	relevance	for	the	younger	group.		
	
The	final	four	main	differentiating	factors,	with	scores	above	60%	(see	Table	4.F)	all	fall	
to	the	older	group.	The	first,	the	‘Left’	concept,	stands	out	in	particular	here	with	a	67‐
32%	split.	This	seems	to	be	related	to	what	was	on	the	left	‘Hand’	‘Side’	of	the	vehicle,	
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and	the	act	of	‘Turning’	or	‘Bearing’	left	(Figure	4.3/Table	4.D).	There	are	also	
similarities	here	with	a	second	distinguishing	concept	for	this	group,	‘Right’,	that	
actually	was	mentioned	more	times	in	the	texts	than	‘Left’	(387	to	349),	but	had	a	less	
unique	split	(at	61‐38%)	for	the	older	group.	However,	taken	together,	the	indication	
here	is	that	the	older	drivers	invested	considerably	more	effort	into	being	aware	of	
what	was	to	the	left	and	right	front	aspects	of	their	vehicles,	and	additionally	it	would	
seem,	the	direction	the	vehicle	was	taking.	This	latter	conclusion	is	derived	from	a	third	
differentiating	concept,	‘Coming’	(61‐38%),	which	had	the	highest	text	occurrence	
(7%/442	word	count)	for	the	group.	It	is	also	known	from	Figure	4.3/Table	4.D	that	it	is	
a	concept	highly	related	to	that	of	(and	words	relating	to)	‘Towards’,	which	in	turn	is	
related	to	road	artefacts,	such	as	‘Roundabouts,	and	‘Junctions’.	(In	contrast,	for	the	
younger	drivers,	the	‘Coming’	concept	was	more	relevant	to	the	act	of	stopping	the	car).	
Finally,	the	last	of	the	main	discriminating	concepts	in	Table	4.F	for	the	older	group	was	
‘Traffic’	with	a	62‐37%	split.	This	again	appeared	indicative	of	a	forward	focus,	due	to	
its	relationship	with	observing	‘Lights’	(Figure	4.3)	and	from	a	particularly	strong	
linkage	to	words	like	‘Ahead’	(Table	4.D).	
	
Also,	in	terms	of	the	combined	data,	a	network	was	produced	(in	Figure	4.6)	that	gave	
an	indication	as	to	how	relevant	a	concept	was	for	a	particular	group	from	its	proximity	
to	a	group’s	‘Folder’	node.	As	might	be	anticipated,	the	ones	that	stand	out	here	reflect	
what	was	found	in	the	standalone	networks	considered	earlier	(in	Figures	4.4	and	4.5).		
	
For	the	younger	group,	this	was,	again,	‘Checking’,	‘Mirror’,	‘Looking’,	and	‘See’.	
However,	three	other	concepts	can	now	be	differentiated,	which	were	somewhat	
peripheral	in	the	younger	group’s	individual	network	(Figure	4.5).	These	are:	‘Sure’,	
which	in	that	network	had	a	close	link	to	‘Behind’;	‘Gear’	which	had	a	connection	to	
‘Down’;	and	‘Corner’	with	‘Around’.	
	
For	the	older	group,	the	concepts	that	were	most	distinguishing	were	those	(four)	
familiar	from	the	‘Prominence’	Table	(4.F):	‘Traffic’,	‘Coming’,	‘Left’,	and	‘Right’.	In	
addition,	the	‘Turning’	concept	became	a	discriminating	factor,	which	in	the	individual	
group	network	(Figure	4.4)	had	a	linkage	to	the	‘Left’	concept:	however,	in	Figure	
4.3/Table	4.D	it	could	also	be	seen	to	be	related	to	the	‘Right’	concept.	Finally,	once	
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again	the	‘Hour’	concept	(as	in	miles	per	hour)	stood	out	for	the	older	group	in	this	
combined	Figure	as	it	did	in	the	group’s	network.	This	appears	related	to	an	awareness	
of	speed	limit	signs,	that	perhaps,	more	than	the	younger	group,	assisted	them	with	
speed	regulation.	
	
Overall,	it	briefly	can	again	be	concluded	from	these	comparisons	that	the	younger	
group	exhibited	more	awareness	around	their	vehicles,	particularly	from	behind,	and	
regulated	their	speed,	perhaps	more	consciously,	through	gear	manoeuvres.	The	older	
group	had	less	unique	concepts,	and	where	found,	they	appeared	to	be	related	to	a	
directional	focus	–	particularly	to	what	was	coming	towards	their	vehicles.	In	contrast	
to	the	younger	group,	they	additionally	appeared	to	regulate	their	speed	of	travel	more	
by	road	signage	than	continual,	conscious,	gear	changing.		
	
4.4.2.	Potential	lines	of	further	enquiry	
The	general	approach	to	assessing	SA	in	the	literature	is	to	have	groups	of	participants	
undertake	a	SA‐related	task	on	a	simulator	and	then	have	their	responses	scored	
against	those	perceived	to	be	of	relevance	for	the	researcher.	This	study,	in	contrast,	
sought	to	evaluate	SA	from	an	actual	driving	experience	and	took	no	view	as	to	what	SA	
might	comprise	of	‐	merely	a	quantitative	measure	of	the	information	that	it	was	based	
upon.	How	well	a	driver’s	thoughts	were	structured	was	the	key	here.	By	this	approach,	
the	older	drivers	in	this	Study,	who	were	active,	professional	people,	and	many	of	whom	
were	still	working,	appeared	to	demonstrate	a	good	and	coherent	awareness	of	their	
driving	environment,	judging	by	the	SA	metric	scores.		
	
However,	the	qualitative	data	that	was	generated	appeared	to	show	indications,	as	
outlined	above,	for	the	older	drivers	to	have,	in	particular,	an	undue	focus	to	the	front	of	
their	vehicles,	and	furthermore,	to	potentially	be	processing	driving	environment	
related	information	that	was	of	less	safety	relevance.		It	cannot	be	known	from	the	
methodology	what	key	information	might	have	been	missed	by	a	driver,	but	like	other	
SA	studies,	comparisons	to	what	the	researcher	deems	indicative	of	such	assertions	can	
be	made	to	evaluate	whether	they	have	any	merit.	
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For	example,	in	Table	4.H	below,	a	short	list	of	concepts	has	been	created	that	
potentially	could	indicate	the	extent	to	which	a	driver	had	an	awareness	of	what	was	
happening	behind	his/her	vehicle.	A	concept	and	word	count	(in	Leximancer)	can	then	
be	taken	for	each	group	as	a	means	of	comparison.	For	the	concept	count,	the	
Leximancer	software	assesses	a	sentence	for	a	concept;	for	the	word	count	it	simply	
records	instances	of	that	concept.			
	
Table	4.H:	Rearward‐related	concept	comparisons			
Concept	 Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Concept	Count	 Word	Count	 Concept	Count	 Word	Count	
Behind	 123	 125	 92	 91	
Mirror	 12	 21	 123	 132	
Rear	 0	 0	 8	 40	
Wing	(mirror)	 2	 1	 17	 10	
Totals	 137	 147	 240	 273	
 
From	this	data,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	younger	driver	group	was	exhibiting	almost	
twice	as	many	rearward	glances	during	the	driving	trial	than	the	older	group.	It	is	
possible,	however,	that	this	difference	might	be	due	to	a	form	of	double	counting,	in	the	
sense	that	for	the	younger	group	the	‘Mirror’	and	‘Behind’	concepts	might	have	been	
closely	related,	perhaps	spoken	together	on	a	high	number	of	occasions	in	the	same	
sentence.	This,	though,	does	not	appear	to	be	the	case.	The	highest	percentage	
likelihood	of	such	an	association	was	actually	found	for	the	older	group	(see	Table	4.I),	
but	it	is	rather	weak	one	when	consideration	is	given,	say,	to	the	relationship	between	
the	‘Wing’	and	‘Mirror’	concepts.	
	
Table	4.I:	Likelihood	of	a	‘Mirror’	and	‘Behind’	concept	relationship		
Concept	 Group	
Younger		 Older		
Mirror	
(Related	to:)	
Wing(100%),	Rear	(38%),	Check	(31%),	
Checking	(24%),	Behind	(11%)	
Check	(50%),	Behind	(2%)	
Behind	
(Related	to:)	
Rear	(12%),	Wing	(12%),	Space	(9%),	
Mirror	(8%)	
Mirror	(17%),	Space	(11%),	Check	(10%).	
	
A	second	aspect	of	interest	is	the	potentially	sub‐optimal	amount	of	relevant	
information	being	processed	by	the	older	drivers.	This	is	also	more	difficult	to	
substantiate	from	the	text	alone,	but	again,	perhaps	an	indication	can	be	gleaned	from	
what	the	participants	themselves	enunciated	in	relation	to	driving	safely(?).	The	
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concepts	presumed	of	relevance	are	compared	by	concept	and	word	count	in	Table	4.J	
(below).	
	
Table	4.J:	Safety‐related	concept	comparisons	
Concept	 Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Concept	Count	 Word	Count	 Concept	Count	 Word	count	
Checking	 6	 19	 178	 220	
Check	 10	 45	
Indicating	 31	 108	 117	 142	
Indicate	 28	 45	
Blind	 6	 7	 29	 33	
Clear	 66	 71	 112	 122	
Sure	 18	 19	 105	 98	
Gap	 0	 0	 9	 12	
Safe	 6	 11	 14	 19	
Looking	 0	 57	 136	 161	
Look	 19	 46	
Aware	 10	 10	 63	 69	
Warning	 10	 11	 12	 12	
(having)Time	 22	 10	 20	 12	
(enough)Space	 9	 9	 11	 10	
(enough)Room	 16	 9	 13	 13	
Totals	 257	 341	 955	 923	
 
Here	a	substantial	difference	in	overall	scores	is	revealed.	In	fact,	the	younger	group	
performs	better	on	all	but	two	concept	scores	and	in	every	relevant	word	count,	which	
was	a	surprising	result.	
	
There	were	indications	during	the	task	of	the	older	drivers	being	more	easily	distracted	
from,	and	having	less	awareness	of,	the	driving	task.	Equally,	though,	it	might	be	that	
their	driving	experience	was	just	leading	to	less	information	processing,	resulting	in	less	
relevant	text,	but	it	is	hard	to	conclude	that	this	could	account	for	all	of	such	a	
difference.		
	
If	there	was	a	deficit	in	processing	relevant	information,	and	then	taking	actions	relating	
to	driving	safely,	it	would	appear	of	interest	to	investigate	how	an	older	driver	would	
cope	with	an	unexpected	hazard	or	a	more	taxing	driving	environment	than	the	one	
encountered	in	the	Study.	
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4.4.3.	Limitations	
Due	to	a	limited	number	of	volunteers	for	this	study,	it	was	not	possible	to	match	the	
two	participant	groups	for	mileage	driven,	accidents	incurred	etc.	Emphasis	was	placed	
on	producing	the	most	descrete	groups,	by	age,	as	possible.	However,	there	was	no	
evidence	that	the	driven	milieage	in	a	given	week	was	significantly	different	between	
the	two	groups,	or	that	its	form	gave	any	advantage.	For	example,	for	the	most	part,	the	
students	tested	for	this	study	mainly	drove	short	distances	to	and	from	the	University’s	
campus.	The	older	group	may	have	driven	more	varied	routes	over	a	similar	time	
period,	but	that	variation	did	not	appear	to	translate	into	better	SA.	One	older	
participant,	for	example,	who	undertook	quite	varied	driving	for	his	work,	saw	himself	
as	a	very	proficient	driver.	However,	for	SA‐related	scoring	he	was	ranked	13th,	and	thus	
was	outscored	by	many	younger	(and	older)	drivers	who	drove,	potentially,	less	diverse	
routes.			
	
The	‘Think	aloud’	methodology	chosen	for	this	study,	whilst	being	less	obtrusive	and	
easy	to	understand,	also	impacts	on	the	number	of	participants	that	can	be	assessed	
within	a	reasonable	time	period.	This	is	principally	due	to	the	need	for	commentaries	to	
be	accurately	transcribed,	and	then	formatted	as	truly	as	possible	to	a	participant’s	
enunciation.	Thus	with	limited	numbers	also	comes	related	limits	on	generalisations,	
though	this	issue	is	not	uncommon	in	SA	research.	The	‘Think	aloud’	approach,	like	
many	other	SA‐related	techniques,	also	has	its	limitations.	Whilst	it	can	be	said	that	
strong	and	related	connections	between	knowledge	concepts	in	any	context	will	aid	
their	recall,	and	indeed,	Situation	Awareness	from	a	better	processing	of	incoming	
information,	the	approach	can	only	assess	what	the	participant	says	s/he	is	aware	of.	
Thus	whilst	one	driver	may	less	optimally	organise	a	higher	number	of	safety‐related	
cues	from	around	his/her	vehicle,	another	may,	very	proficiently,	organise	a	similar	
number	of	more	general	concepts	mainly	from	looking	forward	from	his/her	front	
windscreen.	It	therefore	is	possible	from	this	method	that	the	latter	driver	could	be	
calculated	as	having	a	more	cohesive	information	network	indicative	of	better	Situation	
Awareness,	but	it	is	arguable	if	this	is	correct.	It	would	therefore	seem	advantageous	to	
firstly	investigate	whether	SA,	as	measured	by	this	approach,	can	be	correlated	to	a	
driving	proficiency	measure,	and	secondly,	to	investigate	whether	it	can	show	
variability	in	scoring	for	driving	environments	of	different	complexity.	
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4.5.	Conclusion	
This	study	showed	that	at	the	individual	level,	older	drivers	can	show	good	Situation	
Awareness.	There	was	no	suggestion	of	presumed	perceptual	or	cognitive	deficits	
impacting	on	the	quantitative	scoring	measures	of	SA	utilised	here.	In	fact,	the	two	
oldest	participants,	both	of	whom	were	in	their	early	80’s,	performed	well,	ranking	3rd	
and	7th	overall.	At	the	group	level,	though,	there	were	suggestions	of	a	less	cohesive	
performance	in	information	processing	by	the	older	drivers,	which	appeared	evident	
during	the	study	from	them	being	more	likely	to	stray	in	their	commentaries	from	the	
driving	task.	Qualitative	and	quantitative	comparisons	of	relevant	concepts,	and	their	
interrelations	for	each	age‐grouping,	tended	to	support	this	view	by	showing	the	older	
driving	group	to	rely,	in	particular,	on	less	rearward	and	safety‐related	cues,	and	from	
exhibiting	seemingly	less	awareness	of	the	need	for	speed	regulation.		
	
The	principal	question	raised	here	then	is	why	the	apparent	poorer	awareness	
indicated	more	by	the	qualitative	data	was	not	matched	by	the	metric	scores	in	the	
quantitative	data.	The	reasoning	for	this	may	lie	in	the	fact	that	the	route	driven	was	
insufficiently	demanding,	thus	allowing	for	any	sub‐optimal	processing	of	information	
to	have	a	limited	effect.	This	may	also	explain	the	apparent	lack	of	impact	of	age‐related	
cognitive	decrements,	as	in	less	demanding	driving	situations	these	too	could	have	been	
compensated	for	by,	perhaps,	the	older	driver’s	greater	driving	experience	(53.9	to	11.2	
average	years	in	this	study),	as	has	been	found	by	McPhee	et	al.	(2004).	The	group	may,	
as	a	result,	have	been	better	able	to	anticipate	environments	that	might	cause	them	
difficulty,	and	slowed	their	speeds	to	allow	for	more	information	processing	time.	
(Table	4.A.	above	shows	that	they	traversed	the	route	(significantly)	slower	than	their	
younger	participants:	but	admittedly,	only	by	three	minutes	on	average	over	15	miles).	
There	is	also	the	possibility,	of	course,	that	they	may	have	undertaken	more	automatic	
processing	of	information	(as	found,	e.g.,	by	Bosman	&	Charnes,	1996).	That	does	not	
mean	the	group	necessarily	processed	all	the	relevant	information	in	this	way,	merely	
that	the	driving	environments	they	encountered	here	may	have	allowed	them	sufficient	
time	for	such	automatic	processing	whilst	delivering	a	cohesive	and	continual	
commentary.	
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The	question	that	flows	from	such	contentions	is	whether	the	quantitative	SA	
proficiency	demonstrated	by	the	older	driving	group	in	this	study,	would	be	retained	in	
more	taxing	driving	conditions.	As	in	such	circumstances	the	need	for	optimal	
awareness	of	safety‐related	cues	and	potential	hazards	would	become	more	critical,	and	
thus	impinge	on	information	processing	time.	 	
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Chapter	5:	Hazard	Perception	literature	review		
	
5.1.	Introduction	
Having	good	Situation	Awareness	is	an	important	aspect	of	successful	and	safe	driving,	
and	in	the	previous	chapter/study	it	was	shown	that	age‐related	cognitive	decrements	
did	not	necessarily	reduce	an	older	driver	group’s	Situation	Awareness	whilst	driving,	
what	was,	a	non‐taxing	route.	However,	this	better	than	expected	performance	may	
have	come	from	a	more	limited	awareness	from	what	was	to	the	front	of	their	vehicles,	
in	contrast	to	a	younger	group’s	better	all‐round	awareness.	Two	main	questions	arose	
from	this	work.	Firstly,	whether	the	older	driver’s	SA	performance	levels	would	be	
retained	in	more	taxing	driving	conditions,	and	secondly,	whether	the	approach	to	
measuring	SA	had	sufficient	construct	validity	to	be	able	to	relate	it	to	an	actual	driving	
performance	indicator.	In	the	study	that	follows	in	Chapter	6,	these	issues	will	be	
investigated	further.	This	will	be	achieved	by	utilising	journeys	verified	as	being	
different	in	their	levels	of	cognitive	taxation,	and	by	incorporating	a	driving	
performance	measure	into	the	study’s	design.	In	this	chapter,	a	justification	will	be	
made	for	the	driving	performance	measure	chosen	for	that	research,	Hazard	Perception	
(HP),	by	considering	its	relevance	to	Situation	Awareness	and	to	older	drivers.	
	
5.2.	Justification	for	the	use	of	a	Hazard	Perception	measure	
In	considering	an	appropriate	driving	measure	for	Study	2,	Hazard	Perception	was	
found	to	have	four	clear	and	important	advantages.	Firstly,	it	could	be	tested	in	a	
reasonable	timeframe,	through	media	that	can	be	purchased	at	insignificant	cost	and	
run	through	most	portable	computers.	Secondly,	it	has	been	correlated	with	traffic	
accident	involvement	across	a	number	of	studies	(e.g.	Peltz	&	Krupat,	1974;	McKenna	&	
Crick,	1991;	Darby	et	al.,	2009;	McKenna	&	Horswill,	1999;	Quimby	et	al.,	1986;	Wells	et	
al.,	2008).	Thirdly,	it	has	been	found	to	decline	with	age	(e.g.	Wallis	&	Horswill,	2007)	‐	a	
principal	exploratory	aspect	of	this	thesis	‐	and	finally,	and	most	significantly,	it	
potentially	has	performance	linkages	to	Situation	Awareness.	Hazard	Perception	is,	
after	all,	about	anticipating	potentially	dangerous	situations	on	roadways,	and	has	been	
viewed	as	an	ability	to	read	the	road	(Mills	et	al.,1998)	and	even,	having	Situation	
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Awareness	for	hazardous	situations	involving	roadway	environments	and	users	
(Horswill	&	McKenna,	2004).	
	
Furthermore,	Endsley’s	three‐level	model	of	Situation	Awareness	(Endsley,	1995a)	
would	appear	to	provide	a	basis	for	understanding	why	drivers	have	different	Hazard	
Perception	abilities,	and	for	potentially	identifying	the	causes	of	those	differences.	In	
her	model,	as	was	seen	in	Chapter	3,	Level	1	SA	corresponds	to	perception,	Level	2	to	
comprehension,	and	Level	3	to	projection.	Thus,	it	could	be	argued	that	if	we	perceive	a	
wide	range	of	relevant	cues,	we	will	then	be	better	able	to	comprehend	a	current	
environment,	and,	as	a	result,	better	able	to	project	future	actions.	So	in	road	driving	
contexts,	good	Situation	Awareness	might	mean	that	we	would	be	better	able	to	predict	
a	potential	hazard	by	more	proficient	projection	of	the	behaviour	of	other	road	users,	
and	how	that	might	impact	on	the	development	of	a	current	driving	situation.		
	
To	take	an	actual	example,	say	when	driving	along	a	street	you	perceive	a	group	of	
children,	a	ball,	and	a	small	area	of	open	space.	You	will	then	be	better	able	to	
comprehend	that	a	game	of	football	is	likely	to	be	in	progress,	than	if	you	only	
perceived,	say,	one	of	the	children	and	the	open	space.	As	such,	you	would	also	be	better	
able	to	project	that	there	is	a	chance	that	the	ball,	and	possibly	one	of	the	children,	may	
run	into	the	road.	Thus	a	better	SA	proficiency	here	would	more	likely	lead	to	those	
potential	hazards	being	detected,	and,	as	a	result,	a	better	driving	action.	You	may,	for	
example,	then	slow	the	car’s	speed	to	allow	for	adequate	braking	should	the	ball	and/or	
child	appear	on	the	roadway.	Hazard	Perception	therefore	has	similarities	to	Endsley’s	
view	of	Situation	Awareness	in	the	sense	that	it	is	the	process	of	detecting,	evaluating	
and	responding	to	dangerous	events	on	the	road	that	have	a	high	likelihood	of	leading	
to	a	collision.		
	
In	addition,	however,	it	also	has	relevance	to	the	cyclical‐based	definitions/models	of	
SA,	preferred	in	this	thesis,	as	proposed	by,	for	example,	Smith	&	Hancock	(1995).	For	
this	approach,	Hazard	Perception	could	be	said	to	reflect	a	driving	skill	that,	like	
Situation	Awareness,	involves	constructing	continuous	and	updated	representations	of	
traffic	conditions	from	around	a	vehicle.	These	representations,	in	turn,	would	
determine	how	effectively	an	environment	is	measured	for	risk,	and	therefrom,	how	
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well	the	driver	anticipates	and	plans	for	appropriate	courses	of	action	(Isler,	Starkey,	&	
Williamson,	2009).			
	
5.3.	What	factors	influence	Hazard	Perception	ability?	
In	previous	chapters	the	factors	that	influence	an	individual’s	Situation	Awareness	have	
been	discussed	in	some	detail,	it	therefore	would	appear	of	use	to	also	assess	those	
thought	to	be	influential	for	Hazard	Perception	by	way	of	comparison.	
	
Overall,	Hazard	Perception	skills	are	said	to	reflect	how	well	an	individual	can	cope	with	
the	complex	cognitive	demands	that	a	traffic	environment	can	impose,	through	his/her	
conscious	and	effortful	processes	(Horswill	&	McKenna,	2004).	In	this	regard,	four	
factors	will	be	briefly	discussed:	under‐developed	eye	movements,	visual	attention,	
accuracy	of	self‐evaluations,	and	driving	experience.	
	
5.3.1.	Under‐developed	eye	movements		
A	first	area	of	explanation	for	differences	in	Hazard	Perception	performance	is	said	to	
be	related	to	less	developed	frontal	lobe	executive	functions	of	the	brain.	These	include:	
goal‐directed	behaviour,	visual	search,	impulse	control,	divided	attention,	and	working	
memory.	These	deficits	are	of	particular	relevance	to	young	(teenage)	drivers	(Lenroot	
&	Giedd,	2006;	Dahl	&	Spear,	2004;	Keating,	2007;	Isler	et	al.,	2008)	who	are	also	said	to	
have	under‐developed	control	of	their	voluntary	eye	movements.	Evidence	for	this	
comes	from	studies	(e.g.	Munoz	et	al.,	1998;	Klein	et	al.,	2005)	that	have	linked	younger	
participants’	difficulties	with	voluntary	saccadic	eye	movement	tasks	to	delayed	
maturation	of	their	frontal	lobes.	This	could	suggest	that	younger	drivers	may	be	
disadvantaged	in	their	visual	search	behaviour	by	not	being	able	to	move	their	eyes	fast	
and	frequently	enough	to	fixate	on	all	relevant	traffic	information.	This	has	been	
demonstrated	by	Mourant	&	Rockwell	(1972),	who	found	that	young	and	novice	drivers	
fixated	longer	on	irrelevant	traffic	information	and	moved	their	eyes	less	frequently.	
This	would,	of	course,	also	impact	on	the	proficiency	of	their	Situation	Awareness,	
particularly	at	Level	1,	but	therefrom,	also	at	Levels	2	and	3.							
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5.3.2.	Visual	attention	
A	second	aspect	related	to	good	Hazard	Perception	is	said	to	be	good	visual	attention	
(Fitzgerald	&	Harrison,	1999).	This	relates	to	the	processes	that	find,	extract,	and	define	
features	in	the	visual	environment	(Jenkin	&	Harris,	1999).	With	similarities	to	the	
‘constraint	satisfaction	process’	approach	(Baumann	&	Krems,	2009)	alluded	to	in	
Chapter	3,	Ball	(1997),	has	described	how	these	processes	must	be	constantly	utilised	to	
detect	potential	hazards	(whilst	inhibiting	non‐hazardous	related	information)	for	
adjustments	to	be	made	for	the	avoidance	of	collisions.		
	
It	would	appear	that	visual	attention	would	be	a	particularly	important	factor	for	
Hazard	Perception	when	driving	in	unfamiliar	areas,	as	a	driver	would	then	require	
more	concentration	to	process	road	and	traffic	conditions,	which	would	thereby	reduce	
the	resources	available	to	him/her	to	detect	potential	hazards.		
	
Visual	attention	can	also	be	degraded	by	distraction,	for	example	by	stimuli	in	the	
external	driving	environment	(Underwood	et	al.,	2003),	such	as	another	road	user	
suddenly	moving	into	a	driver’s	field	of	view.	This	could	adversely	influence	his/her	
capability	to	utilise	existing	knowledge	to	anticipate	emerging	problems,	and	therefrom	
to	avoid	a	hazard.	The	importance	of	distraction	is	supported	by	evidence	that	has	
significantly	related	insufficient	visual	attention	to	traffic	violations	and	accidents	
(Owsley	et	al.,	1998)	and	a	threefold	increase	in	the	risk	of	crashes	and/or	traffic	
violations	(Richardson	&	Marottoli,	2003).	
	
Other	concurrent	factors	that	may	also	cause	drivers	to	fail	to	allocate	their	visual	
attention	optimally,	are	said	to	be	inexperience	(Falkmer	&	Gregersen,	2005;	
Underwood	et	al.,	2005)	and,	significantly,	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	age	(Lee	et	al.,	
2003;	Lee	&	Lee,	2005).	
	
5.3.3.	Accuracy	of	self‐evaluations		
In	addition	to	the	above	cognitive‐based	factors,	proficiency	in	Hazard	Perception	may	
also	be	affected	by	a	driver’s	roadway	confidence.	In	that,	if	s/he	is	over‐confident	in	
his/her	ability	to	cope	with	a	hazard,	it	could	lead	to	collisions.	In	this	regard	several	
studies	have	shown	that,	for	driving	in	general,	younger	drivers	have	more	of	a	
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tendency	to	overestimate	their	own	skill,	but	underestimate	the	skill	of	other	drivers	
(Groeger	&	Brown,	1989;	McKenna	et	al.,	1991;	Sexton	et	al.,	2006).		
	
However,	in	regards	to	Hazard	Perception,	such	over‐estimations	are	surprisingly	
higher	than	both	overall	driving,	and	elements	of	it	‐	such	as	vehicle	control.	Farrand	&	
McKenna	(2001),	for	example,	have	found	a	disassociation	between	young	novice	
drivers’	ratings	of	their	Hazard	Perception	and	their	actual	driving	performance	on	a	
video‐based	test,	even	when	evaluated	on	a	scene‐by‐scene	basis.	And	this	over‐
confidence	is	not	just	limited	to	younger	drivers,	it	appears	to	be	prevalent	across	all	
age‐groups.	Horswill	et	al.	(2004),	for	example,	have	found	that	all	drivers	generally	rate	
their	Hazard	Perception	ability	as	better	than	the	average	driver,	and	also	better	than	
their	peers	(where	a	peer	is	defined	as	someone	of	the	same	age,	sex,	education,	
training,	experience,	etc.	as	themselves).		
	
5.3.4.	Driving	Experience	
A	final	major	factor	that	influences	Hazard	Perception	ability	appears	to	be	driving	
experience,	as	younger	novice	drivers	have	been	found	to	detect	fewer	hazards	(e.g.	
Underwood	et	al.,	2005)	and	more	slowly	(e.g.	McKenna	&	Crick,	1991;	Wallis	&	
Horswill,	2007)	than	experienced	drivers.	This	despite	Farrand	&	McKenna	(2001)	
finding	that	they	demonstrated	no	difference	in	their	ability	to	discriminate	traffic	
scenes	according	to	their	hazardousness	level.	A	reason	for	this	may	be	the	inefficient	
eye	scanning	behaviour,	alluded	to	above,	and	insufficient	‘mental	maps’	(schemas),	that	
in	tandem	may	lead	to	sub‐optimal	processing	of	relevant	cues	relative	to	experienced	
drivers	(Horswill	&	McKenna,	2004;	Underwood,	2007).	
	
Another	major	reason	for	poorer	Hazard	Perception	amongst	inexperienced	drivers	
might	be	a	lack	of	cognitive	resources	for	adequate	attention.	Underwood	(2007),	for	
example,	suggests	that	for	novice	drivers,	the	driving	task	(such	as	steering,	changing	
gears,	and	speed	control)	may	not	have	been	automated	enough	to	free	up	the	
attentional	capacities	required	to	enable	effective	road	Situation	Awareness	and	the	
searching	for	hazards.		
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McKenna	&	Farrand	(1999),	have	also	found	that	experienced	drivers'	Hazard	
Perception	reaction	times	were	slowed	more	than	novices'	reaction	times	when	the	
drivers	were	required	to	perform	a	secondary	verbal	task.	They	argued	that	this	
indicated	that	the	experienced	drivers	were	utilising	cognitive	resources	to	undertake	
more	sophisticated	and	proactive	visual	searches,	as	they	were	diminished	once	
diverted	elsewhere.		
	
Experienced	drivers	are	also	said	to	be	better	able	to	detect	a	potential	hazard.	Armsby	
et	al.	(1989),	for	example,	asked	participants	to	classify	pictures	of	different	traffic	
situations,	and	found	that	fog	(a	potential	hazard)	was	considered	more	hazardous	
among	experienced	than	novice	drivers.	Additionally,	Finn	&	Bragg	(1986),	found	that	
novice	drivers	rated	a	pedestrian	walking	along	a	road	(an	actual	hazard)	as	more	
hazardous,	and	‘tailgating’	(a	potential	hazard)	less	hazardous,	than	experienced	
drivers.			
	
It	has	therefore	has	been	argued	(e.g.	Benda	&	Hoyos,	1983;	Brown	&	Groeger,	
1988;	Armsby	et	al.,	1989)	that,	overall,	experienced	drivers	take	a	more	holistic	
perception	of	traffic	environments,	and	(e.g.	Chapman	&	Underwood,	1998ab)	that	they	
are	better	able	to	adapt	their	visual	scanning	patterns	to	different	road	situations,	and	
then	process	this	information	with	longer	fixation	durations.	
	
5.4.	Hazard	Perception	ability	and	age	
Like	any	skill,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	drivers	will	improve	their	ability	to	detect	
hazards	as	their	experience	grows,	as	has	been	suggested	by	the	studies	reported	above.	
In	simple	terms:	with	more	experience,	more	relevant	feedback	will	be	taken	from	an	
environment,	resulting	in	better	Hazard	Perception	(e.g.	Matthews	&	Moran,	
1986;	Naatanen	&	Summala,	1976).		
	
However,	it	would	appear	that	certain	cognitive‐related	age	deficiencies,	that	were	
considered	in	some	detail	in	Chapter	2	(e,g.,	general	cognitive	slowing	(Salthouse,	
1996),	inhibitory	deficits	(Hasher	&	Zacks,	1988),	and	task‐switching	deficits	(Mayr	&	
Liebscher,	2001)),	may	impact	upon	the	advantages	of	experience.	And	like	Situation	
Awareness,	they	may	also	affect	the	proficiency	of	Hazard	Perception	sufficient	to	make	
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them	an	important	factor	in	determining	crash	risk	amongst	older	drivers	(Watzke	&	
Smith,	1994).	The	reason	for	this	would	appear	to	lie	in	the	dynamic	nature	of	Hazard	
Perception	(and	indeed	SA).	Thus	inhibitory	deficits	that	impinge	on	identifying	
relevant	from	irrelevant	cues;	and	task‐switching	deficits	that	affect	attention	to	
multiple	sources	of	information,	will	affect	HP	(as	they	do	with	SA)	performance.	
		
As	visual	performance	also	becomes	more	variable	with	advancing	age,	both	through	
the	normal	aging	process,	as	well	as	through	an	increase	in	the	prevalence	of	ocular	
disease	later	in	life	(Haegerstrom‐Portnoy,	Schneck,	&	Brabyn,	1999),	this	too	can	affect	
Hazard	Perception.	Thus,	factors	such	as	visual	acuity	and	contrast	sensitivity	may	
impinge	on	an	older	driver’s	capability	to	process	visual	stimuli,	which	may	result	in	
him/her	being	less	likely	to	anticipate	hazards	effectively	if	s/he	has	difficulty	seeing	
the	cues	associated	with	them.		
	
Additional	age‐related	difficulties	related	to	Hazard	Perception	have	also	been	proposed	
by	Bolstad	&	Hess	(2000)	in	regards	to	attentional	problems,	particularly	in	novel	
contexts,	and	Schacter	(1996),	in	regards	to	the	recall	of	past	actions.	However,	Schacter	
also	suggests	that	with	proper	retrieval	cues,	an	older	driver’s	performance	may	be	able	
to	reach	standards	commensurate	with	younger	drivers,	due	to	a	dependency	on	their	
schemata.	As	these	will	only	be	minimally	affected	by	ageing,	he	argues	that	the	older	
driver	would	be	able	to	utilise	them	to	focus,	encode,	and	retrieve,	via	a	probabilistic	
basis,	relevant	information	from	a	particular	driving	environment.	This	appears	related	
to	SA	being	produced	via	Neisser’s	Perceptual‐action	cycle	(Neisser,	1976),	discussed	in	
Chapter	3.	
	
Finally,	Borowsky	et	al.	(2009),	have	found	that	older‐experienced	and	experienced	
drivers	tend	to	classify	video	of	traffic	scenarios	according	to	environmental	similarities	
(e.g.,	grouping	all	of	those	that	included	residential	traffic	environments),	whereas	
young‐inexperienced	and	inexperienced	drivers	tended	to	classify	them	according	to	
hazard	instigator	similarities	(e.g.,	grouping	those	that	included	pedestrians	crossing	
the	road).	These	findings	suggest	that	as	with	experienced	adults,	older	drivers	similarly	
perceive	hazards	in	an	advantageously	holistic	manner	and	that	possibly	this	skill	
remains	intact	into	old	age.	These	findings	build	on	earlier	work	by	Underwood	et	al.	
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(2005),	who	also	found	similar	scanning	patterns	between	older	(60‐75	years)	and	
experienced	(30‐45	years)	drivers,	and	that	the	older	group	could,	in	fact,	detect	more	
hazards.	
	
5.5.	Older	driver	Hazard	Perception	performance	
The	above	findings	have	much	in	parallel	to	Situation	Awareness	research,	in	that	both	
Hazard	Perception	and	SA	are	said	to	be	affected	by	age‐related	declinations	that	
perhaps	can	be	arrested	by	longer	driving	experience.	So	has	the	Hazard	Perception	
performance	of	older	drivers	also,	like	SA,	been	found	to	be	less	proficient?		
In	small	sample	studies	of	older	drivers,	such	as	the	Underwood	et	al.	(2005)	(n=12)	
study	reported	above	(but	also	in	e.g.	Olson	&	Sivak,	1986	(n=15))	no	significant	
difference	in	reaction	times	to	hazards	between	older	and	younger	drivers	was	found.	
However,	in	larger	sample	studies,	such	a	correlation	has	been	evident.	In	Quimby	&	
Watts	(1981)	(n=60),	for	example,	Hazard	Perception	response	times	were	found	to	be	
slower	for	drivers	aged	under	25,	but	then	became	quicker	with	experience	and	age	
until	55.	Between	55	and	65,	performance	levels	then	dipped	back	to	under	25	year	old	
standards,	and	then	further	worsened	from	65.	Horswill	et	al.	(2008)	also	used	a	large	
sample	(n=118)	to	investigate	the	Hazard	Perception	ability	of	older	drivers	by	
measures	of	cognitive	ability,	vision,	and	reaction	time.	They	found	that	Hazard	
Perception	response	times	increased	significantly	with	age	and	that	this	was	related	to	
contrast	sensitivity,	useful	field	of	view,	and	simple	reaction	time.		
	
However,	as	any	aggregate	decrease	in	Hazard	Perception	ability	for	older	drivers	in	
these	studies	could	have	been	due	to	specific	pathologies	in	certain	individuals,	rather	
than	normal	age‐related	declines,	Horswill	et	al.	(2009)	(n=79),	subsequently	
investigated	a	sample	of	health‐checked	drivers.	They	found	that	those	aged	75–84	
were	significantly	slower	at	Hazard	Perception	than	groups	aged	65–74	and	35–55,	who	
did	not	in	fact	differ.	The	differences	between	the	older	group,	and	the	other	groups	
combined,	were	again	found	to	be	related	to	contrast	sensitivity,	useful	field	of	view,	
and	simple	reaction	time.	Given	that	Hazard	Perception	ability	has	been	linked	with	
crash	risk,	these	results	suggest	that	healthy	older	drivers,	at	least	those	over	75,	are	
more	vulnerable	to	road	accidents.		
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One	should	add	here,	though,	an	aspect	that	has	been	mentioned	in	Chapter	2	in	regards	
to	a	gradual	cessation	of	driving	amongst	older	drivers.	This	is	the	idea	that	the	driving	
behaviour	of	older	drivers	is	determined	by	both	their	capacity	to	drive	safely,	and	their	
own	self‐beliefs	about	their	driving	capabilities.	Anstey	et	al.	(2005),	for	example,	have	
argued	that	while	the	capacity	to	drive	safely	may	decline	with	increasing	age,	there	
may	be	an	equivalent	change	in	driving	behaviour,	as	older	drivers	notice	that	their	
capacity	is	declining	and	take	compensatory	action	(such	as	restricting	their	driving	to	
safer	environments).	
	
Other	research	has	supported	this	assertion,	by	showing	that	older	drivers	do	indeed	
restrict	their	driving	exposure	across	a	range	of	situations	(Baldock	et	al.,	2006;	
Marottoli	&	Richardson,	1998;	Molnar	&	Eby,	2008),	and	furthermore	that	this	appears	
to	be	driven	by	confidence	levels	in	driving	ability,	at	least	for	some	aspects	of	their	
driving	(Baldock	et	al.,	2006).		
	
There	are,	however,	two	related	points	here.	Firstly,	such	self‐regulation	amongst	older	
driver	groups	will	only	be	effective	if	it	is	accurate,	and	as	was	indicated	in	‘5.3.3’	above,	
it	may	not	be	accurate	enough.	Groeger	&	Grande	(1996),	for	example,	add	to	the	view	
given	in	that	section	‐	that	younger	drivers	tend	to	over‐estimate	their	driving	
performance	(i.e.	Groeger	&	Brown,	1989)	‐	by	finding	similar	over‐estimations	for	all	
age	groups.	Also,	other	studies	have	shown	that	older	drivers,	like	drivers	of	all	ages,	
tend	to	exhibit	a	self‐enhancement	bias,	considering	themselves,	on	average,	to	be	
considerably	better	than	the	average	driver	(Freund	et	al.,	2005;	Marottoli	&	
Richardson,	1998).	In	fact,	Freund	et	al.	(2005)	have	found	that	the	higher	older	drivers	
rated	their	expected	performance	in	a	driving	simulator,	the	more	likely	they	were	to	be	
rated	unsafe	when	they	actually	‘drove’	in	it.		
	
A	second	important	aspect	here	is	that	there	is	also	evidence	that	this	cessation‐
compensation	for	age‐related	declines	is	not	effective	in	eliminating	increases	in	crash	
risk.	For	example,	Ross	et	al.	(2009)	found	that	those	who	performed	poorly	on	a	UFOV	
sight	test	may	have	restricted	their	driving	but,	despite	this,	that	they	were	still	twice	as	
likely	to	be	involved	in	an	at‐fault	crash	compared	with	those	who	performed	well	on	
that	test.		
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In	sum,	older	drivers	who	demonstrate	a	diminished	Hazard	Perception	capacity	may	
be	at	greater	risk	of	crashing.	Though	they	may	be	able	to	moderate	this	risk	if	they	can	
accurately	and	effectively	monitor	that	diminished	capacity,	so	allowing	them	to	
regulate	their	driving	appropriately.	Thus	how	accurately	older	drivers’	self‐monitor	
their	Hazard	Perception	is	crucial.	It	is	conceivable,	due	to	them	having	much	greater	
driving	experience,	that	they	may	be	better	placed	than	other	driver	groups	to	
accurately	undertake	this	evaluation:	however,	evidence	suggests	otherwise.	Horswill	et	
al.	(2011),	for	example,	have	found,	from	a	large	sample	(n=307)	of	older	drivers,	that	
their	judgements	of	confidence	for	a	Hazard	Perception	Test	performance	had	little	or	
no	relationship	to	their	actual	test	scores.	
	
5.6.	How	Hazard	Perception	is	measured	
The	test	utilised	in	Horswill	et	al.	(2011),	above,	is	one	typical	for	the	measurement	of	
Hazard	Perception,	and	for	the	purposes	of	the	study	to	be	undertaken	(and	
subsequently	reported	in	Chapter	6),	its	format	deserves	further	consideration.	The	
usual	approach	that	such	tests	take	has	been	to	use	video	clips	of	traffic	situations	taken	
from	the	driver’s	perspective	(Quimby	&	Watts,	1981;	Olson	&	Sivak,	1986;	McKenna	&	
Crick,	1991,	1994,	1997;	Chapman	&	Underwood,	1998ab;	McKenna	&	Horswill,	1999;	
Horswill	&	McKenna,	2004;	Sagberg	&	Bjørnskau,	2006).	Each	short	clip	typically	
contains	one	(though	sometimes	two)	hazard(s)	(e.g.,	a	pedestrian	steps	into	the	road	
from	between	parked	cars;	another	road	user	moves	into	the	path	of	the	car	being	
driven),	which	usually	would	require	a	driver	to	brake	or	perform	steering	changes.	An	
individual’s	ability	to	perceive	and	react	to	such	events	is	measured	by	his/her	timing	of	
simple	push‐button,	or	(in	Horswill	et	al.,	2011)	screen	touch,	responses.	In	rarer	cases,	
a	continuous	recording	is	taken,	with	the	participant	moving	a	lever	between	settings	
marked	“safe”	to	“dangerous”	(e.g.	Crundall	et	al.,	2003;	Pelz	&	Krupat,	1974).	
	
Researchers	have	demonstrated	that	Hazard	Perception	response	times	are	longer	for	
crash‐prone	drivers	(McKenna	&	Crick,	1991;	McKenna	&	Horswill,	1999;	Quimby	et	al.,	
1986)	and	inexperienced	drivers	(e.g.	Quimby	&	Watts,	1981;	McKenna	&	Crick,	1991;	
Renge,	1998;	Wallis	&	Horswill,	2007).	Thus	it	has	been	argued	that	poor	Hazard	
Perception	ability	is	an	important	contributor	to	increased	crash	risk	(Horswill	&	
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McKenna,	2004),	and	particularly	for	newly	qualified	drivers	who	are	over‐represented	
in	the	UK	and	US	crash	statistics	compared	to	more	experienced	drivers	(Braitman	et	al.,	
2008;	Maycock	et	al.,	1991;	Underwood,	2007).			
	
The	UK	Government	has	considered	this	research	sufficiently	convincing	to	introduce	a	
Hazard	Perception	element	to	the	UK	driving	test	in	2002.	It	has	also	been	incorporated	
into	the	driving	licence	procedures	in	some	states	in	Australia.	The	validity	of	Hazard	
Perception	Tests	is	said	to	be	demonstrated	by	the	correlations	highlighted	above	with	
crash	risk	(see	also	Hull	&	Christie,	1992;	Transport	and	Road	Research	Laboratory,	
1979),	differences	between	novice	and	experienced	drivers	(e.g.	Sexton,	2000),	and	also	
with	expert	ratings	of	drivers'	performance	on	real	roads	(Mills	et	al.,	1998).		
	
The	rationale	behind	their	introduction	was	that	if	a	learner	driver	does	not	respond	
fast	enough	to	video‐based	hazards,	s/he	might	equally	not	respond	fast	enough	to	
actual	on‐road	hazards	and	thus	increase	his/her	probability	of	crashing	(see	
Drummond,	2000).	So	by	including	an	HP	Test,	the	aspiration	was	that	it	might	
encourage	learners	and	instructors	to	focus	more	upon	hazards	during	driver	training.	
	
It	is	arguable,	however,	as	to	whether	this	has	been	achieved,	and	there	have	been	
studies	that	question	the	validity	of	such	tests.	For	example,	Chapman	&	Underwood	
(1998ab);	Crundall	et	al.	(2010);	and	Sagberg	&	Bjørnskau	(2006)	failed	to	find	
expected	differences	in	Hazard	Perception	ability	as	a	function	of	age,	driving	
experience,	and	accident	propensity.	
	
It	has	also	been	suggested	that	Hazard	Perception	testing	may	not	be	a	good	predictor	
of	driving	proficiency,	and	that	its	benefits	may	be	limited	to	quite	specific	driving	
situations	(such	as	high‐speed	accidents,	especially	where	the	driver	accepts	some	
blame	(Wells	et	al.,	2008)).	
	
Nahvi	(2007)	has	made	a	‘Freedom	of	Information’	request	to	the	UK	Government,	and	
obtained	Hazard	Perception	Test	(HPT)	pass	rates	measured	over	a	one	year	period	
(from	December	2005	to	2006)	(see	Table	5.1).	This	data	shows	a	lower	than	expected	
success	rate	for	Potential	and	Approved	Driving	Instructors,	who	would	be	assumed	to	
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be	particularly	proficient	at	Hazard	Perception.		However,	the	pass	score	required	for	
these	candidate	groups	was	higher	than	for	a	learner	driver	or	motorcyclist.		
	
Table	5.1:	Percentages	of	applicants	passing	the	UK	HPT	between	December	2005/2006.	
Driver	Type	 Pass	score	required	 Percentage	achieving	score	
Car	 44	 86.06	
Motorcycle	 44	 94.31	
Large	Goods	Vehicle	 50	 85.70	
Passenger	Carrying	Vehicles	 50	 84.06	
Potential	Driving	Instructor	 57	 62.46	
Approved	Driving	Instructor	 57	 62.33	
	
	
Although	the	results	from	this	data	are	not	clear‐cut,	and	regrettably	similar	
information	is	unavailable	at	this	time,	it	does	indicate	that	the	Hazard	Perception	Test	
used	in	the	UK	driving	test	is	no	easier	for	experienced	drivers	to	pass.	This,	then,	raises	
questions	as	to	how	older	drivers	might	perform,	particularly	when	consideration	is	
given	to	the	fact	that	the	test	appears	to	place	much	emphasis	on	response	and	reaction	
times	(McKenna	&	Crick,	1991;	McKenna	&	Horswill,	1999;	Quimby	et	al.,	1986;	Olson	&	
Sivak,	1986;	Underwood	et	al.,	2005;	Quimby	&	Watts,	1981;	Horswill	et	al.,	2008;	
Horswill	et	al.,	2009).	To	undertake	the	test	successfully,	split	second	proficient	
‘clicking’	of	a	button	is	required:	one	second	late,	and	the	tested	individual	is	rated	as	
being	unaware	of	the	hazard	being	assessed,	even	though	in	some	cases	the	time	frame	
to	respond	appears	to	the	author	to	be	rather	fast	and	in	some	cases	arbitrary.	The	car	
driven	in	the	video	clips	also	travels	at	consistent	speeds	that	match	the	limits	given	for	
a	particular	roadway.	Although	this	would	appear	normal	for	younger	drivers,	for	an	
older	driver	such	speeds	may	appear	excessive.	Thus	whereas	an	older	driver	might	
decrease	his/her	speed	to	increase	information	processing	time	on	roadways	that	s/he	
may	anticipate	as	dangerous,	on	a	typical	HP	test	this	would	not	be	possible,	and	thus	
their	Hazard	Perception	performance,	as	a	result,	may	be	affected.			
	
5.7.	The	way	forward	
In	the	following	chapter,	a	study	will	be	undertaken	to	measure	an	older	driver’s	Hazard	
Perception	ability.	In	view	of	potential	difficulties	for	older	drivers	in	spotting	hazards	
at	higher	speeds,	as	highlighted	above	in	relation	to	certain	age‐related	cognitive	
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deficits.	And	bearing	in	mind	that	the	participants	in	the	study	will	not	be	aware	that	
they	are	taking	a	Hazard	Perception	Test,	nor	have	any	training	or	lengthy	practice	
beforehand,	a	variation	on	the	standard	test’s	measure	is	proposed.	In	short,	
participants	will	still	have	their	HP	scored	by	the	timeliness	of	their	response,	but	
separately,	credit	will	also	be	given	for	spotting	a	hazard	outside	of	the	given	timeframe.	
A	total	score	from	the	sum	of	these	two	parts	will	then	be	made.	This	total	score,	and	the	
score	for	detecting	a	hazard,	can	then	further	be	related	to	a	participant’s	SA	score	
derived	from	his/her	commentaries	on	similar,	though	longer,	video	footage	of	car	
journeys	undertaken	just	prior	to	the	HPT	element.	Thus,	the	study	will	be	able	to	show,	
perhaps	more	accurately,	whether	older	drivers	do	demonstrate	poorer	HP.	And	in	
addition,	whether	this	could	be	related	to	the	SA	measure	utilised	for	the	study,	and	for	
those	in	the	series,	based	on	‘Think	aloud’,	narrative‐based,	information	networks.	
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Chapter	6:	A	Study	investigating	the	Situation	Awareness	and	
Hazard	Perception	proficiency	amongst	older	and	younger	
drivers	
	
6.1.	Introduction	
In	Study	1	the	Situation	Awareness	(SA)	scores	of	an	older	driver	group	were	found	to	
be	similar	to	that	of	a	younger	group.	However,	when	the	concepts	in	the	narratives	
were	extracted	and	compared,	the	older	group	showed	indications	of	being	aware	of	far	
fewer	safety‐related	concepts	and	words,	and	of	being	less	aware	as	to	what	was	
happening	around	their	vehicles.	They	also	appeared	to	process	information	less	
rigorously	‐	demonstrating	a	more	general,	directional‐based,	awareness,	in	contrast	to	
the	younger	drivers	who	focussed	more	on	specific	driver	actions	and	roadway	
artefacts.	
If	older	drivers	do	undertake	more	cursory	observation,	and	process,	potentially,	an	
insufficient	number	of	safety‐related	cues,	then	whilst	this	may	not	necessarily	impact	
on	them	driving	safely	in	less	demanding	conditions,	such	as	those	encountered	whilst	
driving	in	Study	1,	it	could	(as	was	argued	in	Chapter	4)	if	those	conditions	became	
more	complex,	and	thus	more	cognitively	demanding.	
	
6.1.1.	Approach	to	measurement	capture	
6.1.1.1.	Situation	Awareness	
To	investigate	this	further,	participants	in	an	older	driver	group	were	again	evaluated	
against	those	in	a	younger	driver	group,	though	with	a	preference	given	to	volunteers	
who	had	previously	undertaken	Study	1	to	allow	for	a	comparison.	Once	again	‘Think	
aloud’	commentaries	were	recorded,	but	video	footage	of	two	car	journeys	of	different	
complexity	replaced	the	single	driven	journey	assessed	for	Study	1.	It	was	felt	that	to	
drive	a	very	complex	route,	such	as	the	one	to	be	shown	on	video,	whilst	giving	a	
continual	commentary,	could	potentially	present	ethical	difficulties	as	it	may	unduly	
distract	a	driver.				
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6.1.1.2.	Hazard	Perception	
In	addition	to	capturing	driver	SA	through	a	different,	video,	format,	this	approach	also	
afforded	the	advantage	of	seamlessly	allowing	a	participant	to	be	assessed	for	his/her	
Hazard	Perception.	As	was	argued	in	the	preceding	chapter,	this	measure	was	chosen	
for	four	main	reasons.	To	briefly	recap,	these	were:		
	
a)	because	it	represents	an	important	aspect	of	driving	safely,	sufficiently	so	to	have	it	
tested	as	part	of	the	UK	Driving	Licence	procedures	since	2002.		
	
It	has	been	argued	that	newly	qualified	drivers	have	a	deficiency	in	identifying	emerging	
road	hazards	(Horswill	&	McKenna,	2004)	due	to	their	over	involvement	in	road	
accidents	(Braitman	et	al.,	2008;	Maycock	et	al.,	1991;	Underwood,	2007).	Thus,	by	
testing	for	Hazard	Perception,	it	was	hoped	to	enhance	a	learner	driver’s	skill	for	the	
identification	of	potential	hazards	–	those	that	would	cause	a	driver	to	change	speed,	
direction,	or	stop,	and,	as	a	corollary,	have	him/her	more	mentally	prepared	to	take	
action	if	they	then	turned	into	actual	hazards.	
	
b)	as	a	result	of	its	inclusion	in	the	UK	driving	test,	there	are	numerous	video‐based	
examples	available	on	CD	and	the	internet	of	the	kinds	of	hazards	learner	drivers	will	
encounter	when	they	come	to	take	their	test.	Often	these	will	include	measures	of	
performance	that	will	help	a	student	driver	assess	his/her	progress.	These	will	usually	
include	whether	an	appropriate	hazard	(or	hazards)	were	recognised	within	a	
particular	video	clip,	and	also	within	the	predefined	time	periods	that	the	test	sets.	
These	video	databases	are	therefore	both	easy	to	obtain,	extract,	and	incorporate	into	
studies	of	Hazard	Perception,	and	advantageously,	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	
research,	without	affecting	any	SA	measurement	objectives.	
	
c)	Hazard	Perception	has	relevance	for	the	measurement	of	older	driver	ability.	It	
appears	from	Chapter	5	that	generally	proficiency	in	detecting	a	hazard	will	decline	
after	the	age	of	75,	but	not	necessarily	be	demonstrated	between	age	groups	below	that	
threshold	(see	Horswill	et	al.,	2009).		
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d)	it	has	potential	links	with	Situation	Awareness.	For	example,	Zhang	et	al.	
(2009)/Kaber	et	el.	(2012)	have	found	that	if	a	hazard	is	encountered	in	a	rural	
environment	it	can	actually	improve	an	older	driver’s	SA,	but	decline	it	if	encountered	
within	an	urban	environment.	And	additionally,	that	being	exposed	to	a	hazard,	
particularly	a	dynamic	one,	can	worsen	an	older	participant’s	driving	performance	in	
either	environment.	
	
6.1.2.	Objectives	and	hypotheses	
As	with	Study	1,	this	study	again	sought	to	compare	SA	proficiency	scores,	and	the	
related	concepts	underlying	them,	for	both	an	older	and	younger	‘driver’	group.	Two	
video	journeys:	one	‘Complex’;	one	more	‘Standard’	and	similar	to	that	actually	driven	in	
Study	1,	provided	the	media	for	a	participant	to	provide	a	commentary	for.	Such	an	
approach	was	chosen	to	satisfy	RQ1	and	RQ3.	The	narratives	subsequently	produced	
were	measured,	as	before,	by	SA	metric	scores	and	word	count/relevance,	Prominence,	
and	network	indicators,	with	the	aim	of	looking	for	age‐group	differences	relating	to	
driver	safety.	
	
In	addition,	the	quantitative	SA	cohesion/proficiency	scores	found	were	then	compared	
to	the	scores	indicative	of	Hazard	Perception,	and	the	speed	of	that	detection,	to	see	if	
there	were	any	inter	or	intra	group	correlations	(as	sought	by	RQ2).		
	
The	aim	was	to	recruit,	as	far	as	possible,	those	participants	who	had	volunteered	for	
the	previous	study.	Given	that	the	younger	participants	tended	to	be	final	year	research	
students,	there	was	less	scope	to	achieve	this	for	that	grouping.	However,	for	those	who	
did	agree	to	volunteer	again,	an	assessment	would	be	made	as	to	whether	SA	was	
(quantitatively)	found	to	be	easier	to	achieve	for	those	participants	whilst	they	actually	
drove	(Study	1)	or,	in	this	study,	whilst	they	watched	videos	of	driving	(from	the	
driver’s	perspective).		
	
Finally,	the	concepts	generated	by	all	of	the	participants	in	this	study	were	then	
compared	to	those	from	Study	1	to	assess	for	any	differences.	
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It	was	hypothesised	that	due	to	age‐related	perceptual	declines,	that	the	Hazard	
Perception	(HP)	scores	and	the	Situation	Awareness	metrics	would	be	more	deficient	
for	the	older,	than	younger,	group,	and	particularly	so	for	the	more	‘Complex’	video	
journey.	And	in	addition,	that	higher	SA	metric	scores,	whether	found	for	an	individual	
or	a	group,	would	be	related	to	higher	HP	indicator	scores.	
	
No	hypotheses	were	made	in	regards	to	whether	the	SA	scoring	(for	those	who	
undertook	both	studies)	would	be	higher	for	these	video‐based	tasks,	or	whether	(for	
all	participants)	different	main	concepts	would	be	considered	as	relevant.		
	
6.2.	Method	
6.2.1.	Design	
The	study	was	based	on	the	assumption	that	a	video‐based	‘driving	experience’,	
undertaken	by	twenty	individuals	(within	two	designated	age	groupings)	would	be	
capable	of	providing	sufficient	and	relevant	driving‐related	information	to	make	group	
SA	network	and	HP	comparisons	possible.	A	pre‐test,	with	two	volunteers,	provided	a	
satisfactory	amount	of	commentary	from	the	two	videod	journeys	for	analysis	purposes.		
	
Although	a	video‐based	approach	offers,	for	example,	the	option	of	having	a	journey	
‘frozen’	at	certain	points	to	have	participants	answer	SA‐related	questions	(as	is	often	
undertaken	in	SA	studies),	the	‘Think	aloud’	approach	was	retained	as	it	was	felt	to	
provide	a	more	realistic	‘driving’	experience,	and	would	beneficially	allow	performance	
comparisons	to	be	made	for	those	participants	who	had	also	undertaken	Study	1.			
	
Thus,	participants	viewed	two	actual	and	complete	car	journeys	(links	given	in	6.2.1.1.	
below),	rather	than	the	computer‐based,	truncated	journeys,	often	utilised	in	the	
literature.	They	were	asked	to	contemporaneously	provide	a	verbal	commentary	of	
what	information	they	were	taking	in	from	the	different	environments	encountered,	
what	they	might	do	with	it,	and	what	driving	actions	they	might	undertake	if	they	were	
driving	the	vehicle.	The	commentaries	were	recorded	by	the	researcher	(who	
undertook	all	the	trials)	via	an	audio	capture	device,	whilst	he	simultaneously	listened	
through	earphones	to	ensure	that	what	was	being	said	could	be	clearly	heard.		
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The	narratives	were	then	later	transcribed	verbatim,	after	which	they	were	(as	with	
Study	1)	run	through	software	capable	of	extracting	a	detailed	network	of	the	main	
cognitive	and	physical	concepts	that	were	considered	of	importance	whilst	‘driving’	the	
route.	And	additionally,	an	individual’s	or	a	group’s	Situation	Awareness	related	scores	
from	how	proficiently	the	concepts	that	comprised	a	driver’s	or	group’s	network	were	
interrelated.		
	
The	study	sought	to	provide	a	realistic	driving	experience	from	the	driver’s	viewpoint,	
by	using	video	footage	of	actual	car	journeys.	The	footage	was	run	from	a	pc	in	a	quiet	
room,	and	comprised	of	two	formats	(see	6.2.1.1.	and	6.2.1.2.	below).	The	approach	
provided	a	realistic	basis	for	safely	extracting	the	level	of	detail	needed	to	produce	a	
comparison	of	the	SA	of	different	driver	age‐groups,	when	encountering	both	
‘straightforward’	(non‐taxing)	and	more	‘complex’	(taxing)	‘driving’	conditions.			
	
6.2.1.1.	Commentary	for	SA	measurement	
For	this	first	aspect	of	the	study,	the	participants	were	told	to	take	a	‘drivers’	
perspective	and	to	provide	a	verbal	commentary	of	what	they	considered	of	importance	
in	the	video	footage	of	two	different	journeys.	In	particular,	they	were	told	to	bear	in	
mind	facets	that	would	enable	safe	transit	of	the	routes,	including	where	the	vehicle	
might	optimally	be	placed.	Given	that	the	older	drivers	might	be	less	likely	to	have	
encountered	video	footage	to	consider	(whereas	all	the	younger	drivers	would	have	due	
to	their	driving	test),	it	was	decided	to	always	show	the	easier	journey	first.	This	
journey,	with	footage	that	lasted	7	minutes	and	28	seconds,	had	similar	urban	driving	
conditions	to	that	in	Study	1,	though	on	this	occasion	along	suburban	roads	in	the	
outskirts	of	Poole	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WhlW782ZJPw.		
	
The	second	journey,	lasting	7	minutes	and	50	seconds,	was	a	more	‘complex’	journey	
involving	a	drive	through	Bristol	City	Centre	
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MSZ2diCG1ho#t=150.		No	sound	was	audible	on	
either	footage.	
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6.2.1.2.	Commentary	for	Hazard	Perception	measurement	
For	this	second	aspect	of	the	study,	the	participants	were	(later)	judged	from	their	
commentaries	as	to	their	awareness	of	either	one	hazard	(present	in	twelve	videos)	or	
two	hazards	(in	three	videos),	and	whether	they	were	detected	in	a	timely	manner.	Each	
hazard	usually	included	two	elements:	the	hazard	itself	‐	such	as	a	narrow	gap	between	
vehicles;	and	a	necessary	related	action	‐	such	as	slowing	down,	or	moving	to	avoid	the	
hazard.	Examples	included:	pedestrians	crossing	the	road;	cyclists	encountered	at	high	
speed;	vehicles	emerging	from	parking	bays;	meeting	oncoming	vehicles	on	narrow	
roads;	and	animals	wandering	onto	the	road.		
	
The	clips	used	were	indistinguishable	in	format	from	the	two,	seven	minute,	journey	
clips	that	the	participants	had	previously	viewed	and	also	provided	commentaries	for.	
However,	as	they	lasted	for	only	one	minute,	they	were	felt	to	be	of	insufficient	length	to	
be	transcribed	for	SA	assessment	purposes.	The	clips	that	were	chosen	were	from	221	
examples	that	had	previously	been	used	in	the	Hazard	Perception	element	of	the	UK	
driving	test.	Their	presentation	was	in	the	same	order,	as	due	to	the	very	different	
nature	of	the	hazards	involved,	no	practice	effect	was	likely	(or	found).	
	
As	with	the	first	part	of	the	Study,	participants	were	asked	to	give	a	verbal	commentary	
(for	each	video	clip),	with	consideration	to	safety‐related	information,	including	vehicle	
movement,	once	again	being	emphasised	by	the	researcher.	
		
6.2.2.	Participants	
20	participants	undertook	the	trial	(14	male/6	female),	ranging	in	age	from	23	to	82	
years.	They	were	divided	into	two	groupings:	either	to	one	comprising	of	an	age	range	
of	40	years	and	younger;	or	to	another	comprising	of	an	age	range	of	70	years	and	older.			
The	older	participants	(7	male/3	female;	average	age:	75.5	years)	were	UK	drivers	
recruited	through	local	retirement	clubs	‐	eight	of	the	group	had	undertaken	Study	1.	
The	younger	participants	(7	male/3	female;	average	age	25.7	years)	were	research	
students	and	associates	at	either	the	Design	School	or	the	School	of	Engineering	at	
Loughborough	University	‐	two	of	this	group	had	undertaken	Study	1.	They	were	all	
compensated	£15	for	their	time	and	travel.			
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6.2.2.1.	Inclusion	criteria	
The	inclusion	criteria	stipulated	was	for	potential	participants	to	be	regular	drivers,	
have	a	full	UK	driving	licence,	and	to	be	aged	either	up	to	40	years	old,	or	above	70	
years	old.	For	Study	comparison	purposes,	preference	would	be	given	to	those	who	had	
participated	in	Study	1,	and	who	wished	to	volunteer	again.	
	
6.2.2.2.	Exclusion	criteria	
Due	to	the	need	for	accurate	transcriptions,	potential	participants	who	had	a	poor	
clarity	of	spoken	English	were	excluded.	
	
6.2.3.	Materials	
The	Study	required	a	PC	capable	of	running	‘Leximancer’	and	‘Agna’	software	packages	
and	the	Hazard	Perception	Test	videos,	and	a	device	for	recording	each	participant’s	
‘driving’	commentary.	
	
6.2.4.	Procedure	
Each	participant	was	briefed	on	how	the	research	was	to	be	conducted	and	its	overall	
aims.	They	were	then	offered	an	opportunity	to	read	again	a	copy	of	the	‘Think	aloud’	
instruction	sheet	(see	Appendix	2)	that	informed	them	of	how	to	give	an	appropriate	
verbal	commentary	(should	that	document	sent	out	the	day	before	the	trial	be	unclear	
or	need	refreshing	in	memory).	The	researcher	then	re‐emphasized	the	need	for	the	
participant	to	act	as	s/he	would	normally	do	whilst	driving,	and	to	provide	a	constant	
commentary.	The	participant	was	then	given	an	opportunity	to	ask	any	questions,	and	if	
content,	to	sign	an	‘Informed	Consent’	form	(see	Appendix	3),	after	which	s/he	was	
asked	to	adjust	their	seat	so	that	they	could	clearly	see	the	pc’s	screen.		
	
Once	comfortable,	the	participant	was	notified	of	the	audio	recording	equipment	(which	
was	then	set	to	record)	and	a	one	minute	trial	phase	followed.	On	conclusion,	the	
researcher	added	further	suggestions	and	guidance,	whilst	the	participant	could	raise	
any	problems	or	further	questions.	Once	happy,	the	participant	was	then	invited	to	
provide	commentaries	for	the	two	seven‐minute	video	journeys,	in	quick	succession,	
and	then,	after	a	short	break,	the	fifteen	one‐minute	segments	of	journey	footage	that	
contained	either	one	or	two	identifiable	hazards.	
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6.2.4.1.	Commentary	and	timing	aspects	
During	the	data	collection	phases,	the	aim	was	for	the	researcher	to	remain	silent	and	
simply	monitor	the	audio	capture	process	as	the	participant	commented	on	the	(17)	
videos.		
	
It	was	possible,	due	to	each	session	running	for	no	longer	than	one	hour,	for	four	
participants	to	be	tested	in	one	day.	The	time	slots	allocated	started	at:	9.30	am;	11.30	
am;	2pm;	and	4pm	(Monday–Friday).	
		
6.2.5.	Data	analysis	
The	verbal	commentaries	for	the	two	recorded	seven	minute	journeys	were	transcribed	
verbatim	post‐trial,	and	then	subjected	to	analysis	by	Leximancer	software	(Smith,	
2003)	capable	of	creating	semantic	networks	(i.e.	themes,	keywords,	key	concepts,	and	
the	relationships	between	them)	unique	to	each	participant	and	group.	These	networks	
represented	the	cognitive	elements	of	the	‘driving’	experience	through	changing	
journey	environments,	and	thus	provided	an	insight	into	an	individual’s	or	a	group’s	
Situation	Awareness.	Within	each	network	were	nodes	of	variable	size	that	related	to	
each	element’s	relevance,	that	is,	how	frequently	it	occurred	and	how	it	related	to	other	
elements	within	the	network	–	what	is	termed,	its	semantic	connectivity	(Leximancer,	
2011).	
	
The	application	of	this	technique	to	verbal	commentaries	in	real‐life	transport	contexts	
is	a	relatively	new	one,	but	proven	as	a	useful	tool	for	evaluating	Situation	Awareness	in	
driving	research	(e.g.	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Chowdhury,	2013;	Walker	et	al.,	2007;	Stanton,	
et	al.,	2007;	Salmon,	Stanton,	&	Young,	2012;	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Salmon,	2011).	
	
6.2.5.1.	Network	analysis	
The	raw	quantitative	data	sets	that	the	Leximancer	software	provides	can	be	entered	
into	a	mathematical	program	(Agna,	published	by	geocities.com)	for	structural	analysis	
comparisons	of	particular	networks.	Two	of	the	measures	that	the	software	can	produce	
are	of	particular	relevance	for	calculating	Situation	Awareness:		
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a)	Density	
A	Density	score	represents	the	level	of	interconnectivity	within	a	network,	in	the	sense	
of	how	proficient	the	linkages	are	between	its	concepts.	For	SA	assessments,	higher	
levels	of	interconnectivity	are	indicative	of	enhanced,	richer,	SA,	since	there	are	more	
linkages	between	the	network’s	concepts,	thus	aiding	information	retrieval.	Poorer	SA	is	
embodied	by	a	lower	level	of	interconnectivity,	since	the	concepts	underpinning	it	are	
not	so	well	integrated.	
	
b)	Diameter	
A	Diameter	score	also	represents	the	connections	between	the	concepts	in	a	network,	
but	moreover	it	reflects	the	efficiency	of	the	paths	across	it.	Greater	diameter	values	are	
indicative	of	more	concepts	per	pathway	through	the	network	suggesting	poorer	SA;	
whilst	lower	diameter	scores	are	indicative	of	better	SA,	since	the	holder	is	able	to	
generate	awareness	through	a	better	(and	faster)	linkage	across	his/her	network’s	
concepts.	
	
To	identify	the	unique	and	common	concepts	for	each	group,	and	the	key	or	main	
concepts	underpinning	SA	in	general,	the	Leximancer	software	also	makes	a	sociometric	
status	analysis	of	each	of	the	networks	it	produces.	
	
Sociometric	status	
This	analysis	identifies	a	network’s	key	or	main	SA	concepts	by	providing	a	measure	of	
how	‘busy’	a	concept	is	relative	to	the	total	number	of	concepts	within	the	network	
(Houghton	et	al.,	2006).	These	concepts	are	defined	as	having	salience	as	they	act	as	
hubs	and	are	highly	connected	to	other	concepts	in	the	network.	Typically,	concepts	
with	a	sociometric	status	value	above	the	mean	value	for	the	network	as	a	whole	are	
taken	to	be	key	or	main	concepts.	
	
6.2.5.2.	Hazard	Perception	proficiency	
The	fifteen	hazard	clips	used	in	the	Study	were	of	similar	difficulty,	chosen	from	221	
available	examples	at	random,	and	presented	in	the	same	order	to	each	participant.	By	
chance,	the	first	three	contained	two	hazards,	the	following	twelve,	one	hazard.	As	
mentioned	in	the	‘Design’	section	above	(6.2.1.2.),	each	hazard	usually	had	two	
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elements:	the	hazard	itself,	and	a	related	action.	The	more	elements	a	participant	spoke	
about,	the	higher	hazard	identification	score	s/he	(later)	obtained.	The	scoring	system	
was	0.5	pts	for	detecting	the	hazard,	and	0.5	pts	for	mentioning	the	appropriate	driving	
action(s).	So	if	the	required	action	for	a	hazard	involved	both	moving	and	slowing	down,	
then	0.25	pts	would	be	given	for	each	of	these	elements,	whereas	if,	say,	only	slowing	or	
moving	was	required,	then	the	full	0.5	pts	would	be	given	for	that	detection.	In	addition,	
a	further	1	point	would	be	awarded	for	mentioning	the	hazard	‘in	time’.	If	only	the	
related	movement	associated	with	a	hazard	was	mentioned,	then	0.5	pts	would	be	
awarded.		
	
When	a	video	was	later	being	reviewed,	the	researcher	was	able	to	see	a	time	bar	
beneath	each	clip.	On	starting	each	one,	an	indicator	traversed	this	time	bar	and	at	
different	times,	dependent	on	the	hazard,	it	passed	through	a	time	period	of	varying	
lengths	that	prescribed	when	a	hazard	should	be	detected.	If	a	participant	began	
mentioning	the	appropriate	hazard,	or	the	related	movement	cues,	during	this	time	
period,	then	s/he	was	awarded	1/0.5	pts	as	appropriate.	
	
6.2.6.	Summary	of	the	approach	to	data	capture	
Figure	6.1	below	summarises	the	stages	involved	in	capturing	and	comparing	the	data	
for	this	study.			
Figure	6.1:	Study	2	data	analysis	stages
	
SA Commentary Aspect HP Awareness Aspect
Participant provides a commentary Participants provide commentaries
as s/he views video of two different for 15 videos that contain either
journeys, where the second one is one or two designated hazards
more complex than the first
Verbal transcript created
Scores for their awareness of these
Participant transcripts analysed Identification of unique and hazards, and whether detected
individually and by relevant group common SA concepts for each within predefined timeframes calculated
designation to create SA networks group
Network data entered into
Agna and analysed in
terms of structure and content
SA metrics produced
i) Density   ii) Diameter
for individual and group narratives
SA indicator scores Hazard detection scores
Group comparisons
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6.3.	Results	
6.3.1.	Quantitative	data		
6.3.1.1.	Group	SA	scores	and	other	comparative	data	
As	was	discussed	in	Chapter	4	(Study	1),	previous	SA	studies	have	tended	to	evaluate	
older	and	younger	performance	on	a	group	score	basis.	If	the	approach	taken	to	
produce	that	measure	combines	the	‘Standard’	and	‘Complex’	journey	texts	into	one	
narrative	for	each	participant.	And	these	are	then	further	combined	and	processed	as	
one	complete	narrative	for	each	group,	then	the	younger	‘drivers’	once	again	produce	
the	better	SA	performance.	However,	if	the	narratives	for	the	two	journeys	are	
(similarily	evaluated)	separately,	then	the	older	drivers	are	found	to	perform	better	on	
both,	and	particularly	on	the	more	‘complex’	variant	(see	Table	6.A).	
	
Table	6.A:	Group‐based	SA	scores	
	 SA	assessment	scores	
(Diameter/Density)	
Other	Data	 Study	1	
scores	
Group	 Standard	
Journey	
Complex	
Journey	
Journeys	
combined	
Av.	Age	
yrs.	
PPt’s	in	
S1	
Gender	
Older	 2/0.7610	 2/0.7956	 2/0.8427	 75.5	 8	of	10	 7M/3F	 2/0.7417	
Younger	 2/0.7578	 2/0.7586	 2/0.8597	 25.7	 2	of	10	 7M/3F	 2/0.8238	
Av.	Words	 742	 860	 1602	 	 2649	
*Note:	lower	Diameter	scores	and	higher	Density	scores	equate	to	better	SA	
	
If	the	groups	are	evaluated	by	averaging	the	individual	SA	scores	from	each	of	its	
participants,	however,	then	the	older	group’s	advantage	becomes	more	pronounced.	
This	is	particularly	the	case	when	the	two	journey’s	narratives	are	combined	as	one	(see	
Table	6.B/6.C).	In	addition,	the	majority	of	these	SA	scores	are	higher	in	proficiency	
than	was	found	for	the	driving	study	(1),	suggesting	that	perhaps	for	the	older	group	in	
particular,	the	video‐based	task	might	have	been	easier	for	them	to	undertake.		
	
Table	6.B:	Average	of	individual	network	scores	
	 SA	assessment	scores	 Study	1	
scores	Group	 Standard	
Journey	
Complex	
Journey	
Journeys	
combined	
Older	 2.8/0.4310	 3/0.4386	 2.4/0.5563	 3.1/0.3819	
Younger	 3.1/0.3789	 3.4/0.3743	 2.7/0.4633	 3.2/0.3874	
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Table	6.C:	SA	group	differences	(by	t‐test)	based	on	individual	Density	scores	
SA	Density	measure	of:	 p<*	
Standard	Journey	 0.209	
Complex	Journey	 0.237	
Journeys	combined		 0.062	
	*	all	differences	in	favour	of	the	older	group	
	
To	consider	the	three	variants	given	in	Table	6.C	in	more	detail,	firstly,	in	the	‘Standard’	
journey,	the	SA	scores	between	the	two	groups	were	not	significant,	but	in	less	parity	
than	for	a	similar	journey	driven	(than	watched)	in	Study	1.	This	despite	Study	1	
producing	significantly	longer	narratives	(2649/742	–	Table	6.A),	which	perhaps	
accounted	for	its	wider	range	of	SA	Density	scoring	to	that	found	from	this	study’s	
shorter	time	trials.	There	were,	however,	some	similarities	in	the	scoring	distribution	
by	rank	between	the	two	studies,	with	again	the	younger	participants	occupying	the	top	
two,	and	much	of	the	lower	ranking	positions.		
	
In	regards	to	the	second,	‘Complex’	journey,	variant,	however,	the	older	group	showed	a	
more	pronounced	and	wider	range	of	scoring	to	the	younger	group.	This	despite	a	lesser	
average	word	count	difference	between	the	two	groups	here,	in	comparison	to	the	
‘Standard’	journey.	However,	overall,	the	group	differences	in	SA	Density	score	were	
still	similar	to	the	‘Standard’	journey.	
	
Finally,	and	thirdly,	when	the	journeys	were	combined,	raising	the	average	word	count	
to	1602,	the	older	driver’s	SA	Density	group	scores	were	found	to	be	appreciably	higher	
when	compared	by	the	individual	scores	(see	Table	6.C)	and	close	to	being	significant.	
This	reversed	the	finding	for	when	the	group’s	narratives	were	considered	as	one	text	
(Table	6.A).	
	
It	is	worth	noting	that	the	SA	Diameter	scores	were	not	similarly	compared	statistically,	
due	to	insufficient	group	differentiation	from	the	length	of	narrative	produced.	
	
6.3.1.2.	Hazard	Perception	Scores	
In	terms	of	Hazard	Perception,	it	was	found	that	the	younger	participants	out‐
performed	their	older	counterparts	in	overall	scoring,	with	around	two	thirds	of	that	
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difference	being	attributable	to	the	older	group	identifying	the	appropriate	hazard	
outside	of	the	allotted	timeframe	(see	Table	6.D	below).		
	
Table	6.D:	Group	Hazard	Perception	Test	scores	and	t‐test	significance	
Hazard	Perception	(overall	point	scores)	
Group	 Identification	of	hazard	 Within	allotted	timeframe	 Total	score	
Older	 87	 78	 165	
Younger	 96	 99.5	 195.5	
p<	 0.394	 0.083	 0.138	
	
In	terms	of	how	pronounced	these	scores	were	between	the	two	groups,	the	‘speed	of	
detection’	comparison	shows	a	difference	that	fell	just	short	of	being	statistically	
significant,	despite	what	was	a	small	sample.	
	
6.3.1.3.	Does	better	SA	lead	to	better	Hazard	Perception?	
If	the	SA	of	both	of	the	journeys	that	these	twenty	participants	undertook	are	compared	
to	their	overall	Hazard	Perception	(HP)	point	scores,	then	no	argument	can	be	made	for	
SA	assisting	the	identification	of	a	dynamic	road	hazard	(see	Table	6.E).	However,	if	the	
speed	element	is	discounted	and	the	SA	scores	are	compared	only	to	the	detection	of	a	
hazard,	whether	or	not	it	was	spotted	within	the	designated	time	frame,	then	a	
relationship	very	close	to	significance	is	found.	
	
A	further	investigation	of	the	factors	of	age,	and	the	influence	of	the	speed	of	hazard	
detection,	found	further	interesting	and	unexpected	results.	
	
In	regards	to	the	older	group,	the	SA	scores	appeared	to	have	no	relationship	with	
hazard	identification.	If	the	speed	aspect	of	the	Hazard	Perception	Task	is	taken	out,	
however,	then	more	of	a	relationship	emerges,	with	the	higher	SA	scorers	then	being	
found	to	detect	the	most	hazards.	But	this	was	not	a	statistically	significant	relationship.	
	
If	the	younger	group	is	assessed	in	a	similar	fashion,	however,	then	a	relationship	
between	the	SA	and	Hazard	Perception	scores	does	emerge,	and	significantly	so.	
Furthermore,	the	four	members	of	this	group	that	had	relatively	higher	SA	scores,	were	
also	the	individuals	who	consistently	recorded	the	best	HP	total	scores	over	three	
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separate	assessments.	If	the	speed	element	is	once	again	taken	out,	then	this	correlation	
becomes	slightly	more	pronounced.	
	
Table	6.E:	SA	to	Hazard	Perception:	(t‐test)	comparisons	
SA	(Density	score	‐	from	combined	journey)	to	HP	
score	(with	or	without	(w/o)	speed	element)	
Statistical	Significance	(p<)	
SA	to	Total	HP	score	(all	participants)	 0.450	
SA	to	HP	score	w/o	speed	element	(all	participants)	 0.060	
SA	to	Total	HP	score	(Older	Group)	 0.936	
SA	to	HP	score	w/o	speed	element	(Older	Group)	 0.360	
SA	to	Total	HP	score	(Younger	Group)	 0.008	
SA	to	HP	score	w/o	speed	element	(Younger	Group)	 0.005	
	
It	should	be	noted	that	whilst	the	combined	journey’s	SA	Density	score	is	probably	the	
best	indicator	of	an	individual’s	SA	for	this	study,	it	was	also	found	that	the	SA	Density	
scores	for	the	‘complex’	journey	in	isolation,	and	an	alternative	SA	measure	for	when	
the	journeys	are	combined	(averaging	participant	scores	from	the	two	individual	
journeys)	also	showed	an	SA/HP	relationship	for	the	younger	group	(Table	6.F).	
	
Table	6.F:	Further	SA	to	Hazard	Perception	(t‐test)	comparisons	for	the	Younger	group	
SA	calculation	basis	 Measure	 Statistical	Significance	(p<)	
Average	of	individual	
scores	(both	journeys)	
SA	to	HP	total	score	 0.036	
SA	to	HP	score	w/o	speed	element	 0.027	
Standard	Journey	(only)	 SA	to	HP	total	score	 0.146	
SA	to	HP	score	w/o	speed	element	 0.106	
Complex	Journey	(only)	 SA	to	HP	total	score	 0.035	
SA	to	HP	score	w/o	speed	element	 0.034	
		
6.3.1.4.	Is	SA	easier	to	produce	whilst	driving	or	when	watching	a	video	of	a	driven	
journey?	
For	those	participants	who	undertook	both	Study	1	&	2,	the	video	tasks	of	Study	2	
produced	significantly	better	SA	Density	scoring	(p<0.015)	than	when	driving	(in	Study	
1)	(see	Table	6.G).	In	fact,	all	but	one	participant	scored	higher	on	the	video	task.	It	
should	be	noted	that	the	SA	scores	for	Diameter	were,	again,	not	similarly	calculated	for	
significance	as	they	were	not	discrete	enough	between	the	two	groups.	
	
	
	
	
	
144 
 
Table	6.G:	Average	SA	score	comparison	(by	t‐test)	for	those	undertaking	both	studies	
SA	score	comparison	for	both	studies	
Study	 Diameter	 Density	
1	(Driving‐based)	 3	 0.4173	
2	(Video‐based)	 2.4	 0.5585	
p<	 Not	calculated.	 0.015	
	
Overall	then,	it	would	seem	that	the	video	tasks	were	appreciably	easier	to	produce	
scores	indicative	of	cohesive	Situation	Awareness	than	when	driving.	This	could	have	
been	due	to	a	practice	effect,	but	this	is	doubtful.	Setting	aside	the	fact	that	some	months	
had	passed	since	Study	1,	each	participant	retained	his/her	style	of	commentary	
(reflected	in	word	count),	and	tended	to	stay	consistently	around	the	same	SA	score	
ranking	for	both	studies	‐	nine	out	of	the	ten	moved	no	more	than	two	places	up	or	
down.	The	one	exception	was	an	older	driver	who	rose	five	rankings	from	9th	in	Study	1	
to	4th	in	Study	2.	This	participant,	who	had	the	most	pronounced	increase	in	SA	Density	
score	from	Study	1	(up.	0.2237),	was	also	the	stand‐out	performer	in	the	Hazard	
Perception	element	of	the	study	for	the	older	group.	He	was	ranked	3rd	for	hazard	
detection	and	7th	for	speed	of	detection,	which	placed	him	5th	overall	out	of	the	twenty	
participants.	Thus	for	this	most	improved	participant,	at	least,	better	Situation	
Awareness	appeared	to	assist	with	Hazard	Perception.	
	
6.3.2.	Qualitative	data	
6.3.2.1.	Main	and	related	concepts	and	words		
In	Figure	6.2	below,	the	main	and	related	concepts	that	were	important	for	the	two	
participant	groups	from	their	narratives	are	recorded	with	the	relevant	percentage	
between	each	being	given.	(Once	again	an	example	narrative	is	provided	as	an	
appendix).	The	main	concepts	in	Study	1	that	retained	their	importance	for	a	group	in	
this	study	are	in	bold	type.	The	darker	the	background	shading	the	greater	the	word	
count	(for	the	main	concepts);	or	the	interrelation	(between	more	general	concepts	and	
a	main	concept).	
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Figure	6.2:	Main	concept	comparisons	and	concept	linkages	
*major	concepts	are	those	above	a	50%	relevance	for	the	network	and	with	over	a	150	word	count	
Although,	overall,	the	key	concepts	for	both	groups	were	more	similar	in	this	study,	
than	for	Study	1,	there	were	some	interesting	differences.		
	
a)	Older	Group	
For	the	older	group,	the	main	(eight)	concepts	that	were	important	for	Study	1	were	
again	represented	here,	but	their	relative	importance	did	change.	The	‘Going’	concept	
rose	in	prominence,	and	had	a	particularly	strong	relationship	with	‘Straight’,	whereas	
the	‘Coming’	concept	fell	in	importance,	with	its	formally	strong	relationship	with	
‘Towards’	disappearing	altogether.	The	‘Traffic’	concept	became	far	more	evident,	but	
became	more	related	to	‘Lights’	than	in	Study	1,	with	actual	indicator	colours	now	rising	
to	relevance.	The	‘Car’	concept	also	fell	in	its	ranked	importance,	as	did	its	direct	
relationship	to	‘Parked’	car(s),	with	the	focus,	in	this	respect,	moving	from	‘Right’	in	
Study	1,	to	‘Left’	with	the	video	footage.	‘Van’(s)	also	appeared	to	have	relevance	for	the	
older	group	here,	which	was	not	evident	in	the	driving	study.	
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In	terms	of	the	related	words	to	the	main	concepts	(see	Table	6.H,	below)	there	was	
again	more	awareness	of	the	colour	of	traffic	lights	in	this	study,	and	a	change	in	the	
relationship	with	the	‘Going/Go’	concept	to	more	movement	(e.g.,	‘Slowly’)	than	
direction‐related	words	(e.g.,	‘North’).	There	was	also	seemingly	more	awareness	within	
the	group	of	road	type	(Major,	Minor,	Secondary),	and	of	more	specific	cues,	such	as	
‘Police’,	‘Pub’,	‘Van’,	’Car’,	‘Mirror’,	‘Silver’,	and	‘Youth’.	
	
Table	6.H:	The	concepts	and	words	related	to	the	main	concepts	given	by	older	drivers	
Rk.	 Main	Concepts	
&	word	count	
S1	 Main	related	concepts	 S1	 Main	related	words	 S1	
1	 Traffic	(365)	 8	 Green	(100%);	Red	(52%);	
Ahead	(37%)	
Lights,	
Warning	
Lights	(6.58);	Green	(5.7);	
Light	(4.49)	
Ahead	
2	 Left	(340)	 7	 Turning	(41%);	Side	(33%);	
Around	(27%);	Parked	(25%)	
Hand,	Side,	
Turning	
Pub	(4.05);	Swinging	(3.91)	 Bearing,	
Entry	
3	 					Going/go			
								(332)	
6	 Straight	(99%);	Over	(41%);	
Past	(40%)	
Straight,	Over	 Slowly	(4.28);	Ready,	
Underneath	(3.58)	
North,	
Slipway	
4	 Right	(268)	 2	 Turning	(40%);	Around	
(32%);	Side	(31%)	
Hand,	Turning,	
Lane	
Bear,	Course	(3.23)	 Turning	
5	 Coming	(257)	 1	 Junction	(35%);	Car	(20%)	 Toward,	
R’bout,	Junct’n	
Towards	(6.01);	Watching,	
Youth	(3.31)	
Towards	
6	 Road	(248)	 5	 Down	(26%);	Into	(25%);	
Side	(31%)	
Side	 Major	(4.36);	Minor,	
Secondary,	Travelling	(3.14)	
Main,	Slip,	
Windy	
7	 Car	(246)	 4	 Parked	(65%);	Van	(31%)	 Parked,	Side,	
Towards	
Silver	(3.64);	Police	(3.42)	 Parked	
8	 Side	(236)	 	 Lane	(37%);	Right	(28%),	
Road	(24%);	Left	(23%)	
	 Hand	(5.48);	Wrong	(3.53)	 	
9	 In	(210)	 3	 Area	(43%);	Lane	(27%)	 Lane	 Built‐up	(3.67);	Fact,	Mirror	
(3.44)	
Front,	Case,	
Fact	
10	 Parked	(206)	 	 Car	(54%);	Van,	Past	(29%)	 	 	 	
*Main	concepts	are	those	with	over	50%	network	influence	and	appear	in	the	texts	on	over	200	occasions	
	
	
In	regards	to	the	network	of	all	the	significant	concepts	provided	by	this	group	(Figure	
6.3),	there	seems	to	be	a	more	in‐depth	awareness	here	than	in	Study	1,	with,	again,	
more	mention	of	specific	aspects	of	a	road	environment,	such	as	‘Pedestrian’	and	
‘Crossing’,	‘Red’	traffic	signals,	and	also	‘Bus’	‘Van’	and	‘Bridge’.	These	concepts	are,	
however,	somewhat	peripheral	in	the	network.	The	‘Traffic’	and	‘Left’	concepts,	in	
contrast,	appear	to	have	more	centrality	and	therefore	of	more	importance,	as	do	the	
‘Side’	and	‘Going’	concepts,	which	have	more	linkages	within	the	network.	
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Figure	6.3:	Older	driver	concept	network	
	
	
	
b)	Younger	Group	
The	younger	Group,	which	was	less	homogenous	between	the	two	studies,	produced	
more	new	main	concepts	(4),	though	with	less	associated	word	counts	than	the	older	
group	(see	Table	6.I,	below).	However,	that	appeared	to	be	due	more	to	the	change	of	
task	than	the	group’s	composition	(see,	Discussion,	below).	The	most	prominent	new	
main	concepts	were	‘Traffic’	and	a	related	‘Lights’	concept,	which	in	combination	were	
potentially	as	influential	as	the	‘Traffic’	concept	was	for	the	older	participants.	Also	of	
interest	was	more	apparent	awareness	of	‘Red’	signals	by	this	group,	and	the	inclusion	
of	a	new	‘Side’	concept	related	mostly	to	‘Parked’	cars	(32%).	
	
The	concepts	retaining	importance	from	Study	1	were	the	‘Cars’	concept,	which	again	
had	a	strong	link	to	‘Parked’	(as	it	did	for	the	older	group,	though	to	a	lesser	degree)	and	
‘In’	to	‘Lane’	(also	found	with	the	older	group	though	with	a	different	emphasis	(‘In’	to	
‘Area’)).	The	‘Going’	and	‘Road’	concepts	swapped	ranked	position	between	the	two	
studies,	though	retained	similar	main	concept	linkages.	
	
In	terms	of	the	words	related	to	these	main	concepts,	there	was	again	an	awareness	of	
traffic	‘Light’	colours,	but	here,	additionally,	the	‘Amber’	light	and	the	fact	that	some	
lights	were	‘Temporary’	(this	was	also	found	for	the	‘Traffic’	concept).	With	the	
exception	of	the	important	‘Cars’	concept,	the	other	three	concepts	that	were	retained	
as	main	concepts	for	this	study	had	a	change	in	word	emphasis.	The	‘Going’	concept	
now	appearing	to	be	more	specifically	related	to	speed;	the	‘Road’	concept	more	
reflective	of	configuration	and	position	than	merely	(road)	type;	and	the	‘In’	concept,	
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referring	to	‘Bus’	‘Lane’	than	merely	‘In’	‘Lane’	as	in	Study	1.	In	general,	like	the	older	
group,	there	were	more	specific	words	given,	such	as	‘Estate’,	‘Police’,	‘Bays’	and	traffic	
signal	colours.	
	
Table	6.I:	The	concepts	and	words	related	to	the	main	concepts	given	by	younger	drivers	
Rk.	 Main	Concepts	&		
word	count	
S1	 Main	related	concepts	 S1	 Main	related	words	 S1	
1	 Cars	(339)	 2	 Parked	(92%);	Side	(35%)	 Parked,	Behind,	
Side,	Coming	
Parked	(4.82);	Police	
(4.23)	
Parked,	
Front	
2	 Lights	(256)	 	 Green,	Red	(100%);	Traffic	
(85%)	
	 Green	(5.15);	Red	(4.99);	
Amber,	Temporary	(2.89)	
	
3	 Road	(248)	 6	 Side	(39%);	Crossing	(38%)	 Side	 Wide	(4.74);	Middle	(4.14)	 Slip	
4	 Traffic	(211)	 	 Lights	(70%);	Green	(51%);	
Red	(38%)	
	 Lights	(6.55);	Temporary	
(3.14)	
	
5	 Left	(207)	 	 Turning	(33%);	Parked	(29%);	
Side	(26%);	Into	(24%)	
	 Estate,	Smaller	(3.37)	 	
6	 Going	(178)	 3	 Around	(27%);	Over	(24%);	
Into	(22%)	
Around	 Straight	(4.29);	Slower	
(3.53);	Fast,	Room	(3.32)	
Go,	
Orange	
7	 Side	(175)	 	 Parked	(32%);	Road	(28%);	
Right	(25%);	Left	(22%)	
	 Hand	(5.95);	Anyone	
(3.06)	
	
8	 In	(172)	 4	 Lane	(31%);	Bus	(25%)	 Lane	 Front	(5.29);	Bays,	Case	
(3.31)	
Front	
Case	
*Main	concepts	are	those	with	over	50%	network	influence	and	appear	in	the	texts	on	over	170	occasions	
	
The	network	map	for	the	younger	drivers	(Figure	6.4)	indicates,	like	Table	6.I	above,	the	
importance	of	the	‘Cars’	concept	with	many	linkages	to	related	concepts	that	
additionally	now	include	‘Pull’	‘Left’	and	‘In’.	Also	the	‘Lights’	concept	looks	a	prominent	
cluster	with	its	linkages	to	‘Traffic’	and	traffic	light	colours,	whereas	the	‘Road’	concept	
appears	of	less	importance.	Like	the	older	group	there	is	an	awareness	linkage	between	
the	‘Pedestrians’	and	‘Crossing’	concepts,	though,	additionally	here,	also	to	those	who	
may	be	‘Around’.	
	
Figure	6.4:	Younger	driver	concept	network	
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6.3.3.	Combined	Group	data	
The	differences	between	the	narratives	given	by	the	older	and	younger	participants	
were	also	assessed	to	reveal	the	most	distinguishing	main	concepts	for	each	group.	In	
Table	6.J	(below)	the	software	has	combined	the	frequency	of	a	concept	(based	on	its	
word	count)	with	a	‘strength’	percentage	(which	reflects	the	extent	it	uniquely	applies	
to	one	group	over	another).	These	two	category	scores	are	then	combined	to	produce	a	
Prominence	score.  
	
Table	6.J:	Main	concepts	by	a	Prominence	score	for	both	groups	
	 Relative	Prominence	of	main	concepts	for	both	groups	
	 Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Concept	 Rk.	 Freq.	 Strength	 Prom.	 Rk.	 Freq.	 Strength	 Prom.	
Turning	 11	 6	 69	 1.2	 16	 	 	 	
Coming	 5	 9	 65	 1.2	 11	 6	 34	 0.8	
Going	 3	 11	 65	 1.2	 6	 8	 34	 0.8	
Right	 4	 9	 64	 1.2	 10	 6	 35	 0.8	
Left	 2	 12	 62	 1.1	 5	 9	 37	 0.9	
Side	 8	 8	 57	 1.0	 7	 8	 42	 1.0	
Lane	 12	 4	 56	 1.0	 12	 4	 43	 1.0	
Traffic	 1	 12	 56	 1.0	 4	 12	 43	 1.0	
In	 9	 8	 56	 1.0	 8	 8	 43	 1.0	
Road	 6	 9	 51	 0.9	 3	 11	 48	 1.1	
Cars	 7	 11	 47	 0.8	 1	 16	 52	 1.2	
	
As	can	be	seen	in	Table	6.J,	a	distinguishing	main	concept	for	the	older	group	is	
‘Turning’	–	as	in	the	act	of	turning	‘Into’,	or	‘Left’	and	‘Right’.	The	low	frequency	of	its	
use	within	the	text	(6%)	perhaps	excludes	it	as	a	main	group	concept,	but	due	to	its	
relative	‘strength’	within	the	network	for	the	older	participants	it	then	emerges	as	a	
distinguishing	concept	when	the	two	groups	are	directly	compared	(i.e.	mentioned	69%	
to	31%	in	favour	of	the	older	group).	Figure	6.2	appears	to	confirm	this	2:1	ratio,	as	
both	the	‘Left’	and	‘Right’	main	concepts	for	the	older	participants	(but	only	‘Left’	for	the	
younger	participants)	links	to	the	‘Turning’	concept.	Four	other	concepts:	‘Coming’,	
‘Going’,	‘Right’,	and	‘Left’,	all	of	which	were	main	concepts	for	the	older	group	(Table	
6.H),	also	show	some	uniqueness	here,	whereas	the	important	‘Traffic’	concept	has	little	
distinguishing	value	due	to	it	being	mentioned	to	a	similar	frequency	(12%)	to	that	of	
the	younger	group.				
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The	younger	participants,	in	contrast,	generally	produced	fewer	outstanding	
distinguishing	concepts	for	this	study,	with	additionally	the	‘Lights’	concept,	that	was	a	
main	concept	for	the	group,	surprisingly	omitted	from	Table	6.J.	It	can	be	speculated	
that	when	all	the	narratives	were	combined	this	concept	perhaps	became	related	to	the	
‘Traffic’	concept	and	thus	lost	the	individuality	it	had	demonstrated	in	Table	6.I(?).	The	
‘Cars’	concept,	with	a	52%	strength	score	is	thus,	perhaps	as	a	result,	the	only	concept	
for	the	Group	to	gain	a	1.2	rating,	due	to	its	high	text	frequency	(16%).	This	gives	it	a	
Prominence	scoring	that	matches	the	top	four	distinguishing	concepts	for	the	older	
group,	though	it	is	not	as	distinctive	in	the	text	(as	shown	by	the	‘strength’	scores).			
	
Finally,	Figure	6.5	again	shows	the	relevance	of	particular	concepts	to	each	of	the	two	
groups	in	a	network	format.	Here	it	can	be	seen	that	whereas	‘Cars’ maybe	an	important	
main	concept	for	the	younger	group	(see	Figure	6.2	and	Table	6.I,	above),	it	is	not	as	
unique	to	the	group	as	‘People’	and	‘Cyclist’.	For	the	older	group,	‘Turning’	remains	a	
distinguishing	concept,	and	also	‘Going’,	but	it	can	now	be	seen	that	in	addition,	‘Area’	
and	‘Sign’	are	particularly	relevant	to	this	group.	These	concepts	can	potentially,	though,	
be	mentioned	to	very	different	degrees,	for	example	a	contrast	can	be	made	between	
the	word	counts	for	‘Turning’	(252)	and	’Going’	(178),	with	those	for	‘Area’	(60)	and	
‘Sign’	(72).	
	
It	should	also	again	be	noted	that	the	position	of	the	concepts	in	these	networks	can	
change	with	each	iteration	of	data	processing.	Thus	their	usefulness	and	accuracy,	
unlike	the	quantitative	data	from	which	they	are	based,	can	often	depend	on	a	number	
of	iterations	being	undertaken	before	a	stable	visual	representation	can	be	concluded.	
This	limitation	was	touched	upon	in	the	previous	chapter,	and	it	is	mentioned	again	in	
the	Discussion	section	below.	
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Figure	6.5:	All	concept	relevance	to	each	group	in	network	format	
 
6.4.	Discussion	
6.4.1.	Quantitative	data		
6.4.1.1.	Group	SA	scores	and	other	comparative	data	
In	regards	to	the	group	scores,	an	issue	is	firstly	again	raised	here,	as	it	was	for	Study	1,	
over	which	score	best	reflects	its	SA,	and	this	is	particularly	relevant	here	as	the	two	
different	methods	of	calculation	have	led	to	different	results.	Although	a	narrative	does	
not	have	to	be	long	to	be	analysed	and	calculated	as	containing	cohesively	good	or	
poorly	structured	information,	it	nevertheless	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	
more	text	it	has,	the	more	confident	we	can	be	that	it	accurately	reflects	SA	proficiency.	
In	the	Group	scores	far	more	text	is	produced	for	evaluation,	as	its	member’s	narratives	
are	combined	as	one.	Thus	when	the	texts	from	the	‘Standard’	and	Complex’	journeys	
are	considered	in	this	way,	twenty	narratives,	two	from	each	participant,	inform	a	
group’s	score.	An	assumption	is	made	here,	of	course,	that	the	two	journeys	can	be	
combined,	but	this	would	seem	reasonable,	as	on	a	single	car	journey	it	will	often	be	the	
case	that	a	driver	will	encounter	both	the	individual	journey	environments	that	were	
experienced	in	the	videos.	Also,	both	journeys	were	advantageously	administered	
consecutively	after	a	very	short	break,	making	the	likelihood	that	they	constituted	one	
journey	more	plausible.	
	
As	was	shown	in	Table	6.A,	the	younger	group,	by	this	group‐based	approach,	exhibited	
the	better	SA.	However,	for	the	two	individual	journeys:	one	‘Standard’;	one	‘Complex’,	
which	combined	ten	narratives	for	each	group,	the	SA	cohesion	for	each	group	falls,	
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despite	the	texts	potentially	being	more	homogenous,	with	the	older	group	being	found	
to	exhibit	the	better	SA	scores	for	both	journeys.		
	
When	SA	is	calculated,	though,	by	averaging	the	individual	narrative	scores	(Table	6.B),	
a	further	pronounced	scoring	difference	is	found	in	favour	of	the	older	group	for	both	of	
the	individual	journeys,	and	even	more	so	when	they	are	combined:	much	in	contrast	to	
the	group‐based	score.	The	older	group,	then,	is	shown	to	be	better	able	to	cohesively	
manage	the	information	that	it	is	taking	in	from	the	video	environments,	and	more	able	
to	do	so	than	when	actually	driving	(a	conclusion	corroborated	by	the	SA	scores	of	those	
participants	who	undertook	both	studies).	
	
Three	aspects,	however,	are	worthy	of	note	here.	Firstly,	for	a	statistical	comparison,	SA	
scores	have	to	be	based	on	individual	narrative	scores	alone,	not	10	or	20	combined	as	
in	the	group‐based	assessments.	This	could	allow	for	more	volatility	in	scoring,	and	
potentially	in	favour	of	the	older	group	‐	as	they	produced	26.57%	more	average	text.	
Secondly,	the	video	task	may	have	been	much	easier	for	the	older	drivers	to	undertake,	
as	they	may	have	had	to	make	a	greater	and	more	debilitating	cognitive	effort	whilst	
driving,	relative	to	a	younger	group.	Thirdly,	as	was	demonstrated	in	Study	1,	at	the	
individual	level	of	analysis,	removing	just	one	outlying	score	can	make	a	considerable	
overall	comparative	difference.	For	example,	in	the	combined	journey	analysis	one	
participant	in	particular	out‐performed	the	other	nineteen.	If	his	data	is	excluded,	the	
SA	Density	averages	for	the	two	groups	then	moves	more	into	parity	(Older	Group,	
0.4772;	Younger	Group	0.4633).		
	
The	merit	of	the	first	two	of	these	contentions	can	be	considered	further	by	the	
additional	evidence	discussed	below.	However,	in	terms	of	the	individual	quantitative	
data	given	here	it	should	be	noted	that	the	participant	performance	differences	between	
Study	1	&	2	appear	to	provide	support	for	the	second	of	these	contentions	(ease	of	task).	
For	example,	the	worst	performer’s	SA	score	for	the	combined	journey	video‐based	
comparison,	would	still	have	enabled	him/her	to	be	placed	10th	in	Study	1’s	driving	task.	
Additionally,	whereas	some	older	drivers	reached	SA	Density	scores	above	what	they	
could	achieve	in	the	driving	trial,	the	younger	drivers	(although	not	performing	as	well	
on	this	video‐based	study)	still	did	not	record	scores	below	that	of	40%	of	their	
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counterparts	in	the	driving	study.	This	potential	difference	in	difficulty	was	also	
quantified	statistically	and	will	be	discussed	further,	below,	when	looking	at	data	from	
those	participants	who	had	undertaken	both	of	the	studies.	
			
6.4.1.2.	Hazard	Perception	Scores	
In	terms	of	the	Hazard	Perception	scores,	it	should	be	noted	that	although	the	younger	
participants	identified	more	hazards	(53%	to	48%),	there	was	not	a	great	deal	of	
difference	in	scoring	here	between	the	two	groups	(5%).	However,	this	widens	to	a	
point	just	short	of	statistical	significance	(p<0.083),	when	consideration	is	given	as	to	
whether	a	hazard	was	recognised	‘in	time’	(55%	to	43%).	The	combination	of	these	two	
elements	produces	an	overall	54%	to	45%	score	in	favour	of	the	younger	group.		
It	was	the	case,	of	course,	that	the	participants	were	not	alerted	to	the	advent	of	a	
hazard	in	this	study.	If	they	were,	one	could	envisage	that,	on	average,	the	younger	
group	would	make	up	the	4%	they	would	need	to	pass	this	element	of	the	UK	Driving	
Test	(58%).	However,	as	speed	of	detection	is	crucial	to	good	scoring	here,	it	does	seem	
questionable	as	to	whether	the	older	drivers	would	likewise	be	able	to	make	up	the	
13%	that	they,	on	average,	would	need	to	pass.		
	
This	could	represent	a	potential	bias	against	an	older	driving	test	candidate,	as	
generally	the	older	drivers	in	this	study	were	more	likely	to	say	that	they	would	drive	
far	slower	than	the	speeds	they	encountered	in	the	videos.	Thus	if	the	videos	were	
slowed,	perhaps	they	may	have	been	able	to	produce	scores	more	commensurate	with	
their	younger	counterparts?	It	can	be	assumed,	of	course,	that	the	drivers	in	the	Hazard	
Perception	example	videos	were	driving	to	appropriate	speed	limits,	but	the	speeds	did	
indeed	seem	a	little	excessive	at	times,	particularly	along	narrow	country	roads,	and	
this	was	also	commented	on	by	a	couple	of	the	younger	drivers.	
	
6.4.1.3.	Does	better	SA	lead	to	better	Hazard	Perception?	
In	view	of	the	possibility	that	the	driving	speed	of	the	vehicles	may	have	placed	the	
older	drivers	at	a	disadvantage	to	the	younger	group,	two	hazard	perception	indicators	
were	measured	against	what	was	considered	the	best	measure	of	SA	here	–	a	score	from	
combining	the	text	of	the	two	video‐based	journeys.	
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As	a	result,	six	measures	are	gained	(see	Table	6.E).	Firstly,	if	consideration	is	given	to	
the	two	produced	for	the	older	group,	then,	in	both	cases,	an	individual’s	Situation	
Awareness	proficiency	did	not	appear	to	help	with	the	detection	of	a	hazard.	The	reason	
for	this	finding	is	unclear.	But	again,	account	has	to	be	taken	of	the	driving	speeds	in	the	
videos,	which	may	simply	have	not	given	the	older	drivers	sufficient	time	to	process	
hazard‐relevant	information,	and	thus	negating	any	advantageous	SA	proficiency.	
Secondly,	there	are	two	measures	that	consider	all	of	the	participant’s	SA	and	HP	scores.	
Here	again,	there	is	no	correlation	between	the	overall	totals,	but	with	the	speed	
element	taken	out,	a	statistically	significant	relationship	is	very	nearly	achieved.	This	
may	be	much	due	to,	thirdly,	an	interesting	and	statistically	strong	relationship	being	
found	between	the	younger	group’s	SA	and	their	Hazard	Perception	scores,	with	or	
without	the	speed	element	taken	into	consideration	(p<0.005/p<0.008).		
	
To	corroborate	this	last	finding,	an	alternative	method	of	evaluating	the	‘Combined	
journey’	score	was	made	by	averaging	the	SA	scores	from	the	two	individual	journeys	
for	each	of	the	younger	participants.	This	necessarily	led	to	lower	overall	SA	Density	
scores,	but	these	still	had	a	statistically	significant	relationship	to	those	indicative	of	
Hazard	Perception.	This	was	also	found	to	be	the	case	for	the	individual	‘Complex’,	but	
not	for	the	‘Standard’,	journey	‐	although	that	too	was	close	to	significance	when	the	
speed	element	was	removed	(see	Table	6.F).	
	
In	terms	of	SA	and	HP	capability,	then,	it	appears	that	SA	(however	calculated	for	a	
group)	may	be	of	more	relevance	for	younger	than	older	driver	performance.	It	may	be	
possible	that	due	to	declinations	in	perceptual	processing	capability	with	age,	that	some	
of	the	older	drivers	were	unable	to	detect	certain	hazards,	and	more	often,	not	within	
safe	reaction	times	due	to	the	‘excessive’	speeds	in	the	videos.	Perhaps	such	deficiencies	
reach	points	that	even	good	SA	cannot	compensate	for?	Or	that	by	trying	to	proficiently	
process	a	volume	of	information	that	s/he	cannot	cope	with,	the	older	driver	was	more	
likely	to	miss	specific	data	and	to	comprehend	environments	in	a	more	simplified	form?	
As	younger	drivers,	in	contrast,	do	not	have	the	encumbrance	of	slower	or	wider	
variances	in	processing	speeds,	maybe	their	Situation	Awareness	levels	are	thus	a	more	
reliable	indicator	of	Hazard	Perception	performance?	
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If	the	SA/HP	proficiency	relationship	found	in	this	study	is	confirmed	for	younger	
drivers,	then	potentially	by	training	them	to	improve	their	SA	may	also	improve	their	
Hazard	Perception	as	a	result.	There	is	evidence	that	SA	can	be	improved	with	training	
(Stanton	et	al.,	2007;	Soliman	&	Mathna,	2009;	Walker	et	al.,	2009),	as	can	Hazard	
Perception	(Horswill	&	McKenna,	2004),	but	not,	as	yet,	Hazard	Perception	through	
enhancing	SA	proficiency.		
	
With	older	drivers,	on	the	basis	of	these	results	at	least,	attempts	to	improve	their	SA	
may	not	result	in	better	Hazard	Perception.	However,	it	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	
this	group	would	not	have	encountered	video	footage	of	hazards	before,	whereas	all	of	
the	younger	group	would	have	done	so	from	having	taken	their	driving	tests	after	2002.	
It	could	therefore	be	that	with	more	practice,	and	with	tailored	slower	speeds,	that	the	
older	drivers	might	be	able	to	improve	their	HP	scores	sufficient	to	bring	them	more	
into	line	with	their	higher	SA	scores	for	this	study.		
	
6.4.1.4.	Is	SA	easier	to	produce	whilst	driving	(Study	1)	or	when	watching	a	video	of	a	
driven	journey	(Study	2)?	
An	indication	can	be	gained	as	to	which	of	these	two	tasks	were	the	easier	to	undertake	
from	the	individual	SA	scores	recorded	for	the	two	studies.	What	these	reveal,	in	
particular,	is	a	more	rapid	decline	in	scoring	by	rank	in	the	driving	study	(1),	
particularly	by	the	middle	ranked	scorers.	In	relation	to	the	Combined	journey	video‐
based	SA	scores,	an	initial	similarity	in	scoring	at	the	higher	end	rankings	is	then	
marked	by	a	rapid	comparative	fall	in	the	driving	study	from	rank	6	to	10,	followed	by	a	
similar	degree	of	decline	to	the	present	study	from	rank	11	to	20.			
	
Also,	a	comparison	between	just	the	ten	participants	who	undertook	both	of	the	studies	
shows	that	in	all	but	one	case	a	higher	score	was	recorded	for	the	video‐based	
assessments	of	this	study.	This	was	sufficient	to	make	the	difference	between	the	two	
tasks	significant	at	p<0.015.	
	
It	would	appear,	then,	that	it	is	easier	to	produce	better	Situation	Awareness	when	
looking	at	a	video	of	a	journey	(from	the	driver’s	perspective)	than	when	actually	
driving	a	similar	journey	yourself.	This	could	be	due	to	a	reduction	in	mental	workload,	
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from	removing	the	physical	driving	element	involved	in	Study	1.	This	could	also	explain,	
at	least	in	part,	the	better	SA	performances	amongst	(in	particular)	the	older	group.	
This,	though,	in	turn,	raises	an	important	question	over	the	usefulness	of	video,	and	
potentially	also	simulator‐based	assessments	of	driver	capability,	given	the	pronounced	
differences	here	to	the	SA	scores	derived	from	actual	driving	in	Study	1.		
	
6.4.1.5.	Task	difference	between	the	‘Standard’	and	‘Complex’	video	journeys	
In	regards	to	the	two	individual	videoed	journeys,	these	surprisingly	produced	more	
similarity	in	scoring,	which	was	more	challenging	to	explain	‐	particularly	as	both	were	
considered	by	all	participants	as	being	different	in	activity	and	difficulty.	After	viewing	
both	video	journeys,	all	participants	were	asked	whether	the	videos	differed	in	their	
difficulty	to	produce	a	commentary,	and	if	so	why.	They	all	indicated	that	the	second	
‘Complex’	journey	to	be	the	more	difficult	as	it	had	more	‘going	on’	and	thus	often	had	
more	to	comment	on	than	could	be	achieved	in	the	available	time.		
	
It	could	be	that	for	both	journeys,	that	ran	quickly	in	succession,	a	too	consistent	
approach	to	commentary	was	thereby	taken,	which,	together	with	lesser	overall	text	
being	produced,	simply	pulled	the	scores	into	parity.	It	may	also	be	that	the	lack	of	
dangerous	consequences	for	missing	important	information	could	have	aided	this	
proposed	consistency	in	commentary,	which	may	also	have	fostered	more	similar	
information	being	processed	by	the	groups	for	the	two	journeys?		
	
6.4.2.	Qualitative	data	
6.4.2.1.	Main	and	related	concepts	and	words		
a)	Older	Group	
In	terms	of	the	main	concepts	identified	for	this	group,	it	was	found	that	all	eight	of	
those	given	by	the	older	participants	in	the	previous	study	were	again	deemed	to	be	of	
relevance	here.	This	may	in	part	be	due	to	the	retention	of	eight	of	the	ten	participants	
for	this	group	from	Study	1.	Of	these	main	concepts,	‘Traffic’	was	found	to	be	the	most	
important,	though	with	an	increasing	interrelation	with	‘Lights’	than	previously,	and	
with	more	mention	of	their	colours.	Much	of	the	data	also	showed	an	importance	for	
movement	cues	for	this	group,	as	in	’Going’	straight	or	slowly,	and	‘Turning’	‘Left’	and	
‘Right’.	Whereas	the	direction‐based	‘Coming’	‘Towards’	a	road	artefact,	that	was	very	
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evident	in	Study	1,	disappeared	as	a	relationship	at	the	concept	level	here,	but	remained	
so	as	a	word	association.		
	
b)	Younger	Group	
The	younger	group	in	contrast	had	more	change	in	the	main	concepts	that	it	felt	was	
important,	with	four	of	the	nine	considered	of	relevance	in	the	last	study	being	retained	
for	this.	This	might	be	explained	by	the	group’s	composition,	which	was	rather	different	
with	only	two	of	the	participants	that	also	volunteered	for	Study	1.	However,	it	is	more	
likely	to	be	reflective	of	the	change	in	task	between	the	two	studies.	This	is	proposed	as	
a	member	of	the	younger	group	in	Study	1	was	far	more	likely	to	mention	his/her	
driving	actions,	such	as	in	regards	to	gear	changes,	checking	mirrors,	and	indicating.	
Additionally,	they	generally	spoke	far	more	about	what	was	occurring	behind	their	
vehicles.	In	this	Study,	with	all	the	relevant	information	visible	only	through	the	front	
windscreen,	and	no	actual	driving	required,	this	perceptual	awareness	was	no	longer	
relevant.	This	is	perhaps	reflected	in	the	loss	of	important	driving	and	rearward	vision‐
related	concepts	(notably,	‘Down’	‘Speed’	and	‘See’),	which	were	the	most	prominent	
and	distinguishing	concepts	from	that	of	the	older	group	in	Study	1.	Now,	like	the	older	
group,	there	was	a	focus	on	parked	‘Cars’,	‘Lane’,	and	the	‘Side’	of	the	road,	and	also,	
though	to	a	lesser	degree,	with	‘Traffic’/’Lights’.			
	
Generally,	the	new	main	concepts	that	became	prominent	in	this	study	for	the	younger	
group	were	less	distinguishing	and	generally	also	seen	as	being	of	importance	by	the	
older	group.	This	lack	of	distinction	might	have	been	augmented	by	lesser	amounts	of	
text,	potentially	the	video	study	being	easier	to	undertake,	or	contrary	to	belief,	that	the	
videos	actually	provided	less	scope	for	a	commentary.	All	these	factors	could	also	
account	for	the	better	older	driver	performance.		
	
6.4.2.2.	Network	maps	
The	network	maps	appear	to	reflect	a	better	interrelation	of	concepts	for	the	older	than	
younger	group.	There	is	an	awareness	for	the	older	participants	of	‘Pedestrian’(s)	with	
‘Crossing’,	many	concepts	linked	out	of	‘Right’,	‘Side,	and	‘Left’,	and	a	cluster	around	
‘Going’.	Additionally,	specific	vehicles	are	mentioned,	such	as	‘Bus’	and	‘Van’	(only	by	
this	group),	along	with	specific	actions	like	‘Stop’,	and	unique	road	artefacts	such	as	
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‘Sign’	and	‘Bridge’.	Overall,	there	is	more	similarity	here	with	the	younger	group,	than	in	
Study	1.		
	
The	younger	group’s	network,	in	contrast,	appears	more	spread	out	with	fewer	
connections	but	with	more	distinct	clusters.	The	importance	of	the	‘Cars’	concept	is	
evident	in	this	regard,	with	many	linkages	to	related	concepts’;	also	the	‘Lights’	concept	
looks	another	prominent	cluster,	with	its	linkages	reflective	of	Table	6.I	above	(‘Traffic’,	
‘Green’,	‘Red’).	Like	the	older	group	there	is	also	a	cluster	that	includes	‘Pedestrians’	and	
‘Crossing’,	though	additionally	here	with	‘Around’.	As	for	individual	concepts,	more	
awareness	of	‘People’	is	demonstrated,	and	in	line	with	the	previous	study,	being	‘Sure’	
of	their	actions.	
	
6.4.3.	Combined	Group	data	
The	older	group	produced	a	26.57%	higher	average	word	count	(1790.5:	1414.6)	than	
the	younger	group	in	this	study.	In	contrast,	in	Study	1	the	average	word	count	
difference	was	0.45%	(2655:2643)	in	favour	of	the	younger	group.	Yet	despite	this	
group	difference	in	narrative	length,	a	lack	of	concept	distinction	was	evident	here.	The	
software	only	highlights	‘Turning’	(see	Table	6.J),	a	directional	concept	for	the	older	
group,	as	being	particularly	distinguishing	(69‐30%).	However,	this	had	a	relatively	low	
frequency	in	the	text,	was	identical	in	Prominence	score	to	four	other	concepts,	and	was	
not	evaluated	as	a	main	concept.		
	
For	the	younger	group	the	software	found	no	particularly	distinguishing	concept,	which	
was	not	found	in	Study	1,	although	the	‘Lights’	concept	would	appear	to	merit	inclusion.	
Also	unlike	Study	1,	Table	6.J	shows	that	a	number	of	concepts	had	far	higher	
frequencies	in	the	text.	For	the	older	group:	‘Traffic’	(12%);	‘Left’	(12%);	‘Going’	(11%);	
and	‘Cars’	(11%)	can	be	highlighted.	For	the	younger	group:	‘Cars’	(16%);	‘Traffic’	
(12%);	and	‘Road’	(11%).	(In	Study	1	the	highest	frequency	of	a	main	concept	was	7%).	
Not	surprisingly	all	these	concepts	were	analysed	as	being	main	concepts	for	each	
group,	but	the	scores	reflect	more	intra	and	inter	group	similarity	in	word	usage.	
	
The	combined	network	(Figure	6.5),	however,	does	provide	some	distinguishing	
information	for	the	two	groups.	Generally,	it	could	be	said	from	looking	at	this	network	
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that	there	were	indications	that	whereas	the	older	drivers	gave	more	consideration	to	
facets	of	car	movement,	such	as	‘Going’,	‘Straight’,	‘Turning’,	‘Right’,	the	younger	drivers	
appeared	to	take	more	notice	of	individual	objects	in	the	road	environment,	such	as	
‘Pedestrian’,	‘People’,	‘Cyclists’	and	‘Cars’.		
	
However,	it	should	be	noted	that	whereas	both	the	‘Pedestrian’	and	‘Crossing’	concepts	
appeared	in	both	of	the	individual	group	networks	(Figures	6.3	and	6.4)	and	had	similar	
word	counts	(i.e.	‘Pedestrian’:104	(older)‐94	(younger)/	‘Crossing’	(67‐56),	here	both	
are	seen	as	particularly	relevant	to	the	younger	group.			
	
This	is	also	the	case	for	‘Cyclist’,	which	also	had	a	similar	word	count	between	the	two	
groups	(32	(older)	‐	41	(younger)),	but	appeared	in	neither	group’s	network.	It	could	be	
that	the	‘Cyclist’	concept	was	seen	as	more	relevant	to	the	younger	group	due	to	its	
linkage	through	the	‘People’	concept,	which	the	software	calculated	as	only	relevant	to	
the	younger	participants	(0‐38).		
	
The	limitations	of	these	networks	has	been	discussed	previously,	however	this	is	not	to	
discount	that	the	younger	group	may	have	been	more	aware	of	specific	roadway	
information.	The	main	two	concepts	for	this	group	were,	after	all,	‘Cars’	(with	a	339	
word	count)	and	‘Lights’	(with	256)	whereas	for	the	older	group	it	was	‘Traffic’	(365)	
and	‘Left’	(340),	with	‘Cars’	(246),	for	example,	being	rated	7th,	despite	having	more	
scope	for	a	higher	word	count	due	to	the	group’s	greater	(26.57%)	volume	of	text.		
	
6.4.4.	Limitations	
As	with	Study	1,	although	the	participants	were	regular	drivers,	they	could	not	be	
matched	for	mileage	driven	per	week,	or	accident	history	etc.	It	was	felt	there	was	
particular	value	in	trying	to	recruit,	as	far	as	possible,	those	participants	who	had	
volunteered	for	Study	1,	and	consequently	that	any	such	matching	should	now	be	
abrogated.	However,	as	argued	in	relation	to	that	study,	it	was	unlikely	that	this	variable	
confounded	the	results	that	were	found.		
	
In	addition	to	certain	anomalies	in	regards	to	the	Leximancer	software’s	visual	network	
representations	(alluded	to	above),	limitations	with	the	‘Think	aloud’	methodology	
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again	need	to	be	highlighted.	Whilst	being	less	obtrusive	and	easy	to	understand,	the	
approach	once	again	impacted	on	the	number	of	participants	who	could	be	assessed	
within	a	reasonable	time	period	‐	which	was	particularly	disappointing	here	as	156	
people	had	volunteered.	This	was	principally	due	to	the	need	for	commentaries	to	be	
accurately	transcribed,	and	then	formatted	as	truly	as	possibly	to	a	participant’s	
enunciation.	And	having	utilised	the	method	for	Study	1,	there	were	demonstrable	
advantages	in	using	it	again	here	for	comparison	purposes:	notwithstanding	that	this	
constrained	group	sizes,	and	once	again	limited	the	study’s	power	for	making	group	
generalisations.		
	
Similar	issues	also	apply	to	the	assessments	of	Hazard	Perception,	as	by	using	narrative	
data	it	took	time	to	gain	accurate	individual	scores.	Although	the	rankings	of	the	
participants	were	virtually	the	same	here	over	three	separate	assessments,	there	were	
slight	variations	in	scoring	sufficient	to	suggest	an	advantage	for	perhaps	three	judges	
to	record	scores	independently,	with	those	totals	then	being	averaged.	
	
The	amount	of	text	being	produced	by	the	two	groups	may	also	be	worthy	of	mention	
here,	as	an	argument	could	be	made	that	the	differences	(26.57%)	might	have	impacted	
on	comparisons	in	SA	scoring,	both	here,	and	with	Study	1.	Clearly	a	reduction	in	text	
was	very	likely	for	this	study	due	to	the	shorter	journeys	being	commented	on,	however	
it	is	important	to	note	that	word	counts	differences	should	not	influence	SA	scoring.	
This	indeed	was	found,	as,	for	example,	a	lesser	average	word	count	difference	(per	
group)	on	the	‘Complex’	(149.8)	than	‘Standard’	journey	(225.5),	still	brought	a	wider	
range	in	SA	Density	scoring.	That	said,	if	viable	(as	two	older	participants	experienced	
vertigo	during	this	short	study),	thirty	to	forty	minutes	of	video	footage	would	probably	
have	been	advantageous	for	study	comparison	puposes.			
	
6.5.	Conclusion	
In	this	Study,	older	participants	identified	fewer	hazards,	and	in	a	less	timely	manner,	
than	younger	participants.	Yet	their	group	SA	was	found	to	be	as	good,	and,	in	fact,	
better,	when	assessed	by	an	average	of	individual	scores.	Although	the	younger	drivers	
produced	lower	SA	Density	scores,	these	were	found	to	be	related	to	their	Hazard	
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Perception	scoring.	This	was	the	case	for	both	a	‘Complex’	journey,	and	a	‘Complex’	and	
‘Standard’	journey	in	combination.	
	
These	findings	raise	an	issue	of	how	relevant	SA	might	be	for	older	driving	groups	for	
the	detection	of	hazards.	For	example,	being	able	to	demonstrate	a	good	cohesive	
awareness	from	a	high	degree	of	information	processing	may	not	necessarily	help	
detect	a	hazard,	if,	say,	too	much	information	is	being	sought	that	cannot	be	processed	
in	a	timely	fashion.	Or	alternatively,	when	the	wrong	kinds	of	information	are	being	
processed,	however	cohesively,	under	perceived	time	pressure.			
	
Overall,	the	younger	participants	were	found	in	this	study	to	give	less,	but	more	
cohesive,	information	relative	to	the	older	participants	at	the	group	level,	but	not	at	the	
individual	level.	It	can	be	speculated	that	this	shows	the	younger	group	exhibiting	more	
similarity	in	information	processing,	despite	it	being	a	more	heterogeneous	group,	with	
participants	from	across	Europe,	Asia,	and	the	UK.	The	older	group,	in	contrast,	with	
participants	exclusively	from	the	UK,	still	appeared	to	have	undertaken	more	
idiosyncratic	processing	at	the	group	level.	As	with	Study	1,	there	were	also	indications	
of	the	younger	participants	giving	more	consideration	to	specific	information.	The	
contrast	in	the	three	main	concepts	given	by	the	younger	group	(‘Cars’,	‘Lights’,	‘Road’),	
to	the	more	general	main	concepts	given	by	the	older	group	(‘Traffic’,	’Left’,	’Going’),	are	
perhaps	indicative	of	this.	However,	in	general,	the	gap	closed	here	from	Study	1.	
	
Thus,	once	again,	depth	of	processing	may	be	an	important	explanatory	variable	here,	
particularly	in	regard	to	hazard	detection.	Perhaps	by	undertaking	more	shallow	
processing,	the	older	group	was	able	to	produce	a	more	cohesive	broader	awareness	
due	to	having	more	time	to	process	information	than	when	driving,	and	with	less	critical	
consequences.	However,	such	broader	processing,	when	under	more	time	pressure	(due	
to	vehicle	speed)	did	not	appear	optimal	for	observing	specific	dynamic	hazards,	and	
when	age‐related	cognitive	deficits	are	also	factored	in,	perhaps	this	explains	the	
group’s	poorer	relative	performance.	In	contrast,	more	in‐depth	but	less	cohesive	
processing	may	have	better	enabled	the	younger	participants	to	perform	better	in	this	
regard.	And	if	so,	it	would	appear	possible	that	if	they	were	trained	to	undertake	better	
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co‐ordinated	information	processing,	that	not	only	would	their	Situation	Awareness	
improve,	but	also,	as	a	result,	their	Hazard	Perception.	
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Chapter	7:	A	study	investigating	the	Situation	Awareness	of	older	
and	younger	drivers	when	driving	a	route	with	extended	periods	
of	cognitive	taxation.	
	
7.1.	Introduction	
In	Study	1	of	this	series,	scores	demonstrative	of	Situation	Awareness	(SA)	whilst	
driving	were	found	to	be	very	similar	between	that	of	an	older	and	younger	participant	
group	(p<0.975).	However,	when	the	narratives	on	which	those	scores	were	based	upon	
were	evaluated	and	compared,	the	older	group	was	found	to	have	given	far	fewer	
safety‐related	concepts	and	words,	and	appeared	to	be	less	aware	as	to	what	was	
happening	around	their	vehicles.	They	also	appeared	to	process	information	less	
rigorously	‐	demonstrating	a	more	general,	directional‐based,	awareness,	in	contrast	to	
a	younger	driver	group’s	focus	on	more	specific	driving	actions	and	roadway	artefacts.	
	
An	argument	was	made	that	if	older	drivers	do	undertake	more	cursory	observation,	
and	process,	potentially,	an	insufficient	number	of	safety‐related	cues,	then	whilst	this	
may	not	necessarily	impact	on	them	driving	safely	in	less	demanding	conditions	(such	
as	encountered	in	Study	1),	it	could	if	those	conditions	became	more	cognitively	
demanding.		
	
To	investigate	this	further,	Study	2	again	evaluated	an	older	against	a	younger	driving	
group.	The	same	‘Think	aloud’	method	was	employed,	but	the	commentaries	requested	
were	for	two	car	journeys	shown	on	video:	the	latter	of	which	having	particularly	high	
levels	of	roadway	and	peripheral	activity.	It	was	assumed	that	the	participants,	who	
were	asked	to	imagine	themselves	as	the	driver,	would	find	this	task	more	cognitively	
taxing	than	Study	1,	and	that	due	to	age‐related	processing	deficits,	that	it	would	impact	
more	on	the	older	group’s	performance	and	thus	their	scores	indicative	of	SA.		
	
The	results	from	the	Study	were,	however,	contrary	to	expectation,	with	the	older	
driving	group	demonstrating	more	Situation	Awareness	for	both	journeys,	and	
particularly	so	when	the	narratives	of	both	were	combined	(p<0.062).	A	similar	
comparative	assessment	with	the	commentaries	of	those	participants	who	had	also	
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undertaken	Study	1	further	found	significantly	improved	SA	Density	scores	(p<0.015).	
Finally,	although	the	two	individual	video	journeys	from	Study	2	were	considered	by	all	
participants	as	being	very	different	in	roadway	complexity,	they	nonetheless	produced	
similar	group	level	scores	for	SA	proficiency.	To	investigate	these	findings	further,	a	
return	is	made	in	this	final	study	to	actual	roadway	assessments,	to	consider	whether	
driving	a	more	‘complex’	route	to	that	of	Study	1	would	similarly	show	a	lack	of	effect	on	
a	participant’s	SA.	
	
7.1.1.	Approach	
In	order	to	evaluate	the	relative	difficulty	of	this	Study	to	those	undertaken	previously	
in	this	series,	a	preference	was	given	firstly	to	volunteers	who	had	undertaken	Study	2,	
or	both	Study	2	and	Study	1,	and	if	insufficient,	then	to	those	who	had	just	undertaken	
Study	1.	A	comparison	could	then	be	made	between	their	SA	Density	scores,	and	they	
could	be	asked,	in	connection	to	Study	2,	whether	the	task	of	providing	a	commentary	
whilst	driving,	or	whilst	watching	a	video,	was	the	easier	to	undertake,	and	to	give	their	
reasons.	
	
7.1.2.	Objectives	and	hypotheses	
The	principal	objective	was	to	capture	an	appropriate	and	sufficient	commentary	from	a	
participant	for	his/her	SA	to	be	assessed.	This	would	be	achieved	by	having	him/her	
drive	out	and	back	to	Loughborough	University,	UK,	along	a	more	cognitively	
challenging	route	than	employed	for	Study	1,	and	for	around	the	same	time	period.		
	
This	route,	however,	could	not	be	as	‘complex’	as	the	one	utilised	previously	on	video.	It	
would	not	be	viable	or	fair,	for	example,	to	expect	participants	to	drive,	at	distance,	to	a	
city	centre	location	on	par	in	complexity	with	Bristol	(used	in	Study	2),	and	then	return	
to	Loughborough.	The	closest	candidate	would	be	Leicester,	over	12	miles	away.	
Moreover,	this	ethically	would	not	be	advisable,	as	safety	could	potentially	(if	not	likely)	
be	compromised.	What	was	required	was	a	circular	route	from	the	University	that	
would	present	more	challenges	to	the	driver	than	Study	1,	though	not	place	him/her	in	
conditions	above	what	s/he	might	normally	experience	(given	the	additional	
commentary	task).	The	route	chosen	was	tested	and	found	to	be	sufficiently	taxing	for	
the	puposes	of	investigating	RQ3,	yet	retained	sufficient	gaps	before	directional	input	
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was	needed	by	the	researcher.	As	such,	it	was	considered	safe	for	giving	a	commentary,	
but	to	support	this	view,	the	route,	as	before,	was	presented	to	potential	participants	
some	weeks	in	advance	for	them	to	consider	for	difficulty.	No	one	felt	it	to	be	overly	
taxing	(or,	for	that	matter,	after	driving	it	whilst	providing	a	commentary).	
	
As	with	Studies	1	and	2,	SA‐related	proficiency	scores,	and	the	constituent	concepts	and	
their	links	within	each	of	the	networks	that	informed	them,	would	be	determined	from	
computer	software.	In	addition	to	intra	study	comparisons	of,	once	again,	older	and	
younger	driving	groups,	some	inter	study	observations	were	also	made	with	the	
findings	from	Studies	1	&	2.	However,	these	are	considered	in	further	detail	in	the	
following	‘Overview	and	Synthesis’	Chapter.	
		
It	was	hypothesised	that	due	to	age‐related	perceptual	declines,	that	the	Situation	
Awareness	metric	scores	would	be	more	deficient	for	the	older,	than	younger,	driving	
group,	as	they	would	be	facing	a	more	difficult	journey	(than	Study	1)	and	a	more	
demanding	overall	task	(than	Study	2).	As	such,	the	two	groups	would	also	consider	
different	main	concepts	as	being	of	relevance.		
	
7.2.	Method	
7.2.1.	Design	
The	study	once	again	adopted	a	‘Think	aloud’	(or	Verbal	Protocol	Analysis)	approach	to	
data	capture.	As	with	Study	1,	this	required	participants	to	drive	their	own	cars	around	
a	pre‐defined	course.	And	whilst	doing	so,	to	provide	a	verbal	commentary	of	what	
information	they	viewed	as	relevant	from	a	particular	driving	environment	and	how	
that	impacted	on	their	driving	actions.	These	commentaries	were	recorded	via	an	audio	
capture	device,	whilst	simultaneously	being	listened	to	via	earphones	by	the	researcher,	
to	ensure	that	what	was	being	said	could	be	clearly	heard.	The	same	researcher	was	
present	for	all	of	the	journeys,	either	driven	or	watched	in	this	series,	and	the	only	
person	involved	in	later	(verbatim)	data	transcription.	This	approach	was	taken	to	
improve	reliability.	The	narratives	produced	for	the	study	would,	as	before,	be	run	
through	Leximancer	software,	which	is	uniquely	capable	of	producing	detailed	visual	
networks	of	the	main	concepts	considered	of	importance	whilst	driving	the	route.	
Additionally,	an	individual’s	or	a	group’s	Situation	Awareness	would	again	be	assessed	
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through	Agna	software,	from	how	proficiently	the	concepts	that	comprised	a	driver’s	or	
group’s	network	were	interrelated.		
	
It	has	been	argued	previously	that	this	approach	provides	a	better	and	more	realistic	
basis	for	extracting	the	level	of	detail	needed	to	provide	a	comprehensive	
understanding	and	comparison	of	the	Situation	Awareness	of	different	driver	age‐
groups.			
	
7.2.2.	Participants	
21	participants	undertook	the	trial	(12	male/9	female),	ranging	in	age	from	23	to	84	
years.	They	were	divided	into	two	groups:	either	to	one	comprising	of	an	age	range	of	
up	to	50	years;	or	to	another	comprising	of	an	age	range	of	above	70	years.		
	
The	older	participants	(7	male/3	female;	average	age:	77.2	years)	were	UK	drivers	who	
had	undertaken	previous	studies	in	this	series	(all	had	undertaken	Study	2/7	had	
additionally	undertaken	Study	1).	The	younger	participants	(5	male/6	female;	average	
age:	28.2	years)	were	research	students	and	associates	at	the	Loughborough	Design	
School	and	School	of	Engineering	(6	had	undertaken	Study	2/2	had	additionally	
undertaken	Study	1).	They	were	compensated	£20	for	their	time	and	travel	expenses.	In	
deciding	on	who	was	to	take	part,	preference	was	given	to	the	oldest	and	youngest	
volunteers.	
	
7.2.2.1.	Inclusion	criteria	
The	inclusion	criteria	stipulated	was	for	potential	participants	to	have	a	full	UK	driving	
licence	with	no	recent	major	endorsements,	be	regular	drivers,	and	to	be	aged	either	up	
to	50	years	old,	or	above	70	years	old.	
	
7.2.2.2.	Exclusion	criteria	
Due	to	the	need	for	accurate	transcriptions,	potential	participants	who	had	a	poor	
clarity	of	spoken	English	would	be	excluded.	
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7.2.3.	Materials	
The	vehicle	used	to	drive	the	route	was	provided	by	the	participant.	The	researcher	
required	a	digital	device	to	record	the	driver’s	commentary,	and	latterly	a	PC	capable	of	
running	the	required	software	packages.	
	
7.2.3.1	Route	
The	test	route	was	11.9	miles	in	length	(following	a	short	warm‐up	phase	of	0.5	miles)	
running	through	Leicestershire	to	Swithland	reservoir	(see	Figure	7.1).	It	comprised	of	
2.5	miles	along	dual	carriageway	(A6);	2.25	miles	along	a	major	‘A’	class	road	(A6004);	
3.2	miles	through	towns	(Quorn:	1.5	miles;	Mountsorrel	1.7	miles);	and	4	miles	of	
countryside	driving	(including	2.66	miles	along	single	car	width	roads).	The	route,	
which	was	pre‐tested	a	few	days	previously	for	safety,	difficulty,	and	potential	delay	
from	roadworks,	was	found	to	take	about	30	minutes	to	drive	(with	45	minutes	then	
being	allocated	for	each	journey),	and	was	to	start	and	end	at	Loughborough	University,	
UK.	However,	no	data	was	captured	once	a	driver	had	exited	the	roundabout	off	of	the	
A6	and	back	onto	the	A6004	(see	red	symbol/Figure	7.1).	This	was	because	it	was	felt	
that	sufficient	commentary	would	have	been	captured	by	that	time,	and	the	roadways	
from	that	point	had	already	been	commented	upon.	
	
Figure	7.1:	Route	map	
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All	trials	took	place	in	good	visibility	and	at	pre‐defined	times	(11.40	am,	1.40	pm,	or	
3.30pm)	in	order	to	avoid	peak	traffic	conditions,	and	to	thereby	retain	some	control	
over	traffic	density	and	the	time	taken	to	traverse	the	route.	As	the	weather	could	not	
be	controlled,	it	was	important	to	ensure	a	participant’s	safety	by	not	allowing	any	
driving	in	dangerous	conditions.	Also	in	this	regard,	care	was	taken	not	to	overly	
distract	a	driver	with	instruction	and	directions.	
	
The	route	was	chosen	to	present	a	participant	with	more	challenges	than	in	Study	1	
(though	within	reason	for	safety).	In	the	SA	literature,	‘complex’	and	‘non‐complex’	
routes	are	assumed	from	a	simple	numerical	comparison	of	the	(rather	artificial)	
roadway	artifacts	presented	via	a	pc	or	simulator.	For	this	study,	a	more	detailed	route	
comparison	was	made.	Table	7.A	below,	gives	some	comparative	data.	
	
	Table	7.A:	Study	1	&	3	route	difficulty	comparisons	
Route	comparisons	 Study	1	 Study	3	
Roadway	artefact	
Traffic/pedestrian	lights	 16	 17	
Roundabouts	 6	 12	
Totals	 22	 29	
Cornering/turning	
Left	turns	 1	 2	
Left	bends	(sharp	&	blind)	 1	 13	
Left	bends	(sharp)	 0	 2	
(Of	which	were	90	degrees)	 (0)	 (3)	
‘T’	Junction	Left	turn	 3	 1	
Right	turns	 4	 2	
Right	bends	(sharp	&	blind)	 1	 12	
Right	bends	(sharp)	 0	 3	
(Of	which	90	degree	turns)	 (0)	 (3)	
‘T’	Junction	Right	turn	 1	 2(1	blind)	
Totals	 11	 37	
	
The	aim	was	to	produce	more	occasions	that	required	the	driver	to	increase	his/her	
cognitive	effort.	Thus	negotiating	sharp	bends	than	when	driving	on	straight	and	open	
roads	was	felt	of	relevance	‐	Taylor	et	al.	(2002),	for	example,	argue	that	bend	density	
contributes	to	driving	difficulty.	This	difference,	although	generally	found	and	recorded	
in	Table	7.A.	above,	was	particularly	evident	during	the	4	miles	of	countryside	driving,	
which	presented	a	driver	with	progressively	more	difficult	tight	cornering	with	either	
blind	or	restricted	views.	This	element	also	included	roadways,	not	utilised	in	Study	1,	
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where	there	was	only	enough	space	for	one	car	to	pass	(see	top	left	image:	Figure	7.2).	
So	the	driver	on	this	route	had	to	be	more	aware	of	oncoming	traffic.	Additionally,	it	is	
also	assumed	in	the	literature	that	intersections	(including	traffic	lights),	and	changing	
lanes	and	entering	traffic	flow	(such	as	at	roundabouts)	constitute	more	complex	
driving	(e.g.	Teh	et	al.,	2014;	Ernst	&	O’Connor,	1988	‐	see	also	Fildes	et	al.,	2000).	Thus	
the	comparative	number	of	roundabouts	encountered	and	recorded	for	Table	7.A.	was	
of	relevance.	
	
To	these	aspects	it	can	be	added	that	the	drivers	were	uniquely	exposed	to	a	right	turn	
from	a	‘T’	junction	with	no	visibility	from	the	right	(Figure	7.2:	top	right	image).	
Restricted	road	widths	through	towns	with	oncoming	vehicles	(Figure	7.2:	bottom	left	
image),	a	small	angled	bridge	with	room	for	only	one	car	and	no	view	of	oncoming	
traffic	(Figure	7.2:	bottom	right	image),	and	an	entrance	onto	a	dual	carriageway	with	a	
limited	slip	lane,	making	acceleration	and	lane	entry	difficult.		
	
Figure	7.2:	Examples	of	blind	turns	and	narrow	roads	on	the	route
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7.2.4.	Procedure	
7.2.4.1.	Pre‐run	phase	
Firstly,	informed	(ethical)	consent	was	obtained	from	all	participants	before	the	route	
was	driven	(see	Appendix	3).	At	this	time,	it	was	also	emphasised	that	control	of	the	
vehicle,	and	the	safety	of	other	road	users,	remained	the	participants’	responsibility	at	
all	times,	and	therefore	that	they	should	drive	as	they	normally	would	do	on	each	
roadway.	An	instruction	sheet	(see	Appendix	1)	on	how	to	provide	a	commentary	was	
then	once	again	offered	to	the	participant	(they	had	initially	received	this	the	day	before	
attendance)	to	re‐read.				
	
7.2.4.2.	Warm‐up	phase	
The	participant	then	walked	the	researcher	to	his/her	car,	and	once	comfortable,	began	
the	short	0.5	mile	journey	to	the	start	of	the	test	route	through	the	University’s	campus.	
This	enabled	the	(5)	new	participants	to	practice	their	commentaries.	For	the	(16)	
participants	who	had	undertaken	previous	studies,	this	stage	was	optional.		
	
During	this	time	the	researcher	checked	whether	the	new	participants	had	a	grasp	of	
what	was	required,	and	where	appropriate,	suggested	additional	input.	A	check	was	
also	made	of	the	recording	equipment	to	ensure	that	it	was	adequately	capturing	the	
driver’s	comments.	At	the	end	of	this	phase	all	participants	was	asked	if	they	were	
happy	to	commence	the	recorded	route,	and	if	so,	the	data	collection	phase	commenced.	
	
7.2.4.3.	Data	collection	phase	
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During	this	(11.9	mile)	phase	the	researcher	remained	silent	and	simply	monitored	the	
audio	capture	process.	He	did,	however,	give	route	directions	(and	whenever	possible	
these	were	conveyed	at	times	when	a	participant	had	taken	a	pause	in	his/her	
commentary),	and	when	necessary	(which	was	very	rare),	prompt	the	participant	for	
more	commentary.		
	
7.2.4.4.	Debriefing	stage	
A	debriefing	session,	in	the	participant’s	car,	took	place	on	return	to	the	university,	at	
which	point	his/her	views	on	the	route	were	taken,	and	additionally	for	the	participants	
who	had	undertaken	Study	2,	one	standard	question	‐	whether	commenting	on	this	
drive	was	a	more	difficult	task	(than	doing	so	for	the	videos	of	car	journeys	in	Study	2)	
and	to	give	their	reasoning.		
	
7.2.5.	Data	analysis	
The	verbal	commentaries	that	were	recorded	were	transcribed	verbatim	post‐trial,	and	
then	subjected	to	analysis	by	Leximancer	software	(Smith,	2003)	capable	of	creating	
semantic	networks	(i.e.	themes,	keywords,	key	concepts,	and	the	relationships	between	
them)	unique	to	each	participant	and/or	group.	These	networks	were	representative	of	
the	elements	of	the	study’s	driving	task	through	its	changing	journey	environments,	and	
thus	provided	an	insight	into	an	individual’s	or	a	group’s	SA.	Within	each	network	were	
nodes	of	variable	size	that	related	to	a	concept’s	relevance,	that	is,	how	frequently	it	
occurred	and	how	it	was	related	to	others	within	the	network	–	what	is	termed,	its	
semantic	connectivity	(Leximancer,	2011).	
	
The	application	of	this	technique	to	verbal	commentaries	in	real‐life	transport	contexts	
is	a	relatively	new	one,	but	proven	as	a	useful	tool	for	evaluating	Situation	Awareness	in	
driving	research	(e.g.	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Chowdhury,	2013;	Walker	et	al.,	2007;	Stanton	
et	al.,	2007;	Salmon,	Stanton,	&	Young,	2011;	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Salmon,	2011).	
	
7.2.5.1.	Network	analysis	
The	raw	quantitative	data	sets	that	the	Leximancer	software	provides	can	be	entered	
into	a	mathematical	program	(Agna,	published	by	geocities.com)	for	structural	analysis	
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comparisons	of	particular	networks.	As	with	previous	studies	in	the	series,	two	of	the	
measures	that	the	software	produces	were	used	to	calculate	Situation	Awareness:		
	
a)	Density	
A	Density	score	represents	the	level	of	interconnectivity	within	a	network,	in	the	sense	
of	how	proficient	the	linkages	are	between	its	concepts.	For	SA	assessments,	higher	
levels	of	interconnectivity	are	indicative	of	enhanced,	richer,	SA,	since	there	are	more	
linkages	between	the	network’s	concepts,	thus	aiding	information	retrieval.	Poorer	SA,	
in	contrast,	is	embodied	by	a	lower	level	of	network	interconnectivity,	and	since	the	
concepts	here	will	not	be	as	well	integrated,	this	will	slow	information	retrieval.	
	
b)	Diameter	
A	Diameter	score	also	represents	the	connections	between	the	concepts	in	a	network,	
but	moreover	it	reflects	the	efficiency	of	the	paths	across	it.	Greater	Diameter	values	
being	indicative	of	more	concepts	per	pathway	through	the	network,	suggesting	poorer	
SA;	whilst	lower	Diameter	scores	indicate	better	SA,	since	the	holder	is	able	to	generate	
an	awareness	through	less	linkages,	and	therby	faster	access	to	relevant	concepts	across	
his	or	her	network.	
	
To	identify	the	unique,	common,	and	main	concepts	underpinning	the	SA	for	each	
group,	the	Leximancer	software	also	makes	a	sociometric	status	analysis	of	each	of	the	
networks	it	produces.	
	
Sociometric	status	
This	analysis	identifies	a	network’s	key	or	main	SA	concepts	by	providing	a	measure	of	
how	‘busy’	a	concept	is	relative	to	the	total	number	of	concepts	within	the	network	
(Houghton	et	al.,	2006).	These	concepts	are	defined	as	having	salience	as	they	act	as	
hubs	and	are	highly	connected	to	other	concepts	in	the	network.	Typically,	concepts	
with	a	sociometric	status	value	above	the	mean	value	for	the	network	as	a	whole	are	
taken	to	be	key	or	main	concepts.	
	
7.2.5.2.	Task	difficulty	
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For	those	who	undertook	both	this	and	Study	2	(16	participants),	the	Study	that	was	felt	
to	be	the	easier	to	undertake	was	recorded,	and	the	main	reasons	given	(if	any)	
captured.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
7.2.6.	Summary	of	the	approach	to	data	capture	
Figure	7.3	below	summarises	the	main	stages	involved	in	data	capture	and	comparison.			
	
Figure	7.3:	Study	3	data	analysis	stages	
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7.3.	Results	
7.3.1.	Quantitative	data	
7.3.1.1.	Group	SA	metric	scores	and	other	comparative	data	
As	is	generally	found	in	the	literature,	the	younger	drivers	in	this	study	exhibited	the	
better	SA‐related	scores,	and	unlike	previous	studies	in	this	series,	this	was	found	to	be	
the	case	whether	their	commentaries	were	collated	and	assessed	as	two	groups,	or	from	
a	comparison	by	their	(averaged)	individual	scores	(Table	7.B).	
	
Table	7.B:	Group	SA	metric	score	comparisons	
SA	assessments	
Group	
	
Ppts.	 By	Group	score	 By	Individual	scores		
Diameter	 Density	 Diameter	 Density	
Older		 10	 2	 0.7247	 2.70	 0.4321	
		Younger		 11	 2	 0.8895	 2.55	 0.5333	
*Note:	lower	Diameter	scores	and	higher	Density	scores	equate	to	better	SA	
	
Furthermore,	the	individual	SA	Density	scores	were	found	to	be	significantly	in	favour	
of	the	younger	group	(p<0.024)	from	an	independent	sample	t‐test	(Table	7.C).	The	
Diameter	scores	could	not	be	likewise	assessed	due	to	insufficient	differentiation.	As	
can	be	seen	in	Table	7.D	(below),	these	scores	were	always	either	‘2’	or	‘3’.		
		
Table	7.C:	SA	Density	score	comparison	by	independent	sample	t‐test	
Group	 SA	scores	 Statistical	significance	
Diameter	 Density	 T	 Ppts.	 df.	 Sig.	
Older	 2.8	 0.4321	 ‐2.454	 21	 19	 0.024	
Younger	 3.1	 0.5333	
	
It	should	be	noted	that	in	Study	2,	when	its	video	journeys	were	combined	to	measure	
SA,	an	opposite	result	was	evident,	with	far	better	Density	scores	being	recorded	by	an	
older	group	(p<0.062).	
	
7.3.1.2.	Individual	SA	scores	and	other	comparative	data	
The	individual	scores	and	other	related	participant	data	are	shown	in	Table	7.D	(below).	
In	terms	of	course	completion	times,	both	groups	drove	slower	on	average	than	in	Study	
1,	with	the	older	group	taking	around	2	minutes	longer	(32.80	minutes)	than	the	
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younger	group	(30.86	minutes)	‐	in	Study	1	they	took	3	minutes	longer	on	average,	
though	that	route	was	about	20%	longer.	Unlike	Study	1,	the	course	completion	times	
between	the	two	groups	was	not	significant.		
	
The	average	length	of	a	narrative	was	7%	higher	for	the	younger	group	(2827	words)	
than	their	older	counterparts	(2648	words).	In	contrast,	for	Study	2,	it	was	the	older	
group	that	produced	more	average	text	(26.57%);	for	Study	1	it	was	more	in	parity	(a	
0.45%	advantage	for	the	younger	group).	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	7.D:	SA	rankings	and	scores,	and	other	individual	data	
Rk.	 Group	 Dia.	 Density	 Age	 M/F	 Text	 Time	(mins.)	
1	 Younger	 2	 0.6984	 23	 F	 3845	 31	
2	 Younger	 2	 0.6923	 25	 F	 3276	 30	
3	 Younger	 2	 0.5952	 34	 M	 4098	 33.5	
4	 Younger	 2	 0.5815	 23	 F	 2416	 29	
5	 Older	 2	 0.5555	 71	 F	 3729	 34.5	
6	 Younger	 3	 0.5507	 46	 F	 1870	 28.5	
7	 Younger	 3	 0.5500	 30	 M	 2654	 31	
8	 Older	 2	 0.5159	 77	 M	 2293	 30	
9	 Younger	 2	 0.5132	 25	 F	 2837	 33.5	
10	 Older	 2	 0.5032	 82	 M	 5425	 37	
11	 Older	 3	 0.5000	 75	 M	 1417	 30	
12	 Younger	 3	 0.4366	 31	 M	 1825	 31.5	
13	 Younger	 3	 0.4268	 23	 F	 1544	 33	
14	 Older	 3	 0.4253	 79	 M	 2900	 34	
15	 Younger	 3	 0.4137	 27	 M	 3861	 30.5	
16	 Younger	 3	 0.4074	 23	 M	 2867	 28	
17	 Older	 3	 0.3990	 83	 M	 2604	 35.5	
18	 Older	 3	 0.3942	 73	 F	 2310	 32	
19	 Older	 3	 0.3492	 75	 M	 2010	 30.5	
20	 Older	 3	 0.3424	 73	 M	 2125	 31.5	
21	 Older	 3	 0.3360	 84	 F	 1667	 33	
	
In	terms	of	individual	rankings,	the	younger	participants	occupied	six	of	the	top	seven	
placings,	whereas	the	older	drivers	occupied	the	last	five	placings.	Also,	the	female	
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participants	appeared	to	perform	particularly	well	in	the	Study,	occupying	five	of	the	
top	six	positions	with	nine	participants	‐	in	Study	2	it	was	three	of	the	top	six	with	six.	
		
These	results	therefore	show	more	of	an	age	to	SA	relationship	in	regards	to	the	
network	SA	Density	scores	(see	Figure	7.4	below),	particularly	for	those	participants	
performing	very	well	or	poorly.		
	
Figure	7.4:	Declining	SA	scores	to	Age	
	
7.3.2.	Qualitative	data	
7.3.2.1.	Individual	Group	data	
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Figure	7.5:	Major	concepts	for	the	Older	and	Younger	Groups
*major	concepts	are	those	above	a	50%	relevance	for	the	network	and	with	over	a	200	word	count	
	
In	Figure	7.5	(above),	the	key	or	main	concepts	for	each	group	derived	from	their	
narratives	are	given	on	the	left.	(Once	again	an	example	narrative	is	provided	as	an	
appendix).	Those	that	are	in	bold	text	being	unique	to	a	particular	group	(e.g.,	‘Hand’	or	
‘Speed’),	with	the	background	shading	indicative	of	three	levels	of	concept	count	(399,	
299,	or	199	hits	and	above).	The	Figure	also	shows	the	percentage	of	occurrence	with	
other	concepts	in	the	text	(again,	the	darker	the	background	colour	the	stronger	the	
connection)	and	where	linkages	are	unique	to	a	group,	or	of	relevance	for	both.	Due	to	a	
lack	of	differentiation	between	the	main	concepts	and	the	words	associated	with	them,	
these	were	omitted	from	analysis	in	this	study	(though	are	included	in	Study1	&	2).	
	
	
a)	Older	Group	
Main concept by % of network linkage
OLDER
Coming 44 Towards 26 Past 25 R'bout
Left 42 Parked 40 Hand 38 Side 30 Turning 28 Bend
Car 86 Parked 26 Behind 26 Appr'ch'g 25 Towards
Right 38 Hand 36 Side 31 Turning 33 Bend
Going 51 Straight 25 Towards 26 Over 28 Past
Road 41 Narrow
In
Side 30 Parked 100 Hand 29 Lane 28 Bend
Hand 28 Parked 94 Side 28 Lane 28 Bend
Traffic 50 Lights
YOUNGER
Car 93 Parked 36 Behind 31 Pull
In 25 Lane
Go 27 Around
Down 30 Gear
Coming
Road 32 Side
Right 29 Side
Left 28 Parked 33 Side 25 Lane
Side 26 Parked 27 Left
Speed
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For	the	older	drivers,	it	was	found	that	two	main	concepts	were	unique:	‘Hand’	–	as	in	
‘Side’	and	‘Lane’;	and	‘Traffic’	–	related	mainly	to	‘Lights’.	It	could	be	that	the	‘Hand’	
concept	might	merely	be	a	reflection	of	more	precise	speech,	whereas	the	‘Lights’	
linkage	to	‘Traffic’	denotes	more	of	an	interest	with	road	signalling.	As	has	been	found	
previously,	there	was	again	a	preoccupation	for	this	group	with	what	was	‘Coming’	or	
‘Going’	‘Towards’	or	‘Past’	the	‘Car’,	and	additionally,	particular	interest	in	‘Turning’	the	
vehicle	in	response	to	the	many	‘Left’	and	‘Right’	‘Hand’	‘Bend(s)’	along	the	route.	
	
b)	Younger	Group	
The	younger	group	also	had	two	unique	main	concepts:	‘Down’	‐	as	in	going	down	
‘Gear’;	and	‘Speed’.	The	latter,	unlike	the	other	main	concepts,	had	no	concept	linkages	
of	note	‐	the	best	given	by	the	software	was	with	‘Checking’	(at	9%).	As	both	of	these	
concepts	were	also	unique	for	the	differently	comprised	younger	group	of	Study	1,	it	
would	seem	that	speed	regulation	is	an	important	differentiating	factor	for	the	younger	
driver.			
	
c)	Both	groups	
For	both	groups,	much	importance	was	attached	to	the	‘Parked’	concept,	particularly	to	
‘Cars’	for	the	younger	group,	and	for	the	older	group	an	indication	of	more	emphasis	to	
those	parked	to	the	‘Left’.	The	route	had	many	parked	cars	that	caused	obstructions,	and	
this	was	also	indicated	by	the	linkages	for	both	groups	to	the	‘Side’	concept.	What	was	
also	evident	was	apparently	a	more	similar	interest	in	what	was	happening	‘Behind’	the	
vehicle	(36%	‐	26%	in	favour	of	the	younger	group).	This	indicated	a	change	from	
similar	visual‐based	data	in	Study	1,	but	this	was	latterly	contradicted	by	additional	
numerical	data	given	in	Table	7.H	(below).	
	
Overall	the	younger	group	had	less	major	linkages	from	their	main	(to	related)	
concepts,	despite	producing	more	narrative	text	and	a	higher	concept	category	total	
word	count	(5077	to	4519).			
	
How	the	concept	linkages	that	were	made	for	both	groups	is	shown	in	the	networks	
produced	in	Figures	7.6	&	7.7	below.		
Figure	7.6:	Concept	network	for	the	Older	Group	
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In	Figure	7.6,	the	centrality	and	importance	of	the	‘Coming’	concept	is	clearly	revealed	
for	the	older	group,	as	it	was	for	Study	1,	with	a	closeness	and	interrelation	with	‘Going’	
and	‘Towards’.	The	‘Right’,	‘Hand’,	Side’	and	‘Left’	concepts	are	also	shown	to	be	as	an	
important	interelated	cluster;	‘Traffic’,	less	so,	but	it	is	linked	to	the	‘Coming’	concept.	
	
Figure	7.7:	Concept	network	for	the	Younger	Group	
	  
 
For	the	younger	drivers	in	Figure	7.7,	there	are	arguably	three	important	concept	
clusters	that	are	more	spread	out	in	the	network.	The	closely	related	‘Car’,	‘In’,	‘Right’	
and	a	number	of	other	important	concepts,	and	two	other	distinct	clusters	emanating	
from	the	‘Go’	and	‘Down’	concepts.	These	appear	more	detached,	but	both	have	a	link	
(albeit	tenuous)	to	the	larger	‘Car’,	‘In’,	‘Right’	cluster.		
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7.3.3.	Combined	Group	data	
The	Leximancer	software	also	has	the	capability	of	assessing	two	(or	more)	individual	
or	group	texts	to	reveal	the	most	distinguishing	concepts	for	each.	In	Table	7.E	(below)	
it	combines	the	frequency	and	strength	of	a	concept	to	produce	Prominence	scores	for	
the	two	driver	groups.	
	
Table	7.E:	Concept	Prominences	for	the	Older	and	Younger	Groups		
Relative	Prominence	of	main	concepts	for	both	groups	
	 Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Concept	 Rk.	 Freq.		 Strength		 Prom.		 Rk.	 Freq.		 Strength		 Prom.		
Parked	 11	 4	 58	 1.2	 23	 	 	 	
Traffic	 10	 6	 58	 1.2	 17	 	 	 	
Left	 2	 8	 55	 1.2	 8	 6	 44	 0.8	
Coming	 1	 9	 53	 1.1	 5	 7	 46	 0.9	
Right	 4	 8	 50	 1.1	 7	 7	 49	 0.9	
Side	 8	 5	 49	 1.1	 9	 5	 50	 0.9	
Road	 6	 7	 47	 1.0	 6	 7	 52	 1.0	
Going	 5	 7	 45	 1.0	 3	 8	 54	 1.0	
Car	 3	 8	 44	 0.9	 1	 9	 55	 1.1	
In	 7	 7	 42	 0.9	 2	 8	 57	 1.1	
Down	 16	 	 	 	 4	 7	 71	 1.3	
Checking	 270	 	 	 	 12	 4	 96	 1.8	
				
	
a)	Older	group	
The	older	group	showed	little	uniqueness	in	its	concepts,	with	‘Parked’,	‘Traffic’,	and	
‘Left’	appearing	to	be	the	most	differentiating	for	the	group	with	Prominence	scores	of	
1.2.	
	
b)	Younger	group	
For	the	younger	group,	in	contrast,	the	need	for	‘Checking’	was	particularly	unique.	Its	
Prominence	score	of	1.8	being	considerably	high,	and	based	on	a	concept	ranking	
difference	not	found	in	the	other	studies	for	this	series.	The	1.3	rating	given	to	the	
‘Down’	concept	–	as	in	going	‘Down’	‘Gear’	(see	Figure	7.5)	–	is	also	worthy	of	mention	
here	with	its	high	(71%)	‘Strength’	score.		
	
Finally,	any	further	differences	between	the	two	group’s	perspectives	could	be	revealed	
through	a	combined	network	‘map’	that	reflected	the	relevance	that	the	forty	most	
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commonly	cited	concepts	had	for	each	group.	This	is	indicated	by	their	proximity	to	a	
group’s	‘Folder’	node	(see	Figure	7.8	below)	where	‘s3o’	relates	to	the	older	group	and	
‘s3y’	to	the	younger	group.	
	
Figure	7.8:	Relative	relevance	of	a	concept	for	each	group		
	
	
This	network	again	highlights	the	importance	of	the	‘Checking’	concept	for	the	younger	
group,	and	additionally	two	other	concepts,	‘Speed’	and	‘Gear’(s),	that	appeared	
distinguishing	in	Figure	7.5,	but	not	so	for	Table	7.E	due	to	comparison	limitations	(see	
Discussion).	None	of	these	concepts	however,	appear	to	be	interrelated,	which	was	also	
apparent	from	Figure	7.5.	
	
For	the	older	group	‘Traffic’	once	again	appeared	to	be	a	distinguishing	concept,	as	was	
‘Bend’,	which	also	appeared	to	be	of	particular	relevance	for	this	group	in	Figure	7.5.	In	
addition,	the	‘Left’	concept,	which	had	a	direct	linkage	to	the	older	group’s	folder	node,	
appears	here	to	be	particularly	related	to	a	third	distinguishing	concept,	‘Turning’,	
which	did	not	register	in	Table	7.E,	but	was	again	unique	to	the	older	group	in	Figure	
7.5.	
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7.3.4.	Was	this	study	or	Study	2	the	harder	to	undertake?		
Relevant	participants	were	asked	on	completing	the	route	whether	they	had	found	the	
drive,	or	the	video‐based	task	of	Study	2,	the	easier	to	undertake.	All	of	the	older	drivers	
said	the	drive	was	the	easier	task	of	the	two	to	provide	a	commentary	for	(see	Table	
7.F).			
	
Table	7.F:	Task	difficulty	and	main	reasons	
Group	 Which	Study	was	the	easier	to	undertake?	 Why?	
S2	(video)	 S3	(driving)	 Neither	 Main	Reasons	
Older	 0	 10	 0	 Can	drive	at	preferred	speed/familiar	with	vehicle	/unrestricted	view/control	of	vehicle	and	knowledge	of	its	direction.	
Younger	 3	 2	 1	 Unfamiliar	route/have	to	drive	and	comment.	
	
A	common	theme	conveyed	by	the	older	drivers	was	that	as	they	were	familiar	with	
their	vehicles,	they	could	proceed	at	a	speed	that	was	comfortable	for	them	(whereas	in	
the	videos	the	driver	was	perceived	as	driving	too	fast),	and	although	the	route	
traversed	was	unfamiliar	(as	it	was	in	Study	2),	that	they	had	preferred	to	have	been	
given	directions	than	not	know	where	the	car	would	be	going	(as	in	the	videos).	The	
younger	drivers,	in	contrast,	marginally	found	the	video	task	easier,	and	when	not,	this	
was	due	to	becoming	more	familiar	and	confident	with	giving	a	commentary,	rather	
than	the	driving	task	itself	being	viewed	as	easier.	In	general,	having	(more)	familiarity	
with	video	footage,	they	saw	advantages	of	simply	commenting,	than	having	to	both	
drive	and	comment.	They	also	felt	the	driving	task	became	more	difficult	once	the	route	
became	unfamiliar,	i.e.	away	from	the	University’s	environs,	even	though	the	route	
taken	in	the	video	footage	was	actually	less	familiar	to	them.		
	
7.4.	Discussion	
7.4.1.	SA	scoring	and	concept	comparisons	
It	is	worth	prefacing	this	section	by	briefly	commenting	on	some	parities	between	the	
older	and	younger	groups	that	were	highlighted	in	Table	7.D,	which	provide	a	good	
basis	for	group	comparisons	to	be	made.	Specifically,	the	average	time	to	complete	the	
course	was	similar	for	both	groups	(with	comparable	volumes	of	traffic	and	weather	
conditions),	as	was	the	average	length	of	narrative	that	was	provided	(a	7%	difference	
in	favour	of	the	younger	group).			
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7.4.1.1.	Quantitative	data	
In	this	Study,	measures	indicative	of	Situation	Awareness,	showed	that	a	younger	group	
out‐performed	an	older	group,	as	is	generally	found	in	the	literature.	This	was	the	case	
whether	the	narratives	of	the	two	groups	were	considered	as	a	whole,	or	from	an	
averaging	of	their	individual	scores	(Table	7.B).	In	the	latter	case,	which	allows	for	a	
statistical	evaluation,	the	Group	differences	by	SA	Density	score	were	found	to	be	
significant	(p<0.024)	(Table	7.C).	
	
Unlike	the	driving	route	in	Study	1,	where	care	was	taken	not	to	challenge	drivers	with	
difficult	roadways,	this	Study,	in	contrast,	actually	sought	out	road	environments	that	
would	require	extra	concentration	and	awareness	by	the	participant	driver,	and	often	
for	long	periods.	Perhaps	as	a	result,	the	Study	produced	different	individual	
quantitative	results	to	that	of	Study	1.	As	Table	7.D	indicates,	for	the	route	driven	in	this	
study	the	younger	participants	held	the	highest	four	ranking	positions,	and	the	older	
drivers	the	lowest	five	positions.	For	Study	1,	the	younger	drivers	occupied	four	of	the	
five	lowest	positions,	and	there	was	more	group	parity	at	the	highest	five	positions.	The	
participants	in	this	Study	also	improved	(and	brought	more	consistency	in)	their	
network	Density	scores.	For	example,	the	last	placed	participant	by	this	measure	for	this	
Study	would	have	been	placed	10th	in	Study	1.	Thus	a	more	difficult	route,	rather	than	
degrading	SA,	actually	appeared	to	improve	it.	However,	with	the	higher	scoring	
rankings,	although	the	same	participant	was	placed	first	for	both	studies	with	exactly	
the	same	Density	score,	the	easier	drive	undertaken	in	Study	1	produced	more	Density	
scores	in	the	0.6	and	above	bracket.	
	
Overall	then,	as	was	shown	in	Figure	7.4	(above),	a	clearer	SA	to	age	relationship	was	
found	for	this	driving	study	that	was	not	evident	for	Study	1.	This	was	particularly	the	
case	for	the	more	extreme	ranked	scores,	but	far	less	so	for	the	middle	ranked	scores.	So	
perhaps	the	more	‘complex’	drive	simply	provided	a	better	basis	for	differentiating	
between	those	participants	who	had	the	very	best	and	worst	awareness?		
	
7.4.1.2.	Qualitative	data	
It	has	been	argued	in	previous	chapters	that	the	quantitative	results	given	above	reveal	
only	how	cohesively	a	participant	organises	the	information	s/he	extracts	from	an	
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environment.	Whilst	a	more	cohesive	network	with	many	linkages	must	aid	information	
retrieval,	and	that	this	must	be	important	in	driving	contexts	when	on	occasion	seconds	
can	be	very	important,	the	SA	indicative	measures	taken	here	do	not,	of	course,	reflect	
the	quality	of	the	information	within	a	particular	network.	This	too,	though,	is	obviously	
an	important	element	for	good	driving	proficiency,	and	thus	it	is	necessary	to	extract	
and	compare	the	driving	concepts	that	underlie	an	individual’s	or	group’s	score	‐	to	gain	
a	sense	of	what	she,	he,	or	the	group,	is	seeking	to	process.	
	
In	this	regard,	despite	the	varying	routes	and	group	scores	found	for	the	two	driving	
studies	undertaken	in	this	series,	in	terms	of	what	information	was	being	
comprehended	and	considered	of	value,	there	was	some	similarity	in	regards	to	what	
each	group	viewed	as	important.	In	short,	the	older	drivers	tended	to	perceive	and	
evaluate	more	concepts	to	the	front	of	their	vehicles;	whereas	the	younger	drivers	paid	
more	attention	to	concepts	indicative	of	speed	regulation.	However,	in	this	present,	
more	difficult	driving	study,	the	older	drivers	gave	indications	of	being	more	aware	of	
driving	movement	and	specific	artefacts;	whilst	the	younger	drivers	appeared,	on	
occasion,	to	have	undertaken	more	broader	(top‐down)	processing.	
	
a)	Older	group	
The	main	concepts	that	were	considered	important	for	the	older	group	of	Study	1	
retained	their	status	in	this	study.	Figure	7.5	shows	that	this	was	particularly	the	case	
for	‘Coming’,	which	again	had	the	highest	concept	count.	The	importance	of	the	‘Going’	
concept	was	also	evident	once	more,	as	was	its	linkage	(also	found	for	the	‘Coming’	
concept)	to	‘Towards’.	The	bias	for	taking	information	from	the	‘Left’	(front)	side	of	the	
vehicle	was	retained	for	this	group,	but	it	was	less	pronounced.	For	example,	what	was	
‘Parked’	on	the	left	‘Hand’	‘Side’	was	apparently	of	importance,	but	when	it	came	to	
‘Turning’	and	‘Bends’,	the	right	side	of	the	vehicle	then	became	marginally	more	of	a	
focus.	The	new	main	concepts	for	the	group	were	‘Side’,	probably	due	to	the	many	
narrow	roadways	encountered,	and	‘Hand’,	which	appeared	to	be	merely	a	product	of	
more	precision	in	speech	than	better	awareness	per	se.	A	general	‘Traffic’	concept,	was	
again	a	unique	main	concept	for	the	group,	but	lessened	in	importance,	and	became	
more	specifically	related	to	‘Lights’.	Finally,	the	prevalence	of	a	‘Bends’	concept	
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indicated	a	specific	awareness	of	a	necessary	driving	action,	particularly	due	to	its	
linkage	with	‘Turning’	the	vehicle.	
	
b)	Younger	Group	
For	the	younger	group,	Figure	7.5	showed	that	there	were	less	distinguishing	and	less	
concept	relationships	than	were	found	for	the	older	group.	The	interest	in	gear	changes	
relating	to	slowing	‘Down’	was	more	evident	than	in	Study	1,	but	the	‘Down’	concept	
had	considerably	less	importance	for	this	study,	and	there	was	now	no	tangible	links	
between	‘Speed’	and	‘Down’,	and	‘Coming’	to	a	‘Stop’.	In	regards	to	the	older	group’s	
awareness	of	a	need	for	‘Turning’	around	‘Bend’(s),	for	the	younger	group	the	
processing	of	such	information	appeared	to	be	less	deep,	with	‘Go’	‘Around’	seemingly	
the	only	relationship	reflective	of	this	action.	Additionally,	there	seemed	to	be	a	bias	for	
the	group	to	the	‘Left’	‘Side’	of	their	vehicles,	and	to	what	was	‘Parked’	on	the	‘Left,	and	
to	both	the	‘Left’	and	‘Right’	side	more	generally.		
	
c)	Both	groups	
For	both	groups	the	importance	of	‘Parked’	‘Cars’	was	more	evident	in	this	study,	due	
largely	to	the	road	conditions.	For	the	older	group	the	cars	parked	to	the	‘Left’	of	the	
road	were	considered	of	slightly	more	importance.	The	‘Side’	concept	was	evident	for	
both	groups	(though	more	distinguishing	for	the	younger	group),	as	was	the	‘Behind’	
concept,	which	now	was	shown	as	being	more	in	parity	with	a	‘Car(s)’	concept,	whereas	
in	Study	1	it	only	had	that	linkage	for	the	younger	group	(along	with	‘See’).	In	fact,	it	
could	additionally	be	inferred	from	Figure	7.5	that	the	older	group	paid	equal	attention	
as	to	what	was	‘Approaching’	their	‘Car,’	as	they	did	to	what	was	coming	from	‘Behind’.	
	
Network	map	data	
The	network	maps	reflect	the	information	given	in	Figure	7.5	in	a	visual	form.	It	was	
evident	from	these	Figures	(7.6	&	7.7)	that	the	older	group’s	concepts	emanated	
principally	from	the	important	‘Coming’	concept.	As	a	result,	the	speed	theme	concepts,	
such	as	‘Speed’,	‘Limit’,	and	‘Thirty’,	do	seem	somewhat	detached	in	the	network.	
However,	these,	and	other	more	specific	concepts,	such	as	‘Bridge’,	‘Pedestrian’,	
‘Roundabout’,	‘Sign’,	and	‘Lights’	are	more	evident	in	the	network	than	for	Study	1.	The	
younger	group,	in	contrast,	had	main	concepts	slightly	more	spread	out	within	its	
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network	e.g.,	‘Go’,	‘Down’,	and	‘Car’,	giving	the	impression	of	a	better	overall	linkage.	
There	were	also	more	indications	of	anticipating	potential	hazards	here,	from	concepts	
such	as	‘Checking’,	that	a	‘Corner’	maybe	‘Blind’,	and	that	a	roadway	‘Looks’‐	‘Clear’.	The	
older	group	did	also	have	‘Clear’	in	their	network,	but	it	was	related	to	the	‘Coming’	
concept	that	had	a	focus	more	on	what	was	being	seen	out	of	the	front	windscreen.	
	
It	should	be	reiterated	from	previous	chapters,	though,	that	these	network	graphics	can	
often	be	of	less	value	than	the	data	they	are	drawn	from	(in	Figure	7.5).	The	peripheral	
concepts	can	change	position	on	each	map	iteration,	and	the	prominence	of	certain	
concepts	can	also	be	less	easy	to	discern	(e.g.,	between	‘Coming’	and	‘Left’	for	the	older	
group	in	Figure	7.6).	However,	that	said,	the	group	networks	do	appear	to	retain	some	
similarity	between	the	two	driving	studies	–	particularly	the	centrality	of	the	‘Coming’	
concept	for	the	older	group.		
	
7.4.1.3.	Combined	Group	data	
When	all	of	the	participants’	narratives	were	considered	and	compared	to	produce	one	
combined	network,	it	then	became	possible	to	reveal	which	concepts	stood‐out	as	being	
of	particular	relevance	to	each	group.	This	comparison,	however,	reproduced	by	the	
software	in	tabular	form	(in	Table	7.E)	does	not	provide	an	exhaustive	list,	rather	a	
limitation	to	about	twelve	concepts	with	a	bias	to	those	that	appear	a	high	number	of	
times	in	the	narratives.		
	
So	considering	the	Prominence	scores	in	Table	7.E,	it	becomes	evident	that	for	the	older	
group	there	were	few,	if	any,	main	concepts	that	showed	a	particular	uniqueness.	The	
software	calculates	‘Parked’	and	‘Traffic’	in	this	category,	each	with	a	58%	relevance,	
but	those	concepts	also	figured	strongly	for	the	younger	group	(42%).	The	‘Left’	
concept,	also	had	an	identical	Prominence	score	(1.2)	due	to	its	high	frequency	in	the	
texts	(8%).	
	
The	younger	group,	in	contrast,	did	show	more	uniqueness	in	their	concepts.	The	
‘Checking’	concept,	for	example,	was	particularly	differentiating	for	the	group	with	a	
96%	strength	score	(from	a	181‐	6	concept	comparison	count).	This	appeared	to	have	
similarities	with	the	most	distinguishing	concept	for	this	group	in	Study	1	‐	‘See’	(with	a	
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1.5	Prominence	score)	‐	in	that	both	were	related	to	looking	‘Behind’	the	vehicle.		To	a	
lesser	degree,	the	‘Down’	concept	also	retained	the	uniqueness	it	had	for	Study	1	with	a	
71%	strength	score	(from	a	373‐121	concept	comparison	count),	and,	again,	a	1.3	
Prominence	score.		
	
As	suggested	above,	the	software,	for	combined	numerical	data,	tends	to	place	a	
limitation	on	the	number	of	(usually	main)	concepts	that	are	assessed.	On	this	occasion,	
this	may	have	omitted	some	additional	data	of	relevance.	Specifically,	whereas	the	
concepts	ranking	just	below	those	included	in	Table	7.E	for	the	older	group	showed	
little	discrimination,	that	was	not	the	case	for	the	younger	group.	The	‘Speed’	concept,	
for	example,	which	was	ranked	10th	(23rd	for	the	older	group),	showed	a	text	difference	
of	213‐80	in	favour	of	the	younger	group	(a	72%	strength	score)	and	a	4%	to	2%	
relevant	frequency	advantage.	This	would	seem	worthy	of	inclusion	in	any	tabular	
comparison.	Likewise,	the	‘See’	concept,	11th	in	count	(33rd	for	the	older	group),	
showing	a	text	difference	of	182‐53	in	favour	of	the	younger	group	(a	77%	strength	
score)	and	a	4%	to	1%	relevance,	also	appeared	distinguishing	from	the	older	group.		
	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	‘Hand’,	a	main	concept	for	the	older	group	(9th)	with	229	
hits	and	a	5%	relevance,	did	not	register	for	Table	7.E	or	the	network	map	that	followed	
(Figure	7.8).	This	was	due	to	it	having	a	zero	hit	for	the	younger	group,	which	the	
software	then	simply	discounts.	This	concept,	though,	was	very	discriminating	for	the	
two	groups,	leaving	aside	that	it	seemingly	had	little	relevance	to	awareness.			
	
Network	map	data	
A	network	map	of	concepts	that	was	produced	from	the	combined	data	(in	Figure	7.8)	
shows	visually	how	relevant	a	(top	40)	concept	was	for	a	particular	group	from	its	
proximity	to	a	group	‘Folder’	node.	As	might	be	anticipated,	the	ones	that	stand	out	here	
reflect	what	was	found	in	the	standalone	networks	considered	earlier	(in	Figures	7.6	
and	7.7).		
	
For	the	older	group,	the	concepts	that	were	the	most	distinguishing	were	not,	as	might	
be	expected	from	Table	7.E,	the	four	top	ranking	concepts.	These,	‘Coming’,	‘Left’,	‘Car’,	
‘Right’,	were	found	more	towards	the	centre	of	the	network	as	a	cluster,	also	having	
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relevance	for	the	younger	group.	The	more	distinguishing	concepts	were	said	to	be	
‘Turning’	(with	a	88‐43	concept	count	comparison)	and	‘Bend’	(123‐54)	which	were	
shown	to	be	particularly	relevant	for	this	group	in	Figure	7.5,	but	were	too	low	in	
frequency/strength	combination	to	be	included	in	Table	7.E.		
	
For	the	younger	group,	three	concepts	showed	particular	relevance:	‘Checking’,	‘Speed’	
and	‘Gear’.	The	‘Checking’	concept	was	unsurprising	given	the	data	provided	in	Table	
7.E	above.	The	‘Speed’	and	‘Gear’	concepts,	also	considered	above,	are	now	included	by	
the	software.	Both	concepts	also	appeared	distinguishing	in	Figures	7.5	and	7.7,	but	
probably	had	too	low	a	word	comparison	count	(e.g.,	‘Gear’	(56‐17))	to	be	included	in	
Table	7.E.		
	
7.4.2.	Task	difficulty	
The	findings	given	in	Table	7.F	above	could	be	particularly	important	both	for	this	
series	of	studies	and	for	our	understanding	of	Situation	Awareness	more	generally.	
They	suggest	that	rather	than	a	(perceived)	easier	task	bringing	higher	SA	proficiency,	
as	was	concluded	after	Study	2,	that	it	actually	is	more	likely	to	be	the	case	that	a	harder	
(perceived)	task	would	bring	a	general	uplift	in	SA	scoring.	However,	this	effect	did	
seem	less	relevant	at	the	very	highest	scoring	levels.	
		
In	summary,	then,	it	was	shown	in	Study	1	that	all	participants,	young	and	old,	could	
drive	a	relatively	standard	journey	without	difficulty,	and	produce,	at	that	time,	what	
appeared	to	be	surprisingly	similar	SA	scores	given	other	findings	in	the	literature	(e.g.	
Bolstad,	2001;	Zhang	et	al.,	2009).	In	Study	2,	which	was	considered	by	the	older	drivers	
to	be	more	difficult	to	undertake,	it	was	found	that	their	SA	scores	were	appreciably	
higher	in	comparison	to	those	from	a	younger	group.	Whereas	in	the	present	Study,	
which,	overall,	the	younger	drivers	felt	to	be	more	difficult,	the	opposite	result	occurred.		
The	changes	in	SA	scoring	from	Study	2	to	the	present	study,	for	those	who	undertook	
both,	are	summarised	in	Table	7.G	below.		
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Table	7.G:	SA	Density	score	uplifts	from	Study	2		
SA	Density	scores	improving	or	worsening	from	Study	2	
Group	 Participants	 Improving	 Worsening	
Older	 10	 1	 9	
Younger	 6	 5	 1	
	
Notwithstanding	the	low	comparison	sample	here,	particularly	for	the	younger	
participants,	this	data	further	underlines	that	firstly	SA	could	be	variable	according	to	
the	task,	rather	than	being,	say,	uniformly	poor	for	older	drivers	as	is	usually	proposed	
in	the	literature	(e.g.	Bolstad,	2001).	And	secondly,	that	the	danger	for	these	older	
drivers	in	motoring	contexts	might	be	more	related	to	them	lessening	their	awareness	
due	to	perceived	easier	driving	conditions,	rather	than	any	general	deficiency	per	se.	
	
7.4.3.	Findings	relating	to	rearward	and	safety‐relevant	concepts	
In	Study	1,	it	was	argued	that	the	older	driver	group	had	shown	indications	of	having	an	
undue	focus	to	the	front,	and	front/left	of	their	vehicles,	at	the	expense	of	what	was	
occurring	behind.	As	such	it	was	felt	that	this	less	optimal	awareness	might	result	in	the	
older	drivers	missing	important	safety‐related	information.	This	assertion	could	not	be	
measured	in	Study	2,	but	in	this	Study,	it	could	be	re‐considered.	The	initial	evidence	
appeared	to	show	that	the	older	drivers	had	taken	more	note	of	what	was	happening	
‘Behind’	their	vehicles.	This	was	due	to	the	strong	linkage	between	that	concept	and	the	
main	‘Car’	concept	in	Figure	7.5	(above),	and	the	central	position	of	the	‘Behind’	concept	
in	Figure	7.8.	However,	when	a	comparison	was	made	of	the	times	a	rearward	looking	
concept	or	word	was	mentioned	in	all	of	the	twenty‐one	narratives,	the	results	showed	
the	younger	group	to	have	mentioned	them	around	twice	as	much	(Table	7.H).	
	
Table	7.H:	Rearward‐related	concept	comparisons			
Concept	 Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Concept	Count	 Word	Count	 Concept	Count	 Word	Count	
Behind	 99	 105	 83	 86	
Mirror	 0	 3	 117	 97	
Rear	 0	 0	 32	 35	
Wing	(mirror)	 2	 1	 5	 14	
Totals	 99	 108	 237	 232	
	
A	second	aspect	of	interest	from	Study	1’s	findings	was	a	potentially	sub‐optimal	
amount	of	relevant	information	being	processed	by	the	older	drivers.	This	was	more	
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difficult	to	substantiate	from	the	text	alone,	but	an	argument	was	made	that	perhaps	an	
indication	could	be	gleaned	from	what	the	participants	themselves	had	enunciated	in	
their	narratives.	In	Table	7.I,	below,	it	is	shown	that	the	younger	group	mentioned	these	
concepts	about	three	times	more	often	than	the	older	group. 
	
Table	7.I:	Safety‐related	concept	comparison	
Concept	 Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Concept	Count	 Word	Count	 Concept	Count	 Word	count	
Checking	 0	 6	 181	 183	
Check	 5	 0	
Indicating	 23	 76	 26	 71	
Indicate(d)	 30	 25	
Blind	 18	 20	 78	 81	
Clear	 46	 55	 113	 121	
Sure	 0	 23	 144	 124	
Gap	 5	 5	 12	 12	
Safe	 9	 12	 12	 20	
Looking	 16	 64	 165	 175	
Look	 0	 	
Aware	 0	 3	 75	 79	
Warning	 7	 8	 0	 2	
(having)Time	 33	 7	 36	 23	
(enough)Space	 0	 9	 0	 28	
(enough)Room	 27	 27	 13	 14	
Totals	 219	 315	 756	 933	
 
These	results	surprisingly	mirror	those	of	Study	1,	despite	the	drive	for	this	study	being	
more	onerous.		
	
There	were	indications	whilst	traversing	the	route	that	the	older	drivers	were	more	
easily	distracted	from,	and	therefore	had	less	awareness	of,	the	driving	task.	This	would	
most	likely	be	reflected	by	the	group’s	overall	(SA	metric)	scoring,	and	indeed	the	
younger	group	showed	better	SA	proficiency	scoring	here,	as	it	did	for	Study	1.	It	could	
be,	of	course,	that	any	lack	of	focus	by	the	older	group	could	only	have	been	evident	at	
times	when	they	perceived	a	driving	environment	as	being	less	risky	‐	due	to	their	far	
greater	driving	experience.	Additionally,	it	should	be	borne	in	mind	that	the	younger	
group	did	produce	7%	more	average	text	in	their	commentaries.	However,	with	the	
drive	being	a	more	difficult	one	to	that	undertaken	for	Study	1,	it	would	be	reasonable	
to	expect	more	parity	in	the	enunciation	of	such	safety‐related	concepts.		
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These	aspects	would	no	doubt	benefit	from	further	research	with	different	
methodologies,	as	they	could	indicate	important	precursors	for	accident	involvement	
amongst	older	drivers.	
	
7.4.4.	Limitations	
As	has	been	mentioned	in	regard	to	previous	studies,	the	participants	could	not	be	
matched	for	potentially	influencing	factors	such	as	annual	mileage	driven,	or	accident	
history,	due,	latterly,	to	an	emphasis	on	volunteer	continuity.		
	
Also,	the	‘Think	aloud’	methodology	utilised	for	the	series,	whilst	being	less	obtrusive	
and	easy	to	understand,	again	impacts	on	the	number	of	participants	that	can	be	
assessed	within	a	reasonable	time	period.	This	is	principally	due	to	the	need	for	
commentaries	to	be	accurately	transcribed,	and	then	formatted	as	truly	as	possible	to	a	
participant’s	enunciation.	A	task	that	is	not	helped	in	driving	contexts,	with	engine	and	
exogenous	noise.	So	with	such	limited	numbers,	also	comes	related	limits	on	
generalisations	‐	though	this	issue	is	not	uncommon	in	SA	research	(whether	or	not	
narratives	are	utilised).		
	
It	also	should	be	noted,	once	again,	that	whilst	it	can	be	said	that	strong	and	related	
connections	between	knowledge	concepts	will	aid	their	recall,	and	thus	in	this	context	
an	individual’s	SA	from	better	processing	of	incoming	information,	the	method	can	only	
assess	what	the	participant	says	s/he	is	aware	of.		
	
7.5.	Conclusion	
This	study	showed	that	the	Situation	Awareness	of	an	older	driver	group,	driving	what	
was	a	rather	cognitively	taxing	route	on	occasion,	was	significantly	poorer	than	that	of	a	
younger	driver	group.	This,	despite	these	same	older	participants	out‐performing	a	
similarly	comprised	younger	group	on	video‐based	measures	of	driving	SA	only	a	few	
months	previously.	
	
In	the	present	Study,	the	older	participants	surprisingly	felt	less	challenged.	In	periods	
they	demonstrated	that	they	could	‘switch	off’	awareness.	Whereas,	whilst	watching	a	
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video	of	a	car	journey	in	the	previous	study,	travelling	at	what	to	them	was	perceived	to	
be	higher	than	comfortable	speeds,	they	had	to	concentrate	more	fully	on	the	task.	
	
For	the	younger	drivers,	generally	the	opposite	was	true.	Driving	a	car	was	seen	as	an	
additional	effort,	whereas	watching	video	footage	was	nothing	new,	it	presented	no	
problems,	and	advantageously	the	car	‘drove	itself’.	
	
The	results	in	this	Study	also	indicate	that	the	older	group	could	(once	again)	be	giving	
less	comparative	consideration	to	what	was	behind	their	vehicles	and	to	safety‐related	
cues,	whilst	arguably	improving	their	processing	of	specific	driving	environment	
information.	
	
In	the	literature,	this	study’s	findings	support	the	general	contention	that	older	drivers	
exhibit	less	Situation	Awareness.	However,	much	in	regards	to	the	measured	
proficiency	of	SA	may	be	down	to	perceptions	of	task	difficulty	and	motivation.	If	the	
older	drivers	here	did	consider	the	drive	being	undertaken	as	presenting	little	difficulty,	
due,	perhaps,	to	their	wealth	of	driving	experience,	then	potentially	insufficient	
awareness	did	occur	given	the	nature	of	the	route.	Alternatively,	it	could	just	be	simply	
a	problem	of	them	not	being	able	to	consistently	process	high	levels	of	relevant	
information	over	sustained	periods	of	time,	due	to	cognitive	slowing	and	processing	
resources	(as	highlighted	in	Chapter	2).		
	
Finally,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	the	older	participants	in	these	studies	were	
proficient	drivers,	who,	despite	any	age‐related	processing	limitations,	would	no	doubt	
drive	safely	on	all	classes	of	roadways,	and	particularly	on	ones	that	they	were	familiar	
with.	However,	confidence	from	experience	could	mask,	perhaps	an	unknown	decline	in	
awareness	here	(as	consider	in	Chapter	5),	that	is	likely	to	increase	with	age.	Driving	
more	slowly,	and	employing	in‐car	automated	driver	assistance	devices,	will	no	doubt	
help	to	give	these	older	drivers	more	time	to	process	sufficient	information.	But	
moreover,	a	method	for	keeping	them	concentrating	on	the	driving	task,	particularly	for	
longer	journeys,	would	seem	invaluable	for	increasing	their,	and	others,	road	safety.	
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Chapter	8:	Overview	&	Synthesis		
	
8.1.	Introduction	
This	thesis	has	sought	to	investigate	the	Situation	Awareness	of	car	drivers,	particularly	
those	aged	over	70	years.	However,	the	concept	is	of	relevance	to	drivers	of	all	ages	as	
driving	requires	Situation	Awareness	to,	for	example,	monitor	constantly	changing	
environments,	understand	and	manage	incoming	information,	and	make	decisions	‐	
often	under	high	mental	workload	conditions.	It	can	therefore	reasonably	be	contended	
that	if	a	driver	is	not	able	to	adequately	perform	such	tasks,	then	his/her	driving	
performance	will	ultimately	suffer.	
	
The	approach	taken	to	investigate,	and	ultimately	seek	to	measure	both	a	group’s	and	
an	individual’s	Situation	Awareness,	was	to	focus	on	what	information	a	driver	
selectively	attended	to,	as	such	perceptions	would	inform	both	his/her	comprehension	
of	a	given	driving	environment,	and,	in	turn,	how	to	react	to	it.		
	
As	several	cognitive	(and	physical)	abilities	are	needed	for	a	driver	to	gather	that	
information,	such	as	vision,	perception,	memory	and	attention,	and	given	they	are	
known	to	decline	with	age,	the	thesis’s	interest	was	whether	those	declines	might	
impinge	on	a	driver’s	Situation	Awareness.	And,	in	particular,	when	a	driving	task	had	
an	increased	level	of	cognitive	complexity.	It	has	been	proposed	in	the	literature	that	
age‐related	declinations	will	affect	our	information	gathering,	and	thereby	be	
detrimental	for	initial	formations	of	SA	(Bolstad	&	Hess,	2000:	supporting	a	viewpoint	
given	by	Jones	&	Endsley,	1996).	This	is	because	they	will	bring	difficulties	in	perceiving	
what	is	important	on	roadways:	such	as	lane	position;	speed;	and	the	location	of	other	
cars.	Thus	the	proficiency	of	older	drivers	has	become	of	particular	interest	to	
researchers	in	Western	societies,	due	to	related	concerns	that	such	processing	
limitations	and	an	expected	further	growth	of	this	driving	group,	will	ultimately	result	
in	more	road	accidents.			
	
As	Situation	Awareness	is	considered	to	have	use	as	an	explanatory	framework	for	
evaluating	driving	performance	(e.g.	Salmon,	Stanton,	&	Young,	2012:	“Appropriate	
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conceptualisations	and	assessments	of	SA	have	much	to	offer	future	road	safety	efforts”	
(p.473)),	the	SA	levels	of	drivers	in	differing	age‐groups	has	understandably	been	
explored	and	compared	(e.g.	Bolstad,	2001;	Zhang	et	al.,	2009;	Kaber,	et	al.,	2012;	Ho	et	
al.,	2001).	Yet,	surprisingly,	research	in	this	area	has	been	sparse,	and	when	undertaken	
it	has	exclusively	utilised	rather	artificial	driving	simulators	and	simulations.		
	
This	thesis	sought	to	add	to	the	literature	by	considering,	over	a	series	of	studies,	
whether	older	drivers	would	exhibit	poorer	SA	in	relation	to	other	age	groupings,	as	has	
generally	been	assumed	and	found.	To	achieve	this,	consideration	was	given	to	the	
advantages	of	a	methodology	that	would	take	SA	measures	from	actual	driving	
environments	(Aspect	1),	and	of	different	complexity	(RQ1	&	RQ3).	Additionally	(in	
RQ2),	participant	SA	proficiency	by	age	would	be	assessed	for	any	correlation	with	a	
driving	performance	measure	(Hazard	Perception).	And	finally,	Aspect	2	added	a	
requirement	to	draw	conclusions	and	suggest	recommendations	for	improving	the	SA	of	
older	drivers.	These	were	considered	throughout	the	thesis,	but	are	discussed	
collectively	below.	
	
This	Chapter	is	structured	by	summaries	and	synthesises	of	the	main	findings	from	the	
thesis	in	relation	to	these	Aspects	and	Research	Questions,	each	of	which	are	now	
considered	below	in	the	order	envisaged	and	researched	(as	highlighted	in	Chapter	1).	
	
8.2.	(Aspect	1):	What	theoretical	perspective	and	method	would	be	the	
most	useful	for	evaluating	Situation	Awareness	in	driving	contexts?	
8.2.1.	Theoretical	perspective	
It	is	important	to	firstly	recognise	that	how	a	researcher	conceptualises	Situation	
Awareness	will	inform	how	she	or	he	measures	it.	In	any	such	discussion,	one	has	to	
firstly	defer	to	the	work	of	Mica	Endsley,	whose	definition	of	Situation	Awareness	back	
in	1995,	still	remains	the	most	established	and	widely	accepted.	She	contended	that	SA	
is:	"the	perception	of	elements	in	the	environment	within	a	volume	of	time	and	space,	
the	comprehension	of	their	meaning,	and	the	projection	of	their	status	in	the	near	
future"	(Endsley,	1988,	p.97).	Thus	Situation	Awareness	by	this	definition	is	a	cognitive	
product	of	information	processing,	and	she	seeks	to	describe	the	different	cognitive	
195 
 
resources	and	mechanisms	that	might	be	involved	in	constructing	and	maintaining	it.	
The	related	methods	to	this	approach	therefore	measure	the	extent	to	which	an	
individual	is	aware	of	a	pre‐defined	element	in	an	environment,	their	understanding	of	
the	properties	of	it	in	relation	to	the	task	they	are	performing,	and	also	what	the	
potential	future	states	of	it	might	be.			
	
Thus	there	is	a	preference	for	adherents	of	this	approach	for	recall	techniques	that	take	
a	snapshot	of	the	contents	of	an	individual’s	mind,	as	it	relates	to	SA,	at	particular	
point(s)	in	time.	SA	is	measured	from	the	answers	that	a	participant	gives,	based	upon	
his	or	her	knowledge	and	understanding	of	a	particular	situation	at	the	point	of	recall.	
The	responses	given	then	being	compared	to	‘perceptions’	of	the	state	of	the	system	
being	investigated	at	that	recall	point.	Therefore,	like	other	approaches	similar	in	kind,	
e.g.,	observer	ratings	and	personal	performance	measures,	the	participant’s	responses	
or	inferred	actions	are	measured	against	what	is	considered	as	indicative	of	good	SA.	
	
To	achieve	this,	notably	in	the	road	transport	sphere,	simulations	of	relevant	
environments	are	usually	utilised,	as	they	can	exactly	and	explicitly	produce	knowledge	
objects	that	‘should’	be	reported.	They	also	allow	for	precise	and	repeatable	information	
recall	points	or	‘probes’,	which	would	not	be	possible	on	actual	roadways.		
	
An	important	problem	with	such	simulations,	however,	particularly	at	the	time	of	the	
principal	studies	investigating	the	effects	of	age	and	Situation	Awareness	(Bolstad,	
2001;	Zhang	et	al.,	2009),	were,	that	to	different	degrees,	they	lacked	realism	(see	
Figure	8.1).		
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Figure	8.1:	Example	equipment	and	driving	screens	from	Bolstad	(2001)	(left),	and	Zhang	
et	al.	(2009)/Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	(right)	
	
	
Such	deficits	were	further	augmented	by	a	lack	of	highly	realistic	and	complex	driving	
tasks,	and	as	the	participants	knew	SA‐related	questions	were	to	occur	at	the	end	of	
each	segment	of	a	trial,	they	may	have	taken	advantage	of	this	knowledge	to	prepare	or	
anticipate	for	them.	
	
It	could	also	be	argued	that	Endsley’s	view	of	SA	as	solely	an	individual	psychological	
phenomenon,	gained	from	linear	processing	of	information,	does	appear	rather	limited.	
In	particular,	to	fully	understand	the	driving	task,	perhaps	more	consideration	should	
be	given	to	the	interactions	within	it?	In	the	sense	of	the	driver	enacting	personal	
experience	to	cope	with	roadway	environments	that,	in	turn,	will	modify	that	
experience	and	his/her	actions.	
	
This	thesis	has	therefore	argued	for	a	different	methodological	approach	for	the	
assessment	of	older	driver’s	Situation	Awareness,	and	this	again	stemmed	from	how	the	
concept	was	defined.	At	the	outset,	the	author	agreed	with	researchers	such	as	Smith	&	
Hancock	(1995),	who	argued	that	SA	cannot	just	be	a	product	of	awareness,	as	Endsley	
(1995a)	suggests,	but	that	account	should	also	be	taken	of	the	processes	for	gaining	
awareness.	 
	
From	this	approach,	more	emphasis	is	placed	on	a	cyclical	interaction	between	the	
individual’s	perception	of	an	environment,	his/her	memory/experience,	and	active	
exploration	(e.g.	Adams	et	al.,	1995).	A	driver	knows,	for	example,	from	previous	
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experiences	how	a	driving	situation	should	evolve	(e.g.,	that	the	distance	to	the	vehicle	
in	front	should	remain	stable);	so	s/he	will	repeatedly	and	actively	attend	to	relevant	
aspects	in	the	environment	(in	this	case,	say,	the	speed	of	the	other	vehicle),	and	
compare	it	to	an	expected	‘situational	development’.	The	results	(and	thus	the	quality)	
of	that	comparison,	would	then	guide	future	aspects	of	driving	behaviour.		
	
This	thesis	has	further	argued	that	Situation	Awareness	would	be	better	measured	in	
road	environment	contexts.	And	that	the	driving	‘system’,	the	environment	within	
which	the	individual	is	operating,	should	be	incorporated,	whilst	allowing	its	
component	parts,	most	notably	that	of	the	driver	or	driver	group,	to	be	extracted	and	
evaluated.	To	achieve	this,	a	driving	‘system’	from	the	driver’s	perspective	had	to	be	
represented.	It	was	proposed	that	the	best	way	to	achieve	this	was	to	create	individual	
(or	group)	semantic	or	propositional	networks	to	depict	the	information	comprising	a	
person’s	or	group's	SA.	Propositional	networks	(Anderson,	1983)	capitalise	on	a	
number	of	important	principles	of	systems	thinking.	For	example,	they	can	represent	SA	
by	the	proficiency	of	the	connections	between	the	information	elements	that	comprise	a	
network,	and	show	that	individualistic	representations	of	awareness,	and	the	
propagation	of	SA	activity,	need	not	be	linear	as	Endsley	suggests.	
	
This	approach	also	sat	well	with	the	more	naturalistic	methods	favoured	by	the	author	
for	evaluating	SA.	It	was	argued	in	Chapter	3,	for	example,	that	there	would	be	benefits	
from	assessing	a	participant’	SA	in	their	own	cars	on	actual	roadways.	Specifically,	this	
would	allow	for	driver	sensitivity	to	familiar	vehicle	feedback,	on‐road	events	would	be	
meaningful	and	not	contrived,	and,	as	a	consequence,	a	good	chance	would	be	afforded	
of	capturing	accurate	driver	awareness.	Additionally,	as	network	data	can	be	captured	
in	one	continuous	session,	this	advantageously	would	obviate	the	need	for	recall	
‘freezes’	of	a	task,	as	well	as	observer	or	post‐hoc	individual	evaluations.	
	
Propositional	networks	can	now	also	be	created	and	evaluated	by	computer	software,	
rather	than	subjectively	by	a	researcher.	It	is	possible	to	compare	quantitatively	and	
qualitatively	both	individual	and	groups	of	networks	from	participant	commentaries.	
The	approach	to	achieving	such	output,	and	its	advantages,	are	now	considered	below.	
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8.2.2.	Method	(for	capturing	the	SA	network)	
The	thesis	utilised	a	‘Think	aloud’	or	Verbal	Protocol	Analysis	(Ericsson	&	Simon,	1984)	
method	to	capture	the	data	required	to	produce	a	network.	This	involved	participants	
thinking	aloud,	or	more	specifically,	saying	whatever	came	into	their	mind	as	they	
completed	a	particular	task.	This	approach	was	chosen	because	it	could	produce	an	in‐
depth	amount	of	information	of	relevance	to	the	participant,	which	subsequently	could	
be	structurally	evaluated.	As	such,	it	potentially	could	provide	insights	as	to	the	thought	
processes	that	an	individual	or	a	group	brought	to	a	particular	journey	or	road	
environment.		
	
In	addition,	the	method	is	simple	to	explain,	understand,	and	can	allow	for	data	to	be	
captured	over	long	time	periods,	such	as	on	the	routes	proposed	for	the	studies,	that	
were	up	to	16	miles	in	length.	Although	the	‘Think	aloud’	approach	can	be	utilised	in	a	
variety	of	settings,	its	usage	was	limited	to	a	quiet	room	to	watch	videos	of	car	journeys	
in	Study	2,	and	the	participant’s	own	vehicle	in	Studies	1	&	3.	These	more	familiar	
environments	can	be	contrasted	with,	for	example,	an	unknown	instrumented	vehicle,	
or	a	simulator,	which	may	distract	a	participant	from	providing	his/her	actual	thought	
processes.	The	researcher	could	also	remain	somewhat	inconspicuous,	there	were	no	
questions	to	ask,	and	no	distracting	additional	equipment	in	the	participant’s	view	‐	
such	as	would	be	required	by	an	eye‐tracking	device	that	may	also	need	to	be	set	up.	
The	commentaries	could	be	recorded	unobtrusively,	with	the	participant	left	simply	to	
remark	on	what	s/he	considered	as	relevant	during	a	video	or	a	drive.		
	
The	aim	of	the	studies	was	not	so	much	about	the	quantity	of	commentary	captured,	
more	how	relevant	the	concepts	enunciated	were,	and	how	cohesively	they	were	
structured.	To	that	end,	once	a	commentary	had	been	recorded	and	later	transcribed,	it	
was	then	interrogated	by	computer	software	(Leximancer)	developed	by	Andrew	Smith	
at	the	University	of	Queensland,	Brisbane,	Australia	(Smith,	2003).	This	software	
remains	unique	in	the	detail	of	the	analysis	that	it	can	undertake	and	display.	It	is	
capable	of	producing	both	a	visual	network	‘map’	that	reveals	the	linkages	between	(if	
necessary,	hundreds	of)	concepts,	and	the	quantitative	data	from	which	it	is	based	upon	
(such	as	word	counts	and	algorithmic	scores).	
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Leximancer	can	also	analyse	narratives	either	collectively	or	individually,	and	provide	a	
quantitative	output	for	each	in	‘Excel’	format.	The	relevant	‘sheets’	can	then	be	‘pasted’	
into	Agna	mathematical	software	for	further	quantitative	evaluations	relating	to	each	
network’s	structural	cohesion.	This	software	has	been	used	successfully	in	previous	
transport	studies	(e.g.	Salmon,	Young,	&	Cornelissen,	2013;	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Salmon,	
2011;	Walker,	Stanton,	&	Chowdhury,	2013),	however,	for	the	studies	in	this	thesis,	this	
was	the	first	time	it	was	utilised	to	assess	the	comparative	SA	performance	of	older	and	
younger	drivers,	and	the	first	time	its	outputs	were	statistically	compared.	
	
8.3.	(RQ1):	Is	Situation	Awareness	worse	amongst	older	(than	younger)	
drivers	in	cognitively	non‐taxing	driving	conditions?	
In	previous	studies	of	note	that	have	looked	into	the	Situation	Awareness	of	older	
drivers	using	simulations,	there	was	perhaps	a	reasonable	assumption	that	this	age	
grouping	would	perform	poorer	than	young	or	middle‐aged	groups.	Bolstad	(2001)	
“older	drivers	that	have	deficits	in	certain	cognitive	and	physical	abilities	will	also	be	
deficient	in	their	ability	to	attend	to	important	information”	<thus>	“If	drivers	are	not	
attending	to	the	necessary	information,	it	seems	logical	that	performance	will	ultimately	
suffer”	(p.272).	Zhang	et	al.	(2009)	“age	related	decline	in	sensory,	cognitive	and	
physical	function	may	place	elderly	drivers	at	risk	and	more	vulnerable	to	an	accident”	
(p.1)	<because>	“driver	inattention	and	deficiencies	in	information	processing	are	
major	factors	in	accident	causation”	(p.2).			
	
Bolstad	(2001)	found	from	a	recall	probe	technique	that	an	older	driver	group	(average	
age	70.4	years	(n=16))	reported	significantly	less	SA	relevant	information.	Zhang	et	al.	
(2009)	found	that	“The	effect	of	age	on	SA	is	consistent	with	the	findings	of	the	previous	
research	under	normal	driving	conditions	(Bolstad,	2001,	Shinar,	1993).	i.e.	elderly	
drivers	exhibited	poor	SA	compared	to	young	drivers.”	(p.6).	The	older	group’s	average	
age	in	this	study	was	72.2	years	(n=10).		Kaber	et	al.	(2012),	discussing	Zhang’s	work,	
go	further:	“As	perceptual	and	cognitive	abilities	decline	with	age,	older	drivers	show	
lower	SA	at	all	levels	compared	to	young	drivers”	(p.609).	
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In	Study	1,	where	the	average	age	of	the	older	participants	was	higher	than	in	these	
previous	studies	at	75.6	years	(n=10),	a	Situation	Awareness	‘score’	was	sought	for	both	
an	older	and	younger	driver	group.	As	was	discussed	in	Aspect	1,	the	approach	taken	
was	very	different	to	the	studies	mentioned	above,	as	the	data	was	captured	on	actual	
roadways	than	in	simulators.	It	also	was	not	compared	by	content	to	what	‘expert’	
drivers	felt	should	have	been	observed	(e.g.	Bolstad,	2001).	Of	more	interest	was	how	
cohesively	the	participant	processed	the	information	that	s/he	felt	was	relevant.	This,	it	
was	argued,	would	produce	results	more	indicative	of	Situation	Awareness	proficiency.			
	
The	Agna	software,	based	on	the	Leximancer	data,	can	produce	two	SA	‘scores’	in	this	
respect.	And	it	can	provide	these	for	each	individual	participant,	and	for	each	driving	
group	(as	its	narratives	can	be	combined	and	analysed	as	one	entity).	
	
It	was	found	that	when	the	individual	participant	scores	were	averaged,	that	they	
produced	overall	scores	for	the	two	groups	that	were	unexpectedly	similar.	The	
expectation	was	for	a	better	younger	group	performance,	as	having	a	higher	average	age	
(at	31.1	years)	than	the	Bolstad	(19.5	years)	and	Zhang/Kaber	(20.7	years)	studies,	it	
was	presumed	to	have	had	much	more	driving	experience.	Overall,	though,	the	older	
drivers	in	Study	1	tended	to	occupy	the	middle	ranking	positions	(7	out	of	the	10)	for	SA	
Density	(which	was	the	more	discriminative	of	the	two	scores),	whereas	the	younger	
driver’s	performances	tended	to	be	more	inconsistent,	for	example	they	held	the	two	
highest	and	the	two	lowest	ranked	positions	by	this	measure.	As	no	age	to	SA	
correlation	was	found,	the	study	thus	raised	doubts	as	to	the	perceived	importance	in	
the	literature	of	age‐related	perceptual	and	cognitive	deficits,	particularly	as	the	two	
oldest	participants	in	their	early	80’s	had	ranked	3rd	and	7th	overall	(out	of	20).		
	
At	the	group	level,	though,	there	were	suggestions	of	a	less	integrated	performance	by	
the	older	drivers	from	their	lower	SA	Density	scoring.	This	was	also	reflected	in	
qualitative	comparisons	of	relevant	concepts	and	their	interrelations.	In	particular,	the	
older	driving	group	placed	less	emphasis	on	rearward	and	safety‐related	cues,	and	
seemed	to	exhibit	less	awareness	of	the	need	for	frequent	speed	regulation.	Much	of	the	
focus	for	the	group	was	related	to	what	their	vehicles	were	‘coming	–	towards’	or	what	
was	‘in	–	front’,	whereas	the	younger	group	was	more	appreciative	of	‘slow(ing)	–	
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down’,	where	‘cars	were	parked’,	and	to	‘see’	what	was	coming	from	‘behind’.	This	
seemingly	more	proficient	awareness	appeared	to	mirror	Bolstad’s	findings,	as	her	
younger	drivers	had	demonstrated	better	recall	of	what	were	considered	as	important	
driving	cues.			
	
Thus	in	regards	to	whether	SA	was	more	deficient	for	older	drivers	in	non‐taxing	
environments,	the	answer	from	this	study	was	unclear.	Although	older	drivers	could	
take	in	cues	from	a	driving	environment,	and	process	that	information	as	cohesively	as	
younger	drivers,	the	information	that	they	drew	upon	to	inform	their	SA	appeared	
disadvantageously	more	diverse,	general,	and	of	less	task	relevance.	It	was	unclear,	
however,	why	this	was	the	case.	As	has	been	seen	with	previous	SA	research	of	older	
drivers,	much	has	been	made	of	age‐related	cognitive	decrements.	So	perhaps	the	route	
driven	was	insufficiently	demanding,	and	thus	allowed	for	those	decrements	to	be	
compensated	for,	by,	for	example,	a	greater	degree	of	automatic	processing?	Bosman	&	
Charnes	(1996)	have,	in	fact,	found	older	drivers	to	undertake	more	automatic	
processing	of	information,	and	furthermore,	this	could	be	related	to	their	greater	
driving	experience	(see	McPhee	et	al.,	2004).	If	this	is	the	case,	then	they	may	have	been	
better	able	to	anticipate	environments	that	might	cause	them	difficulty,	and	by	
generally	driving	at	more	constant	speeds,	concepts	relationships	indicative	of	driving	
actions	such	as	‘slowing’	and	‘down’	may	thus	have	appeared	of	less	relevance	for	the	
group?	
	
This	somewhat	generous	interpretation	of	their	perceptions	does,	though,	still	imply	a	
lower	level	of	cognitive	effort.	An	assertion	that	has	some	support	from	the	SA	metric	
scores	that	another	older	group	(with	many	of	the	same	participants)	produced	for	the	
second	driving	study	(3).		
	
In	Study	2,	however,	a	contrasting	effort	appeared	to	be	shown	for	a	route	comparable	
to	that	driven	in	Study	1(in	terms	of	roadways	and	traffic	levels),	when	viewed	on	video.	
With	task	difficulty	assumed	to	be	easier	for	this	route,	it	was	felt	that	similar	SA	
quantitative	scoring	would	again	be	produced	by	a	younger	and	older	participant	group.	
The	older	drivers,	though,	surprisingly	produced	an	uplift	in	the	cohesion	of	their	SA‐
related	networks.	This	was	initially	explained	as	being	due	to	the	task	being	far	easier	
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for	them	to	undertake	than	might	have	been	expected.	The	journeys	commented	on	
were,	after	all,	shorter,	and	had	participants	consider	only	roadway	information	from	a	
forward	looking	perspective,	rather	than	all	around	the	vehicle	whilst	driving.	A	bearing	
from	the	findings	of	Study	1	that	could	provide	an	advantage	for	the	older	driver.	
However,	an	unknown	element	here	(later	revealed	after	Study	3)	was	that	the	older	
drivers	found	providing	a	commentary	for	a	video	to	be	a	relatively	more	difficult	task	
(than	whilst	driving),	which	beneficially	appeared	to	have	raised	their	attention	and	
concentration,	and,	as	can	reasonably	be	inferred,	their	SA.	Table	8.A	provides	SA	score	
comparisons	between	Study	1	and	the	relevant	journey	from	Study	2	(the	bolder	scores	
indicate	the	higher	intra‐study	scoring,	the	shaded	backgrounds	the	degree	of	higher	
inter‐study	scoring).		
	
Table	8.A:	SA	metric	score	comparisons	between	Study	1	&	2	
	 Group	
Older	 Younger	
Study	 Group	score	 Average	ppt.	score	 Group	Score	 Average	ppt.	score	
1	 2/0.7417	 3.1/0.3819	 2/0.8238	 3.2/0.3874	
2	 2/0.7610	 2.8/0.4310	 2/0.7578	 3.4/0.3743	
	
The	impact	of	task	difficulty	on	Situation	Awareness,	then,	appears	to	potentially	be	an	
important	factor	for	determining	its	proficiency,	but	in	SA‐related	studies	it	appears	to	
have	been	either	removed	by	screening	or	not	considered.	For	example,	in	Ho	et	al.	
(2001)	“To	ensure	that	all	participants	understood	the	task,	an	accuracy	of	90%	had	to	
be	obtained	on	the	practice	trials	before	continuing	to	the	actual	testing.	If	the	
participant	failed	to	obtain	90%	accuracy,	the	instructions	were	repeated,	and	the	
practice	trials	were	presented	again.”	(p.109).	
	
In	Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	“Participants	were	instructed	to	follow	a	pre‐defined	route,	which	
was	presented	on	a	hardcopy	map	placed	adjacent	to	the	right	side	of	the	simulator	
steering	wheel	and	was	readily	accessible	for	navigation	at	any	point	during	a	trial.	
Participants	were	required	to	maintain	speed	limits,	comply	with	traffic	rules,	negotiate	
surrounding	traffic	and	respond	to	SA	probes.”	(p.605).	In	this	case,	the	study	is,	in	
effect,	asking	older	participants	to	use	a	navigation	aid	to	‘drive’	around	predetermined	
routes	for	eight	minutes.	This,	in	a	sense,	combines	both	video	and	driving	tasks.	So	
might	this	produce	more	effort	among	the	older	drivers	due	to	its	novelty,	or	perhaps,	
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less,	as	‘driving’	a	short	route	could	be	viewed	by	them	as	a	straightforward	task?	
Moreover,	in	view	of	performance	difficulties	for	older	drivers	associated	with	lower	
levels	of	mental	energy	or	attentional	capacity	(Craik	&	Byrd,	1982),	would	having	them	
drive	for	2	hours	and	40	minutes	(eight	trials	of	twenty	minute	duration)	not	be	a	
relatively	harder	undertaking?		
	
Task	difficulty	also	has	particular	relevance	for	RQ3	where	its	influence	will	be	
revisited.	However,	before	leaving	this	RQ,	it	is	important	to	note	that	although	Study	2	
was	verified	by	the	older	drivers	as	being	more	difficult,	and	where	presumed	extra	
effort	may	have	accounted	for	their	26.57%	more	commentary	(than	the	younger	
group),	this	did	not	translate	into	more	specific	than	general	cues	being	mentioned.	
Although,	perhaps	due	to	the	short	length	of	the	videos,	there	was	more	similarity	in	the	
two	group’s	concepts	than	with	Study	1,	nonetheless,	the	younger	group’s	main	
concepts	of	'car’,	‘lights’	and	‘road	(side)’	were	still	arguably	more	specific	and	useful	for	
safe	driving,	than	the	older	group’s	focus	on	‘traffic’,	‘left	(side)’	and	‘going’(?).		
	
8.4.	(RQ2):	Does	Situation	Awareness	proficiency	assist	in	the	detection	of	
roadway	hazards?	
A	driving	performance	measure	was	chosen	for	Study	2	to	assess	for	any	relationship	
with	Situation	Awareness.	It	was	felt	that	if	any	such	relationship	could	be	found	that	
this	would	both	advantageously	give	credibility	to	the	method	used	in	the	thesis	for	the	
measurement	of	SA,	and	raise	the	possibility	that	the	concept	could	indirectly	improve	
driver	performance	through	training.		
	
The	performance	measure	chosen	to	be	investigated	was	Hazard	Perception	(HP)	‐	as	it	
was	in	the	Zhang	et	al.	(2009)/Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	studies	mentioned	above.	As	Chapter	
5	&	6	highlight,	this	was	due	to	four	main	reasons:	it	is	testable	by	commentaries,	and	
thus	could	be	measured	together	with	Situation	Awareness;	it	has	linkages	to	traffic	
accidents	(e.g.	McKenna	&	Crick,	1991);	like	Situation	Awareness	it	has	been	found	to	
decline	with	age	(e.g.	Wallis	&	Horswill,	2007);	and	potentially	there	is	a	performance	
relationship	between	the	two	concepts.	This	last	factor	can	be	demonstrated	by	similar	
conceptualisation,	such	as	the	ability	to	read	the	road	(Mills	et	al.,	1998),	or	to	anticipate	
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potentially	dangerous	situations	on	it	‐	in	effect,	having	Situation	Awareness	for	
hazardous	situations	involving	roadway	environments	and	users	(see,	Horswill	&	
McKenna,	2004).	 
	
In	Study	2,	two	Hazard	Perception	indicators	were	assessed	against	what	was	
considered	the	best	measure	of	SA	within	that	study	‐	a	Density	metric	score	from	
combining	the	text	of	the	two	video‐based	journeys	that	were	assessed.	As	a	result,	six	
comparative	scores	were	obtained,	and	these	are	reproduced	below	in	Table	8.B.	
	
Table	8.B:	HP	and	SA	score	correlations	
	 Group	
SA	Density	scores	for	combined	journey	
HP	measure	 Both	 Older	 Younger	
Total	HP	score	(p<)	 0.450	 0.936	 0.008	
HP	score	w/o	speed	element	(p<)	 0.060	 0.360	 0.005	
	
For	the	older	group,	by	either	HP	measure,	an	individual’s	Situation	Awareness	
proficiency	did	not	appear	to	help	with	the	detection	of	a	hazard.	However,	account	has	
to	be	taken	of	feedback	given	by	older	group	participants	after	the	study,	that	
considered	the	driving	speeds	in	the	videos	as	being	too	fast	(though	they	were	actually	
within	appropriate	speed	limits).	This	could	indicate	that	they	simply	may	not	have	had	
sufficient	time	on	certain	trials	to	process	the	relevant	information	for	a	hazard’s	
detection.	That	perceived	lack	of	time,	coupled	with	the	fact	that	sometimes	the	hazards	
were	only	briefly	visible,	suggests	cognitive	decrements	may	have	been	of	relevance	for	
this	aspect	of	the	study.	As	Bolstad	(2001)	contends	“We	can	therefore	speculate	that	
the	ability	to	attend	to	important	information	(initial	formation	of	SA)	will	also	change	
with	age	due	to	changes	in	these	[related]	cognitive	abilities	and	these	differences	will	
be	more	apparent	as	task	complexity	increases.”	(p.272).	Thus	an	inference	can	be	made	
that	experience	and	even	good	SA‐related	processing	of	information	may	not	always	be	
sufficient	in	certain	driving	contexts.	And	indeed,	Bolstad	further	states	“There	may	
come	a	time,	however,	when	the	experience	will	no	longer	insulate	the	[older]	driver	
from	performance	decrements”	(p.272),	as	is	suggested	here	with	Hazard	Perception.	
	
It	could	equally	be	though,	as	Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	propose	(see	also	RQ3	below),	that	
complex	roadway	environments	may	actually	raise	the	SA	performance	of	older	
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participants	at	its	perception	level;	though	at	the	expense	of	better	comprehension	and	
action.	In	other	words,	the	increased	effort	in	perceiving	cues	may	impinge	on	their	
ability	to	comprehend	a	hazard,	and	how	to	react	to	it,	and,	indeed,	it	was	these	two	HP	
elements	that	were	measured	in	Study	2.	
	
As	a	result	of	the	low	SA	to	HP	relationship	amongst	the	older	group,	perhaps	
unsurprisingly,	when	the	scores	from	both	groups	were	considered	together,	again	no	
correlation	was	found	between	the	overall	HP	total	scores	and	the	SA	Density	scores.	
However,	when	the	speed	of	detection	element	was	taken	out,	and	a	correlation	
assessed	simply	between	the	number	of	hazards	a	participant	detected	and	his/her	SA	
Density	score,	then	a	statistically	significant	relationship	was	very	nearly	achieved	
(p<0.060)	(Table	8.B).	This	was	encouraging	given	the	small	sample	sizes,	and	given	the	
fact	that	participants	were	unaware	that	hazards	were	being	presented	and	scored.	
	
Furthermore,	in	contrast	to	the	older	group,	the	younger	participants	showed	an	
interesting	and	statistically	significant	relationship	between	both	their	group’s	
‘Combined	journey’	and	‘Complex	journey’	SA	Density	scores,	and	their	Hazard	
Perception	Test	scores.	This	was	the	case	whether	or	not	the	speed	(of	detection)	
element	was	taken	into	consideration:	for	the	‘Combined	journey’	‐	p<0.005	(without	
the	speed	element)/p<0.008	(with	the	speed	element);	for	the	‘Complex	journey’	‐	
p<0.034/p<0.035.			
	
In	terms	of	a	Situation	Awareness	to	Hazard	Perception	relationship,	then,	this	study	
showed	that	SA	proficiency	may	indeed	be	an	important	precursor	for	hazard	detection	
at	least	amongst	younger	driving	groups.	Perhaps	this	was	due	to	them	not	having	the	
encumbrance	of	slower	information	processing	speeds,	whereas	to	different	degrees,	
these	could	have	masked	an	SA	to	HP	relationship	for	the	older	group.	Additionally,	it	
should	be	borne	in	mind	that	the	older	drivers	would	not	have	encountered	video	
footage	of	hazards	before,	whereas	all	of	the	younger	group	would	have	done	so	from	
having	taken	their	driving	tests	after	2002.	It	could	therefore	be	that	with	more	
practice,	and	with	tailored	slower	speeds,	that	the	older	drivers	might	be	able	to	
improve	their	HP	scores	sufficient	to	bring	them	more	into	line	with	their	higher	SA	
Density	scores,	or	bring	that	about	through	perhaps	a	better	balance	between	their	
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Level	1	SA	(perception)	and	Levels	2	&	3	(comprehension	&	projection).	Indeed,	Kaber	
et	al.	(2012)	observe	“older	drivers	appeared	to	adopt	a	conservative	driving	style	as	a	
method	to	compensate	for	any	declines	in	abilities.	Specifically,	they	drove	slower	when	
negotiating	hazards,	especially	under	dynamic	conditions.	It	is	possible	that	older	
drivers	may	intentionally	give	themselves	more	time	to	perceive	and	process	
environmental	cues	after	hazard	exposure	in	order	to	maintain	perceived	risk	below	a	
certain	internal	threshold	(Fuller,	McHugh,	&	Pender,	2008;	Summala,	1996).	However,	
young	drivers	maintain	higher	speeds	than	older	drivers	in	the	presence	of	hazards	as	
compared	to	normal	driving,	especially	under	static	hazard	conditions.”	(p.609).	
	
In	view	of	that	information,	perhaps	the	Hazard	Perception	Tests,	utilised	for	Study	2	
and	the	UK	Driving	Test,	unfairly	disadvantages	older	drivers?	The	author	is	unaware,	
for	example,	as	to	whether	consideration	is	given	by	the	DVLC	to	the	fact	that	older	
drivers	purposely	drive	slower	for	safety	reasons,	or	that	they	might	in	some	instances	
experience	mild	vertigo	whilst	undertaking	such	tests	(as	was	found	in	Study	2)?			
	
In	addition	to	quantitative	data,	consideration	can	also	be	given	to	qualitative	data	for	
this	RQ.	In	particular,	the	similarities	or	differences	in	the	main	concepts	that	informed	
the	SA	of	the	best	and	worst	Hazard	Perception	Test	performers	can	be	assessed.	It	was	
found	that	they	were	surprisingly	similar	‐	only	those	in	bold	in	Table	8.C	(below)	
differed	between	the	two	groups.		
	
Table	8.C:	Concepts	informing	the	top	and	lowest	5	ranking	HPT	performers	
HPT	
scores	
SA	scores	 Concept	Rank	and	count	 	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Total	
Top	5	 2/0.8115	 Traffic	(197)	 Lights	(180)	 Cars	(175)	 Going	(135)	 Road	(125)	 812	
Lower	5	 2/0.7011	 Car	(149)	 Road	(138)	 Left	(114)	 Traffic	(110)	 Going	(103)	 614	
	
It	therefore	would	seem	that	for	better	Hazard	Perception,	it	is	not	so	much	about	
knowing	what	concepts	may	be	relevant,	but	more	the	times	those	concepts	are	checked	
in	a	driving	environment.	The	better	HPT	scorers	mentioned	the	concepts	important	to	
them	(particularly	the	top	3)	considerably	more	often	within	an	assessed	(combined)	
journey	time	of	just	over	14	minutes.	As	has	been	found	with	high	SA	performers	in	
general	in	this	research,	and	discussed	further	under	Aspect	2	below,	it	is	a	high	
awareness	of	the	concepts	that	are	perceived	as	important	to	the	individual	that	
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generally	(and	arguably,	rightly)	leads	to	better	SA	cohesion	scores.	This	was	also	found	
here	with	the	higher	HPT	scorers,	who	further	produced	a	high	group	SA	Density	score	
of	0.8115,	against	the	lowest	performers	0.7011.	
	
Thus,	quantitatively	at	least,	evidence	is	provided	here	for	good	SA	informing	better	
Hazard	Perception,	but	not	conclusively	so.	One	might	expect,	for	example,	more	of	a	
difference	in	the	overall	SA	Density	scores,	and	perhaps	the	Diameter	scores,	for	these	
‘Top’	and	‘Lower’	HPT	groups	(given	the	average	overall	scoring	differences	for	them	on	
the	test	were	23.6pts	to	12.2pts).	That	said,	it	is	important	to	restate	that	the	
participants	were	not	made	aware	prior	to	the	study	that	any	specific	hazard(s)	would	
be	present	in	a	video,	or	that	they	were	being	judged	on	their	detection.	This	approach	
was	adopted	as	it	was	felt	that	as	hazards	are	not	generally	presumed	in	a	driving	
environment,	that	it	would	be	more	realistic	to	have	them	measured	by	how	well	they	
were	unexpectedly	reacted	to.	However,	if	the	participants	had	been	forewarned,	
perhaps	the	concepts	seen	as	important	might	have	informatively	changed?	
	
In	summary,	again	the	need	for	further	work	is	highlighted	here,	as	it	would	be	of	value	
to	discover	what	perception	strategies	might	aid	Hazard	Perception,	and	whether	they	
could	be	learned	through	training:	particularly	given	that	both	SA	(Stanton	et	al.,	2007;	
Soliman	&	Mathna,	2009;	Walker	et	al.,	2009)	and	HP	(Horswill	&	McKenna,	2004),	have	
been	improved	by	training	programmes.	
	
8.5.	(RQ3):	Is	Situation	Awareness	worse	amongst	older	(than	younger)	
drivers	in	more	cognitively	taxing	driving	conditions?	
One	of	the	interesting	aspects	of	this	series	of	studies	related	to	what	would	be	
perceived	as	a	taxing	driving	environment	(particularly)	for	the	older	drivers,	and	how	
this	would	affect	SA	scoring	expectations.	This	was	relevant	for	Studies	1	&	3,	as	much	
as	it	was	for	Study	2,	but	as	those	studies	involved	actual	driving,	consideration	had	to	
be	given	to	a	participant’s	safety.				
	
In	Study	2,	as	videos	of	(two)	car	journeys	were	to	be	shown	to	participants,	more	
demanding	environments	could	be	considered.	Thus	the	journeys	chosen	were	of	very	
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different	complexity:	one	was	a	drive	around	a	mainly	residential	suburban	area	with	
little	traffic;	the	other	through	a	city	centre	with	more	pedestrians	and	a	greater	range	
and	number	of	vehicles.	To	corroborate	that	perception,	all	of	the	participants	were	
asked	after	they	had	seen	the	two	videos	whether	they	felt	the	journeys	were	different	
or	similar	in	their	difficulty/complexity,	and	all	indicated	that	the	city	centre	drive	was	
the	more	onerous	as	it	was	busier	and	had	more	to	comment	on.	
	
The	two	driven	journeys	for	Study	1	and	3,	although	both	undertaken	by	ten	of	the	same	
participants,	could	not	similarly	be	assessed	for	relative	difficulty	due	to	a	time	lapse	of	
over	a	year	between	them	being	driven.	However,	the	route	chosen	for	Study	3	was	
quantifiably	more	difficult,	and	consequently	felt	to	be	more	taxing	due	to	the	
comparative	number	of,	for	example,	tight	corners,	single	carriageway	roads,	and	
roundabouts	that	the	driver	faced.	Table	8.D	below,	reproduced	from	Study	3,	provides	
some	further	data,	and	additionally,	here,	two	miscellaneous	factors.	
	
Table	8.D:	Study	1	&	3	route	difficulty	comparisons	
Route	comparisons	 Study	1	 Study	3	
Roadway	artefacts	
Traffic/pedestrian	lights	 16	 17	
Roundabouts	 6	 12	
Totals	 22	 29	
Cornering/turning	
Left	turns	 1	 2	
Left	bends	(sharp	&	blind)	 1	 13	
Left	bends	(sharp)	 0	 2	
(Of	which	were	90	degrees)	 (0)	 (3)	
‘T’	Junction	Left	turn	 3	 1	
Right	turns	 4	 2	
Right	bends	(sharp	&	blind)	 1	 12	
Right	bends	(sharp)	 0	 3	
(Of	which	90	degree	turns)	 (0)	 (3)	
‘T’	Junction	Right	turn	 1	 2(1	blind)	
Totals	 11	 37	
Miscellaneous	
Single	car	width	roads	 0	 2.66	miles	
Three‐point	turn	 0	 1	
	
In	terms	of	Situation	Awareness,	for	the	older	drivers	an	assumption	was	made	(as	
given	in	previous	research	above),	that	due	to	age‐related	cognitive	deficits	their	SA	
would	worsen	on	the	more	‘complex’	video	journey.	Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	“As	expected,	
the	complexity	of	the	driving	environment	was	also	influential	in	driver	SA	and	
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performance,	and	this	was	related	to	driver	age.”	(p.609).	Zhang	et	al.	(2009)	
“interaction	of	age	and	complexity	has	a	considerable	effect	on	SA	after	hazard.	Elderly	
drivers	were	adversely	affected	by	increased	clutter	in	driving	environment	and	hence	
showed	poor	SA	under	city	than	rural	scenario”	(p.7).	And	relatedly,	Ho	et	al.	(2001)	
“search	efficiency	declined	with	increased	[roadside	visual]	clutter	and	with	aging.”	
(p.194).	
	
In	terms	of	whether	the	SA	of	older	drivers	worsens	in	relation	to	younger	drivers	in	
more	taxing	conditions,	the	results	from	the	two	related	studies	in	this	series	were	
again	interestingly	diverse	(see	Table	8.E	below).	When	an	SA	measure	was	taken	whilst	
actually	driving	(Study	3),	the	results	mirrored	the	general	beliefs	given	in	the	literature	
‐	that	the	older	drivers	would	perform	(in	this	study,	significantly	(p<0.024))	worse	
than	those	in	a	younger	driver	group.			
	
However,	when	viewing	and	commenting	on	a	complex,	more	cognitively	taxing,	
journey	shown	on	video	footage,	the	opposite	result	was	found.	Here,	the	older	
participants	now	out‐scored	their	younger	counterparts,	particularly	when	the	
individual	SA	Density	scores	were	averaged	and	compared	‐	though	the	differences	
were	not	significant.	
				
Table	8.E:	SA	metric	scores	for	the	‘complex’,	more	cognitively	taxing	trials		
	
	
Study	
SA	metric	scores	
Younger	Group	 Older	Group	
Group	based	 Av.	Individual	 Group	based	 Av.	Individual	
2	(video)	 2/	0.7586	 3.4/	0.3743	 2/	0.7956	 3/	0.4386	
3	(driving)	 2/	0.8895	 2.5/	0.5333	 2/	0.7247	 2.7/	0.4321	
*	bolder	scores	indicate	higher	intra‐study	scoring,	the	shaded	backgrounds	higher	inter‐study	scoring	
	
As	was	discussed	above,	these	two	trials	(in	Table	8.E)	were	evaluated	as	being	more	
cognitively	taxing	than	the	two	given	in	Table	8.F	(below).	In	Study	2	by	the	participants	
themselves,	and	in	Study	3,	by	objective	measures	of	the	route	configuration	in	
comparison	to	Study	1.	
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Table	8.F:	SA	metric	scores	for	the	‘standard’,	less	cognitively	taxing	trials	
	
	
Study	
SA	metric	scores	
Younger	Group	 Older	Group	
Group	based	 Av.	Individual	 Group	based	 Av.	Individual	
2	(video)	 2/	0.7578	 3.1/	0.3789	 2/	0.7610	 2.8/	0.4310	
1	(driving)	 2/	0.8238	 3.2/	0.3874	 2/	0.7417	 3.1/	0.3819	
*	bolder	scores	indicate	higher	intra‐study	scoring,	the	shaded	backgrounds	higher	inter‐study	scoring	
	
If	the	age‐related	decrement	assertions	in	the	literature	are	correct,	then	it	could	be	
assumed	that	the	older	driver’s	SA	would	be	worse	for	the	trials	in	Table	8.E	than	the	
trials	in	Table	8.F.	However,	higher	SA	scores	tend	to	be	found	in	the	more	taxing	trials.		
Thus	SA	was	not	worsened	by	cognitively	taxing	environments	for	the	older	drivers,	nor	
for	that	matter	the	younger	drivers,	rather	it	was	unexpectedly	enhanced.	This	is	not,	
though,	such	an	unusual	finding	per	se.	Kaber	et	al.	(2012),	for	example,	found	“Young	
drivers	exhibited	degraded	Level	1	SA	in	the	complex	environment	after	hazard	
exposure,	while	older	drivers	exhibited	improved	Level	1	SA	in	the	same	condition.”	
(p.605).	Kaber’s	complex	condition	had	the	effect	of	bringing	additional	attention	from	
his	older	drivers	once	they	encountered	a	hazard,	but	that	“higher	Levels	SA,	
comprehension	and	projection,	were	degraded	for	older	drivers	due	to	hazard	
exposure”	(p.609).	The	extra	perceptual	effort	seems	to	have	cost	them	better	
comprehension,	and	this	could	have	relevance	for	their	Hazard	Perception	Test	
performance.	Additionally,	Bolstad	(2001),	although	not	finding	any	increased	SA	
proficiency	with	her	older	driver	group	when	encountering	complex	driving	conditions,	
equally	did	not	find	them	more	affected:	“While	differences	in	SA	performance	between	
the	age	groups	were	hypothesized	to	become	more	pronounced	as	the	complexity	of	the	
task	increased,	this	did	not	bear	out.	Results	show	that	SA	for	all	age	groups	declined	
from	the	moderate	complexity	condition	to	the	high	complexity	condition;	however;	
older	adults	did	not	experience	a	greater	decrease	in	performance	when	compared	to	
the	other	age	groups.”	(p.276).	Thus	perhaps	what	Studies	2	&	3	show	is	that	SA	
performance	can	actually	be	uplifted	through	greater	effort	to	meet	the	demands	of	
increased	cognitive	taxation	and	a	task’s	unfamiliarity	or	difficulty.	However,	this	would	
only	seem	prevalent	when	the	individual	is	aware	of	that	difficulty.	A	contrast	can	thus	
be	made	for	the	older	groups	in	this	regard	between	their	uplift	in	scoring	from	Study	1	
to	Study	2	(when	they	were	conscious	of	the	need	for	increased	cognitive	activity)	and	
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their	subsequent	decline	in	scoring	for	Study	3	(when	they	were	less	aware).	This	
assertion	is	considered	further	under	Aspect	2	below.		
	
8.6.	(Aspect	2):	What	conclusions	can	be	made	in	regards	to	older	driver	
SA?	Could	it	be	improved	and	how?	
8.6.1.	Quantitative	data	
The	SA	Diameter	and	Density	scores	for	the	three	studies	undertaken	in	this	series	are	
given	below	in	Table	8.G.	At	the	overall	group	assessment	level	there	was	both	more	
consistency	and	higher	scoring	by	the	younger	participants	across	the	three	studies.	The	
shaded	backgrounds	and	bolder	text	denote	the	higher	comparative	scores.		
	
This	reflects	that	the	younger	driver	groups,	on	the	whole,	drew	on	more	similar	
concepts	and	related	them	more	proficiently.	This,	despite	these	groups	being	more	
diverse,	both	in	number	(23	to	13	older	participants),	and	background	‐	as	they	
included	a	number	of	foreign	students	who	had	also	driven	abroad.		
	
Table	8.G:	SA	metric	scores	across	the	three	Studies	
	 SA	assessment	scores	(Diameter/Density)	
Group	 Comparison	 	Study	1	 Study	2	 							Study	3		
Dia.	 Density	 Dia.	 Density	 Dia.	 Density	
Older		
	
Group	 2	 0.7417	 2	 0.8427	 2	 0.7247	
Individual	 3.1	 0.3819	 2.4	 0.5452	 2.7	 0.4321	
Younger	 Group	 2	 0.8238	 2	 0.8597	 2	 0.8895	
Individual	 3.2	 0.3848	 2.7	 0.4628	 2.5	 0.5333	
*	bolder	text	indicates	the	higher	comparative	score;	the	darker	background	the	greater	the	difference	
	
However,	when	individual	performances	were	compared	the	picture	became	more	
mixed.	Individual	older	drivers	were	found	to	produce	SA	levels	that	could	match	and	
exceed	the	younger	drivers.	This	was	particularly	reflected	in	the	video‐based	study	(2),	
where	older	drivers	were	ranked	1st,	2nd,	and	4th	overall.	In	contrast,	for	the	driving	
studies	(1	&	3)	the	less	taxing	variant	(Study	1)	produced	parity	in	SA	scoring	with	the	
younger	group,	whilst	a	more	taxing	route	(Study	3)	found	the	younger	group	to	
perform	(significantly	p<0.024)	better.	
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Such	scoring	differences	are	now	considered	further	by	quantitative	data	provided	in	
Tables	8.H	to	8.J	below.	In	Table	8.H,	the	SA	Density	scores	for	the	older	group	from	
Study	2	are	compared	to	those	from	the	more	difficult	second	driving	Study	(3)	‐	
advantageously	all	of	the	older	drivers	in	that	study	also	took	part	in	Study	2.	The	
difference	in	scoring	here	was	significant	(p<0.002),	as	it	was	between	Study	1	and	2	
(p<0.009)	for	the	seven	older	participants	who	undertook	both	those	studies.	It	is	
important	to	note	that	the	Diameter	scores	were	not	similarly	considered	for	such	
comparisons	due	to	their	insufficient	score	differentiation	for	the	length	of	narrative	
produced.	
	
Table	8.H:	Older	driver	SA	metric	comparisons	with	sig.	levels	for	the	Density	scores	
	
Study	
SA	scores	 	 Statistical	significance	
Diameter	 Density	 T	 Ppts.	 df.	 Correlation	 Sig.	
3	(Driving)	 2.7	 0.4321	 ‐4.483	 10	 9	 0.682	 0.002	
2	(Video‐based)	 2.4	 0.5505	
	
In	contrast,	an	opposite	effect,	though	less	pronounced,	was	found	for	the	Density	
scores	of	the	younger	participants	who	had	undertaken	Study	2	and	3,	though	they	were	
fewer	in	number,	see	Table	8.I.	
	
Table	8.I:	Younger	driver	SA	metric	comparisons	with	sig.	levels	for	the	Density	scores	
	
Study	
SA	scores	 Statistical	significance	
Diameter	 Density	 T	 Ppts.	 df.	 Correlation	 Sig.	
3	(Driving)	 2.3	 0.5696	 1.785	 6	 5	 0.438	 0.134	
2	(Video‐based)	 2.7	 0.4793	
	
Such	findings	were	investigated	further	by	considering	how	the	SA	Density	scores	had	
improved	or	worsened	for	those	participants	who	had	undertaken	more	than	one	of	the	
three	studies.		
	
Table	8.J	shows,	for	the	two	driving	studies	(1	&	3),	participants	had	both	improved	and	
worsened	their	SA	Density	score	in	about	equal	measure.	Those	worsening	their	scores	
tended	to	come	from	the	higher	scoring	thresholds	‐	7th	and	above	(falling	0.1020	on	
average),	whereas	those	improving	tended	to	come	from	the	lower	ranking	echelons	of	
Study	1	–	9th	and	below	(improving	by	0.1210	on	average).		
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However,	the	performance	changes	in	relation	to	the	video‐study	(2)	were	far	more	
striking	with	all	of	the	older	drivers	who	took	Study	1	improving	in	Study	2,	and	all	but	
one	then	worsening	for	Study	3.	
	
Table	8.J:	How	SA	Density	scores	improved	or	worsened	for	those	undertaking	
all	three	studies	
	
	
Group	
Comparison	
Study	1	to	Study	2	 Study	2	to	Study	3	 Study	1	to	Study	3	
Ppts.	 Imp.	 Wor.	 Ppts.	 Imp.	 Wor.	 Ppts.	 Imp.	 Wor.	
Older	 8	 8	 0	 10	 1	 9	 7	 4	 3	
Younger	 2	 1	 1	 6	 5	 1	 2*	 1	 0	
*	to	note:	one	ppt.	scored	exactly	the	same	Density	score	
	
Notwithstanding	the	low	comparison	sample	here,	particularly	for	the	younger	
participants,	this	data	supports	the	contention	made	in	earlier	sections	of	this	chapter,	
that	SA	could	have	a	relationship	to	a	task’s	perceived	difficulty	rather	than	being,	say,	
uniformly	poor	for	older	drivers,	as	is	usually	assumed	in	the	literature	(e.g.	Bolstad,	
2001).	This	assertion	had	further	support	from	participant	feedback,	and	this	deserves	
further	consideration.		
	
After	Study	3	was	concluded,	all	of	the	participants	who	had	also	undertaken	Study	2	
were	asked	which	study	they	felt	was	the	easier	to	undertake.	Surprisingly,	all	of	the	
older	drivers	said	that	the	driving	task	(Study	3)	was	easier.	The	video‐based	study	(2),	
in	contrast,	was	considered	as	more	difficult,	and,	indeed,	many	of	the	older	participants	
felt	that	as	a	result	they	must	have	missed	something	to	comment	on.	There	was	a	
general	feeling	that	the	speed	of	the	vehicle	was	often	excessive	and	could	not,	of	
course,	be	regulated.	There	was	also	no	indication	of	where	the	car	would	turn	from	a	
junction,	which	was	seen	as	disorientating.	And	interestingly,	that	the	front‐only	
viewpoint	was	limiting	(despite	being	a	preference	for	the	driving	studies),	as	there	was	
a	desire	to	be	able	to	see	what	was	coming	from	the	‘Left	and	‘Right’.	Concepts,	
incidentally,	that	had	high	relevance	for	the	older	participants	across	all	three	studies	
relative	to	the	younger	drivers	(discussed	further	below).	It	should	also	be	added	that	
two	of	the	older	participants	experienced	some	level	of	vertigo	in	undertaking	the	video	
trials,	with	one	needing	to	withdraw	from	the	study	as	a	result.	In	contrast,	no	problems	
were	highlighted	by	any	younger	driver,	either	during	or	after	any	of	the	studies.	
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It	was	assumed	that	due	to	age‐related	cognitive	decrements,	exposing	older	drivers	to	
a	taxing	journey	would	result	in	a	worsening	of	their	SA.	However,	even	taking	into	
account	that	taxing	environments	can	have	an	opposite	effect	with	older	drivers	(Kaber	
et	al.,	2012),	task	difficulty	would	still	appear	to	be	an	important	variable.	It	was	
speculated	above	that	with	the	tasks	the	older	drivers	found	difficult,	such	as	in	Study	2,	
that	their	concentration	and	attention	perhaps	rose.	Could	this,	though,	have	also	been	
assisted	by	the	short,	7	minute,	duration	of	these	journeys?	Craik	&	Byrd	(1982),	for	
example,	propose	that	a	reduction	in	available	mental	energy	or	attentional	capacity	is	
one	of	several	major	factors	underlying	declining	cognitive	efficiency	in	the	elderly.	
Thus,	perhaps	these	declines	were	not	as	influential	as	they	might	have	been	in	the	
longer	(two)	driving	studies?	And	although	not	seen	as	an	advantage	by	the	older	
drivers,	a	limited	frontal	view	to	comment	on	in	the	video	footage	may	also	have	
assisted	the	group	in	capturing	more	cues,	more	cohesively,	than	when	driving,	due	to	
potential	age‐related	peripheral	view	problems	(e.g.	Ball	et	al.,	1988).	
	
Whether	such	factors	influenced	the	older	driver’s	performance	or	not	can	only	be	
speculated,	but	what	is	clear	is	that	when	they	were	later	faced	with	what	they	
considered	to	be	an	easier	task	(driving	their	own	vehicles	in	Study	3),	a	related	fall	in	
SA	proficiency	was	found	for	nine	of	the	ten	older	participants	(all	of	whom	had	
participated	in	Study	2).	This	despite	this	second	driving	route	being	objectively	more	
cognitively	taxing,	particularly	to	that	of	the	‘Standard’	journey	viewed	in	Study	2.		
	
The	conclusions	that	can	therefore	be	made	here	are	that	older	driver	SA	is	
quantitatively	more	inconsistent	when	assessed	as	a	group	(in	comparison	to	younger	
drivers),	and	that	this	inconsistency	could	be	linked	more	to	perceptions	of	task	
difficulty	than	roadway	complexity	alone.	In	short,	the	older	drivers	in	these	studies	
were	proficient	drivers.	They	were	confident	on	the	road,	though	drove	at	(quantifiably)	
slower	speeds,	presumably	to	give	themselves	more	reaction	time.	They	had	no	
difficulty	explaining	their	thoughts,	often	drawing	on	their	long	driving	experience.	
However,	although	their	SA	was	heightened	for	the	more	complex	driving	route	of	Study	
3	(p<0.393)	when	compared	to	Study	1,	arguably	insufficiently	so,	given	the	far	higher	
uplift	in	SA	scoring	(p<0.062)	recorded	by	the	younger	driver	group.	Whether	this	was	
due	to	superior	confidence,	less	awareness	of	the	difficulties	that	the	more	taxing	route	
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provided,	or,	in	contrast,	an	inability	to	process	and	cohesively	vocalise	commentaries	
in	more	taxing	driving	conditions	over	longer	time	periods,	remains	open	to	question.	
				
8.6.2.	Top	5/Lower	5	SA	performer	comparisons	
The	SA	scoring	from	the	three	studies	could	further	be	compared	by	the	computer	
software	to	see	whether	there	might	be	any	differences	between	the	best	and	worse	SA	
performers	in	terms	of	their	Diameter	and	Density	scoring	and	what	concepts	they	felt	
were	of	importance	(see	Table	8.K).	
		
Table	8.K:	SA	concept	referral	comparison	between	the	best	and	worse	SA	performers		
	
	
Study	
Top	5	performers	 Lowest	5	performers	
Dia./Den.	 Main	
Concepts	
Top	5	concepts	
mentioned	(No.)	
Dia./Den.	 Main	
Concepts	
Top	5	concepts	
mentioned	(No.)	
1	 2/0.8467	 32	 1168	 3/0.3472	 29	 565	
2	 2/0.8387	 31	 864	 2/0.5828	 30	 519	
3	 2/0.8427	 32	 1299	 2/0.5597	 35	 681	
Top	
ranking	
Concepts	
1.	Road	(side);	2.	Car	(parked);	3.	Coming	
(stop);	4.	In	(lane);	5.	Left	(side);	6.	Going	
(straight)	
1.	Car	(parked);	2.	In	(lane);	3.	Road	(side);	4.	
Coming	(towards);	5.	Going	(past)	
	
It	will	first	be	noted	that	the	top	five	performer’s	narratives	were	collectively	both	more	
cohesive	and	also	very	consistent	across	all	three	studies.	These	participants	therefore	
considered	the	same	concepts	more	often	and	related	them	in	a	similar	fashion	for	each	
study.	For	the	lowest	five	participants,	their	SA	Density	and	Diameter	scores	showed	
less	cohesion,	though	still	creditable,	and	also	consistency	between	the	more	difficult	
studies	(2	and	3).	In	Study	1,	however,	the	group’s	performance	was	markedly	poorer,	
but	this	was	not	explained	by	the	concepts	the	group	focussed	on,	or	tried	to	interrelate.	
Like	the	HPT	data	above	(Table	8.C),	and	across	all	three	studies,	four	of	the	top	five	
concepts	were	identical	and	had	similar	main	concept	relationships	(i.e.	‘Car’	with	
‘parked’,	‘In’	with	‘lane’).	It	was,	again,	more	the	number	of	times	these	main	concepts	
were	perceived	and	referred	to	that	appears	to	have	given	the	Top	5	SA	performers	
their	better	Density	and	Diameter	scores.		
	
Having	a	greater	perception	of	these	main	concepts	necessarily	will	bring	more	network	
linkages	to	other	related	concepts,	aiding	their	later	recall	and	comprehension.	Thus	
better	SA	proficiency,	from	a	systems	perspective,	will	emerge	from	how	well	the	data	
the	individual	perceives	is	interrelated.	However,	the	relevance	of	that	information	
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must	also	be	considered,	and	the	findings	from	this	series	of	studies	do	suggest	some	
important	overall	group	differences	as	to	what	was	considered	as	relevant.	
	
8.6.3.	Concepts	comparisons	
In	Table	8.L	below,	the	main	concepts	given	by	the	older	and	younger	groups	are	
ranked.	For	the	younger	group,	which	was	more	varied	in	composition	across	the	three	
studies	than	the	older	group,	a	clear	interest	was	demonstrated	in	parked	cars	whatever	
the	journey,	and	whether	driven	or	not.	Another	distinguishing	concept	and	related	
action,	which	did	not	register	for	the	older	drivers,	was	that	of	speed	regulation.	This	
was	highlighted	by	the	‘Down’	concept	‐	from	its	high	association	with	slowing	through	
‘Gear’	changes;	and	the	‘Speed’	concept	itself.	Younger	drivers	have	been	found	to	be	
more	likely	than	older	drivers	to	drive	with	an	increased	level	of	risk,	by	driving	at	
faster	speeds	(Baxter	et	al.,	1990;	Galin,	1981;	Fancher	et	al.,	1998;	Fildes	et	al.,	1991;	
Quimby	et	al.,	1999a;	Quimby	et	al.,	1999b;	Smeed,	1972).	This	might,	of	course,	have	
accounted	for	their	greater	interest	in	speed	regulation	when	their	driving	was	being	
‘evaluated’?	However,	it	could	also	be	related	to	more	cognitive	capacity	to	consider	a	
range	of	driving	cues,	or	a	(advantageous?)	need	for	more	focus	on	driving	actions	(due	
to	less	experience)	relative	to	the	older	driving	groups.	
	
Table	8.L:	Main	concepts	utilised	by	the	two	age‐groupings	across	all	three	studies		
	
Rk.	
Younger	Group	 Older	Group	
Study	1	 Study	2	 Study	3	 Study	1	 Study	2	 Study	3	
1	 Down	 Car(s)	(parked)	 Car	(parked)	 Coming	(towards)	 Traffic	 Coming	(towards)	
2	 Cars	(parked)	 Lights	 In	 Right	 Left	 Left	
3	 Going	 Road	 Go(ing)	 In	 Go(ing)	 Car	
4	 In	 Traffic	 Down	 Car	 Right	 Right	
5	 Coming	 Left	 Coming	 Road	 Coming	(Junction)	 Going	
6	 Road	 Going	 Road	 Going	 Road	 Road	
7	 See	 Side	 Right	 Left	 Car	 In	
8	 Speed	 In	 Left	 Traffic	 Side	 Side	
9	 Right	 	 Side	 	 In	 Hand	
10	 	 	 Speed	 	 Parked	 Traffic	
*background	shaded	concepts	appeared	in	the	‘top	10’	for	all	three	studies	
	
The	more	homogenous	older	groups	produced	more	consistency	in	their	concepts	(as	
denoted	by	the	darker	shading	in	Table	8.L),	with	an	awareness	of	what	was	‘Coming	‐	
towards’	their	vehicles	of	particular	importance.	This	general	focus	to	the	front	seems	to	
be	augmented,	although	to	a	lesser	extent,	by	what	was	to	the	‘Right’	and	‘Left’.	In	terms	
of	ranking,	both	these	concepts	appear	in	the	top	four	placings	for	the	older	groups	in	
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two	of	the	studies,	and	2nd	and	7th	in	the	third	(Study	1).	This	observational	need	may,	as	
considered	earlier,	have	been	a	factor	for	the	perceived	difficulty	of	the	video	tasks	for	
this	group	in	Study	2.	In	comparison,	for	the	younger	group:	only	‘Right’	figures	in	Study	
1	(9th);	‘Left’	only	in	Study	2	(5th);	and	both	‘Right’	and	‘Left’	at	comparatively	low	
rankings	(7th	and	8th)	in	Study	3.			
	
Table	8.M	(below)	compares	the	most	prominent	concepts	for	each	age	grouping.	That	
is,	those	concepts	that	were	the	most	distinguishing	between	the	two	groups.	There	is,	
not	surprisingly,	much	similarity	here	with	Table	8.L	above,	with	more	consistency	in	
the	main	distinguishing	concepts	for	the	older	group.	The	four	concepts	that	appear	
twice,	in	bold	text,	are	also	again	those	considered	as	major	concepts	for	the	group	in	
Table	8.L.		
	
Table	8.M:	Prominent	Concepts	(above	a	1.2	score)	across	the	three	studies	
Younger	Group	 Older	Group	
Concept	 Prominence	 Study	 Concept	 Prominence	 Study	
Checking	 1.8	 3	 Left	 1.4	+	1.2	 1	+	3	
See	 1.5	 1	 Traffic	 1.3	+	1.2	 1	+	3	
Down	 1.3	+	1.3	 1	+	3	 Coming	 1.3	+	1.2	 1	+	2	
Speed	 1.3	 1	 Right	 1.3	+	1.2	 1	+	2	
Cars	 1.2	 2	 Turning	 1.2	 2	
	 	 	 Going	 1.2	 2	
	 	 	 Parked	 1.2	 3	
	 	 	 Road	 1.2	 1	
*background	shaded	concepts	appeared	in	more	than	one	study	
	
The	younger	drivers	in	this	Table	show,	in	contrast,	that	they	had	a	lesser	number	of	
distinguishing	concepts	across	the	three	studies,	but	where	found	that	they	were	more	
pronounced:	i.e.	the	‘Checking’	concept	(with	a	1.8	Prominence	score);	and	the	‘See’	
concept	(with	1.5).	Interestingly	both	these	concepts	related	to	looking	behind	the	
vehicle,	a	preference	for	younger	drivers	that	is	considered	further	below.	
	
8.6.4.	Rearward	and	safety‐related	concepts	
In	Study	1,	it	was	argued	that	the	SA‐related	data	for	the	older	driver	group	had	shown	
indications	of	them	having	an	undue	focus	to	the	front,	and	front/sides	of	their	vehicles,	
at	the	expense	of	what	was	occurring	behind.	As	such	it	was	felt	that	this	less	optimal	
awareness	might	result	in	the	older	drivers	missing	important	safety‐related	
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information,	and	this	seemed	evident	from	further	concept	comparisons.	This	assertion	
could	not	be	effectively	measured	in	Study	2,	but	in	Study	3	it	could	be	re‐considered.	
The	initial	evidence	from	the	group	networks	in	that	latter	study	appeared	to	show	that	
the	older	drivers	had	taken	more	note	of	what	was	happening	‘Behind’	their	vehicles,	
due	to	linkages	between	that	concept	and	a	main	‘Car’	concept	that	were	not	found	in	
Study	1.	However,	when	a	comparison	was	made	of	the	times	a	rearward	looking	
concept	or	word	was	mentioned	in	isolation	in	both	of	the	driving	studies,	the	results	
were	only	marginally	improved	by	the	older	drivers	for	the	more	taxing	second	drive	
(Table	8.N).		
	
Table	8.N:	Rearward‐related	concept	comparisons	for	Study	1	&	3	
	
	
								
Concept	
	 Older	Group	 	 	 Younger	Group	
Study	1	 Study	3	 Study	1	 Study	3	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Behind	 123	 125	 99	 105	 92	 91	 83	 86	
Mirror	 12	 21	 0	 3	 123	 132	 117	 97	
Rear		 0	 0	 0	 0	 8	 40	 32	 35	
Wing	(mirror)	 2	 1	 0	 0	 17	 10	 5	 14	
Totals	 137	 99	 147	 108	 240	 273	 237	 232	
	
A	second	aspect	of	interest	from	Study	1’s	findings	was	a	potentially	sub‐optimal	
amount	of	safety‐relevant	information	being	processed	by	the	older	drivers.	This	was	
more	difficult	to	substantiate	from	the	text	alone,	but	an	argument	was	made	that	
perhaps	an	indication	could	be	gained	from	what	the	participants	themselves	had	
enunciated	in	their	narratives.	In	Table	8.O,	below,	the	concepts	that	were	felt	to	have	
safety	relevance	are	compared	by	concept	and	word	count	for	the	two	groups	for	both	
of	the	driving	studies.		
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Table	8.O:	Safety‐related	concept	comparisons	for	Studies	1	&	3	
	
	
Safety‐related	
Concepts	
Older	Group	 Younger	Group	
Study	1	 Study	3	 Study	1	 Study	3	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Concept	
Count	
Word	
Count	
Checking	 6	 19	 0	 6	 178	 220	 181	 183	
Check	 10	 5	 45	 0	
Indicating	 31	 108	 23	 76	 117	 142	 26	 71	
Indicate	 28	 30	 45	 25	
Blind	 6	 7	 18	 20	 29	 33	 78	 81	
Clear	 66	 71	 46	 55	 112	 122	 113	 121	
Sure	 18	 19	 0	 23	 105	 98	 144	 124	
Gap	 0	 0	 5	 5	 9	 12	 12	 12	
Safe	 6	 11	 9	 12	 14	 19	 12	 20	
Looking	 0	 57	 16	 64	 136	 161	 165	 175	
Look	 19	 0	 46	 	
Aware	 10	 10	 0	 3	 63	 69	 75	 79	
Warning	 10	 11	 7	 8	 12	 12	 0	 2	
(having)Time	 22	 10	 33	 7	 20	 12	 36	 23	
(enough)Space	 9	 9	 0	 9	 11	 10	 0	 28	
(enough)Room	 16	 9	 27	 27	 13	 13	 13	 14	
Totals	 257	 341	 219	 315	 955	 923	 756	 933	
 
It	was	found	that	the	younger	group	performed	better	on	all	but	two	concept	scores	and	
in	every	relevant	word	count	in	Study	1,	and	overall	that	it’s	participants	mentioned	
these	safety‐related	words	around	three	times	more	often.		
	
For	Study	3,	where	the	drive	was	more	demanding,	the	expectation	was	that	this	large	
gap	would	close,	however	the	Table	again	shows	a	remarkably	similar	ratio	in	overall	
scoring	to	Study	1.	The	more	reliable	word	count	comparison	actually	shows	a	widening	
gap	here,	with	again	the	younger	group	giving	far	more	consideration	to	‘Checking’,	
‘Looking’,	and	being	‘Sure’	and	‘Aware’.	As	expected,	for	both	groups	the	‘Blind’	
(corners/turns)	concept	increased	in	prominence,	given	the	topology	of	Study	3’s	route.	
	
There	were	indications	during	the	driving‐based	studies	that	the	older	drivers	were	
more	easily	distracted	from,	and	therefore	had	less	awareness	of,	the	driving	task.	This	
was	usually	reflected	in	the	group’s	overall	(SA	metric)	scoring,	but	here	there	are	
additional,	demonstrably	large,	differences	in	relation	to	safe‐driving	actions.	It	could	
be,	of	course,	that	such	differences	could	be	due,	as	argued	earlier,	to	the	older	drivers	
processing	such	cues	less	consciously	or	automatically,	and/or	that	they	considered	a	
lesser	number	of	the	driving	environments	encountered	in	need	of	‘looking’	or	
220 
 
‘checking’	due	to	their	greater	driving	experience.	Additionally,	it	should	be	borne	in	
mind	that	the	younger	group	did	produce	7%	more	average	text	in	their	commentaries	
for	Study	3,	whereas	in	Study	1	there	was	more	parity	with	the	older	group.	But	in	view	
of	the	similar	ratios	for	these	concepts	between	the	two	studies	(of	almost	identical	time	
duration),	coupled	with	the	reasonable	belief	that	a	need	for	more	safety	awareness	
should	have	been	apparent	when	driving	Study	3’s	more	cognitively	taxing	route,	it	
would	be	expected	that	these	related	concept	and	word	counts	should	narrow.	After	all,	
the	participants	were	aware	that	their	driving	proficiency,	in	the	sense	of	what	they	
were	aware	of,	was	being	‘tested’,	and	thus	they	may	actually	have	been	more	inclined	
to	enunciate	and	demonstrate	‘safety‐correct’	driving	procedures.		
	
What	these	findings	show	for	the	purposes	of	Situation	Awareness	are	that	older	
drivers	are	potentially	deficient	in	perceiving	these	safety‐related	cues,	despite	their	
longer	driving	experience.	This	could	present	difficulties	for	them	whilst	driving	as	that	
perception	is	arguably	the	most	important	precursor	for	good	Situation	Awareness.	This	
is	because	what	we	perceive	will	inform	both	how	well	we	comprehend	a	driving	
scenario,	and	how	well	we	then	act	in	the	face	of	it.	Thus,	these	findings	would	no	doubt	
benefit	from	being	corroborated	by	further	research	with	different	methodologies,	as	
they	could	indicate	important	precursors	for	accident	involvement	amongst	older	
drivers.	
	
8.6.5.	Can	SA	be	improved	and	how?	
The	concentration	of	this	work	has	been	on	older	driver	SA.	Those	older	drivers	who	
took	part,	often	undertook	all	three	of	the	studies,	and	produced	SA	scores	that	could	
match	and	in	some	cases	exceed	that	of	younger	age	groups.	This	was	particularly	
evident	for	Study	2’s	video‐based	trials,	where	it	has	been	argued	their	SA	improved	
due	to	difficulties	arising	from	the	novelty	of	the	task,	and	its	format.	The	aim	here,	
however,	is	to	improve	older	driver’s	SA	on	actual	roadways.	
	
To	that	end,	it	can	firstly	be	proposed	that	there	is	perhaps	a	need	to	increase	their	
concentration	and	attention	levels	in	line	with	roadway	risk.	These	appeared	to	be	too	
uniform	across	the	two	driving	tasks	that	were	quantifiably	different	in	their	
complexity.	This	was	indicated	by	a	substantially	different	uplift	in	Situation	Awareness	
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scoring	between	the	younger	(p<0.062)	and	older	(p<	0.393)	groups	from	Study	1	to	
Study	3.				
	
The	older	drivers	were	confident	on	a	roadway	whatever	its	complexity.	But	this	
appears	to	have	led	to	insufficient	cohesive	processing	of	cues,	particularly	for	Study	3’s	
more	taxing	drive,	where	vehicles	could	often	quickly	approach	from	the	many	blind	
corners	on	the	route.	This	could	leave	the	older	driver	at	more	risk	when	unexpected	
hazards	occur,	particularly	as	cognitively	and	physically	they	may	be	less	able	to	
respond	effectively.	And,	as	was	argued	in	Chapter	5,	this	is	likely	to	be	augmented	by	
them	being	unaware	of	the	extent	and	prevalence	of	those	decrements.		
	
Another	way	in	which	an	older	driver’s	SA	could	be	improved	would	potentially	be	by	
coaching	them	on	what	should	be	attended	to.	In	Study	2,	it	was	found,	at	least	for	short	
durations,	that	when	faced	with	what	was	perceived	to	be	a	difficult	task,	that	they	
could	undertake	a	higher	degree	of	information	processing	relative	to	a	younger	group	
(as	demonstrated	by	a	26.57%	higher	average	word	count).	Furthermore,	this	increased	
awareness	was	also	more	cohesive	than	the	younger	participants	when	assessed	by	
individual	performance.	In	fact,	it	was	the	only	occasion	over	six	measures	of	SA	Density	
scoring	when	the	older	participants	out‐performed	their	younger	counterparts.	This	
shows	that	the	potential	for	increased	awareness	is	possible	for	older	drivers.	However,	
that	improvement	will	not	translate	into	a	safer	driving	if,	for	example,	the	additional	
information	is	not	processed	in	a	timely	fashion,	or	if	it	leads	to	the	wrong	kinds	of	
information	being	processed,	perhaps	due	to	time	pressure.	In	fact,	it	was	argued	in	
Chapter	6	that	it	could	have	been	for	such	reasons	that	the	older	drivers	faired	worse	
than	younger	drivers	in	detecting	hazards.				
	
It	has	been	shown	from	qualitative	assessments	in	the	studies	undertaken	for	this	
research	that	the	younger	groups	commented	more	consistently	on	relevant	
information,	despite	them	forming	more	heterogeneous	groups.	This	was	the	case	for	
the	commentaries	taken	both	from	video	studies,	and	whilst	driving.	In	the	latter	case	it	
was	shown	(in	Table	8.L	above)	that	the	older	group	attended	more	to	what	was	
‘Coming’	towards	their	vehicles,	what	was	to	the	‘Left’	and	‘Right’,	and	‘Going’‐‘Straight’	
(over).	For	the	younger	group,	it	was	more	about	parked	‘Cars’,	‘Going’‐‘Around’	
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(corners),	and	in	Table	8.M,	‘Checking’	and	to	‘See’	what	was	behind	their	vehicles.	
Additionally,	the	younger	drivers	demonstrated	an	awareness	of	speed	regulation,	not	
exhibited	by	the	older	drivers,	through	the	importance	they	attached	to	that	concept	
through	interrelations	such	as	‘Down’	and	‘Gear’.	In	Study	1	there	were	also	unique	
concepts	relating	to	indicating,	stopping	and	going,	cars	behind	and	to	the	side,	gear	
changes,	seeing	gaps,	and	specific	traffic	light	colours	than	just	the	lights	themselves.	To	
these	can	be	added	the	finding	discussed	in	section	8.6.4	above,	of	a	more	specific	
awareness	of	safety‐related	cues.	
	
A	consistent	difference	in	what	was	perceived	by	the	two	groups	is	thus	evident.	The	
reason	for	this	could	be	related	to	experience,	and	its	relationship	to	perceptions	of	risk	
and	depth	of	processing.	It	could	also	be	due	to	older	group	difficulties	in	maintaining	
sufficient	awareness	over	longer	time	periods.	Whatever	the	reason,	though,	the	
findings	from	this	series	of	studies	indicate	that	the	older	driver	should	gain	a	safety‐
related	improvement	in	SA	from	a	change	in	perceptual	focus.	This	could	be	achieved	by	
undertaking	more	processing	of	a	range	of	relevant	and	specific	artefacts	from	all	
around	the	vehicle,	rather	than	relying	on	fewer	and	broader,	direction‐based,	ones	
predominantly	from	the	front	aspect.	More	consideration	to	speed	regulation	would	
also	seem	beneficial,	and	from	participant	feedback	this	was	often	acknowledged	as	a	
problem.	So	much	so,	in	fact,	that	a	number	of	the	older	drivers	utilised	a	‘cruise‐
control’	function	set	to	a	road’s	speed	limit.	In	this	regard,	however,	additional	speed	
signage	might	be	a	simple	aid	or	even	a	solution,	so	no	doubt	benefits	would	be	gained	
from	research	that	sought	to	evaluate	where	and	to	what	extent	such	additional	
information	of	this	type	would	be	helpful.	From	anecdotal	evidence,	this	could,	in	fact,	
derive	benefits	for	all	drivers,	as	often	narratives	would	include	comments	such	as:	I	
don’t	know	the	speed	I	should	be	doing	along	here,	but	that	x	suggests	that	it	should	be	
y	miles	an	hour.		
	
The	data	across	the	three	studies	undertaken	for	this	thesis	show	that	an	older	driver’s	
SA	would	seem	adequate	during	non‐taxing	and	familiar	routes	(not	withstanding	their	
less	proficient	cue	processing).	It	was	also	shown	that	it	could	be	cohesively	raised	for	
shorter	time	periods,	when	roadways	were	perceived	as	hard	to	evaluate.	However,	and	
perhaps	crucially,	it	could	similarly	fall	to	levels	that	might	be	inconsistent	with	their	
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cognitive	and	physical	capabilities	during	more	(and	actual)	demanding	driving	
environments.	
		
It	may	not	be	possible,	due	to	age‐related	decrements,	for	the	older	driver	to	sustain	
information	processing	capabilities	to	the	level	of	younger	driver	groups	over	a	long	
journey.	The	key	here,	then,	would	seem	to	be	raising	their	awareness	at	propitious	
moments,	and	to	direct	it	to	relevant	safety‐related	cues.	This	could	be	assisted	by	
automated	devices	that	are	able	to	evaluate	and	provide	information	about	different	
driving	environments,	the	likely	dangers,	and	the	necessary	related	driving	actions	to	
operate	effectively	within	them.		
	
In	terms	of	training	for	better	SA,	it	might	be	that	more	bespoke	approaches	might	be	
more	relevant,	but	in	general	the	following	techniques	seem	worthy	of	consideration.	
	
8.6.5.1.	What	an	SA	training	programme	might	include	
Any	training	in	regards	to	Situation	Awareness	should	be	based	around	developing	a	
strategy	that	seeks	to	enhance	how	we	look,	interpret	what	we	see,	and	then	to	combine	
that	information	in	a	way	that	increases	our	anticipation	of	relevant	threatening	events.	
These	are	the	three	basic	components	for	SA	as	described	by	Endsley.	These	may,	of	
course,	not	be	undertaken	hierarchically,	as	Endsley	suggests,	but	in	parallel,	however,	
to	leave	that	discussion	to	one	side,	they	do	provide	a	useful	framework	for	explaining	a	
potential	training	programme,	and	so	will	be	utilised	here.				
	
Thus,	a	first	improvement	to	enhancing	SA	would	be	to	try	to	improve	how	we	look,	as	
this	would	allow	for	a	more	complete	assessment	of	our	field	of	view.	To	achieve	this,	
we	need	to	become	more	systematic	and	specific	in	the	way	we	perceive	information.	As	
if	a	roadway	environment	is	sampled	more	effectively,	and	applied	on	a	more	
continuous	basis,	we	should	be	able	to	increase	our	chances	of	spotting	dangerous	
events	in	time.	
	
Each	driver	therefore	needs	a	scanning	strategy,	and	it	is	proposed	here	that	this	should	
include	a	cyclical	search	of	threats	to	safety,	and	in	parallel,	a	search	for	any	immediate	
threat(s).	An	example	might	involve	looking	at	the	car	directly	in	front	as	a	starting	
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point,	and	then	moving	focus	to	another	slightly	ahead.	Concomitantly,	however,	it	will	
also	be	necessary	to	seek	out	those	items	that	look	the	most	immediately	threatening.	
These	should	be	found	and	then	held	visually	in	memory,	as	our	gaze	range	looks	
further	ahead	along	the	route.	This	pattern	should	then	be	repeated,	starting	again	with	
the	car	directly	ahead.		
	
Whilst	undertaking	this	process,	it	might	also	be	useful	to	silently	(or	out	loud)	talk	
through	what	is	being	looked	for.	This	has	proved	to	be	helpful	for	one	of	the	
participants	of	the	studies	in	this	series.	Indeed,	a	more	systematic	scanning	(with	talk‐
through)	of	roadway	environments,	should	better	alert	the	driver	to	more	possible	
threats	to	safety,	and	thus	ensure	that	fewer	of	them	are	missed.		
	
It	is	appreciated	that	any	such	strategy	of	this	kind	would	take	time	to	master	and	
become	effective.	This	is	due	to	the	difficulty	of	maintaining	concentration	on	two	visual	
processes	simultaneously.	In	this	latter	regard,	training	would	have	to	target	better	
focus	and	movement	of	concentration,	prioritisation,	and	the	need	to	increase	scanning	
proportionate	to	any	threat.		
	
In	addition,	the	driver	would	also	have	to	learn	to	adapt	to	incorporate	a	wider	range	of	
new	items,	and	thus	improve	his/her	effectiveness	in	discarding	non‐relevant	ones.	On	
the	plus	side,	however,	the	proficiency	of	such	techniques	can	be	evaluated	–	for	
example,	by	memory	tests	of	scenes	along	a	test	route	‐	and	over	time	they	should	
become	automatic.		
	
As	has	often	been	argued	in	previous	chapters,	effective	information	perception	is	only	
one	part	of	good	Situation	Awareness.	All	SA	models	also	incorporate	some	method	of	
understanding	of	what	will	be	a	vast	array	of	visual	information,	yet	perhaps	less	is	
made	of	the	ineffective	ways	we	tend	to	do	this.	In	most	cases,	for	example,	we	will	
consider	an	inadequate	number	of	variables,	and	then	calculate	the	probability	of	
something	happening.	An	example	might	be	the	under‐estimation	of	the	speed	of	other	
vehicles.	The	proficiency	of	our	comprehension	and	decision	making	may	also	be	
debilitated	by,	say:	negative	behaviours	‐	such	as	using	a	hands‐free	mobile	phone	
whilst	driving;	our	emotional	states;	and	our	attitudes.	So	to	counter	such	effects	a	
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thinking	strategy	will	also	be	needed,	as	this	should	make	our	mistakes	and	internal	
states	more	obvious.	That	way,	errors	could	be	self‐managed	and	corrected	in	good	
time.		
	
To	achieve	this,	a	step‐by‐step	thinking	though	of	events	could	be	employed	to	reflect	
on	the	consequences	likely	to	be	produced	from	any	given	roadway	environment.	This	
would	allow	for	a	better	filtering	out	of	potential	errors,	and	by	comparing	more	
variables	we	should	develop	a	better	basis	for	anticipating	what	constitutes	an	
approaching	danger.	This,	in	turn,	should	produce	better	decisions,	both	for	ourselves,	
and	for	other	road	users	and	pedestrians.	An	approach	might	be	to	adopt	more	
defensive	driving	actions,	such	as	keeping	several	seconds	of	safe	decision	space	to	the	
car	directly	in	front,	to	allow	sufficient	time	for	this	‘thinking	through’	process.		
		
As	with	the	scanning	strategy,	discussed	earlier,	the	anticipatory	and	action	elements	
forming	part	of	any	thinking	strategy	(given	above)	would	also	need	to	be	undertaken	in	
small	and	cyclical	steps.	In	that	we	would	need	to	check	our	predictions	and	actions	
against	incoming	information	and	its	possible	meanings.	So,	overall,	in	regards	to	
training,	this	approach	would	have	to	be	learned	as	part	of	a	larger,	combined,	method	
of	producing	cyclical	processes	for	both	looking	and	thinking,	and,	in	similar	fashion,	
anticipating.	In	effect,	to	learn	a	continuous	mental	cycle	of	picking	up	and	evaluating	an	
increased	amount	of	relevant	information	based	on	Endsley’s	three	levels	of	Situation	
Awareness.	This	may	seem	a	difficult	task,	but	it	should,	over	time,	become	both	unified,	
natural,	and	beneficial.		
	
8.7.	In	summary,	a	proposed	model	for	SA	whilst	driving	
One	aspect	of	this	research	that	has	evolved	from	its	undertaking,	is	the	usefulness,	
highlighted	again	above,	of	Endsley’s	three	level	model	for	describing	Situation	
Awareness.	On	the	other	hand,	Perception‐Action	models	appear	better	at	explaining	
the	cyclical	nature	of	how	we	produce	good	awareness	and	how	that	it	based	very	often	
on	our	own	preconceptions.	There	is,	therefore,	merit	in	both	approaches,	and	an	
attempt	has	been	made	in	a	model	below,	see	Figure	8.3,	to	drawn	the	two	together.	
Driving	models	of	SA	are	rare.	The	only	one	found	to	be	published	as	a	paper	in	a	peer‐
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reviewed	journal	is	by	Michael	Matthews	and	colleagues	(Matthews	et	al.,	2001)	who	
kindly	sent	the	author	their	work	(see	Figure	8.2).	
	
Figure	8.2:	SA	and	driving	model	by	Matthews	et	al	(2001)		
		
	
Matthews	et	al.	view	SA	as	involving	spatial,	temporal,	goal,	and	system	awareness,	and	
have	integrated	these	aspects	into	a	goal‐oriented	model	of	driver	behaviour	that	
encompasses	the	strategic,	tactical,	and	operational	goals	of	driving.	
	
The	model	draws	much	on	Endsley’s	three	level	model	of	Situation	Awareness	(Endsley,	
1995a),	as	information	processing	is	undertaken	linearly,	with	SA	providing	the	
decisions	and	actions	from	goals	that	can	be	automatically	processed,	though	usually	
based	on	knowledge	and	skill	based	in	long‐term	memory.	
	
In	contrast,	a	more	cyclical	and	constantly	updating	model	is	proposed	(see	Figure	8.3),	
based	more	on	the	work	of	Smith	&	Hancock	(1995)	considered	in	Chapter	3.	It	differs	
from	the	Matthews	et	al.	model	by	its	emphasis	on	SA	constantly	being	updated	in	
tandem	with	changes	in	the	driving	environment,	which	can	sometimes	be	rapid.	It	also	
uniquely	takes	account	of	driver	effort	and,	specifically,	the	impact	of	cognitive	and	
physical	decrements.	For	Matthews	et	al.	these	would	be	subsumed	under	their	more	
general	‘skill’	input	(Endsley’s	model	takes	no	direct	account	of	the	individual’s	skill	or	
effort).	
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Figure	8.3:	A	proposed	model	of	SA	for	the	older	driver 
	
	
SA	has	not	been	shown	by	this	research	as	a	static,	constant,	phenomenon.	Rather	it	is	
one	that	changes	with	each	different	driving	environment	encountered	through,	
initially,	the	quality	of	the	perceptions	that	are	processed.	
	
For	a	driven	journey,	it	is	proposed	that	a	change	in	Situation	Awareness	proficiency	
becomes	likely	when	a	driver	encounters	an	environment	perceived	to	be	different	in	
complexity.	With	that	awareness	s/he	then	makes	an	evaluation,	based	on	his/her	
driving	experience,	and	adjusts	cognitive	effort	accordingly.	This,	together	with	his/her	
intrinsic	ability	to	process	information,	again	based	upon	relevant	driving	experience,	
will	then	produce	a	level	of	conscious	awareness	in	regards	to	the	environment.	It	may	
be	that	the	environmental	change	denotes	less	risk,	and	in	such	circumstances	the	effort	
to	process	information	could	then	fall	to	levels	where	pre‐conscious,	automatic,	
processing	occurs.		
	
Having	attained	a	level	of	information	processing	deemed	sufficient	for	safe	transit	of	
the	new	environment,	this	may	then	be	further	modified	by	age‐related	decrements	(if	
appropriate)	and	the	driver’s	ability	to	mollify	them,	resulting	in	a	new	processing	level.	
This	will	then	determine	the	extent	to	which	relevant	cues	are	perceived,	and	how	
cohesively	they	will	be	processed,	which,	in	turn,	will	subsequently	inform	how	well	the	
driver	interprets	the	new	environment.	A	new	Situation	Awareness	proficiency	is	thus	
attained	which	then	will	inform	his/her	driving	actions	until	the	driving	environment	is	
perceived	to	have	changed	again	(e.g.,	moving	from	a	motorway	to	a	major	roadway	
environment),	at	which	point	this	evaluation	process	will	recommence.	Depending	on	
the	journey,	and	a	driver’s	perceptions	of	environmental	change,	this	cyclical	process	
Driving actions Perceived difficulty of the environment
SA proficiency in a driving environment Adjusted Intrinsic Driving
cognitive X processing  experience
Interpretation of driving environment effort ability
Relevance/cohesion of cues perceived modified by
Age‐related cognitive/physical decrements
against
Opportunities/aids to arrest those decrements
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could	be	undertaken	to	quite	varying	degrees	by	different	drivers.	From	the	evidence	of	
this	series	of	studies,	it	would	arguably	be	the	younger,	than	older,	drivers	who	would	
undertake	this	cyclical	processing	more	often.			
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Chapter	9:	Summary	&	Conclusions	
	
9.1.	Introduction	
The	overall	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to	assess	the	Situation	Awareness	(SA)	proficiency	of	
older	drivers.	This	was	achieved	by	producing	and	comparing	spoken	commentaries	to	
those	of	other,	younger	driver,	groups,	to	gain	an	indication	of	what	was	being	
perceived.	This	might	then	help	to	explain	other	related	and	important	cognitive	
processes	and	the	actions	that	flowed	from	them	(a	link	between	cognitive	process	and	
action	has,	for	example,	previously	been	found	by	Kass	et	al.,	1991,	2007;	Wickens	&	
Hollands,	2000).	
	
The	studies	undertaken	in	pursuit	of	that	aim	also	took	a	consistent	primary	objective:	
to	corroborate	whether	a	commonly	held	view	in	the	literature	‐	that	older	driver	SA	
was	deficient	due	to	age‐related	cognitive	decrements	‐	was	justified.	This	was	
important	to	ascertain	because	a	lack	of	Situation	Awareness	has	been	said	to	constitute	
a	primary	factor	in	accidents	attributed	to	human	error (Hartel,	Smith,	&	Prince,	1991;	
Merket,	Bergondy,	&	Cuevas‐Mesa,	1997;	Nullmeyer	et	al.,	2005;	Gugerty,	1998).	And	
that	age‐related	decrements	have	been	found	to	result	in	slower	motor	responses	
(Rinalducci,	Smither,	&	Bowers,	1993)	and	a	poorer	judgement	of	gaps	(Darzentas,	
McDowell,	&	Cooper,	1980).	Thus	taken	together,	and	given	that	life	expectancy	
continues	to	increase	in	the	UK	and	other	Western	societies,	there	are	reasonable	on‐
going	concerns	that	the	number	of	road	accidents	involving	older	drivers	could	rise.			
	
This	thesis	also	aimed	to	investigate	the	proficiency	of	older	driver	SA	on	the	basis	of	
two	main	tenets.	The	first	was	a	methodological	one:	to	utilise	real	road	environments,	
rather	than	the	somewhat	artificial	simulations	used	in	previous	related	studies.	This	
based	on	a	view	that	capturing	a	driver’s	perceptions	on	actual	roadways,	from	the	
concepts	that	they	perceived	and	felt	to	be	informative,	would	provide	more	useful	data,	
particularly	if	this	could	be	achieved	unobtrusively	and	non‐evasively.	A	‘Think	aloud’	
continual	commentary	was	identified	as	a	suitable	method	to	meet	that	aim,	and	this	sat	
well	with	the	thesis’s	arguments	as	to	how	Situation	Awareness	should	be	
conceptualised	and	measured:	as	considered	in	Chapter	3	in	response	to	Aspect	1.		
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The	second	tenet	was	to	consider	driving	environments	of	different	complexity.	This	
was	felt	necessary	due	to	the	potential	influence	of	cognitive	taxation	deficits	whose	
provenance	could	derive	from	an	individual’s	age	and/or	the	roadway	environments	
that	s/he	encountered.	As	alluded	to	above,	these	may	crucially	affect	how	proficiently	
information	is	processed,	and	as	a	corollary,	would	likely	affect	an	individual	driver’s	
Situation	Awareness.	The	literature	tends	to	undertake	research	on	the	assumption	that	
an	older	driver’s	SA	will	be	deficient	whatever	the	context.	Thus	it	was	considered	of	
value	to	evaluate	whether	firstly	this	SA	deficiency	was	present	on	actual	roadways	
(rather	than	just	in	simulators),	and	if	so,	whether	it	was	then	prevalent	in	both	non‐
taxing	driving	environments	‐	when	the	driver	had	sufficient	time	to	consider	and	react	
to	relevant	cues;	and/or	more	taxing	environments	‐	when	the	chance	of	an	overload	of	
information	was	more	likely	to	occur.	Such	considerations	were	operationalised	as	RQ1	
&	3	and	investigated	in	the	thesis’s	three	studies	(Chapters	4,	6,	&	7).					
	
Although	the	scope	of	the	work	was	anchored	around	the	aim	of	assessing	Situation	
Awareness,	the	need	to	incorporate	video	to	safely	evaluate	complex	roadway	
environments	offered	an	opportunity	to	additionally	consider	whether	the	concept	
would	be	useful	for	improving	a	driving	performance	measure.	Hazard	Perception	was	
chosen	for	this	purpose	due,	principally,	to	its	close	relationship	to	SA,	and	because	it	
had	also	been	said	to	decline	with	age.	RQ2	(considered	in	Chapters	5	&	6)	directed	an	
evaluation	for	any	correlations	between	the	‘scores’	for	these	two	measures.	The	basis	
for	that	analysis	was	that,	if	they	were	found,	this	would	increase	the	validity	of	the	
‘Think	aloud’	method	being	utilised	to	measure	SA,	and,	depending	on	the	strength	of	
the	relationship,	that	it	might	demonstrate	the	usefulness	of	Situation	Awareness	
training	for	improving	Hazard	Perception.				
	
This	final	chapter	will	now	consider	three	aspects	of	the	work	that	stemmed	from	these	
foundations,	and	the	studies	related	to	them.	Firstly,	a	brief	conclusion	in	regards	to	the	
main	findings,	and	how	these	relate	to	the	present	literature.	Secondly,	a	summary	of	
the	limitations	of	the	methodological	approach,	thirdly,	and	in	many	cases	as	a	corollary	
of	those	limitations,	a	section	that	considers	possible	areas	for	future	research,	and	
finally	some	brief	reflections.	
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9.2.	Main	findings	
9.2.1.	Situation	Awareness	
As	alluded	to	above,	Situation	Awareness	is	presumed	in	the	literature	to	decline	with	
age,	and	thus	be	related	to	poorer	driving	task	performances	amongst	older	driver	
groups	(e.g.	Bolstad,	2001;	Zhang	et	al.,	2009).	It	does	not	matter	what	the	driving	task	
is,	that	is	the	default	position.	As	it	is	a	given	that	age‐related	cognitive	decrements	will	
affect	us	all	at	some	point	in	our	lives,	this	is	not	an	unreasonable	assumption.	However,	
findings	in	Chapter	2	suggested	that	drivers	in	their	60’s	and	70’s	may	not	suffer	from	
these	decrements	uniformly,	and	thus	they	may	not	necessarily	have	a	universal	effect	
on	safe	driving	until	an	individual	reaches	at	least	75	years	old.		
	
Furthermore,	it	appeared	questionable	as	to	whether	the	recall	‘probes’	used	by	the	
previous	studies	to	measure	the	SA	of	older	(and	younger)	driving	groups	had	sufficient	
construct	validity.	In	particular,	concerns	were	raised	in	Chapter	3	in	relation	to	driving	
tasks	being	paused	at	predefined	points,	and	that	the	computer‐generated	driving	
environments	and	simulators	at	the	time	had	both	appeared	to	lack	realism.		
	
Taking	older	drivers	out	on	the	road	and	experiencing	their	actual	driving	quickly	
confirmed	such	doubts,	but	it	was	found	to	have	been	of	particular	benefit	to	have	
sought	to	evaluate	their	SA	within	environments	of	different	complexity.	As	was	shown	
in	the	driving	studies	of	Chapters	4	and	7,	a	cognitively	non‐taxing	and	a	more	
cognitively	taxing	route	could	produce	rather	different	relative	levels	of	SA	proficiency.		
Specifically,	for	the	first	route,	which	was	rather	straightforward,	had	limited	traffic,	
though	did	encompass	a	major	motorway,	the	Situation	Awareness	of	the	individual	
older	and	younger	drivers	was	found	to	be	in	parity.	This,	despite	the	fact	that	both	age	
groups	were	older,	on	average,	than	those	used	in	comparative	studies	in	the	literature.	
However,	the	concepts	from	which	that	SA	was	based	upon	was	found	to	differ.	The	
older	drivers	drew	more	on	general,	direction	based,	concepts,	whilst	the	younger	
driver’s	focus	was	more	on	specific,	action	based,	concepts.		
	
For	the	second,	more	difficult	driving	route,	however,	the	expected	deficiency	in	older	
driver	Situation	Awareness	was	evident,	with	a	younger	group	producing	significantly	
higher	(p<0.024)	individual	SA	(Density)	scores.	In	addition,	there	was	a	widening	in	
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the	average	of	these	scores	for	the	two	groups	between	the	easier,	first	(0.0821),	and	
more	difficult,	second	(0.1648),	route.	Yet,	the	main	concepts	from	which	SA	was	based	
upon,	and	the	ratio	of	those	indicative	of	a	rearward	and	safety‐related	focus,	remained	
similar,	and	arguably	deficient	for	the	older	group.	
	
The	obvious	conclusion	from	such	findings	would	be	that	age‐related	cognitive	declines	
had	led	to	a	fall	in	SA	proficiency	for	the	more	taxing	second	drive.	And	this	would,	in	
fact,	have	been	the	only	plausible	explanation	if	it	were	not	for	the	different	approach	
taken	for	the	assessment	of	SA	in	Study	2	(Chapter	6).	
	
This	study	produced	two	further	and	significant	findings.	Firstly,	that	commenting	of	
videos	of	car	journeys,	which	was	thought	to	be	a	simple	exercise,	and	indeed	was	for	
the	younger	participants,	was	a	surprisingly	difficult	one	for	their	older	counterparts.	
And,	secondly,	and	relatedly,	that	this	perceived	task	difficulty	for	the	older	group	did	
not	lead	to	a	fall	in	their	SA	performance	as	might	have	been	expected.	On	the	contrary,	
it	was	enhanced.	As	if	to	reinforce	this,	the	individual	SA	performances	for	nine	of	these	
same	ten	older	participants	then	fell	when	driving	for	the	following	Study,	which,	
without	exception,	was	considered	to	be	a	far	easier	task	to	provide	a	commentary	for	
than	the	video	footage	of	Study	2.	To	some	extent,	this	unexpected	phenomenon	was	
also	supported	by	the	opposite	results	being	found	for	the	younger	group.	Here,	five	out	
of	the	six	participants	who	had	undertaken	both	Study	2	and	the	following	driving	
study,	improved	their	scores	on	the	latter,	which	they	(in	general)	had	considered	to	be	
a	more	difficult	task.	
	
This	raised	questions	as	to	the	impact	of	cognitive	decrements,	relative	to	task	difficulty,	
in	driving	contexts.	It	also	provided	evidence	that	Situation	Awareness,	rather	than	
being	uniformly	good	or	bad,	is,	like	other	psychological	constructs,	prone	to	change.	In	
driving	contexts,	it	may	therefore	increase	and	decrease	depending	on	how	an	
individual	perceives	the	difficulty	of	a	driving	environment	or	task.	This	actually	would	
seem	useful	as	a	rule,	but	the	problem	here	in	regards	to	the	older	drivers	was	that	their	
score	fluctuations	appeared	insufficient	when	compared	to	the	younger	driver	groups.		
Specifically,	the	high	video‐based	SA	scores	that	the	older	group	attained	for	Study	2	
were	not	reproduced	by	this	same	group	when	driving	the	quite	cognitively	taxing	route	
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of	Study	3.	There	were	also	only	small	increases	in	average	individual	SA	scoring	for	this	
study	when	compared	to	the	relatively	easy	drive	of	Study	1,	which	seven	(out	of	ten)	of	
those	participants	had	also	driven.	Furthermore,	similar	levels	of	safety‐related	cues	
were	being	drawn	upon	by	the	older	drivers	for	both	of	the	driven	routes,	despite	their	
difference	in	cognitive	complexity.	In	fact,	the	more	difficult	drive	of	Study	3	actually	
produced	a	fall	in	the	word	count	of	suggested	safety‐related	cues	by	26	(whereas	for	
the	younger	group	it	increased	by	10	from	a	far	higher	level).	In	addition,	a	3‐1	
comparative	ratio	between	the	two	groups	by	this	measure,	and	a	2‐1	ratio	for	cues	
perceived	from	behind	the	vehicle,	were	also	retained	in	favour	of	the	younger	group.	
	
It	could	be,	then,	that	age‐related	cognitive	deficits	may	have	some	relevance	here,	
along,	and	in	combination	with,	driving	experience	and	important	perceptions	of	
perceived	task	difficulty.	Together,	these	factors	may	have	led	to	the	apparent	lesser	
relative	degree	of	cue	processing	undertaken	by	the	older	participants	during	the	two	
driving	studies.			
	
9.2.2.	Hazard	Perception		
In	regards	to	Hazard	Perception,	the	thesis’s	findings	indicate	that	older	drivers	are	less	
proficient	in	detecting	hazards	than	younger	driver	participants.	This,	despite	an	uplift	
in	their	SA	performance	from	when	actually	driving.	However,	whilst	having	a	good	
cohesive	network	of	driving‐related	information	will	no	doubt	help	in	perceiving	and	
comprehending	a	hazard,	that	cohesion	will	be	insufficient	if	it	is	not	backed	by	a	
cognitive	capability	to	utilise	the	network.		Or,	alternatively,	if	the	cues	processed,	
whatever	their	number,	were	less	optimal.	In	both	such	cases	the	important	variable	
would	appear	to	be	the	ability	to	manage	information	under	time	pressure,	and	this	
apparently	was	a	problem	for	the	older	drivers	in	the	video‐based	trials	of	Study	2.	
	
Here,	an	unfamiliar	medium	provided	a	high	number	of	cues	for	processing	within	a	
limited	timeframe	due	to	driving	speeds	that	were,	for	them,	often	perceived	as	being	
excessive.	Although	this	appeared	to	lead	to	an	uplift	in	effort,	judging	by	a	
comparatively	higher	number	and	a	better	cohesion	in	the	cues	being	perceived	and	
processed,	these	factors	were	apparently	unable	to	compensate	for	the	speed	of	
processing	often	required	to	spot	a	particular	hazard.	In	short,	no	strong	SA	to	HP	
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relationship	emerged	for	the	older	group.	However,	as	the	vehicle	speeds	in	the	videos	
were	not	an	issue	for	the	younger	participants,	where	their	SA	was,	conversely,	strongly	
correlated	with	their	HPT	scores,	it	appeared	that	the	processing	speed	difficulties	
demonstrated	by	the	older	group	could	be	attributable	to	age‐related	cognitive	and	
physical	declines	in	this	instance.	
	
It	is	important	to	point	out,	however,	that	less	relevant,	though	cohesive,	SA‐related	
networks	from	driving‐related	information	could	still	be	useful	to	older	drivers	for	
detecting	a	hazard.	Of	the	group’s	top	four	SA	scorers,	for	example,	three	were	also	in	
the	top	four	for	the	group’s	Hazard	Perception	scoring.	Thus,	if	age‐related	cognitive	
deficits	can	at	the	least	be	ameliorated	by	slower	driving	speeds	and	in‐car	technologies,	
then	potentially	more	relevant	cues	could	be	processed	by	older	drivers,	and	assuming	
network	cohesion	is	maintained,	better	Hazard	Perception	should	result.		
	
9.2.3.	Literature	implications	
In	terms	of	how	these	research	conclusions	relate	to	SA	findings	in	the	literature,	it	can	
firstly	be	said	that	on	actual	roadways,	the	SA	of	older	drivers	can	be	deficient	to	that	of	
younger	groups,	as	Bolstad	(2001),	Zhang	et	al.	(2009),	and	Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	contend.	
The	findings	in	the	thesis	also	support	Zhang	et	al.	(2009)/Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	in	
relation	to	older	drivers	improving	their	SA	when	encountering	complex	driving	
environments,	and	decreasing	their	SA	in	non‐complex	environments.	In	Bolstad	(2001)	
complexity	had	(an	unexpected)	lack	of	effect	on	the	SA	of	older	drivers	relative	to	that	
of	younger	groups.	Where	the	studies	in	the	thesis	add	to	these	findings,	is	in	regards	to	
differentiating	between	the	actual	complexity/difficulty	of	a	task	and	a	participant’s	
own	perceptions	‐	which	could	be	rather	different.	The	results	from	this	series	of	
studies	suggest	that	the	younger	drivers	had	a	better	judgement,	at	least	in	regards	to	
the	actual	complexity	of	the	driving	tasks,	whereas	perceived	complexity	for	all	studies	
brought	a	consistent	uplift	in	SA	score	for	both	the	older	and	younger	groups.	
	
It	should	be	reiterated,	of	course,	that	different	methods	were	utilised	by	the	studies	
being	compared	here.	In	Bolstad	(2001)	and	Zhang	et	al.	(2009)/Kaber	et	al.	(2012)	‐	
simulators	with	computer‐generated	driving	environments,	and	with	SA	measures	
taken	at	specific	points	during	a	trial;	in	this	thesis,	in	effect,	from	an	on‐going	
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assessment	during	a	trial,	that	included	complex	journeys	that	were	both	seen	on	video,	
and	actually	driven.	As	such,	complexity,	as	a	measure,	was	different,	and	with	the	
previous	simulator‐based	studies,	it	could	arguably	be	better	manipulated.	The	result	
was	probably	a	greater	differentiation	between	the	non‐complex	and	complex	
conditions	used	for	those	studies	and	more	potential	in‐depth	SA	analysis,	whereas	on	
the	actual	roadways	used	for	this	research,	although	significant	differences	between	
age‐groups	were	still	found,	they	were	not	capable	of	being	quantified,	for	example,	at	
each	of	Endsley’s	SA	levels.		
	
Where	this	research	perhaps	more	crucially	differs	with	those	previous	studies,	
however,	is	in	relation	to	the	cause	of	such	SA	differences.	For	the	studies	in	the	
literature,	the	reasoning	is	primarily	placed	on	age‐related	deficits.	For	the	studies	in	
this	series,	these	are	given	less	importance	due	to	the	variability	in	SA	scoring	
demonstrated	by	the	older	driver	groups,	and	their	capability	to	cohesively	process	
information	to	similar	levels	as	the	younger	driving	groups	(even	by	those	in	their	early	
80’s).	Like	Kaber	et	al.	(2012),	(presumed)	age‐related	cognitive	deficits	were	also	
found	to	be	capable	of	being	arrested	by	slower	driving	speeds,	though	additionally	
here	through	in‐car	technologies.	The	cause	of	any	SA	deficit	by	the	older	groups	thus	
appeared	to	be	more	due	to	a	consistent,	but	insufficient,	depth	of	information	
processing	(in	relation	to	the	younger	groups).	This	could,	of	course,	be	a	product	of	
age‐related	decrements,	but	not	necessarily	so.	In	addition,	and	perhaps,	moreover,	
much	also	depended,	as	mentioned	above,	on	how	difficult	a	task	was	perceived	to	be.	
These	factors,	in	turn,	then	appearing	to	inflate	or	deflate	the	relevance	and	
cohesiveness	of	that	processing.	And	as	was	seen	in	the	previous	chapter,	these	aspects	
were	drawn	together	and	included	in	a	proposed	model	of	driving	SA.	
	
9.3.	Methodological	advantages	and	limitations	
9.3.1.	The	value	of	the	DSA	approach	
As	has	traditionally	been	proposed,	an	individual’s	SA	is	product	of	the	passing,	
merging,	and	reflection	on	information	through	a	number	of	sequential	levels.	The	
Distributed	conceptualisation	of	Situation	Awareness	(or	DSA),	however,	usefully	places	
more	emphasis	on	how	well	that	information	is	integrated,	rather	than	merely	focussing	
on	its	product.	In	this	regard,	it	has	also	been	shown	in	the	studies	reported	here,	and	
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elsewhere	(e.g.	Walker	et	al.,	2009),	that	good	levels	of	SA	can	still	be	achieved	with	
seemingly	insufficient	information	processing.	For	example,	a	participant	could	have	a	
high	word	count	on	his/her	narrative,	indicative	of	high	Situation	Awareness,	but	still	
produce	SA	indicative	scores	deficient	to	others	with	lower	narrative	word	counts.	
Furthermore,	in	some	cases,	perhaps	when	a	driver	needs	more	task	concentration,	
recalling	less,	but	better	integrated	information	elements,	might	be	more	appropriate.			
	
The	DSA	approach	is	better	able	to	account	for	differential	change	in	information	
processing,	as	it	defines	SA	as	activated	knowledge	for	a	task,	at	a	specific	time,	and	
within	a	particular	environment	(Stanton	et	al.,	2010).	From	a	road	user	perspective,	
this	knowledge	will	encompass	the	relationship	between	the	driver’s	goals	and	
behaviours,	and	numerous	information	elements	(e.g.,	vehicles,	the	road	environment,	
and	infrastructure).	Each	of	these	elements,	in	turn,	providing	different	information,	for	
example:	other	vehicles	–	manoeuvres;	the	road	environment	–	traffic	density;	and	road	
infrastructure	‐	route	information	(i.e.,	directions	and	distances).	Thus,	in	order	for	the	
driver	to	achieve	good	SA,	it	becomes	incumbent	upon	him/her	to	extract	these	
information	elements	from	what	is	termed	the	driving	‘system’.	Furthermore,	the	
efficiency	and	safety	of	that	system	will	be	a	product	of	the	compatibility	of	those	
elements,	that	each	individual	road	user	(vehicle	driver	and	pedestrian,	alike),	extract.	
		
A	further	advantage	for	the	DSA	approach	lies	in	its	methodology,	which	will	seek	to	
evaluate	the	driving	system	as	a	whole,	rather	than	considering	its	component	parts	in	
isolation	(e.g.,	the	individual	driver).	So,	for	example,	in	the	context	of	driving	errors	and	
accidents,	the	concentration	will	not	simply	be	with	aberrant	driving	behaviours.	These	
would	be	viewed	as	more	likely	a	product	of	the	interaction	between	many	different	and	
varied	factors	within	the	driving	system	being	operated	in	when	the	accident	occurred.	
Such	factors	might	be	infrastructure	design,	driver	training,	road	rules	and	regulations,	
car	information	feedback,	environmental	conditions,	and	the	behaviour	of	other	road	
users.	Thus	the	DSA/systems	approach	would	seem	better	placed	to	enhance	our	
understanding	of	these	errors	and	road	safety	in	general,	and	also,	as	a	corollary,	to	
foster	more	appropriate	countermeasures.	
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9.3.2.	The	value	of	the	‘Think	aloud’	approach	and	the	Leximancer	software	
Due	to	taking	this	DSA,	or	systems,	approach	to	evaluate	participant	drivers	on	actual	
roadways,	a	method	had	to	be	utilised	that	was	could	capture	the	relevant	influence	of	a	
particular	driving	environment’s	elements,	whilst	not	over‐burdening	and	placing	the	
driver	at	undue	risk.	A	‘Think	aloud’	narrative	was	felt	appropriate	to	achieve	this	aim	
as	it	involves	merely	verbalising	externally	about	a	task,	which,	for	the	most	part,	might	
otherwise	be	undertaken	internally.	As	such,	the	task	is,	and	was	found	in	this	series	of	
studies,	to	present	no	difficulties.	On	occasion,	when	cognitive	resources	were	stretched	
by,	say,	a	complex	roundabout	or	junction,	a	commentary	might	have	to	momentarily	be	
suspended.	But	these	pauses	were	brief,	and	participants	were	advised	that	when	such	
circumstances	arose,	to	concentrate	fully	on	the	driving	task.	They	could	then	report	
their	thoughts	soon	after,	when	driving	had	once	again	become	easier.	The	approach	
also	has	the	additional	advantage	of	not	directing	participants	to	talk	about	what	is	
considered	as	important	and	worth	commenting	on	(by	others)	in	any	given	roadway,	
neither	does	it	evaluate	awareness	of	a	given	route	by	memory	tests.	Guidance	of	a	
general	nature	is	given	prior	to	commencing	a	study,	but	it	is	emphasised	that	there	is	
no	right	or	wrong	statement	–	what	is	important	to	the	participant	is	what	counts,	
however	idiosyncratic.		
	
A	disadvantage	of	the	‘Think	aloud’	approach,	however,	is	that	it	requires	very	accurate,	
verbatim,	transcriptions	of	participant	commentaries.	This	can	be	a	problem	if	
additional	or	expert	transcribers	cannot	be	utilised,	as	to	produce	just	one	narrative	is	a	
very	time‐consuming	exercise.	As	a	corollary,	this	limits	the	number	of	participants	who	
can	be	assessed,	as	other	studies	that	have	also	used	the	approach	testify.	For	example:	
Salmon,	Young,	&	Cornelissen	(2013)	investigating	driving	behaviour	(15	participants);	
Aitken	et	al.	(2011)	investigating	patient	assessments	(7);	Eveland	&	Dunwoody	(2009)	
investigating	usage	of	the	world	wide	web	(16);	and	Sullivan	&	Blackman	(1991)	
investigating	pilot	behaviour	(12).	So	if	funding	allowed	for	professional	transcribing	of	
narratives,	many	more	participants	could	be	considered	for	a	study.	This	might	usefully	
include,	in	the	case	of	the	studies	undertaken	here,	potentially	more	age	groups	‐such	as	
above/below	20	years	and	above/below	85	years.	The	evidence	suggests	that	it	is	those	
on	the	more	extreme	ends	of	any	age	grouping	who	would	appear	to	be	more	likely	to	
show	differentiations	in	SA	scores:	due	to,	for	example,	age‐related	scanning	deficits	
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(amongst	younger	drivers);	and	cognitive	decrements	(affecting	older	drivers).	
However,	finding,	say,	teenage	drivers,	and	those	over	85	years	can	be	a	difficult	task.	
For	example,	of	the	132	older	driver	volunteers	for	Studies	2	and	3,	only	one	was	over	
85	years	old.		
	
The	production	of	lengthy	commentaries	from	the	‘Think	aloud’	method	additionally	
necessitated	an	evaluation	of	relevant	software.	The	more	widely	used,	and	one	
favoured	at	Loughborough	University	for	narrative	analysis,	is	Nvivo	(produced	by	QSR	
International),	but	Leximancer,	developed	by	Andrew	Smith	(Smith,	2003),	was	felt	the	
better	option.	The	rationale	behind	this	choice	was	considered	in	detail	at	3.7.1.2	above,	
however,	a	further	summarised	consideration	of	Leximancer	would	seem	of	relevance	
here.	
	
Leximancer	has	usefully	been	employed	in	this	research	to	reduce	potential	
preconceptions	relating	to	older	driver	SA	proficiency.	It	also	advantageously	allowed	
for	an	in‐depth	exploration	of	any	revealed	concept’s	value,	its	relevance,	and	its	
relationship	within	a	network	to	other	important	concepts,	which	may	not	necessarily	
have	been	discovered	by	manual	coding.	This	is	due	to	Leximancer’s	clustering	process,	
which	undertakes	around	1,000	iterations	of	any	length	of	text‐based	data,	to	produce	
outputs	usefully	based	on	a	combination	of	complex	algorithmic	analysis	with	aspects	of	
psychology	and	language.	
	
The	software	also	allows	for	flexibility,	in	that	concepts	demonstrably	found	to	be	
irrelevant	to	a	project	can	be	removed,	and	a	network	quickly	recalibrated,	without	
having	to	start	the	process	afresh.	A	task	that	a	researcher	might	be	burdened	with	
when	undertaking	manual	coding,	and	indeed,	with	Nvivo.		
	
Such	advantages	over	human	critical	thinking,	however,	do	not,	and	should	not,	make	
that	effort	redundant.	Time	and	commitment	are	still	required	if	useful	conclusions	are	
to	be	drawn	from	the	software.	After	all,	it	is	the	researcher	him/herself	who	will	have	
the	best	understanding	of	their	data	‐	such	as	its	context,	linkages,	and	subtleties	in	
aspects	of	language	usage	–	and	these	should	be	reflected	back	on	the	software’s	
outputs.		
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When	using	Leximancer,	however,	from	first	use,	it	is	easy	to	believe	that	it	will	
automatically	produce	complete,	trustworthy	and	reliable	analysis.	The	author	has	seen	
how	a	lack	of	familiarity,	perhaps	due	to	the	software’s	simple	calculation	processes	and	
quickly	available	visual	outputs,	has	seemingly	enticed	some	researchers	into	short	
tracking	their	understanding,	and	to	process	and	report	potentially	superficial	or	non‐
meaningful	outcomes	as	a	result.	It	therefore	should	be	stressed	that	it	is	important	not	
only	to	undertake	appropriate	training	to	become	completely	familiar	with	the	metrics	
that	Leximancer	requires	for	a	particular	data	set,	but	also	to	critically	consider	its	
outputs.		
	
Leximancer	also	has	its	faults.	The	most	significant	of	which	is	in	relation	to	its	network	
maps,	in	that	the	same	texts	can	produce	different	network	configurations.	This	
problem	is	recognised	by	the	company	who	sell	the	software,	but,	as	yet,	a	solution	has	
not	been	found.	Thus,	to	produce	a	reliable	network	for	any	given	text,	it	is	necessary	to	
undertake	a	number	of	runs	through	the	calculation	process,	and	to	take	the	output	that	
is	considered	the	most	common.	In	view	of	this	difficulty,	additional,	manually	
constructed	networks	were	produced	for	this	thesis	that	showed	each	network’s	major	
concepts	and	their	(percentage	occurrence)	linkages	to	other	concepts	above	a	pre‐
determined	threshold.	This	visual	data	could	be	reliably	produced	for	each	study,	as	
although	the	network	maps	the	software	produced	were	inconsistent,	the	numerical	
data	on	which	they	were	based	(and	indeed	that	for	the	subsequent	SA	scores)	were	
perfectly	consistent.			
	
Another	issue	in	regards	to	Leximancer,	and	also	the	Agna	software	used	to	produce	the	
SA	scores	for	a	group	or	an	individual	participant,	are	that	the	outputs	cannot	be	
complete	or	direct	measures	of	Situation	Awareness.	The	network	‘maps’	comprise	of	
what	a	participant	reports	s/he	is	aware	of,	whereas	the	cohesion	scores	of	Density	and	
Diameter	indicate	good	precursors	for	Situation	Awareness.		
	
There	is	little	doubt	that	better	organised	and	integrated	perceptions	will	help	in	our	
comprehension	of	driving	events,	and	in	some	cases	our	resulting	driving	performance	
(as	younger	participants	showed	with	Hazard	Perception).	But	as	has	been	discussed	
above,	this	also	has	to	be	considered	against	the	quality	of	the	information	being	
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processed.	So	whilst	there	is	no	doubt	that	‘Think	aloud’	protocols,	particularly	when	
captured	on	actual	roadways,	will	have	real	world	validity,	a	related	question	is	whether	
construct	validity	is	then	retained.	
	
It	is	arguable,	of	course,	whether	any	single	method	of	measuring	SA	could	accurately	
provide	a	better	‘score’	in	isolation,	and	in	real	world	contexts.	Many	claim	that	this	is	
achievable	through	comparisons	to	expert	testimony	(e.g.	SAGAT,	as	it	has	been	shown	
to	have	good	levels	of	sensibility,	reliability,	and	predictive	validity	(Endsley	&	Garland,	
2000)).	However,	Salmon	et	al.	(2009)	suggest	SA	measures	are	effectively	measuring	
different	aspects	of	SA.	Thus	SAGAT,	being	deterministic	and	linear	in	nature,	is	of	most	
use	when	analysts	can	identify	SA	elements	a	priori.	On	the	other	hand,	in	complex	real	
world	activities	like	driving,	where	SA	cannot	meaningfully	be	defined	beforehand,	and	
where	the	outcomes	are	not	easily	predictable,	Salmon	et	al.	(2009)	suggest	alternative	
approaches	may	be	required.		
	
In	on‐road	driving	contexts,	the	use	of	SAGAT	would,	in	any	case,	be	problematic.	Whilst	
stopping	a	car	to	undertake	recall	tasks	is,	of	course,	possible;	it	could	also	be	
impracticable	on	occasion,	potentially	dangerous,	and	would	detract	from	ecological	
validity.	However,	the	conclusions	made	from	this	series	of	studies	would	be	
strengthened,	if,	with	more	time	and	support,	they	could	be	confirmed	by	other	SA	
measures.	A	relevant	example	could	be	eye‐tracking	in	relation	to,	say,	mirror	checking	
behaviour	‐	given	the	concepts	mentioned	in	studies	1	&	3.	
		
Additionally,	although	actual	driving	was	the	preferred	environment	to	evaluate	SA	for	
this	research,	such	a	naturalistic	approach	does	come	at	the	cost	of	experimental	
control.	Even	simple	factors,	such	as	having	an	unfamiliar	‘passenger’	present	in	their	
vehicle	might	influence	a	participant’s	driving	style	and	behaviour.	It	is	also	impossible	
to	create	exactly	the	same	driving	environment	for	each	participant,	as	weather	and	
traffic	density	can	never	be	precisely	repeated	between	trials.	However,	the	SA	driving	
studies	in	the	literature	have	potentially	more	pressing	difficulties	with	ecological	
validity,	due	to	their	use	of	rather	rudimentary	simulators	and	pc‐based	roadway	
representations.		
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In	conclusion	then,	the	principal	methodological	issue	here	in	regards	to	this	thesis	was	
to	match	appropriate	SA	measurement	to	the	task	to	be	assessed,	and	to	give	due	
consideration	to	available	resource	‐	be	it	time,	relevant	expertise,	and/or	equipment.	
The	methodological	approach	chosen	for	the	thesis	met	those	demands	and	produced	
SA‐related	driver	perceptions	that	could	be	analysed	by	software,	rather	than	
subjectively	by	the	researcher.	Its	particular	strength	would	appear	to	be	that	it	could	
highlight	potential	areas	for	further	investigation	from	actual	roadways,	which	may	be	
more	closely	and	accurately	assessed	by	the	use	of	modern	day	simulators	(see	below).	
Thus	it	is	hoped	that	more	SA	research	in	the	future	will	seek	to	measure	the	concept,	at	
least	initially,	on	actual	roadways.		
		
9.4.	Future	Research	
As	the	‘Limitations’	section	above	considers,	it	would	be	of	benefit	to	have	the	important	
findings	of	this	research	confirmed	by	the	use	of	additional	measures,	and,	it	should	be	
added	–	with	more	participants.	This	would	both	increase	confidence	in	asserting	the	
conclusions	made	in	this	work,	and	advantageously	allow	better	scope	for	matching	
within	any	age‐groupings.	As	was	proposed	above,	eye‐tracking	would	seem	the	best	
supporting	option	within	actual	roadway	research	to	achieve	both	of	these	aims.	It	was	
a	concern	at	the	time	of	running	the	studies	that	any	hardware	brought	into	a	
participant’s	car	might	be	more	likely	to	distract	or	change	his	or	her	driving	behaviour.	
But	this	detriment	now	has	to	be	considered	against	the	advantages	of,	for	example,	
validating	a	potential	deficiency	in	rear	view	checking	by	the	older	drivers.		
	
A	further	possibility,	on‐road,	might	be	the	recording	of	brain	activity	for	different	
environments,	to	indicate	which	were	the	more	taxing.	If	this	could	be	achieved,	and	in	a	
non‐invasively	manner	(as	today’s	equipment	suggests,	see	Figure	9.1),	then	it	would	be	
possible	to	direct	SA	training	to	relevant	cues	in	these	environments,	with	the	aim	of	
reducing	potentially	dangerous	excesses	of	information	processing.		
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Figure	9.1:	A	modern	brain	activity	monitor	
	
	
Although	the	studies	in	this	research	advantageously	utilised	actual	roadways	to	
measure	SA,	as	a	result,	consideration	rightly	had	to	be	given	to	a	participant’s	safety.	
Thus	it	was	never	possible	to	expose	the	driver	to	particularly	dangerous	conditions,	
which	though	rare,	may	be	the	very	ones	where	we	need	to	find	“the	few	unsafe	drivers	
that	may	need	to	be	identified”	(p.276)	(Bolstad,	2001).		
	
It	therefore	would	be	interesting	to	use	a	simulator	with	sufficient	realism	to	evaluate	
older	drivers	in	such	environments.	Figure	9.2,	below,	shows	the	potential.	This	
simulator,	based	at	the	University	of	Leeds,	UK,	is	far	advanced	even	from	the	one	
utilised	by	Zhang	et	al.	(and	Kaber	et	al.)	in	2009.	It	can,	for	example,	produce	360‐
degree	and	3D	fields	of	vision,	and	replicate	the	kinetic	characteristics	of	driving,	such	
as	braking,	accelerating,	cornering,	and	even	road	roughness.		
	
Figure	9.2:	Example	of	a	2016	car	simulator	
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A	simulator	of	this	kind	would	thus	be	able	to	realistically	confirm	many	of	the	findings	
from	this	thesis.	For	example,	the	contention,	supported	by	Kaber	et	al.	(2012),	that	
older	drivers	would	improve	their	detection	of	hazards	if	they	were	able	to	control	the	
speed	of	their	vehicle.	Or	whether	a	link	between	Situation	Awareness	and	Hazard	
Perception	performance	could	be	established	sufficient	to	lead	to	benefits	in	safer	
driving	training.	
	
In	addition,	in	this	thesis	and	in	Kaber	et	al.	(2012),	more	taxing/complex	road	
environments	appeared	to	enhance	an	older	driver’s	SA	at	Level	1	(perception).	
However,	Kaber	et	al.	further	contend	that	this	enhancement	will	necessarily	lead	to	a	
degrading	of	SA	at	Levels	2	(comprehension)	&	3	(projection).	This	would	be	interesting	
to	confirm	as	it	is	counter‐intuitive,	yet	potentially	important	for	explaining	the	quality	
of	(particularly)	an	older	driver’s	Situation	Awareness.	
	
In	regard	to	more	general,	developmental,	research,	this	series	of	studies	suggests	older	
drivers	would	benefit	from	additional	in‐car	technology	that	could	raise	their	
awareness.	This,	in	fact,	was	already	evident	in	the	older	participant’s	vehicles:	such	as	
rear	view	cameras,	and	obstruction	and/or	parked	car	warnings.	And	to	enhance	more	
general	on‐road	awareness	and	to	keep	to	speed	limits	(particularly	in	30	mile	an	hour	
zones),	they	additionally	employed	cruise	controls.		
	
However,	in	an	ideal	world,	such	aids	could	be	further	enhanced	by	technology	that	
could	evaluate	a	driving	environment	and	produce	indicators	of	required	processing	
depth	and	simple	attention	related	advice.	This	would	appear	to	be	a	useful	long‐term	
endeavour,	however,	consideration	should	be	given	to	the	affects	that	overly	automated	
vehicles	can	have	for	retaining	SA.	These	perhaps	merit	further	consideration	here.	
	
Today	much	is	spoken	about	the	safety	of	increasingly	autonomous	vehicles,	due	to	
their	impact	on	a	driver’s	Situation	Awareness.	It	is	an	area	that	has	and	continues	to	
attract	much	research	interest	(e.g.	Bashiri	&	Mann,	2014;	Gibson	et	al.,	2016),	and	has	
perhaps	particular	relevance	for	older	drivers	as	further	car	automation	may	allow	this	
group	to	drive	for	an	increasing	number	of	years.	
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To	explain	its	impacts	on	SA,	Endsley’s	model	can	be	taken	as	a	useful	starting	point.	It	
can	be	recalled	that	she	views	SA	as	a	product	of	three	hierarchically	dependent	levels.	
And,	in	order	to	accurately	project	an	outcome	at	its	highest	Level	(3),	that	it	is	firstly	
necessary	to	correctly	interpret,	or	comprehend,	the	current	environment	(at	Level	2),	
which	itself	is	dependent	on	the	perception	and	awareness	of	relevant	environment	
elements	(at	Level	1).	As	a	corollary,	then,	any	interference	with	awareness	at	a	lower	
level	will	affect	those	higher	task	functions.	The	reverse	effect	can	also	occur,	and	
although	not	considered	directly	by	Endsley,	it	can	also	be	argued	that	a	particularly	
strong	schematic	basis	for	how	an	environment	might	be	‐	say	for	a	familiar	road	in	a	
village	‐	may	bring	predisposed	actions	at	her	Level	3	SA.	This,	in	turn,	providing	a	false	
framework	with	which	to	interpret	and	comprehend	the	environment	(at	Level	2),	
which	could	then	lead	to	a	misperception	of	relevant	specific	elements	or	cues	(at	Level	
1).		
	
Thus	if	you	automate	one	of	these	processes,	you	potentially,	like	cognitive	laziness	(in	a	
feedforward	manner)	or	preconceptions	(in	a	feedback	manner),	deny	the	driver	of	
necessary	and	timely	information.	Yet	the	argument	for	automated	vehicles	is	that	the	
driver	need	not	actively	sustain	Situation	Awareness,	and	that	as	a	result,	operating	
safety	and	comfort	will	be	improved	as	it	will	reduce	the	driver’s	workload.	
	
Such	premises,	though,	are	questionable,	as	arguably,	taking	the	driver	out	of	the	SA	
process,	‘out‐of‐the‐loop’,	so	to	speak,	could	compromise	his/her	and	others	safety.	For	
example,	the	effect	of	task	automation	on	reducing	operator	Situation	Awareness	and	
performance	has	been	researched	for	some	years	in	the	aviation	sector	(Edwards,	1977;	
Wiener,	1988).	It	has	been	found	that	there	are	numerous	documented	air	accident	case	
studies	that	indicate	this	‘out‐of‐the‐loop’	problem	that	automation	brings	as	a	pre‐
crash	factor	(Billings,	1991;	Moray,	1986;	Wiener	&	Curry,	1980).		
	
The	dangers	of	displacing	a	human	for	an	automating	system	in	this	regard	are	evident,	
as	if	s/he	has	to	be	quickly	reinstated	to	a	task	(e.g.,	due	to	a	system	failure	or	safety	
critical	event	outside	the	capacity	of	the	system),	this	will	be	hampered	by	a	lack	of	
Situation	Awareness.	As	such,	there	will	be	a	dangerous	transition	to	the	reinstated	
manual	operation,	as	due	to	a	lack	of	expectation,	time	will	be	lost	in	perceiving	the	
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current	situation,	reorienting	oneself	appropriately	to	the	task,	and	then	resolving	any	
problems.		
	
Such	difficulties	could	further	be	heightened	if,	say,	a	driver	perceives	that	the	
introduction	of	an	automated	system	has	led	to	a	decrease	in	driving	task	difficulty.	If	
so,	an	underestimation	of	task	demand	might	follow,	leading	to	less	processing	and	even	
further	reduced	awareness.	Merat	&	Jamson	(2009)	have	demonstrated	this	by	showing	
that	in	highly	automated	vehicles:	the	driver’s	response	was	always	slower	to	a	critical	
event;	that	the	minimum	headway	to	a	lead	car	was	considerably	shorter;	and	that	
anticipatory	braking	performance	was	poorer.	They	argue	that	their	participants	were	
placing	too	high	a	degree	of	trust	on	the	performance	of	the	automated	system,	which	
may	well	be	detrimental	in	real	driving	situations	due	to	a	loss	of	Situation	Awareness.	
	
It	should	further	be	added	here	that	although	automated	systems	are	felt,	and	indeed	
appear,	to	reduce	driver	workload,	they	can	also	potentially	increase	it.	Much	might	
depend	upon	the	psychology	of	the	individual	driver,	as	some	may	feel	that	an	
automated	system	actually	needs	more,	than	less,	monitoring.	But	even	in	such	cases,	
this	additional	activity	would	still	impact	negatively	on	driving	performance,	Situation	
Awareness,	and	safety.	This	is	because	there	would	again	be	less	time	for	that	driver	to	
consider,	when	required,	an	appropriate	range	of	relevant	road	environment	cues,	
process	and	understand	them,	and	then	take	appropriate	actions.		
	
There	is	no	doubt	that	if	roadways	could	be	fully	automated	‐	where	autonomous	
vehicles	could	communicate	with	each	other	and	with	roadway	infrastructure,	that	real	
benefits	could	accrue.	Traffic	would	move	more	efficiently,	parking	issues	would	be	
resolved	in	urban	areas,	and	ride‐hailing	programmes	could	reduce	the	number	of	
vehicles	a	household	might	need.	The	difficulty	would	seem	to	be	in	the	interim	time,	
when	both	fully	automated	and	manually	driven	cars	might	occupy	the	same	roadway	–	
and	it	is	in	such	cases	when	Situation	Awareness	research	will	have	a	crucial	role	to	
play.	There	are	clearly	benefits	for	older	drivers	with	fully	automated	vehicles,	yet	
potentially	a	greater	loss	for	the	group	in	SA	–	due	to	the	onset	of	age‐related	deficits.	
This	is	an	area	that	therefore	requires	particular	focus	in	order	to	ensure	safety	is	
retained	at	all	times.	
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	9.5.	Reflections	
This	thesis	has	looked	at	Situation	Awareness	and	how	it	might	be	affected	by	a	driver’s	
age.	An	academic	reviewer	of	Studies	1	&	2	considered	this	objective	to	be	“a	very	
valuable	research	topic	of	traffic	safety	research”.	The	thesis	also	utilised	a	new	
methodology	to	assess	older	driver	SA	(though	not	new	in	other	transport	contexts).	
This	was	commented	on	by	a	second	reviewer	of	the	work,	who	felt	the	qualitative	
approach	“rather	unusual	in	traffic	psychology,	but	nevertheless	valuable”.	These	
studies,	in	combination,	have	since	been	published	in	‘Transportation	Research	(Part	
F)’:	
	
Key	CEJ,	Morris	AP,	Mansfield	NJ	(2016).	Situation	Awareness:	Its	proficiency	amongst	
older	and	younger	drivers,	and	its	usefulness	for	perceiving	hazards.	Transportation	
Research	Part	F:	Traffic	Psychology	and	Behaviour,	40:156‐168.	
	
Study	3	is	presently	awaiting	publication	in	the	same	Journal,	and	again	this	work	was	
seen	by	one	reviewer	as	“Very	valuable	research	using	an	often	underestimated	
methodological	approach”:			
	
Ref:	TRF_2016_214.	Title:	A	study	investigating	the	comparative	Situation	Awareness	of	
older	and	younger	drivers	when	driving	a	route	with	extended	periods	of	cognitive	
taxation.	Journal:	Transportation	Research	Part	F:	Psychology	and	Behaviour.	
	
Situation	Awareness	is	an	interesting	and	challenging	concept	to	research,	as	it	is	
difficult	to	define	and	demonstrate.	Some	in	fact	have	argued	that	it	does	not	even	exist,	
but	is	merely	a	product	of	working	memory	(e.g.	Bell	&	Lyon,	2000).	Many	others	do	
believe	in	its	existence,	but	have	defined	it	in	a	diverse	number	of	ways	(e.g.	Sarter	&	
Woods,	1991;	Fracker,	1991b;	Smith	&	Hancock,	1995;	Moray,	2004;	Dostal,	2007;	
Artman	&	Garbis,	1998).	Its	leading	and	best	known	researcher,	Mica	Endsley,	whose	
model	of	SA	still	persists	today,	twenty	years	on,	sees	it	as	a	product	of	linear	
information	processing.	But	this	has	been	challenged,	most	notably	by	advocates	of	a	
‘distributed’	or	‘systems’	approach,	who	conceptualise	and	measure	the	construct	
somewhat	differently	(as	discussed	in	Chapter	3).		
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Like	others	(e.g.	Smith	&	Hancock,	1995;	Salmon	et	al.,	2009;	Stanton	et	al.,	2006),	this	
thesis	argues	that	SA	is	more	likely	to	be	an	indistinguishable	product	and	process	of	
information.	Older	drivers,	for	example,	may	indeed	produce	SA	from	a	more	limited	
range	of	relevant	information	cues,	due,	perhaps,	to	age	related	decrements.	But	is	this	
just	from	passive	processing,	or	more	from	a	process	of	selecting	cues	pre‐consciously	
and/or	consciously	from	a	wealth	of	relevant	driving	experience?		
	
The	answer	remains	unclear,	but	it	is	important	to	know,	as	how	we	process	
information	will	ultimately	determine	how	safely	we	drive.	
	
9.6.	Bullet	point	summary	of	the	thesis’s	contribution	
 Older	drivers	matched	younger	drivers	in	Situation	Awareness	scoring	when	
driving	a	non‐cognitively	taxing	route,	but	were	found	to	be	significantly	poorer	
on	a	more	cognitively	taxing	route.	
 The	Situation	Awareness	scores	of	younger	drivers	were	significantly	related	to	
their	scores	for	Hazard	Perception.		
 Younger	drivers	outperformed	older	drivers	on	a	Hazard	Perception	task,	
particularly	in	regards	to	the	speed	of	detecting	a	hazard.	
 Participants	produced	significantly	better	Situation	Awareness	scores	from	
watching	video	footage	of	a	car	journey,	rather	than	when	actually	driving.	
 Textual	analysis	of	driver	commentaries	showed	that	older	drivers	were	less	
aware	of	what	was	behind	their	vehicles	and	enunciated	less	safety‐related	
concepts.	
 Perceptions	of	task	difficulty	appeared	to	be	an	important	influential	factor	for	
SA	proficiency.	
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Appendices	
1.	Instructions	for	Studies	1	&	3	
How to undertake a Verbal (‘think aloud’) Protocol Analysis 
 
A Verbal Protocol Analysis of driving sounds quite complex, but actually its very simple. All 
you do is ‘think aloud’ ‐ talk about the task and the decisions that you are making while you 
are driving.  
 
Sometimes these will be general thoughts i.e., perhaps relating to the volume of traffic on a 
particular roadway. So you may talk about: where you are placing your vehicle; the road 
environment and condition; the road signs and signals you encounter; other road users – 
cars, trucks, buses, cyclists, and what they are doing; and how that relates to you and what 
you are doing about it. 
 
Sometimes your thoughts might be very specific i.e., I am watching that bus and giving it 
space as I think it might pull out in front of me. Other examples might include: 
 
‐ I’m trying to work out if the car to the left of me is going to move into my lane. 
‐ I’m checking the traffic lights/speed limit sign. 
‐ I’ve just noticed that there is a cyclist/vehicle/bus behind me. 
‐ I think that this traffic light is about to turn red so I’m speeding up a little. 
‐ I can see that the car ahead is indicating so I know that they are about to slow down 
and turn left. 
‐ The car in front is slowing down so I need to brake. 
‐ I don’t know what the current speed limit is so I’m guessing based on the road that 
it’s 60 
‐ I just noticed the pedestrian up ahead on the left so I’m keeping an eye on him as I 
think he is about to cross the road. 
‐ I’m deciding whether I have enough time to make it through the lights. 
‐ I think I need to be in the right hand lane here so I’m checking my mirror before 
moving over. 
 
Please note, that it is important that you verbalise as much as you can as you go around the 
route. This includes, for example, when you are stopped at an intersection and are 
observing things and thinking about them (e.g. ‘I am keeping an eye on the traffic light or 
the traffic travelling in the opposite direction as I know when they stop I will be going’ or ‘I 
am keeping an eye on the traffic behind me’). Even if you think what you are thinking is 
irrelevant please still verbalise it.   
 
Also, try to behave and think as you normally would do when driving, and to drive at your 
normal speed. I am interested in YOUR thought processes, so you cannot be wrong as you 
are providing a description of your thoughts as they relate to the driving task. 
 
If for any reason you have to stop “thinking aloud” to complete a difficult manoeuvre, it is 
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important that you remain safe and in control of the vehicle. However, if something does 
happen to stop you talking I would be very interested in it, so please recap your thoughts 
once you are able to do so. 
 
Finally, before you start on the route, you will get a chance to practice “thinking aloud” 
whilst driving around the Loughborough campus. We will start and come back to the 
University once the route is completed. 
 
In summary then: 
1. Please verbalise what you are thinking during your drive; 
 
2. Try to do so as continuously as you can, regardless of whether you think your thoughts 
are relevant or not, though; 
 
3. Behave and think as you normally would (do not make up verbalisations for the sake of 
the study). 
 
Many thanks. 
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2.	Instructions	for	Study	2	
STUDY INSTRUCTION SHEET 
 
This study will ask you to imagine that you are driving the car in the videos that you are 
shown. The videos will be of different lengths, with the longest lasting for about 6 or 7 
minutes. I anticipate that the study will take around 45 minutes in total. 
What I should like you to do is give me a running commentary (that I will record) relating to 
the things that you are aware of from each of the driving environments that you will 
encounter, and in particular those that you feel might impact on your safety. Examples 
might include the actions of other vehicles, pedestrians, and the road environment itself, 
but moreover it is what you think that is of relevance that counts.  
Please note that it is also important to try and verbalise as continuously as you can.  Even if 
you feel that what you are thinking is irrelevant, please still verbalise it ‐ I am interested in 
your thoughts, so what you say cannot be ‘wrong’. 
 
I appreciate that it is a bit unusual to continually verbalise, so if there is a prolonged period 
of silence at any time I might prompt you to say a bit more. On the other hand, if at times 
you feel there is too much to report don’t worry about conveying it a little after the event. 
 
So in summary: 
1. Try to imagine you are the driver in the journey. 
 
2. Verbalise what you are thinking with an emphasis on what might impact on your safety. 
 
3. Try to verbalise continuously regardless of whether you think your thoughts are relevant 
or not. 
 
I hope this is all clear, but if you do have any questions by all means drop me an e‐mail.  
There will also be an opportunity to clarify any aspect of the study on the day, and to have a 
practice run before the trial videos start. 
 
Many thanks again for your help. 
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3.	Typical	information	sheet	and	informed	consent	form	
	
	
	
 
Main Investigator: Dr James Key (J.Key@lboro.ac.uk)  
 
Supervisors: Prof. Andrew Morris (Lead, Behavioural Safety Research Group)  
Prof. Neil Mansfield (formerly, Associate Dean of Research, now at Imperial College, 
London). 
 
Loughborough Design School,  
Loughborough University,    
Loughborough, 
Leicestershire,  
LE11 3TU. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study undertakes an assessment of Situation Awareness through a Verbal (or 
‘think aloud’) Protocol Analysis. The narratives that this method produces will be 
assessed to reveal their underlying structural properties.  
 
The research is being conducted as part of a Postgraduate student research project 
supported and funded by Loughborough University. 
 
Are there any exclusion criteria? 
You must hold a valid Full UK Driving Licence as recognised by Loughborough 
University. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
You will be directed around the route provided previously, and asked to verbalise 
your thoughts whilst driving - as explained in the ‘Verbal Protocol Analysis’ 
information sheet provided. Your responses will be recorded.  
 
Once I take part, can I change my mind? 
Yes, if at any time, before, during or after the study you wish to withdraw, please 
inform the investigator.  You do not have to explain your reasons for withdrawing and 
your data will be destroyed.  
 
Will I be required to visit the University? 
Yes, you will be asked to meet the main investigator at the Loughborough Design 
School (LDS).  During the study, you will be asked to drive a circular route from LDS 
around some roads in Leicestershire, returning to the University’s main entrance car 
park off Epinal Way. 
 
How long will it take? 
This will vary depending on the speed you drive, but the expectation is around 30 
minutes. 
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What personal information will be required from me? 
You will be required to give your age and length of driving experience.  
 
Are there any risks in participating? 
You will be asked to drive on roads, and as such there are inherent risks in this 
activity. However you will be asked to drive at a quiet time of day, and merely to talk 
whilst driving.   
 
What do I get for participating? 
You will be paid £20 for your participation in this research. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes.  You will only be identified using a participant identification number, meaning 
that your name will not be associated with any of your data.  Furthermore, the 
collected data will be stored on a password protected computer that only the main 
investigator has access to.  Your consent form will be stored separately to further 
ensure that your name is not associated with any of this data, all of which will be 
destroyed on the study’s completion. You will not be identifiable in the analysis and 
reporting of your data due to the use of participant identification numbers. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results will be written in a Postgraduate thesis and will be used to guide further 
research in this area. Should the thesis be of a high enough standard, it may be 
published in a relevant peer-reviewed academic journal. 
 
I have some more questions; who should I contact? 
If you have any further questions, please contact the main investigator through the 
contact address/e-mail given above. 
 
What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted? 
If you are not happy with how the research was conducted, please contact Mrs Zoe 
Stockdale, the Secretary for the University’s Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) 
Sub-Committee: 
 
Mrs Z Stockdale, Research Office, Rutland Building, Loughborough University, 
Epinal Way, Loughborough, LE11 3TU.  Tel: 01509 222423.  Email: 
Z.C.Stockdale@lboro.ac.uk 
 
The University also has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle 
Blowing which is available online at 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm.   
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me. I understand that 
this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have 
been approved by the Loughborough University Ethics Approvals (Human 
Participants) Sub-Committee. 
 
I have read and understood the participant information sheet and this consent form. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any 
reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and 
will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the 
statutory obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is 
judged that confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or 
others.  
 
I understand and agree to my responses being recorded. 
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
 
                               Date 
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4.	Example	transcripts	
 
i)	Study	1	
 
PPT19:  
Checking my mirrors to see what the cars behind me are doing, see if they’re turning as well. 
Indicating left, even though I don’t know if I have to. Slowing down as there’s a cyclist, let him pass 
first. Checking my mirrors, and going onto the dual carriageway. And then indicating right to 
overtake the cyclist. Having to twist around because I often check in my back window when I 
overtake, but that’s steamed up, so. Using my wing mirrors as well. Checking my mirrors to see 
what’s going on behind me ‐ base my rearview mirror and the wing mirror on the right. And 
accelerate slightly less, ‘cause, ah there’s a bit of traffic ahead, but still a considerable distance away. 
Checking the traffic lights make sure they’re still green. Still kind of maintaining a slightly slower 
speed than I normally would, because it’s raining and there are cars up ahead. And starting to slow 
down because they’re stopping at the traffic lights. Probably won’t come to a full stop because I’m 
still a considerable distance away. Go straight ahead, and is that waiting here? Checking my, erm, 
wing mirror, because this lane starts merging, so, it’s worth it to see if there’s anyone trying to jump 
in front. Again I’m going considerably slower than I normally would because it’s really wet. Okay so 
I’m checking my rearview mirror, as I’m about to start slowing down, coming up to roundabout, 
checking my wing mirror. And indicating to go right. Slowing down coming up to the roundabout and 
looking ahead to see what’s coming, but then speeding up, ‘cause nothing else is coming my way. 
Checking again in my mirrors. Going up to the traffic lights, so, slowing down. Having a look down 
over the bridge just to see how busy it is, is there any traffic. As we march the traffic lights. Checking 
to see what the van next to me is doing whereabouts they’re going to turn off, and changing lanes to 
go to the exit. Stopping again at traffic lights, and checking my mirrors again. Okay, indicating to 
come off of the roundabout onto the M1. Turning off my indictors, and then easing in the slip road 
trying to get up enough speed so that I’m not slowing anyone else down and can comfortably come 
onto the motorway. I’m checking in my right mirror making sure nothing’s coming. Slowing down 
slightly to get in between two cars. Oh hate driving in this. Normally I would, probably, um, 
accelerate out and overtake but because it’s so, it’s raining so heavily and there’s a lot of spray, this 
is going to be quite difficult, and I don’t like driving minor’s particularly so, I’d rather stay down, and 
leave it more careful. Checking my mirrors to see what’s happening, if there’s anyone close behind 
me. Because I’m in the slow lane, erm, I’m less concerned about people coming up directly behind 
me. As we’re coming up behind a lorry, I’m going to check over my shoulder and in my wing mirror 
and then indicate to overtake. Checking my speed, and all the, behind me. Turn my lights on fully 
rather than just having near side beams on because visibility is quite poor. Visibility my car up, more 
behind can see. Okay so I’m overtaking the larger vehicle, indicating left, checking in my rearview 
mirror to make sure I’ve got enough distance to go back in front of him. And then checking my right 
side mirror to see what’s going on in middle lane. Constantly checking my rearview mirror and my 
wing mirror. Checking signs, reading the signs, for services. Just as they’re there, not as I actually 
want them, but just trying to take notice of what they’re saying. Checking my mirrors again. There’s 
a van coming up on my right so rather than accelerate and overtake this lorry I’m gonna slow down 
slightly let him pass, there’s not much behind these vans so, I’ll now let him pass and then check 
over my shoulder and, indicate right into the other lane to overtake the two lorries right in front of 
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me. Checking in my rearview mirror, seeing what’s behind. And passing the second lorry so, checking 
my rearview mirror, my left side mirror, indicating, going back into the slow lane. Checking the signs 
to see which junction we’re at. See whereabouts we are. I’m flying to East Midlands next, well going 
to East Midlands next week, so interested in those signs to see how far it take us to here. Taking 
notice of the junction countdown signs on the left. Indicating left for this junction. Checking my er 
right wing mirror. Slowing down slightly as I’ve er not really driven on these roads before so just 
making sure that I’m driving at a safe speed just in case there are any slip roads and things like that 
coming out. Taking notice of the signs. I’m not necessarily slowing down but making sure I’m not 
accelerating any further because there’s cars coming off the slip road and checking my left wing 
mirror, see if there are further cars, and my rearview mirror. Okay so checking the sign erm of the 
roundabout and starting to slow down. Go into the middle lane as I don’t want to turn directly left, 
and its coming to a stop at the roundabout. Accelerating to get in the way of that car, counting first 
exit and then indicating to come off at the second. Checking the signs, and merging, checking my left 
wing mirror to make sure there’s nothing coming up behind me. There’s a lorry on a road so I’m 
checking my right wing mirror to make sure that nothing’s coming up behind me, and, pulling in 
slightly because there’s a bus, slowing down and then accelerating ‘cause it’s clear so to get in front 
of the ban, van, then. Okay, so I’m looking at the signs, checking to see what’s going on around the 
roundabout, slowing down, waiting to see if that car’s indicating, but they’ve gone into the left hand 
lane so they’ve pulled off the roundabout. Indicated to come off the roundabout. I’m just having a 
look at the road ahead to see what’s going on. Um, can’t really see any road signs to see what speed 
it is, so, but it’s not a built up area so I’m guessing more than 30 so I’m going at 40 just to be on the 
safe side, maybe a little bit more. Taking note of the signs, aware that’s not far away, the airport, so 
that’s nice. Traffic lights up ahead which are red so, starting to slow down but they’ve just gone 
green so, not particularly slowing down that much. Keeping an eye out for surrounding cars and also 
see if the traffic lights go back to red before I get to them. I now know where the airport is. And 
checking the signs again. So slowing down. So indicating and checking my mirrors, and, not 
necessarily using my brake but using my gears to slow down, and then using my brake because it’s 
quite a tight corner. And going around the corner. And again, no speed signs, but, guessing this 
would be national speed limit. Checking in my rearview mirror again. Probably won’t be going too 
fast because of, ah, there’s no cycle path so there could be cyclists or there’s um road signs of horses 
so going quite slow and now we’re in a 30 so braking to slow down. The car coming so I won’t 
accelerate any further. There’s cars parked on the right so, not going too fast, checking to see if 
there’s any cars ahead. Checking to see if there are any pedestrians on the pathways. Indicating 
right, checking my right mirror, slowing down to pretty much a stop because it’s quite a blind turning 
erm in terms of cars coming towards me. Yet again not going particularly too quickly as it’s quite a 
small road there’s no road markings, erm, no cars coming ahead at the moment but, I suppose 
parked cars parking on, on the right, so, keeping an eye out for any cars coming towards me, any 
cars coming out of the junctions. See a car coming towards me but they are turning, their going, 
parking on my side of the road, so slow down a little bit, ‘cause I can’t actually see behind them, and 
I’ll go quite slowly around them. People like that annoy me. Erm, going really slowly ‘round tight 
corners, leaning forwards to see, to make it a little more visible what I’m seeing and what is ‘round 
there. Again keeping an eye out for any pedestrians or anything around there, so. Coming up to a 
junction so start to slow down. Checking my mirrors again, and coming to a stop, because there’s a 
stop line, and leaning forwards checking right and then left just before I pull out, and then checking 
my rearview mirror just to see if I had, in case there’s anyone particularly coming up fast behind me 
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now. Checking to see if any cars are coming towards the junctions that we are passing ‐ the roads on 
the left. And checking the road signs, speed limits. Checking my rearview mirror. Again, the road 
signs. Hard to a place where we are now. National speed limits, and speeding up a little bit more, 
but, these roads are quite unfamiliar so, not going too fast and its wet and they’re quite er tight 
corners as well. Looking for dog walkers or pedestrians, although it has just occurred to me that it is 
chucking it down with rain so there probably won’t be that many walkers out. Speeding up a little bit 
on this straighter parts of the road but, er actually press my brakes a bit as I don’t know how tight 
the corners are. Taking it, the road sign. What is that animal, is that a cow? Some kind of cattle, ‘allo 
yeah it’s a cow. Er just taking what the road sign that was. Mud on the road, so, not accelerating 
through here. Checking on the left as there’s a couple of cars parked in a lay‐by. Taking note of the 
next sign, horses. Checking my speed limit. Checking the road sign there. And slows to a 30 mile an 
hour speed limit so using my brake to slow down, to make sure I get down to the right speed. 
Changing down a gear, cause there’s cars parked on the right, on the road, so could be keeping an 
eye out for any cars coming towards me. They may have to um come onto my side of the road. I 
notice this sign for, there’s a hump in the road, about a hundred and thirty yards, okay. So, going 
quite slowly, slowing down for the speed bump, going down a gear for that. Having a look at the 
houses around here as they’re really nice as well. Checking to see if there are any cars coming out of 
the er junction ‐ there’s a car reversing out of their driveway. Checking my rearview mirror. 
Overtaking a car that’s on the side of the road. And accelerating a little bit. Again keeping an eye on 
any side roads where cars could come from, any pedestrians on paths, it’s all quite quiet at the 
moment. Slowing down for a speed bump. Checking my rearview mirror as there is now a car behind 
me. There’s cars parked on the left, so, moving out to the right to go past them. Checking ahead to 
make sure there’s no cars coming my way. Lots of cars parked on the right again, so, won’t be much 
space for two cars to pass down here ‐ keeping that in mind. Checking my rearview mirror again to 
see what the cars behind me are doing. Another speed bumps. Er, a school safety zone, just making 
sure the lights aren’t flashing ‘cause that’s when you have to go 20 miles an hour rather than 30, 
which they’re not, so that’s fine. Speed bump, didn’t particularly slow down for that one, although I 
was going 25 miles an hour, so not too bad. Again checking the school safety zone, car park, er signs. 
Killer speed bump. And there’s cars parked on the left just before a corner, so not going too fast 
around these. Thinking of this van, then going back in, then back out here ‘cause there’s further cars. 
Noticing that bus stops have got bright yellow. And no more cars parked on the side so we’re going 
slightly quicker up to 30 miles an hour. Checking my mirror, indicating, and slowing down, making 
sure there are no cars coming up ahead of me so turning right. Checking my mirrors again, and 
looking ahead to see what’s coming there’s a past parked car. Cars parked on the right, so, keeping 
an eye out what’s happening ‐ there’s a Postman getting back into his van. Noticing that there’s a 
massive tree in the middle of the road, so, going ‘round that. It would be quite tight if we were going 
around the other side by the looks of things, but got quite a nice wide road here. Checking my 
mirrors and indicating, and coming to a stop at the junction. It’s not a great deal of visibility to the 
right, so we come out quite slowly, and, check to see what the speed limits are around here, um 
assume this is a 30 ‘cause it’s a built up area of lights, and, just seen a 50 sign coming in to the, as we 
leave the built up area. Checking in my rearview mirror, there’s a van coming quite fast behind me, 
but, I’m not going particularly slowly at the moment. And also another sign reinforcing the 50 mile 
an, mile per hour speed limit. Checking my rearview mirror to see what that lorry’s doing, and 
they’re not so far, and not so close behind me anymore. And got tight corner signs, so, just being 
mindful of those, I’m not particularly slowing down as I’m not going 50 I’m going 40 at the moment, 
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and then accelerating out of the corner. Noticing there’s a there’s a 40 mile an hour speed limit just 
up ahead so, taking my foot off the accelerator. Closing those traffic lights up ahead, and the, er 
road signs, going into the right hand lane and indicating right whilst checking my rearview mirror. Er 
checking the traffic lights, they’re green and slowing down, changing down a gear ‘cause it’s quite a 
tight turn, and seeing what all the other cars are doing, making sure no one is coming from either 
the right or the left, now, or coming out of any car parks. Checking for speed limits, it’s 40. Seeing 
what these road signs are ‐ yellow one with an arrow in a square, not sure what that means, but, 
um, I don’t think it’s very relevant to what we’re doing. So into 30 mile an hour zone. Traffic lights 
ahead have just about turned red, so, not, not braking very hard, just really slowly ‘cause I’m still 
quite considerable distance away and knocking it into neutral, just die down. Making sure I’m in the 
right lane for where I need to go –  just straight ahead, rather than right. And then checking in my 
rearview mirror. Handbrake is not um always very good, so keep me foot on the brake a lot of the 
time – making you feel really safe now ha ha. Okay, so checking my mirrors, see what’s happening 
behind me. Checking ahead to see if there are any pedestrians crossing, where the traffic lights were 
beforehand. Urm there’s cars and vans parked on the left although the road is very wide. So, not so 
slowing down a considerable amount to erm compensate for this. There’s a car coming from the 
right, but just checking there’s enough space, which there is. Making sure I’m keeping to the 30 mile 
an hour speed limit. Checking my mirrors again. Checking to see if any cars are coming out of 
junctions that we pass. Checking the traffic lights remain green as I pass them. Checking the traffic 
from the right. Van slow, way too slow from to the right there, just ch, seeing if he’s going to turn. So 
coming up to a 50 mile an hour zone, so, accelerate a bit more. And got 50, check my rearview 
mirror, it’s quite a wide road, although, there is only room for one car, there’s only one lane, so, just 
making sure no one’s being an idiot trying to overtake. Making note of the bendy road signs and the 
fact that we’re now coming to a part of grevel there’s no barrier in between. Making note of the 30 
mile an hour sign and another straight yellow sign. Checking my speed. Making sure I’m a, a 
considerable distance away from the car ahead, particularly because it’s wet. And cars braking due 
to the lorry coming out, although it’s reversing, so just being aware of that. Checking the um traffic 
lights and slowing down ‘cause a van was turning left. Checking that there’s a car in front of me that 
wants to turn left as well. Checking the road signs, what’s going on around me. Checking my 
rearview mirror, just to make sure that the cars behind me are okay. Taking note of the cameras that 
are up there. Oop being careful of the puddles. Taking note of the speed camera sign although, but 
at the same time being aware that there is no speed camera down here that I know of. That means 
we’re going to break the speed limit. So indicated to make sure I’m in the right hand lane, which is a 
bit confusing because they’ve changed the road markings here, which is quite new. Er, 30 mile an 
hour speed limit coming up to the roundabout, so slowing down, indicating to go into the right hand 
lane and slowing down because there’s traffic lights which are red. And then coming to a stop, and 
accelerating again quite quickly because the lights have gone green. Checking my mirrors to see 
what the cars behind me are doing, counting the exits – one, two, one, and then, oh slowing down 
because there’s a car that’s coming, a couple of cars in front, and indicating to come off left. Slowing 
down because there’s a car in the right lane but, erm, needing to turn. Realising that I’m in the 
wrong lane, so checking my er side mirror and indicating left, and slowing down slightly as the cars 
turning in front of. Also notice the bus wants to come out as well. Checking for a speed limits down 
here, erm there don’t seem to be any signs. Slowing down here, to go in there. Okay. Being careful 
‘cause there’s cars either side so I’m having to drive in the middle of the road, here. Checking for 
pedestrians ‘cause it’s quite a built up area. Lots of cars parked on either side of the road, so, being 
293 
 
quite mindful of that as well. There’s a car coming, towards me, erm but they’re indicating left so, I’ll 
let them go first, I’ll flash them to let them go through, I don’t think she’s seen it so I’ll do it again. So 
that’s caused me to stop behind some parked cars which is fine. Keeping an eye on cars coming 
towards me with parked cars on their side of the road. Lorries coming up there, the road. I’ll just 
slow down rather than completely stop for them, as I was kind of half way between him and a 
parked car, so, stopping wouldn’t really have made a difference. Checking my mirrors, and coming to 
a stop. Checking right and then left. There’s quite poor visibility to the left but to the right it’s clear 
so, come out quite slowly, now checking in my rear view mirrors, my side mirrors, more cars parked 
either side of the road, so, just keeping an eye on that. Slowing down a little bit because I can’t quite 
see around the cars. Checking just like the general strip around me. So checking my mirror, there’s a 
car right ahead but it’s ahead of where I’m turning, so. Cutting in this man walking in the middle of 
the road, so, slowing down, to make sure he gets to the path, before I get any closer. Checking my 
rearview mirror to see what he’s doing ‘cause he’s just come back into the middle of the road, and 
and driving more in the middle of the road here, erm ‘cause there’s no road markings and there’s 
cars parked on either side, though some of them are on the path, erm, a bit strange, but, there’s no 
cars coming ahead, so, driving in the middle of the road. Checking my mirrors and slowing down, and 
stopping ‘cause there’s cars coming to the right. And moving out, checking left and right ‘cause it’s 
quite a busy road. Accelerating. Checking to see where other cars are coming out. Trying to place 
where we are ‘cause I live on this road, and now I know where we are – s’not come out of that road 
before. Erm, so I know it’s 30 down here, but only ‘cause I live here, otherwise I wouldn’t know. I’d 
assume it was a 40, er because it’s quite a wide road although it is a built up area, so. There’s a 
cyclist er wanting to cross, but because there’s cars coming towards me as well, me stopping 
wouldn’t be very helpful. If it was clear on the other side of the road I would have stopped, let her go 
through, so. Checking my mirrors. Oh because the cycle path is so close, checking particularly to see 
if there are any cyclists coming down the side of me, and slowing down, but not stopping at the 
roundabout ‘cause there’s nothing coming, and turning off. Checking the traffic lights, make sure 
they’re still green, and checking to my left to see if they’re any cars coming down the slip road out of 
Russell Todd. There’s cars coming out of the road to my er right, so, slowing down slightly for them. 
Checking traffic lights are still green. Okay so checking my mirrors and indicating right. Checking the 
traffic lights, and slow down quite sharply ‐ squeaky brakes ‐ ‘cause traffic lights have turned red. 
Checking around, we’ll see whose on the roundabout, how busy it is. And traffic lights have turned 
green so, starting off again. Just checking to my right even though the traffic lights are red their side 
but it’s just liking force of habit, checking who’s going on what lane in roundabout and indicating left 
to come off. Checking the traffic lights are still green, and that no one’s crossing, making sure that 
this Nissan is not going to change its mind, and indicate right, slowing, going quite slow, braking to 
turn right, seeing how fast this lorry’s going ahead but, this car has stopped to let me out so thanking 
him, and indicating to my right to the university. Ah barriers up, which is always nice, hopefully it 
won’t erm charge me. Slowing down for the speed bump here, it’s quite harsh. 
 
ii)	Study	2	
 
Standard	drive	
Okay so there’s, there’s cars kind of in front of me, turning in. I’d be aware of whether they were 
turning off of that road or coming towards me ‐ and at what speed as well. Erm, I’m getting 
eventually when he pulls off, I’d be looking in the, erm, mirrors to see if there is anything coming 
294 
 
from behind. Any pedestrians or cyclists maybe coming around the outsides of the cars. There’s a 
pedestrian up ahead but they’re turning off onto the road from the side. There’s a car coming from 
the side of the road but it’s not coming towards me. And another one. And just keeping an eye out 
for anything else, but, because we’re not moving I wouldn’t be too worried. Okay, so there’s another 
car coming towards me, so I’d be aware of kind of where I am on the road, and where they are. And 
then I’d be checking in my er side mirror. Wing mirrors. And I’m coming ‘round, erm, it’s a kind of a 
bit of a blind corner there, so I’d be waiting out for cars making sure they, they can see me. Turning 
into the side road, so making sure there’s no traffic coming across me. Overtaking the cars that are 
parked on the left. So making sure there’s nothing erm ahead of me. Because there’s a lot of trees as 
well, make sure I can, I could see any pedestrians. Coming up to a ‘T’ junction, so slowing down, 
obviously checking left and right. So there’s a bit, a fair bit of traffic. Er across some traffic lights, 
which are green. There’s pedestrians on the other side of the road. Erm, I think there’s a, is that a 
lorry parked on the opposite side of the road, so there’s cars coming around it. So, there’s one 
coming towards me that’s not going to stop, so I’m slowing down, to let them past. There’s 
pedestrians next to me on the road. There’s more cars parked to the side of the road as well, 
although they’re in parking bays so it’s not an issue. More pedestrians and a petrol station mean 
that things could come out, a cars. A side roads. There’s no traffic really is, erm, traffic lights that are 
at red, so I’m slowing down – and stopping. That kid’s on his own, on his own, that’s not very good. 
Erm, just waiting for traffic and pedestrians. Being aware of the fact that clueless is a crossing, so 
people could be crossing at the same time, as when it’s green, but they’re not. So it goes green and I 
go. Go left. Er, there’s a car parked in front of me on the left, on my side of the road, so I’m checking 
to see whether anything coming towards me, and pulling out. And there’s quite a few so I’m staying 
kind of in the middle of the road. I would probably go a little bit faster than this guy is purely 
because it’s quite a long clear road, so you can see that nothing is coming at the moment. If there 
was a closer bend I would go a bit slower. Which is coming up but now the cars are. Oh it’s a ‘T’ 
junction not a bend. So there’s no cars parked there, so slowing down. Checking for traffic. I’d see if 
there’s anything coming my way, and then pulling out. And it’s, more parked cars on there, it’s quite 
a thin road, so I’d go a bit slower, and it’s quite a tight corner as well, so. Although it’s one way, so 
that’s okay. Er, coming up to another junction, and continuing on a one way road, so, there’s less to 
worry about. Cars on the left, making sure that there’s no one getting out of the cars, so there’s no 
doors opening, things like that. No one crossing or any animals coming out from underneath cars as 
well, like cats. Coming up to another junction. Checking for traffic. There’s. Oh no there was a car 
coming, so, not he didn’t pull out then. And another one. I’m pulling out. This one’s quite a busy 
road, so, I’m not going too fast. ‘Cause there’s no pathway or anything, so, straight on to a kind of 
like a bridge. Just taking it, quite. I’d take it quite slowly here ‘cause it’s not a very wide road. There’s 
quite a bit of traffic. Some houses on the left, I think. Erm, traffic lights. There’s someone at the 
traffic lights, and they’ve gone red, so I’m stopping. Can’t see the traffic lights now but, I once there 
be flashing orange I’d make sure no one was on the, crossing, before I started to pull off again. Nice 
bit of a wider road now, so probably could do a little bit safer. There’s people on bikes and things but 
there on the other side of the road. There’s a car parked on the left, but again it’s on the path, so it’s 
not really a hazard. Just kind of making a note of it. Just keep an eye across the road. There’s cars 
pulling out from the junction in front of me on the left. Erm, and that’s because the traffic lights are 
red, but they’ve just turned green, so, would slow down a bit but not much. And turn in to the 
junction. Another quite tight road, so, slowing down a little bit. Quite tight bends with cars coming, 
with car, erm, roads either side as well, so, anything could be coming out of those. A few blind 
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corners. There’s no paths, so if there are any pedestrians, I’d have to kind of go ‘round them, so that 
would be aware of that as well. Wouldn’t go too fast around these corners. Is it another junction? He 
seems to be slowing down so I’m guessing he’s going to turn right. Checking to see if there are no 
pedestrians crossing the road. It’s as though it’s a school sign. Just being aware of small children 
running around, which there are on the right. There’s a car parked on the left, so, I’m looking ahead 
to see if there’s anything coming. There’s not, so I’m pulling out onto the other side of the road. And 
now there’s a car coming, so, get back onto my side of the road, and turn left. More cars parked on 
the left, so, again, there’s a car coming, so I am slowing down and stopping to let them past, until 
there’s enough room for me to go ‘round. There’s another car coming but it’s further away and not 
even turning down that road, so. Again, getting out the way of that car. Being aware of the 
pedestrians which are, are just crossing the road. Where there is no crossings as well so that’s a bit 
dangerous. Turn it ‘round. Again checking to see if there are any pedestrians because this is quite a 
built up area. Looks like a kind of estate, so there might be kids playing. Pulling out past the van. 
There’s lots of cars parked on both sides, so, being aware of that. And, pulling up apparently.  
More	complex	drive	
So, that’s kind of a blind summit of a hill, so wouldn’t go too fast over that. There’s a pedestrian in 
the middle of the road. Cars parked, kind of either side, so, making sure there’s nothing coming 
towards me from their side kind of pulling out. Erm, they’re quite wide roads, so, I reckon I could fit 
two cars down the middle even if you were – yeah they’re kind of bays, on the side, so, not too 
worried about having to slow down to pass those. Although, the layout of the road seems to change. 
So there’s a lot of cars parked and pedestrians ‐ it’s busy. So I’m keeping an eye out, for, all sorts 
really. And then the traffic lights have obviously gone red, and just turned green, so I’m slowing 
down, to allow the two cars in front of me to pass. This looks like a one way road, so, this is okay. 
Traffic lights, making sure they stay green. Pedestrians, on both sides of the road, and a cyclist. Keep, 
being aware of those. There’s cars, pulling out. There’s traffic lights. There’s cars parked. There’s lots 
of things to be aware of: roadworks and signs, and temporary traffic lights. Being aware of, kind of, 
cars passing me, and cars being parked on the left so I’m kind of having to pull out, here. So, I would 
have checked in my mirrors, to make sure, there’s nothings coming. There’s a zebra crossing, that no 
one’s waiting at. Erm, knowing that it’s twenty miles an hour down here, so, erm, taking my time. Ll, 
again, lot’s of cars parked on th, either sides , but, they’re in bays. There’s a bus, park, er, waiting to 
pull out by the looks of things. Erm, more traffic lights, oh lots of pedestrians, it’s roadworks going 
on. Passing on cars on the left that are parked in bays, that’s not a problem. Further roadworks and 
kind of, cones, and, barriers, so taking my time near those ‘cause they could have blown over at 
some point, or. That’s a hazard. Car in front of me is turning left, so I’m slowing down, particularly 
‘cause there’s pedestrians crossing. More traffic lights which are green. God, loads of more 
roadworks. Coming up to, another junction so slowing down ‘cause there’s quite a few cars in front 
of me. I am also kind of in the middle of the road here, so, I’d be checking I’m not in anyone’s way. 
Not that I could do anything about it if I was. Erm, coming up to traffic lights, but they’re green. 
Quite a lot of visual noise around here, loads of traffic lights and stuff. This is better. Onto a dual 
carriageway, no more parked cars either side, but, it looks like it’s quite busy, so, making sure that 
there’s no one too close behind me as I go into the left hand lane. Traffic lights are green, and 
coming up to a roundabout, so slowing down ‐ particularly because the traffic lights are red. Pulling 
off. Okay I, I’d check in my mirrors again just to make sure there’s no one kind of in the wrong lane 
trying to cut me up or anything. I’d speed up here so I could join the, whatever that is, dual 
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carriageway, at a decent speed, even though it’s thirty. Um just so that I didn’t cause any problems 
with cars either before or after me. And then join the dual carriageway. Erm, switch lanes, checking 
my mirrors. Okay, switching lanes again, so I’d be checking my mirrors. Keeping an eye on the traffic 
lights, see when they change, particularly ‘cause there’s a camera there. Um, yep, hoping that I’m in 
the right lane, ‘cause it’s busy. Following this ‘round. There’s another camera, so, checking the traffic 
lights again. That’s not worth the risk. And another camera. And more traffic lights. With pedestrians 
there as well, so it would be extra careful. Following it around, more traffic lights. Another 
pedestrian waiting. Probably keep an eye on that lorry as well, I don’t like passing lorries in roads 
this small. We’re going into the right hand lane. Checking the traffic lights are slowing down, ‘cause 
there’s traffic at the red traffic lights. Be checking that sign to make sure I’m on the right, erm, in the 
right lane and going in the right direction. Following it ‘round. Watching out for that bus and the 
lorry, and slowing down, but not much, ‘cause the lights going green. Switching lanes. Here, be in, 
okay. Then I’d be indicating. And, pulling off. The traffic lights are green, and no one waiting at them, 
but there’s someone’s stood there now. More parked cars and pedestrians. There’s a guy on the left, 
on the path. Traffic lights – one set are green, and one set are red, so, make sure I was going in the 
right direction. More traffic lights, of which at green. There’s cars around, there’s er, woah, there’s a 
van pulling out, only a little bit too far over to my side just in case I was, not in the middle of the 
road. There’s a lorry parked on the left, so I wouldn’t get too close to that. Probably try and get a 
happy medium between far enough away from the lorry but not in the, right hand lane. This guy 
looks like he just hasn’t caught up, alongside it. Ah, it’s a police car on the right. Erm, so that’s 
obviously why that Mercedes has pulled ‘round. Just rather be keeping an eye of where that was 
going to go, in my mirrors. Going around the road blockages. Erm, making sure there was no 
oncoming traffic. There’s more cars parked on the left. Erm, so, going ‘round those slowly. There’s 
traffic lights which are, which are red ‐ oh right okay so there’s a little green arrow. Erm, keep an eye 
out for further cars and pedestrians. There’s road blockages on the left, so, particularly as that’s a 
bus coming I’d be careful I wasn’t pulling out too far. With that cyclist as well going ‘round the 
parked cars. And, there’s traffic, so, slowing down. At this point, yeah, probably keep an eye out as 
to where that cyclist was going ‘cause I past it before. And now, yeah, letting it go in front of me 
because of the, traffic on the left. Okay, but because they can now safely go in the bus lane, I would, 
not overtake them, ‘cause there’s traffic lights which are red. This quite a tight road again, there’s 
cars parked on the other side and there’s lots of kind of big heavy vehicles going through, so I’d be 
aware of that. In terms of my erm placement of the car. Okay, past the traffic lights. There’s 
pedestrians at the crossing but the lights are green. But notice the police car, probably. Er, green 
traffic lights. Want to keep going around. Er have we checked, oh, there’s a pedestrian taking him 
time. Checking traffic lights again. Following this ‘round. So there’s cars parked on the right, it looks 
like quite a wide road. There’s a car coming towards me. Er, yeah, there’s enough space there. 
 
iii)	Study	3	
	
Alright, so I’m going to slow down a little bit for the traffic lights, but not too much because they’ve 
just turned to green, so, hoping I won’t have to use my brakes. It’s quite busy because all the 
students are back, and, however, the lights are green, so, it’s very unlikely that anyone will be 
crossing the road. Looking at a car to my left, just making sure that they don’t pull out. I can see a 
cyclist through the er back window of the car ahead, erm, they’re not going to go across, that’s okay. 
There’s people on the path, but there not of any concern really. Nowhere near the road. Traffic 
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lights up ahead, and there’s people waiting either side, so they’re likely to change, but, they haven’t, 
so that’s good, oh, just got through them. And then a red light up ahead, so I’m slowing down. 
Checking my rear view mirror to make sure anyone who’s behind me is slowing down as well. I can’t 
see the traffic lights, so, I’m going to have to rely on the vehicles ahead of me. And there’s a vehicle 
coming up behind on the left. I’m just making sure I’ve left them enough space. Okay, so, vehicles 
ahead of me moving forwards. Keeping an eye on the traffic lights, make sure they stay green. 
Jumping through that one. Okay. Again, just keeping an eye on the two sets of traffic lights ahead. 
Checking in my right, rear view, er right, wing mirror, as two lanes merge into one. So I’m just 
making sure no one’s trying to overtake. Keeping an eye out for, cyclists on the road, as there’s no 
cycle path. Lots of pedestrians on the pathway. There’s more traffic lights coming up ahead, and 
they’re green at the moment, and it doesn’t, there’s nobody on the crossing, so. Okay, slowing down 
‘cause the car ahead of me is braking. Coming up to a roundabout. There’s a learner coming ‘round. 
There’s another car, however, in need of indicating to come around in front of me, going. Indicating 
to turn off the roundabout. There’s traffic lights up ahead, so I’m Just making sure that, they’re 
staying green at the moment, and also keeping an eye on the vehicles, a couple of cars ahead of the 
one in front of me. Just to kind of pre‐empt any stops. I’m slowing down, and checking, right, to see 
if there are any oncoming vehicles, which there aren’t, so I’ll go. And indicating to go off the 
roundabout. Just checking the car to the right of me. Think that’s doing. Again traffic lights ahead, 
but they’re really green. There’s a car to my left about to pull out. Just checking in my rear view 
mirror, see if there’s anything behind. There’s no traffic behind at all, as the, lights have just gone 
red, so. Nice and clear, green lights at the crossing. Again, just slowing down a little bit, ‘cause 
there’s a roundabout coming up. And although the car hasn’t braked in front of me yet, it, likely to 
soon. Slowing down considerably, as it’s a bit of a blind corner ‘til now. And this is, there’s no cars 
around, so, crossing the roundabout. Checking that site entrance to make sure there’s no cars 
coming out of it. And indicating to come off the roundabout. Checking my rear view mirror, still no 
one behind. And checking my speed dial as well. And I know there’s another roundabout coming up 
soon, so I’m just kind of monitoring, the distance between my car and the car in front. Okay, so, 
veering slightly to the right, going to the right hand lane, and slowing down. As the car in front of me 
is also slowing down. It’s a busier roundabout, so, kind of turn, almost stop. There’s a car coming. I 
can get out before it. Okay, following this car around, keeping to the right. Checking my left wing 
mirror, to make sure there’s no traffic coming. And signalling to come off the roundabout. Checking 
my speed dial. And checking both sides of the road because that was a cycle crossing. There’s a car 
on my right, but it won’t pull out because there’s traffic on, the right hand side of the road, at the 
moment. Okay I’m slowing because there are traffic lights ahead, and the vehicles ahead of me are 
slowing down and braking. Slowing to a stop and checking my rear view mirror as well ‘cause there’s 
now a car behind me, which is going into the right hand lane. The car in front of me is indicating left, 
which means I’ll probably take off slightly slower. So I’ll bear that in mind when I, pull away as well. 
Okay, the lights have gone green. So I’ll give the Land Rover in front a bit more space, ‘cause he’ll be 
slowing down to turn. There’s a pedestrian about to cross the road, but it’s my right of way. 
Checking my speed dial. And again, keeping an eye out for pedestrians and cyclists ‐ we’re entering a 
village ‐ and there’s a cycle path on the left. There’s pedestrians around, and there’s also vehicles 
parked on the left, so, I’m making sure there’s no oncoming traffic that could potentially cause a 
hazard, create a hazard. Bike, er, the bus in front is braking. There’s a mini roundabout, and I’m 
making sure there’s nothing coming on the right, from the roundabout, so we can go straight over. 
Speed bump. Okay, it’s quite busy by the bus stop, and the bus is going to stop there as well, to pick 
up the, er, people. So, I’m slowing down, and I can see a truck, or a, a van coming, on the right hand 
side. I’m gonna indicate right, and wait for this vehicle to pass. And then, overtake the bus. Probably 
accelerating slightly quicker than I normally would because there was a car a fair distance away. 
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Checking the pedestrians on my left. Slowing down for the speed bumps. Checking my rearview 
mirror, make sure there’s nothing going on behind. There’s some pedestrians on the sidewalk, and 
they’re crossing each other, so, slow down a little bit. Okay, traffic lights are green. Okay, checking 
on the right, the mini roundabout, there’s nothing there. Checking my speed dial. There’s a cyclist, 
he’s on the other side of the road. There’s cars parked, however they’re set back from the road, so, 
it’s not too much of a hazard. There’s three pedestrians walking abreast on the path. Keeping my eye 
on the speedometer. Here there’s more cars parked on the side of the road this time so having to go 
around them. There’s an oncoming bus but I’ve got time to go around them. Also there’s no cars 
behind me so I didn’t indicate to go around them. Okay, so I’m slowing for the mini roundabout. 
There’s nothing coming from the right, so I’m turning. There’s a cyclist coming up ahead. Just 
checking in my rear view mirror again. It’s a bit of a blind corner, so, I’m going slightly slower. And 
this car’s parked on the side, so, that’ll mean I’ll go a bit slower as well. Okay. It’s a nice open road. 
Nice and quiet down here. Again, checking my rear view mirror. Again it’s gone up to a national 
speed limit, however, there are some, real blind corners, so, take my time ‘round here. I got lost 
‘round here last week, I’ve just recognised that. It’s quite a blind corner, I guess, I’m just taking it a 
bit slower. And w,will checking my rear view mirror to make sure there’s no one behind me. A bit of 
a blind hill as well, so taking care for potential cyclists. And braking around another blind corner, and 
another. There’s also some kind of, debris on the road, so that’s making me go a little bit slower as 
well, just because of the skid risk. And, there’s a construction site entrance sign, so, taking care, part 
that entrance. And there’s an oncoming car, so I’m slowing down a little bit as it’s on a corner. And 
slowing down again due to the blind corner. Bit bright, so I’ll put the sun visor down, might 
compromise my vision. Here’s another car coming, although it’s nice wide stretch of road. It’s 
another tight corner ‘cause there’s a sign, saying so, so I’m not going to go too fast around this one. 
It’s mad that this is a, national speed limit zone. Slow around another corner, and, accelerating a bit 
‘cause we’re on a straight. I am slowing down again for another corner, this one’s quite a tight one 
as well. The weather is obviously making this a little bit harder as well ‘cause we’ve got some really 
bright patches of sunshine which are, causing some glare for the windscreen. Okay so make sure 
there’s no oncoming traffic. There’s a car coming out of the right, but it was slowing down, as it’s 
quite a er a narrow road, so, wasn’t enough space for the two of us. There’s a pedestrian in the road, 
ah, but he’s on the right, so, we’ll, drive past slowest in case there’s any oncoming traffic which I 
cannot see, because of the blind dip. So, I’ll go a bit slower, but there’s nothing coming. Okay, it’s a 
bit of a blind corner here. The roads are much more narrow, so, I’ve got to go, much slower, and 
then, it opens up a bit. Yes, slowing down, just coming to a bit of a blind dip again. And, a very tight 
corner. Almost looks like a dead end it’s so tight. Okay, taking it really slow around the corner, just in 
case anything was coming. And again, got another, very tight corner coming up, with quite a lot of 
debris of, twigs and things in the road, so, I’ll take it nice and slowly. If a car was coming along, it 
would be pretty tight, so. There’s three pedestrians walking in the middle of the road, erm, so, 
hoping, yep, they’re go over to the right. Risky. Okay, there’s another blind corner, so, I’ll take this 
nice and slowly. And another one. Okay, it’s come here for a little while, for, another corner a few 
yards up ahead. Okay, then it opened out a little bit, so, go a tiny bit faster. Checking my speed dial 
to see how fast, and then slowing down again, it’s really another tight corner. Checking my rear view 
mirror to see if there’s any traffic behind, which there isn’t. I’m going slowly around, the corners up 
ahead. There’s no pedestrians at the moment. Oh, there’s one, and there’s dogs which are off of 
leads, so, gonna go quite slowly. They’ve got them to sit down, so, say thank you. And then a really 
tight corner, so I’m gonna go really slowly around here, as I have to come outwards a bit to have to 
turn the corner. I see some cars parked up ahead on the road, which makes it, a little more difficult. 
So before we go past them just making sure there’s nothing, coming, ahead of me ‐ which there 
isn’t. It’s a nice, straight, bridge, over the reservoir, so, go a little bit faster. And it’s a nice view. 
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Okay, so there’s a car parked on my side of the road, so I'm just gonna check my wing mirror to 
make sure there’s nothing coming behind me, if there was I would have signalled. Okay, so I’m 
making sure there’s nothing coming that way, or ahead of me, or behind me, so I can do my turn. 
And I’m checking the mirrors, just to make sure there’s nothing coming up that lane that I’m 
reversing into. And then, I’m coming, out, having turn ‘round. Okay, so, making sure there’s nothing 
coming the other way now, which there isn’t. Checking in my rear view mirror to make sure there’s 
no traffic behind me. And slowing down a little bit, just to make sure there’s no traffic coming 
towards me. Passing the parked cars on my right. And then slowing down considerably, for the tight 
corner over the bridge. At least I know there are some pedestrians on this road, so, I’ll be taking 
these corners, particularly slow, particularly as the dog, as the dogs are off the leads, so. Just in case 
they’re running in the road at all. Trying to keep, erm, a fair bit to the left, as it’s a very narrow road. 
Okay, so the pedestrians are crossing the road, so they’re on my right. Just, slowing down, ‘cause the 
dogs are running around. Being careful around these blind corners again. Checking my rear view 
mirror, just to make sure the pedestrians aren’t, huh, aren’t chasing me ‐ the dogs aren’t running up 
behind. And, try again, trying to just keep to the left, on the, corners, just in case there’s any 
oncoming traffic. I know there are some more pedestrians coming up, relatively soon, so, be 
keeping, being mindful of them. Particularly as they were walking in the middle of the road 
beforehand, so. Hopefully they’ll be able to hear my car first as they will be facing the other way. 
Okay, so another blind corner. I’m slowing down again, the road gets a little narrow. Okay, so there’s 
quite a few pedestrians in front, facing me. So he’s on my side so I’m gonna have to go off to the 
right making sure there’s no traffic coming towards me. And, the pedestrians have moved over to 
the left ‐ thank you. Okay, so I’ve safely crossed them, and then I’m moving back over to the, left 
hand side of the road, driving up to quite a tight corner. So, I’m slowing down considerably, and 
keeping as far to the left as I can. Oo, okay, and it’s clear for me for quite a while. Checking my rear 
view mirrors, make sure there’s nothing coming behind. There’s a gate on my right and left, just 
making sure there's nothing coming out of those. Okay, so there’s a blind, hill, coming up. So I’ll just 
slow, slow down slightly coming up to that. And then there’s a driveway, there’s nothing coming out 
of there. There’s some more house here, so I’m more aware of the fact that vehicles could come out 
of erm the driveways and any of these cars. Any of these driveways, yes, the cars will come out of 
the driveways. Okay so I’m slowing ‘cause we’re coming up to a junction. Oo, it’s a bit of a blind one. 
There’s nothing coming to my left, however there’s a car coming to my right, so, just double 
checking again, right and then left, and right before I go. Okay, I can see the change in speed limits, 
so, just checking my, speedometer. Make sure I don’t keep to the correct speed.  There’s an opening 
on my right, so making sure no vehicles coming from there. It’s there, checking my rearview mirror, 
have to make sure that nothings coming from behind, signalling, and turning left. Another quick 
check in my, wing mirror to make sure there’s no cyclists. Okay, so there are some cyclists in the 
road up ahead, riding, two or three abreast by the looks of things. So hopefully they will, move. It’s 
quite a wide road though, so, if there’s, there’s plenty of space. I’m slowing down nevertheless, 
because they’re never quite wide. Checking in my wing mirrors, there’s, a pedestrian coming out on 
my right. Slowing down, just to make sure there’s nothing coming up on my right hand side for the 
roundabout. And going straight over. There’s a pedestrian up ahead, he’s crossing the road, but, 
they’re way ahead, so, no need to slow down at this moment. Oh, is she stopping in the road. And 
there’s an oncoming van. Checking in my rear view mirror, there’s still no vehicles behind. There’s a 
junction on the left, from that road on the left, so making sure no one’s coming out of that. So a car 
coming out from the junction on the left, so just slowing down a little bit. Okay so they’re braking 
now, although not signalling, so, slow down a little bit for them. There’s cars parked on the left, 
although, that car was considerably on the kerb, so, wasn’t too much of a hazard. There’s several 
cars now parked on the left hand side of the road, so, I’m checking in my rear view mirror and my 
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right wing mirror to make sure there’s nothing oncoming. There’s a car coming towards me but the 
car I’m about to pass, on my left, is on the pavement, so it’s not too bad, however there are some 
parked cars on the left. Checking the rear view mirror, to make sure there’s no cars behind. Stopping 
at the junction ’cause there’s a car on my right and a pedestrian who’s a little behind me. Having a 
quick check to the left just to make sure no one’s on the wrong side of the road. Okay, checking my 
wing mirror and my rear view mirror again. Car ahead is braking and signalling right, but they would 
have turned by the time I get there. Oh, they’re doing er, not sure what they’re doing, stopping on 
the side. Checking, the, junction, and there’s a car on the right hand side, so the car, the oncoming 
car is slowing down to be passed. There’s a cat in the road, so, yeah okay, I, had that had been 
further in the road I would have probably slowed down, a lot more, considering, how spontaneous 
they can be. And it’s safely on the pathway. So car coming on my right. It’s quite, a little bit of a tight 
corner, I’m slowing down. There’s cars parked on my right, and there’s an oncoming car. So it’s my 
right of way, so we’ll see what, see what it does, and it’s not going to stop at all. Thank you very 
much, cheers. It’s my right of way. Er, there’s more cars parked on the right, and no oncoming 
traffic. Indicated. Check in my mirror. Lots of pedestrian on the road. Nothing coming from the right, 
so, signalling I’m turning, and, in my, left, wing mirror I’ve just seen there’s a car coming behind as 
well, so be mindful of that. Traffic lights are green. Cars parked on the left, however they are in bays, 
so, that’s not too much of a hazard, and there’s no oncoming traffic. Okay, so there’s a car behind 
me now. I’m just checking in my rear view mirror. The car ahead’s braking for the speed bumps, so 
I’m doing the same. Ensuring that I’m maintaining a safe distance away from the car in front, just in 
case, they brake suddenly, ‘cause we’re in quite a, a small little village. Then a speed bump, and 
there’s a bus wanting to pull out, so, I’ll stop and let them go. So I’m flashing to let them go. There’s 
cars parked on the right hand side which is what they’re, passing. And there’s a car behind passing. 
Just thanking that Audi for waiting. There’s a car behind. Okay, so it’s quite a narrow road here, so 
I’m taking it quite slowly. And reading the signs about oncoming vehicles in the middle of the road. 
And it’s a bit of a blind corner, so, another car coming, so I’m just going to pull over to the left to 
make sure they’ve got space. There’s two cars coming. Oh my goodness, it’s a really narrow bridge. 
Okay then I take it quite slowly. And there’s nothing. Oh I can see cars in the, reflection, so, I’ll take it 
slowly I’m right over the bridge. Check in my rear view mirror, to make sure there’s nothing, no 
traffic behind. Okay, so I’m slowing down, checking in my rear view mirror, for cars behind, and 
turning. That’s fourth gear not second. It’s a, tight corner, but a, wide road, so, not slowing down too 
much, and coming onto the dual carriageway, so braking a little bit. There’s a car coming. And 
signalling to join the dual carriageway. Checking in my wing mirror and rear, rear view mirror, to, 
make sure cars around me are being safe as well. Checking my speedometer. And coming up to a 
roundabout, so, not braking just yet. Just took my foot off the accelerator, and now I’m braking. 
There’s a little bit of, a queue on the roundabout, so, I’ll brake a little bit prematurely, although if the 
cars have gone now, so, just slowing down a little bit. Okay, braking, looking ahead to see if there’s 
any, cars coming from the right. Slowing down, just double‐checking, and, crossing the roundabout. 
Checking in my, wing mirror, to make sure there’s no, outside traffic. Checking my speedometer. 
And, coming up quite close to the car in front, so just going to overtake them. Signalling. Checking 
my wing mirror. Overtaking this car. There’s a car parked in a layby, so I’m just keeping an eye on it, 
to make sure it’s not gonna pull out. Checking my wing, er rear view mirrors, to make sure I’ve left 
enough distance to get back into the left hand lane. And, checking my wing mirror on the right, just 
to keep an eye on the traffic that’s passing me. Checking my speed dial, and looking in the rear view 
mirror as well, just to check the cars behind. Okay, so I’m getting a bit close to the car off in front, 
however there’s a car, coming up on my right, so just slowing down a little bit, and then signalling to 
overtake the car in front of me – whose turning left anyway. So, I’ll wait for him to turn and then 
signal to go into the left hand lane again. So I‘m checking in my rear view mirror, there’s a car 
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coming from the junction on the left, off the slip road, so, I won’t signal just yet. Just making sure in 
my rear view mirror they’ve got enough space, and signalling to go back into the left hand lane. 
Okay, so it’s fifty miles an hour now, so I’m just checking that I’ve slowed down to the correct speed. 
And got signs for the roundabout coming up ahead, so, just being aware of the traffic and the 
junction as well. Checking my rear view mirror, before I slow down. And heading for the, left hand 
lane. Checking to my right, to see what’s coming from, that side of the roundabout. And there’s 
traffic coming from the right, so, I’ve just stopped. And there’s nothing coming, so, crossing the 
roundabout, and signalling left to turn off. Again, checking my rear view mirror, and, left, wing 
mirror, to make sure I’m not gonna hit anything. 
	
